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What is happening in the West Bank is no longer merely settler expansion that can be measured by the number of outposts or the kilometers of land seized. It is now imposing a new reality. The movement of settlement outposts into areas classified as B reveals that the lines drawn by the Oslo Accords now exist only on paper, while a different map is taking shape on the ground one built on roads linking settlements to one another, checkpoints isolating Palestinian communities, and spaces that are gradually narrowing for Palestinian expansion.
This is pushing the Palestinian presence more and more into crowded, fragmented zones, while the wider areas are being managed according to an accelerated settler-colonial logic. This reality is not only changing the shape of the land; it is also affecting the rhythm of daily life itself. A road that was once an ordinary detail in a Palestinian’s life has become a space suspended in uncertainty, between a sudden checkpoint, an emergency closure, and an attack that could happen at any moment.
In this context, NoonPost spoke with Khalil Shaheen, director of research and policy at the Palestinian Center for Policy Research and Strategic Studies, Masarat, as well as a political researcher and analyst, to examine the profound transformations taking place in the West Bank from the expansion of the settlement project and the reengineering of Palestinian geography to the unraveling of patterns of movement and daily life under the weight of a reality changing at a rapid pace.
What does the shift of the settlement project from Area C to Area B under Oslo mean, and what does it reveal about a change in Israel’s strategy of control?
In reality, Israeli governing institutions and strategies have undergone fundamental shifts, especially since this ruling coalition came to power at the end of 2022. Previous Israeli governments, particularly those led by the Labor Party, had adopted a strategy based on the principle of “separation” between Palestinians and Israelis.
At the time, settlement projects were concentrated in what were known as security or economic settlement projects, and largely stayed away from areas with dense Palestinian populations, whether in cities or the villages surrounding them. They were focused mainly along the Green Line, meaning western parts of the West Bank, and in the Jordan Valley, which Israel has long viewed as part of its future expansionist project.
But the scene changed radically with the rise of religious Zionism to the center of decision-making. This current no longer embraces the logic of separation; it has moved to a more comprehensive and aggressive logic based on intensifying the settlement offensive on the edges of areas with dense Palestinian populations. This approach stems from an ideology that considers the West Bank — or what is called “Judea and Samaria” — an integral part of Israel, from north to south.
That means the project is no longer merely about managing the conflict, but about a complete remaking of geography on the basis of annexation.
This approach was clearly reflected in what Bezalel Smotrich proposed under what is known as the “Decisive Plan,” which is based on annexing the entire West Bank and imposing a new reality on Palestinians, one that forces them to choose between emigration, living in a state of permanent subjugation, or facing death at the hands of Israelis.
This strategic shift, alongside the rise of the exterminatory dimension in Israeli policy, especially in the Gaza Strip, marked a dangerous turning point. The goal is no longer limited to emptying Area C, which makes up more than 60 percent of the West Bank, but has gradually extended toward Area A.
If Area A accounts for no more than 18 percent of the West Bank, compared with 61 percent for Area C and about 21 to 22 percent for Area B, then this reality reveals that the space left to Palestinians is shrinking rapidly, to the point that their presence is being confined to narrow geographic enclaves.
At the same time, voices inside Israel have grown louder in calling for the demolition of homes classified as “unlicensed” or “in violation,” and even those near settlement outposts, including inside Area A, which is under Palestinian control. This reflects a clear shift from a policy of containment to one of spatial confinement, reducing Palestinian space to the bare minimum.
What has taken place recently in terms of demolitions, road construction, and the reshaping of demographic features in the northern West Bank — including Jenin refugee camp, Tulkarm refugee camp, and Nur Shams refugee camp, all of which lie in Area A — reveals that Israel has effectively moved beyond the boundaries of the divisions established by the Oslo Accords.
This means Israel no longer views Areas B and C as separate spheres, but as a single geographic arena for reengineering control not only militarily, as was previously the case, but also in terms of sovereignty, demography, and economics, through imposing control over the land and the resources above and below it.
Ultimately, the intensification of settlement outpost construction inside Area B, alongside expanded intervention in Area A, reveals a systematic policy aimed at confining Palestinians to narrow, fragmented geographic enclaves, redrawing the actual map of the West Bank on foundations that serve the Israeli annexation project.
