At a time when many had hoped the Middle East might regain some measure of relative calm after a long wave of conflagration that began with the Gaza war and extended to the current US-Israeli war against Iran, the region quickly returned to the cycle of tension once again. Its people had barely caught their breath before they found themselves facing another wave of escalation, one that left the entire region holding its breath in anticipation of where the renewed confrontation between Tehran and “Tel Aviv” might lead.
The region, which for years lived to the rhythm of relative calm broken only by geographically and politically limited skirmishes, has shifted into a broad arena for struggles over influence, settling scores, and the overlap of international and regional agendas. The Middle East now faces a troubling triangle: a war that no one wants in an all-out form, a settlement for which no one possesses the conditions to bring to fruition, and open-ended escalation managed under temporary ceilings, yet always liable to spiral out of control at any moment.
Thus, the current war has entrenched a new model of regional disarray, with the region oscillating between the possibilities of full-scale confrontation, intermittent negotiations, and a policy of “strike for strike” as a strategy of temporary escalation. The danger of this model lies in the fact that it keeps the Middle East perched atop a permanent volcano of anxiety and tension, making stability nothing more than a deferred idea.
The latest escalation between Iran and “Israel” clearly reveals the fragility of the “containment” equation that some regional and international parties tried to uphold in recent years. That equation is no longer as solid as it once was, nor is it still capable of regulating the rhythm of the conflict or preventing its expansion. Indeed, the repeated strikes and counterstrikes, and the widening scope of military messaging, confirm that the region has effectively entered a more dangerous phase, one in which wars are not decided, settlements do not mature, and escalation is reproduced as a permanent condition.
The Middle East and the gray zone
In most conflict zones and crisis theaters, the options usually hang between two main paths: either the continuation of war or the achievement of final settlements, or at the very least keeping tensions within intermittent limits that surface from time to time at wide intervals. But the current war has reshaped this binary in the Middle East and pushed the region beyond the equation of war or settlement.
The entire region is now moving within a vast gray space. The parties to the conflict are not capable of deciding the scene through a direct, all-out war, given its enormous political, military, and economic costs. Nor does a comprehensive settlement appear near or easily attainable, as the issues have grown more intertwined and complex. Between these two limits, a third strategy has emerged based on limited escalation as the least costly option in the short term, even if it carries an extremely dangerous price in the long term.
Under this strategy, Iran, “Israel”, and the United States each seek to improve their negotiating positions and gain additional points at the bargaining table through calculated, high-impact strikes from time to time. The target bank is also being expanded to include sites and tools that are less costly and easier to hit, allowing each side to send its messages without fully sliding into all-out war.
The danger of this pattern, however, lies in the fact that each side believes it can contain escalation at a certain ceiling and use its military and political capabilities to achieve its goals without crossing red lines. But repeated experience in the Middle East shows that limited escalation does not always remain limited, and that a calculated strike may open the door to an uncalculated response, or to a miscalculation that pushes the entire region onto a more explosive path.
Based on this approach, the Middle East remains perched atop a volcano of permanent tension: continuous anxiety, confusion across the board, cautious calm if it occurs at all, and costly anticipation of any new wave of escalation. In this way, the region is gradually losing one of its most important strategic advantages: its ability to generate a degree of relative stability that for years gave it regional and international weight and standing.
Today, however, that stability has become threatened by the overlap of agendas, the struggle for influence, and the transformation of the region into an open arena for exchanging messages and blows. Instead of being a center of major balances, the region appears to be sliding into a prolonged swamp of temporary escalation, where no war is decided, no settlement matures, and no calm takes hold, shifting from resolving the crisis to merely managing it.
Why has resolving the Iranian file become so difficult?
If the chances of resolving the Iranian file before the outbreak of war ranged from moderate to weak, today they appear closer to impossible, at least in their final and comprehensive form. The latest confrontation has deepened the crisis of trust between Tehran and Washington and pushed the Iranians to further doubt the usefulness of negotiating with the American side, something clearly reflected in the hardening of Iran’s position and its adherence to its core conditions and approaches.
