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In mid-June 2026, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister and leader of the right-wing Likud party, stood before the cameras at a televised news conference in occupied Jerusalem and was asked whether he intended to run in the next legislative elections for the Knesset, He replied that he would run and intended to win.
Netanyahu, who has led the longest period of rule in Israel’s history, wants to cement himself as the central candidate of the right at a moment when the Gaza, Lebanon and Iran files are piling up, the crisis over drafting the Haredim (ultra-Orthodox Jews) is weighing on him, and his relationship with US President Donald Trump is factoring into his image among his electoral base.
The equation of power in Israel begins with the number 61, because the Knesset has 120 members, and forming a government requires a majority capable of securing recommendations and then surviving in parliament under a proportional electoral system based on party lists, with an electoral threshold of 3.25% of the vote.
From this perspective, the question of the next election, due to be held no later than Oct. 27, 2026, with the possibility of being brought forward if procedures to dissolve parliament are completed, goes beyond Netanyahu himself to his ability to turn Likud and its partners into a governing bloc.
That comes in the face of rivals who, in many polls, command a broader numerical space, but are divided among an anti-Netanyahu right, a secular center, a Zionist left, and Arab parties that could offer outside support while at the same time triggering lines of rejection within the camp opposed to him.
The map of Israel’s electoral camps
Netanyahu’s camp: clearer allies, narrower path
Netanyahu operates within a clear right-wing religious bloc, with Likud at its center as the largest party and the prime minister’s political vehicle.
Likud won 32 seats in the 2022 election, while 2026 polls place it in the range of 24 to 30 seats a margin that keeps it at the top of the party field in most scenarios, but leaves it needing almost every partner on its path to a majority.
That is why Netanyahu is treating the election as a battle over Likud votes and a parallel battle over keeping his allies above the electoral threshold, because any failure by a small party on the right could turn his lead into a number incapable of governing.
Alongside Netanyahu stands Aryeh Deri, leader of the Sephardi Haredi party Shas, as one of his most steadfast allies. In the polls, the party usually moves around 8 to 10 seats, drawing its weight from its Mizrahi religious base and from its ability to tie its support for the government to funding for religious institutions and to a law protecting yeshiva students from military service.
That position makes the party part of Netanyahu’s hard base, while at the same time a constant source of pressure on him, because any right-wing government that needs Shas votes will find itself required to offer a formula acceptable to the Haredim on the conscription issue.
United Torah Judaism, or UTJ, occupies the position of the Ashkenazi Haredi ally within the same camp. It is led by figures such as Yitzhak Goldknopf and Moshe Gafni, usually polls in the range of 7 to 9 seats, and shares with Shas its opposition to drafting the Haredim into military service.
For these parties, conscription is tied to a social structure, religious institutions, budgets and schools. That gives Netanyahu an almost guaranteed base, while at the same time placing him before mounting tension with secular voters and parties that raise the slogan of “equality” in bearing the burden of military service.
On the most hardline wing of this camp stands Itamar Ben-Gvir, the national security minister and leader of the far-right Jewish Power party, as the representative of a current pushing for an aggressive military policy in Gaza and inside the occupied Palestinian interior.
Ben-Gvir’s strength in the polls comes from rhetoric that rejects compromise and presents military solutions, making him a partner Netanyahu needs in parliamentary calculations and a burden on him when Washington, mediators, or commanders of the occupation army and its security services push toward de-escalation or a political arrangement.
The closer Netanyahu moves toward a formula that the hard-right public sees as a concession, the more Ben-Gvir becomes capable of threatening the camp’s cohesion from within.
Alongside him stands Bezalel Smotrich, the finance minister and leader of the Religious Zionism party, as the representative of the religious settler current that ties the government to West Bank issues, the budget, and what is called the “Jewish identity of the state.”
Smotrich poses a different kind of risk than Ben-Gvir. The latter appears stronger in popular support in some polls, while the Religious Zionism party at times comes close to the electoral threshold, making its fate a highly sensitive numerical factor.
The clarity of this camp is the source of its strength: its components know their leader and share a common vision of a right-wing religious government that rejects reliance on Arab parties and adopts a hardline security discourse.
But political clarity does not solve the problem of numbers. A general polling trend in Israel places Netanyahu’s camp between 49 and 56 seats, sometimes bringing it close to 60, without giving it stable footing above the decisive number.
Netanyahu’s rivals: broader numbers, harder coalition
By contrast, the front of Netanyahu’s rivals is taking shape as a broad political space that brings together disparate forces more than it embodies a single party or project.
The first of these figures is Naftali Bennett, the former Israeli prime minister and leader of an anti-Netanyahu right-wing current, who is trying to appeal to a conservative public that wants right-wing security leadership without being beholden to Ben-Gvir and Smotrich.
On April 26, 2026, announced Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, the former prime minister and leader of the centrist Yesh Atid party, the unification of their parties into a new electoral list called “Beyahad,” or “Together,” led by Bennett, in an attempt to combine an anti-Netanyahu right and a secular center in a single list.