To what extent does the reality on the ground in the West Bank reflect an actual bypassing of the Oslo Accords through policies of separation, siege, and the reshaping of Palestinian geography?
In practical terms, it can be said that the Oslo Accords have been overtaken for a long time, not only under any particular government but especially since the collapse of the Camp David negotiations. It is worth noting here that the Camp David talks marked an important turning point in the course of the political process.
If we go back to the first intifada, Ariel Sharon tried, in that context, to implement an Israeli policy that overlaps in some respects with what is happening today, especially in terms of separating Palestinian cities from one another and separating cities from their rural surroundings, along with imposing sieges and curfews for long periods across different areas.
This effectively weakened the central role of the Palestinian city and its relationship with its rural surroundings in other words, it reduced the urban role within the West Bank by imposing a reality of repeated and prolonged siege.
Today, a similar pattern can be observed, but one that is harsher and more intense, with the noose tightening further around Area A while efforts are underway to effectively separate it from Area B. This is accompanied by an expansion of Israel’s powers regarding oversight of Palestinian construction, including home demolitions, road building, and the reshaping of spatial structures, ultimately leading to a reengineering of Palestinian space in a more fragmented and controlled form.
How is this reality affecting Palestinians’ ability to expand urban development and plan for their future?
In general, building powers in Area B are no longer in Palestinian hands as they were previously supposed to be. Israel has effectively stripped away licensing powers, especially in the heart of Hebron, including the Old City and the areas surrounding the Ibrahimi Mosque, where these powers have not been in the hands of Hebron Municipality for a long time, and Palestinian local councils no longer exercise them effectively in many parts of Area B.
This reality points to the existence of an integrated system of Israeli laws and procedures in the West Bank, especially in Areas B and C, that effectively strips the Palestinian Authority of its powers regarding oversight of construction and Palestinian urban expansion. This system also works to prevent Palestinians from meeting their urban development needs, whether in residential construction or in developing infrastructure such as roads, transportation networks, and communications.
This is accompanied by a clear policy in the telecommunications sector, as Israeli communications networks are being developed inside these areas, including fourth- and fifth-generation services, 4G and 5G, while Palestinians are denied these modern technologies and their services are often restricted to the third-generation, 3G, range.
Restrictions are also imposed on Palestinian telecommunications companies, including preventing them from erecting signal towers outside the classified areas, which helps entrench a clear disparity in digital infrastructure.
The practical result is to confine Palestinians’ ability to develop urban areas and infrastructure to limited, fragmented spaces.
This approach is not limited to official measures alone; it also extends to unofficial institutions and bodies operating within a settlement-supportive environment. Among these structures are those tied to institutional settlement activity that has been developed and strengthened within Israeli government circles, including those linked to the Israeli Ministry of War, specifically within frameworks backed by Bezalel Smotrich, who has played a pivotal role in restructuring some of the Civil Administration’s tools related to settlement and expanding their activity.
To what extent have roads and daily life in the West Bank shifted from spontaneity to movement governed by security calculations and daily risks, and what effect has that had on the sense of normal life?
The transformation of the road in the West Bank is tied to a radical change in the function of movement itself. Travel is no longer a natural or guaranteed act; it has become conditional movement subject to a system of restrictions, surveillance, and recurring risks, turning roads from mere transit routes into spaces of control and security domination.
This reality is deepened by the intensification of field restrictions, whether through the spread of checkpoints or through gates closed at the entrances to Palestinian villages, making daily movement subject to sudden schedules and closures and turning the road into an unstable, risk-governed space.
This reality is also reflected in restricted access to land and areas surrounding roads, as the route of the road cannot be separated from the system of control over the land itself, making daily movement tied to the ability to access basic resources.
Daily life is no longer based on spontaneity or certainty; it is now governed by the logic of “pre-calculating every movement,” where even the simplest daily act from commuting to reaching work or land is conditioned by procedures and the possibility of denial or closure at any moment, weakening the general sense that a stable, normal life is possible.
These transformations are accompanied by escalating settler attacks carried out within a context of organization, armament, and support, including cases in which there appears to be an overlap between military and civilian roles, reflecting an interlocking structure of control on the ground.