The issue of enriched uranium and the nuclear project remains at the heart of the dispute between the two sides as the most prominent obstacle to any potential settlement. Washington seeks to strip Tehran of any capability that could one day lead it to possess a nuclear weapon, or to approach high levels of enrichment that would give it that possibility. Iran, by contrast, views its nuclear program as a matter tied to national security, sovereignty, and the state’s right to possess the tools of power, not merely a negotiating card open to total concession.
But the crisis is no longer confined to uranium or centrifuges. Tehran now reads US pressure through a much broader lens and sees the real objective as extending beyond restricting its nuclear program to an attempt to strip it of its broader sources of power. From the Iranian point of view, this process begins with the nuclear file, then extends to curbing its regional influence in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Gaza, ultimately reaching the point of resizing its role in the region in a way that serves “Israel”i interests and gives Tel Aviv greater room to dominate the regional landscape.
From here emerges the central question that has become strongly present in the Iranian approach: Does the United States really want only to restrict Iran’s nuclear program, or is it seeking to redraw Iran’s entire place within the region? This question in particular is what makes a settlement more complicated than before. Iran no longer treats US demands as merely technical nuclear conditions, but as an entry point for reengineering the balance of power in the Middle East.
Therefore, the more Washington expands its demands, the more convinced Tehran becomes that negotiations are no longer just about preventing a nuclear weapon, but about the future of Iran’s role itself.
Beyond the nuclear framework
The crisis between Tehran on one side and Washington and Tel Aviv on the other has moved beyond the traditional framework of the nuclear program, even though that file remained for decades the most prominent title of the dispute and a main source of inflaming tensions. But the conflict has expanded, and new factors have entered it, widening its scope and making any attempt at a settlement more complicated and intertwined.
The first factor is the direct military dimension. The confrontation between the two sides has moved from the realm of undeclared operations and shadow wars to a more visible and public level through direct strikes and battles that have crossed many traditional red lines. Nor is the battlefield any longer confined to Iran and “Israel” alone; it has expanded to touch neighboring countries and areas, foremost among them the Gulf, making the conflict geographically broader and more difficult to contain or to control the paths of de-escalation within it.
The second factor concerns Iran’s allies and proxies in the region, foremost among them Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iraqi factions. These are no longer merely support tools or secondary pressure cards, but have become principal parties in the conflict equation. This was evident in Tehran’s insistence that any future agreement, including a nuclear deal, must take into account the position and interests of its allies.
That was reflected in its condition that the war in Lebanon be halted for negotiations with the United States to continue, and then in its latest escalation against “Israel” in response to the targeting of Beirut’s southern suburbs, based on the logic of the “unity of fronts,” which has evolved from a political slogan into a core pillar of Iran’s military and negotiating doctrine.
Maritime corridors and energy security, especially the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, constitute a third circle that has helped pull the crisis out of its narrow nuclear confines. Any escalation with Iran no longer remains limited to Tehran or “Tel Aviv”, but quickly extends its impact to global markets, shipping traffic, energy prices, and the calculations of Gulf states. This makes dealing with the crisis more sensitive, because its costs do not stop with the direct parties, but affect the international economy, supply chains, and energy balances.
The domestic front among the parties to the conflict also poses an additional dilemma for any potential agreement. Public sentiment in Tehran, Tel Aviv, and Washington has become more hard-line, and each side views the other through the lens of demonization and deep rejection, not through the lens of a political rivalry open to settlement.
Therefore, any agreement must take domestic calculations into account, because making broad concessions could become a burden on the regime or government that signs it, especially if the agreement appears to be a retreat before an adversary popularly viewed as a direct threat.
In this sense, the Iranian crisis is no longer a crisis concerning centrifuges and enrichment levels alone. It has become a complex crisis touching the balance of power in the region, Israel’s security, Iran’s influence, Gulf calculations, energy interests, and the domestic mood of the parties in conflict. That is precisely what makes a settlement harder than before, because resolving the nuclear file alone is no longer sufficient to close the doors to escalation.
“Israel” at the heart of the equation
In previous rounds, especially during the course of the 2015 agreement, “Israel” was treated to a large extent as an external party watching the negotiations from afar, even as it exerted influential pressure on the American negotiator. Today, however, the equation has clearly changed. “Tel Aviv” is no longer merely an anxious observer or a pressure-wielding party outside the room, but has become a direct player in the course of the crisis, with real influence over the limits of any potential agreement between Washington and Tehran.