Bennett gives the alliance right-wing cover, while Lapid gives it a civic and secular base. But the experience of the 2021 government, which relied on support from Ra’am (the United Arab List), remains a weapon used by the hard right to cast doubt among voters on Bennett’s ability to lead a purely right-wing camp.
Gadi Eisenkot, the former Israeli army chief of staff and leader of the Yashar party, gives Netanyahu’s rivals something they have lacked for years: a security alternative that appeals to voters who place military experience and wartime management above traditional partisan loyalty.
In a poll published by Israel’s public broadcaster Kan on May 20, 2026, and conducted by Kantar, the Yashar party won 16 seats, compared with 27 for Likud and 23 for the Bennett-Lapid alliance. The poll showed that Eisenkot was the most advanced opposition figure on the question of suitability for prime minister, receiving 35% compared with 42% for Netanyahu.
That makes him a rival to Netanyahu on the issue on which the latter built a large part of his political image: managing security, war and the relationship with the military establishment.
As for Avigdor Lieberman, the former defense minister and leader of the secular right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu party, he carries coalition weight that exceeds his size in polls, which usually place him around 8 to 10 seats.
Lieberman draws on a strong base among Russian speakers and on a secular public angered by Haredi privileges, and he rejects the participation of religious Jews and Arab parties in government.
That stance gives him a clear image among his voters, but turns him into a sticking point in any attempt to form an anti-Netanyahu government, because such a government may need either outside Arab support, an understanding with the Haredi parties, or both.
For his part, Benny Gantz, the former defense minister, former army chief of staff and leader of the National Unity party, enters the map from a weaker position than he held in previous cycles.
For years, Gantz was the face of a security-minded center capable of appealing to part of the Likud electorate, but his brief participation in Netanyahu’s government during the assault on Gaza weakened his image among opposition voters and opened the way for Eisenkot and Bennett to pull away part of his base.
Although 2026 polls usually place him in the range of 5 to 7 seats, his name remains present in scenarios involving a unity government or a centrist formula if other options falter.
Yair Golan, the former deputy chief of staff and leader of the Democrats party, represents the Zionist left wing most willing to cooperate with Arab parties.
His discourse combines a military background with civic demands related to “equality” and the separation of religion and state, giving him a numerically useful position for any anti-Netanyahu bloc, but making him difficult for sectors of the moderate right to accept.
That is why Golan appears as a necessary force in some opposition calculations, and as a political boundary that reminds Bennett and Lieberman how difficult it is to gather all of Netanyahu’s rivals into a single government.
Arab parties: outside the government, inside the equation
Arab parties remain outside the traditional Zionist classification, but they are at the heart of the calculations. Mansour Abbas, leader of Ra’am, or the United Arab List, represents the most pragmatic approach within Arab politics in Israel, focusing on budgets, services, housing and fighting crime in Arab society. He previously opened the door to Arab participation in an Israeli coalition in 2021.
By contrast, Ayman Odeh and Ahmad Tibi lead the Hadash-Ta’al list from a position more closely tied to Palestinian national discourse inside Israel, with potential readiness to provide conditional outside support that would prevent the return of the far right or secure civic and political gains.
As for Balad, associated with figures including Sami Abu Shehadeh, it adopts the discourse of “a state for all its citizens” and rejects support for Zionist coalitions. Some polls place it under pressure from the threshold.
From this perspective, Arab parties derive their weight from two positions at once: their unity increases their ability to influence, while their division could waste votes needed by Netanyahu’s rivals to reach a majority.
Their outside support could therefore open the road to 61 seats, but it runs into red lines for Ben-Gvir, Smotrich and Lieberman.
Arab parties also place Bennett before a difficult test between his desire to bring down Netanyahu and his determination not to appear as a right-wing leader dependent on them.
The issues shaping the ballot box
After mapping the parties, the most important question remains: What could push voters to hold their ground or change it?
In Israeli elections, votes do not usually move according to party loyalty alone. The assault on Gaza, security in the north, escalation with Iran, and the crisis over drafting the Haredim all enter the ballot box this time as a test of Netanyahu, his allies and his rivals alike.
The election battle therefore looks like a mix of seat-counting and the public’s assessment of how the internal and external fronts have been managed since the Al-Aqsa Flood operation on Oct. 7.
In Gaza, is betting Netanyahu is betting on presenting himself as the leader who closed one of the most sensitive files in Israeli society after the release of Israeli captives was completed and the remains of the last detainee were recovered.
At the same time, his rivals are using the length of the war, the scale of attrition, and the continuation of operations in the Strip to pose a different question about the price Israel has paid and the occupation government’s ability to turn the end of the file into political stability.
This shift changes the place of the hard right within the campaign. Pressure is no longer centered on an open captives deal, but on the shape of Gaza after the agreement, the fate of Hamas, the limits of withdrawal from the Strip, the scale of Israeli military control, and the nature of any civilian or security administration for the besieged territory.
Here, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich are pressing for the continuation of the security grip and rejecting any formula that gives Hamas or the mediators the appearance of an achievement, while Netanyahu is trying to keep himself in the position of the security leader capable of combining the closure of the captives file with continued military and political pressure.
