هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
The port of Iskenderun witnessed at the end of September 1950 a farewell unlike the usual family send-offs. Ships were preparing to carry Turkish soldiers to Korea, in the Far East, where a distant war had broken out under the banner of the United Nations.
Korea lay outside the maps through which Ankara was accustomed to reading danger, far from Anatolia, the straits, and the eastern and western borders. But politics narrowed that distance, making the war there part of Türkiye’s security calculations.
At the time, Türkiye was leaving the neutrality of World War II behind and entering a new world whose contours were taking shape rapidly: the Soviet Union was pressuring the straits, Western Europe was seeking security under the American umbrella, and the Atlantic alliance, founded in 1949, was drawing the lines of alignment in the Cold War. That is why sending Turkish soldiers to Korea carried a meaning greater than military participation under the UN flag. Ankara wanted to place itself at the heart of the Western equation and prove to Atlantic capitals that it was ready to bear the cost of its geographic and political position.
And less than two years later Türkiye joined NATO. Since then, its relationship with the alliance has shifted as the meaning of security itself has changed. In the 1950s, security was tied to deterring the Soviets; after the end of the Cold War, it became a search for a new role within a changing international order.
After the Sept. 11 attacks, terrorism and the Middle East moved to the forefront, and with Russia’s war on Ukraine, the Black Sea returned to the top of Europe’s concerns. Across this long span, Türkiye has remained a member unlike any other within the alliance, by virtue of its geography, its military, and borders open to more than one crisis.
That is why the upcoming NATO summit, scheduled to be held in Ankara on July 7 and 8 appears to be an important moment in the alliance’s history as it arrives in the Turkish capital reassessing the meaning of its power, the limits of its commitment, and the map of its threats. Ankara, meanwhile, is receiving it from a very different position than the one it occupied more than seven decades ago. The country that sent its soldiers to Korea to gain entry into NATO is now hosting the summit while seeking to help define the alliance’s risks and direction.
A weighty moment
The Ankara summit comes one year after the The Hague summit, where allies raised the defense spending target to 5 percent of GDP by 2035, including 3.5 percent for direct military spending and 1.5 percent for broader investments in infrastructure, resilience, industry, and cybersecurity. The decision amounted to an acknowledgment that the 2 percent formula that had accompanied NATO for years was no longer sufficient for a world in which warfare is changing rapidly, and in which the idea of deterrence has expanded from the number of soldiers and tanks to ports, railways, ammunition depots, production lines, energy, and communications networks.
From this angle, the Ankara summit looks more like a testing ground than another occasion for issuing promises. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, the alliance has accumulated many pledges, only to run up against the reality that Western financial abundance does not automatically translate into an abundance of weapons and ammunition.
The war revealed that defense production lines need more time than the rhythms of politics allow, and that modern warfare has returned drones, air defense, and electronic warfare to the center of the scene, while also making the targeting of ports, power stations, and infrastructure part of the war itself.
This time, the alliance is likely to find itself facing the test of turning money into actual capability. What is required is for this spending to become a tangible effort that serves the alliance in every possible way, rather than stopping at speeches and official statements.
In that sense, the summit’s importance for its members stems from their search for a clearer way to connect political resources with military capability, and long-term commitments with the fronts’ need for rapid readiness.
For Türkiye, meanwhile, this debate opens an important window through which it sees that countries’ contributions within the alliance are not measured by percentages alone, but by location, military strength, field experience, defense industry, and the ability to manage complex crises on the edges of Europe, the Middle East, and the Black Sea.
Türkiye therefore wants to present itself as a country that adds geographic depth, operational experience, and flexibility in environments that many European capitals do not know from the inside.
The Trump shadow
This time, the summit enters under Donald Trump’s shadow more than his ceremonial presence. His return to the White House has revived an old anxiety within NATO, but in a clearer and less diplomatic tone: Washington wants its allies to pay more and to turn defense promises into money, weapons, and ready armies, after decades in which the United States bore the largest share of the cost of Western security.
That makes the summit as much an internal test as a message to adversaries. The alliance will try to display unity in the face of Russia and other issues, but the harder debate will be among the allies themselves over burden-sharing and over who has the capacity to produce, endure, and take risks.
– Trump revealed from the White House that Erdogan had been on the verge of joining the war on Iran’s side, after saying he was not a supporter of the occupation, before Trump personally asked him to stay out of the confrontation.
– Trump announced his intention to attend the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7 and 8, 2026, stressing that his participation comes out of respect for Erdogan, while… pic.twitter.com/B5xwiuJ91M
— نون بوست (@NoonPost) June 25, 2026
For Türkiye, this shift opens the door to both opportunity and caution. It can present itself as an ally with practical weight: a large army, a sensitive position on the Black Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East, and a rising defense industry. But it also knows that any confused American retrenchment could leave a security vacuum on Europe’s borders and in Türkiye’s neighborhood.