How has settlement changed the relationship between cities and villages in the West Bank, so that geographic proximity no longer guarantees easy access or continued contact between them?
In practical terms, one of the declared goals of what is happening in the northern West Bank, in Jenin and Tulkarm, is to reshape Palestinian demography. The matter is not limited to what has happened, or is still ongoing, in the displacement of more than 42,000 Palestinians from these camps; it extends to other areas such as Tubas, Tammun, and others, where these areas are effectively being separated from the northern West Bank, especially from the eastern Jordan Valley.
This pattern is repeated in other areas, especially in the southern West Bank, particularly in Masafer Yatta. What we are witnessing in the West Bank is a comprehensive process of reshaping Palestinian demography, in line with what was mentioned earlier about confining the dense Palestinian presence within Area A.
In practical terms, this means that the process of annexation and the emptying out of vast areas of the West Bank amounting to about 79 percent of its area is proceeding full speed ahead and has been for some time, at an accelerated pace.
It is no longer possible to imagine that this reality could provide a supportive environment for establishing an independent, geographically contiguous Palestinian state, because what is happening is far deeper than is often imagined, especially in the absence of effective Palestinian policies whether at the official or national level, or even at the level of civil society capable of confronting or thwarting these plans.
As a result, the process of internal forced displacement is accelerating in the West Bank, compounding the scale of the damage and greatly weakening any possibility of a political solution based on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
If we add to that the destruction and extermination taking place in the Gaza Strip, it becomes necessary to reflect on the scale and breadth of the settler-colonial project and its ability to carry out its goals on the ground.
How is this gradual transformation in the West Bank happening without a political declaration, so that facts on the ground determine reality rather than agreements or laws?
Yes, this is a fundamental point. Israel, especially the ruling current that is now moving at an accelerated pace to implement its policies, does not operate through passing or temporary steps, but through imposing facts on the ground designed to be irreversible. In the view of this current, as well as Netanyahu, entrenching these realities on the ground is the most effective way to shut the door on any return to a negotiating track under the formulas previously proposed, and thus destroy any future political opportunity to revive negotiations.
The basic idea here is that the reality on the ground must precede politics and law, and become the decisive factor that reshapes the landscape, so that agreements and legal frameworks retreat before the new realities imposed by force.
This is not an entirely new development, but rather an extension of an old trajectory that was evident even during periods when negotiations were underway, whether before 2000 or after. At that stage, some countries, foremost among them the United States, began to advance the idea that any political solution must take into account the “facts on the ground.” These facts are imposed by Israel through the force of arms and through settlement and gradual annexation.
This was clearly reflected in previous rounds of negotiations, when Israel insisted on cementing the issue of settlement blocs as a fait accompli that had to be accepted. Unfortunately, the Palestinian side engaged with this logic. At the time, the discussion was limited to four main settlement blocs, but Israel did not stop there. During those years, and even after the collapse of negotiations, it moved quickly to expand this reality and turn more settlements into larger, more interconnected settlement blocs.
This was done through a gradual policy that began with the establishment of small, scattered settlements, then the creation of new settlement outposts, before those outposts were later granted legal legitimacy and linked by networks of roads and infrastructure, effectively turning them into integrated, cohesive settlement blocs on the ground.
Herein lies the danger of the matter: The principle accepted by the US administration as sponsor of the negotiations, and accepted by European parties as well as the Palestinian Authority, was based on the possibility of annexing settlement blocs. Israel exploited this principle to the fullest extent by expanding the number of these blocs and turning more settlements and outposts into fixed realities, in order to impose a new negotiating equation that is difficult to reverse.
Today, some estimates indicate that there are more than 850,000 settlers in the West Bank. Estimates by the Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem, ARIJ, even suggest that the actual number may be higher than the figures officially announced. This does not merely produce an expanding settlement reality; it creates a distorted geographic and political structure.
It is neither the reality of one state, nor a binational state, nor a situation that allows for the establishment of an independent, geographically connected Palestinian state. Rather, it turns the West Bank into something like “Swiss cheese” a torn, fragmented geography that empties any future political project of its substance.
How does the overlap between the roles of settlers and the Israeli army in the West Bank help reinforce control over Area B and expand influence there?