In the north, the Lebanon front presents another test of the occupation government’s image. The exchange of fire with Hezbollah and the displacement of tens of thousands of residents of northern towns have turned the question of security into a daily experience for a public part of which had been counted on the right.
The return of settlers, the protection of occupied towns, and the restoration of deterrence thus become electoral themes that can be used against the occupation government if northern settlers feel its security promises have not been translated into reality.
This gives figures such as Eisenkot and Gantz an opportunity to appeal to a public that wants security leadership with military experience, while at the same time giving Netanyahu a chance to defend his record as a leader who confronted multiple fronts.
Iran adds a regional and international dimension to the election. Escalation with Tehran in April 2026 gave Likud a temporary boost in some polls, lifting it into the 27-30 seat range, but the subsequent US-Iran understanding, and the tension that accompanied it between Netanyahu and Washington, reopened the question of his ability to secure American cover for the occupation’s wars.
Within the Israeli right, represents the relationship with Trump represents an important asset in Netanyahu’s rhetoric, so any sign of disagreement with the US administration becomes campaign material his rivals use to cast doubt on his ability to secure long-term international cover.
Domestically, the Haredi conscription crisis appears to be the issue most capable of blowing up alliances. Since the expiration of broad legal exemptions for yeshiva students, the Supreme Court, the army and the secular street have been pushing for greater equality in service.
The Israel Democracy Institute noted that of 19,000 Haredi draftees called up in 2025, fewer than 1.2% — just 232 people — responded, a figure that gives Lieberman and the secular parties strong material against Shas and United Torah Judaism.
Here Netanyahu finds himself caught between his Haredi allies, who demand a law protecting their public, secular voters increasingly angered by the distribution of the burdens of war, and an opposition able to turn the issue into a question of fairness in service and the limits of religious parties’ influence in the state.
The numbers and the scenarios
Recent opinion polls present a fluid map, but one that draws a clear general trend: Netanyahu’s camp moves in most polls between 49 and 56 seats, reaching the edge of 60 in some cases, while it rarely appears above the 61-seat threshold.
By contrast, his rivals’ camp moves between 58 and 67 seats when Arab parties are counted, giving it a numerical advantage in some scenarios without providing it with a ready-made governing formula.
The gap between the two numbers captures the essence of the coming election: Netanyahu may have the clearer camp, while his rivals have the broader space but one that is much harder to assemble.
A poll by Kan in May 2026 showed Likud winning 27 seats, the Bennett-Lapid alliance 23, and Eisenkot’s party reaching 16, while Netanyahu’s camp stood at 53 seats compared with 67 for the anti-Netanyahu camp when Arab parties were included.
That poll clarifies Eisenkot’s position as a rising factor, while at the same time showing that Likud’s remaining a large party does not mean Netanyahu can form a government.
By contrast, a poll published by i24NEWS on May 19, 2026, and conducted by Direct Polls, showed a 60-60 tie between the two camps, with Likud remaining the largest party on 30 seats, the Bennett-Lapid alliance falling to 15 seats, and the rise of the Yashar party led by Gadi Eisenkot to 17 seats. That reveals how quickly the map can shift when the security mood changes or when centrist and right-wing votes are distributed across different lists.
These numbers give the first scenario — Netanyahu’s return — a clear but narrow path. The Israeli prime minister needs to combine Likud with Shas, United Torah Judaism, Jewish Power and Religious Zionism to reach 61 seats; every small right-wing party must cross the threshold; and the conscription crisis must remain under control until the government is formed.
The strength of this scenario lies in the cohesion of the allies and the clarity of the leader, but its weakness lies in the fact that the fall of Smotrich or the dissipation of small right-wing votes could deprive the camp of seats it cannot easily replace.
The second scenario is a government of Netanyahu’s rivals. It would require bringing together Bennett, Lapid, Eisenkot, Lieberman, Gantz and Golan, with direct or outside Arab support, or a right-wing defection that compensates for the need for Arab backing.
Numerically, this possibility appears in polls that give the anti-Netanyahu camp a majority when Arab parties are counted, but politics makes the road full of obstacles: Lieberman rejects Arabs and the Haredim, Bennett is wary of Arab reliance within the government, Golan is more willing to cooperate with Arabs, while Arab parties need a clear political and civic price in order to grant their support.
The third scenario is political deadlock, which emerges when Netanyahu remains below 61 seats and his rivals fail to turn their numbers into a coalition. In that case, Israel could return to an experience similar to the 2019-2021 rounds, when personal and ideological disputes led to repeated elections.
That path could push toward a unity government, pressure within Likud to look for another figure, or additional elections. But any split within Likud would require a major political shock, because the party still revolves around Netanyahu as its most prominent leader and natural candidate.
In that sense, Benjamin Netanyahu enters the election as the candidate of a camp that is clearer than that of his rivals, but he enters it without a guaranteed road to 61 seats.
His rivals, meanwhile, enter the race with broader numbers in many polls, but run up against the difficulty of bringing Bennett, Lieberman, Golan and the Arab parties together in a single formula.
Between these two paths, the electoral threshold, Arab votes, the conscription law, and the outcomes in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran will determine whether the election produces a new government or another round of deadlock.