Israel’s involvement is driven by a set of main objectives, foremost among them obstructing any agreement that does not meet its security interests or align with the ceiling of its ambitions regarding Iran. It also seeks to raise the military and political cost for Tehran and push Washington toward a stricter and more durable agreement, one that does not merely place temporary limits on the nuclear program, but eliminates Iran’s future ability to approach the nuclear threshold or use its regional cards to threaten “Israel”i security.
Under this approach, the Israeli entity does not view negotiations with Iran solely through the nuclear file, or even through ballistic missiles despite their importance. Rather, it treats the crisis as a comprehensive power equation. For Tel Aviv, the issue includes the nuclear program, missiles, the network of allies, regional influence, maritime and logistical corridors, and everything that gives Iran the ability to exert influence and pressure within the region.
Accordingly, Israel’s broader objective is not limited to preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, but extends to curbing its regional influence, reducing its presence in theaters of confrontation, and stripping it of the sources of power that allow it to accumulate deterrence or impose costs on “Israel” and its allies.
In this context, “Israel”’s latest escalation with Tehran, particularly through targeting the southern suburbs card, can be read as an attempt to pressure the negotiating track with Washington, and perhaps to obstruct it or disrupt its timing. Netanyahu’s government appeared to be betting on one of two paths: either monopolizing the Lebanese arena to achieve gains that compensate for part of its political and military losses, or provoking Tehran and pushing it toward a broad response that would reignite the confrontation, thereby slowing negotiations or temporarily derailing them.
Here the danger of Israel’s new role becomes clear. “Tel Aviv” is no longer content with influencing the terms of an agreement from the outside, but has become capable of using military escalation itself as a negotiating tool, or as a means of imposing facts on the ground that reorder the priorities of Washington and Tehran. This makes any potential settlement more fragile, because its fate no longer depends only on what happens at the negotiating table, but also on what unfolds across the open fronts of confrontation.
Has a comprehensive agreement become more difficult than before?
In light of the above, reaching a comprehensive agreement between Tehran and Washington has become extremely difficult. Indeed, even approaching the threshold of the 2015 agreement itself has become more like a distant dream. More than a decade ago, the negotiating equation was built on a relatively simpler formula: restrictions on the nuclear program in exchange for lifting or easing sanctions.
Today, however, the nature of that equation has changed completely, and the ceiling of demands has risen to include more complex and intertwined files, from the nuclear program to ballistic missiles, from the network of regional allies to the security of maritime corridors, and all the way to guarantees against repeated attacks or withdrawal from any future understanding.
Taken together, these files require massive concessions from both Tehran and Washington, something that appears extremely difficult given each side’s adherence to its own approach. Iran sees broad concessions on its cards of strength as meaning a reduction of its regional standing and the stripping away of its deterrent tools, while the United States, along with “Israel”, sees any agreement that does not restrict these cards as an incomplete and temporary agreement that could reproduce the crisis after only a few years.
The core dilemma lies in the fact that each side wants an agreement tailored to its own specifications and conditions. Tehran wants an agreement that lifts sanctions while preserving for it a minimum level of capability and influence, while Washington wants an agreement stricter than the 2015 deal, especially since that agreement was turned in the political discourse of Donald Trump’s administration into a political nightmare and a negotiating specter after it was repeatedly described as a bad and humiliating deal.
As a result, it is no longer possible for that administration to return to a similar formula or anything less, because that would appear to be a retreat from a political ceiling it had itself previously raised.
In sum, the Middle East appears headed toward a new phase of sitting atop a permanent volcano of tension and anxiety. The region is gradually giving up the luxury of stability and the advantage of relative calm, while remaining trapped in a troubling triangle: war, settlement, and open-ended escalation. With each side possessing tools capable of derailing any agreement or blowing up any negotiating track, the coming phase looks more sensitive and dangerous.
The dilemma is no longer only whether the war continues or ends, but in the persistence of partial, limited, and capped escalation as a permanent condition. This type of escalation may appear manageable in the moment, but over time it accumulates politically, militarily, and psychologically until it turns into a broad explosion that could redraw the map of the entire region.