There is nothing spontaneous in the West Bank, including settler attacks, as it is becoming increasingly clear that these are organized attacks within a systematic structure. We are facing groups of settlers operating within a framework of armament and organization that is being strengthened by escalating Israeli government support, to the point that some of them are soldiers by day in military uniform, then switch in the evening to civilian clothes to carry out attacks against Palestinians.
These attacks do not stop at the level of settler action alone; they often take place under direct protection, and sometimes with the participation of the occupation army in attacks targeting Palestinians, their property, and their land. This is accompanied by the growing infiltration of the nationalist Zionist right into the security and intelligence institutions, as well as into the Israeli army itself, deepening this overlap between the political, military, and field dimensions.
Military brigades are deployed mainly in the northern West Bank, and to a lesser degree in the center and south. Some of them have served in the Gaza Strip and are associated with a record of violations there. A large portion of their personnel and officers are settlers, or people who reside during their service inside settlements or alongside them, reinforcing a state of daily, direct overlap between soldiers and settlers within the same reality on the ground.
Accordingly, what the Israeli military establishment is doing including the Civil Administration, which has come under Smotrich’s control, along with the special units subordinate to Central Command is taking place within an integrated implementation system in which the roles of the army and settlers intersect on the ground.
Reports by Israeli institutions such as B’Tselem indicate that what is happening does not appear to be a series of isolated measures, but rather falls within a clear direction aimed at confining Palestinians inside the cities that is, in only about 18 percent of the West Bank’s area while controlling the rest of the surrounding geography.
From here, the path of de facto annexation is effectively being reinforced, even without an official declaration. In recent months, voices within Israeli political debate have suggested that the right’s chances in the next elections could improve if the government moves toward declaring formal annexation rather than merely continuing current policies.
The Israeli right is also debating the issue, with Ben-Gvir and Smotrich pushing for an annexation declaration before the elections, despite the tension that could cause with the US administration.
Even so, the option of formal annexation — whether of the West Bank as a whole or of Areas C and B — does not appear likely in the near term given the US position and Arab positions. But this scenario remains possible over the longer term, while in practice it is already taking shape on the ground through a creeping, gradual process of annexation.
How can the future of the West Bank be understood in light of this trajectory? Is it moving toward a permanent functional division or toward undeclared, gradual annexation that reshapes the geographic reality?
The most likely scenario, if this path of settlement expansion and the linking of settlement outposts through road networks and checkpoints continues, is the entrenchment of a reality of “unofficial annexation” that is, the consolidation of effective Israeli control over large parts of the West Bank, so that the space available to Palestinians shrinks into limited, fragmented zones.
But this scenario is not inevitable. The trajectory remains contingent on several factors, foremost among them Palestinians’ ability to impose countervailing facts on the ground that strengthen their steadfastness, especially in areas confronting settlement, above all East Jerusalem as well as Areas B and C.
This trajectory is also tied to shifts at the regional and international levels, and to the ability of Arab and European parties to move from political positions to actual pressure on Israel to stop this expansion and impose a cost on it.
Even so, even if there is a change in the Israeli government or Likud, or this government, falls in upcoming elections, that does not appear likely to produce a fundamental shift in current policies, because what is happening today is based on creating facts on the ground that are difficult to reverse, whether through negotiations or by any subsequent government. Removing these realities, foremost among them the settlements, has become nearly impossible politically and practically.
There is now almost no significant political force inside Israel that embraces the two-state solution, including the Democrats party, which is considered an extension of the Labor Party that signed the Oslo Accords with the Palestinian Authority. Even its leader, Golan, no longer speaks of a two-state solution, but rather of a formula of separation between Palestinians and Israelis, without a clear commitment to establishing an independent Palestinian state.
As for the rest of the Israeli parties whether Bennett, Yesh Atid (Lapid), or others they have in practice participated in expanding settlements in recent years, especially between 2020 and 2022, and rejected a return to a negotiating track with the Palestinian Authority. The meetings that preceded the formation of the current government with the Palestinian leadership were also mostly security-oriented, through institutions such as the Shin Bet or military figures such as Gantz.
Accordingly, reviving a political track based on the two-state solution appears very difficult at present, unless major changes occur in the international position, especially in US policy. But current indicators do not point to any real inclination to push this path forward or adopt it in a serious and binding way.