It will therefore defend the preservation of the Atlantic bond while at the same time asking the alliance to recognize its particular burdens, from refugees, borders, and terrorism to managing the difficult balance in the Black Sea.
The southern front
Türkiye does not hide its desire to broaden the map of discussion during the summit to include the southern front. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, the eastern front has received most of the attention within the alliance, which is understandable from the standpoint of European fears of Russia. Ankara, however, views Atlantic security through a broader map, one that begins with the Black Sea and does not end with Syria, Iraq, Iran, the eastern Mediterranean, Gaza, Lebanon, the Red Sea, and energy corridors.
Ankara looks at the south from a proximity most European capitals do not possess. In Syria, it has borders exposed to terrorism, refugees, and shifting balances of power. Lebanon is close to the eastern Mediterranean and to energy and shipping routes. Gaza has become a political and moral wound weighing on Türkiye’s relationship with both the West and “Israel.”
From within this circle, Türkiye sees the region’s crises as not stopping at their own maps, but extending into the alliance’s security through borders, ports, energy, bases, and waves of displacement.
The war with Iran has given this debate additional weight. NATO has grown used to viewing the Middle East through the lenses of terrorism, migration, and security partnerships, but it now finds itself confronting instability that touches the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, energy chains, and air and missile defense.
NATO Secretary-General: “Türkiye is of enormous importance, with more than 3,000 companies, and it represents an excellent model in organizing industrial defense.” pic.twitter.com/2otrcUvfCN
— نون بوست (@NoonPost) May 22, 2026
Energy and weapons
Gas lines, ports, and railways have become part of the Atlantic security equation. Every crisis in Türkiye’s neighborhood quickly turns into a question of an alternative route, a secure pipeline, a port capable of operating, or a corridor not disrupted by war. After the Russia-Ukraine war, Europe’s need for routes that reduce its dependence on traditional pathways increased, bringing Turkish geography back to the fore between the Caucasus and the eastern Mediterranean, and between the Caspian Sea and the Middle Corridor linking China and Europe.
From this perspective, Ankara wants its location to be read as a practical capability for the alliance, and as a corridor that can ease the pressure of crises when energy and trade routes in the Gulf, the Red Sea, or the Black Sea are disrupted.
Ankara is also seeking to add another card to this geography: the defense industry. Drones, smart munitions, warships, armored vehicles, communications systems, and air defense have all become part of Türkiye’s external presence and of its narrative of self-reliance.
Türkiye is therefore likely to try at the summit to link its location with its factories, and the debate over defense spending with supply chains inside NATO, calling for broader space for its companies and for easing the political restrictions that hindered defense cooperation with it in earlier stages.
– Reuters revealed that US President Donald Trump’s administration plans to move forward with the sale of dozens of aircraft engines to Türkiye in a deal worth more than $700 million despite objections within Congress.
– The deal aims to supply the Turkish KAAN fighter jet with engines produced by General Electric, while Ankara seeks to strengthen… pic.twitter.com/etwQ4ijtEj
— نون بوست (@NoonPost) June 25, 2026
Ankara’s weight
The summit carries more than one Turkish message in multiple directions, and the files of defense, aircraft, industrial restrictions, and Syria appear strongly present, especially with a US administration that approaches Atlantic commitments in the language of interests and cost. Ankara must remind European countries that the continent’s security does not pass through the eastern front alone, and that reducing dependence on the United States requires dealing with Türkiye as a security actor present in defense, energy, migration, counterterrorism, and the reconstruction of Ukraine and Syria.
The accumulated indicators reflect Türkiye’s rise as a pivotal player within NATO, drawing on its military weight and the expansion of its defense industries. Could it lead NATO if Washington withdraws? pic.twitter.com/wI0HnCIRv8
— نون بوست (@NoonPost) April 11, 2026
Moscow, meanwhile, will read Türkiye’s hosting of the summit as a signal that Ankara’s open channels with the Kremlin do not negate its Atlantic position, even as they reveal the room for maneuver Türkiye is trying to preserve between belonging to the alliance and maintaining relative independence in managing its relations. In the Middle East, meanwhile, Ankara wants to cement its presence in the files of Syria, Gaza, Lebanon, the eastern Mediterranean, and Iran, as a country living in direct contact with crises and paying the cost of their repercussions.
Türkiye today appears to occupy a position that gives it greater weight than it had in earlier stages. A turbulent world stretching from Ukraine to Iran raises the value of countries situated at geographic crossroads, and an alliance searching for spending, production, and readiness needs partners that possess a military, an industry, and field experience.