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It is revealed by the summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, in Ankara on July 7 and 8, 2026, just how significant Türkiye’s position within the alliance has become, as an Atlantic power standing at sensitive geographic and military crossroads.
Since joining in 1952, Türkiye has given NATO direct reach into the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Its importance then grew further with the war in Ukraine and the transformation of the Black Sea into an open arena of European security.
At this point, Ankara emerges as a central ally that is difficult to bypass in calculations of deterrence and force posture, as it controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, overlooks the maritime theater of confrontation with Russia, stands on the borders of Syria, Iraq and Iran, and links the alliance’s southern flank to crises Europe cannot keep outside its own security concerns.
This geography is translated into practical influence through clear tools. Türkiye activated the Montreux Convention after the Russian-Ukrainian war, restricting the passage of warships connected to the conflict, and it hosts key NATO infrastructure on its territory, while also fielding the alliance’s second-largest military manpower after the United States.
By this equation, Türkiye derives its weight from the combination of location, military, industry and consensus power within an alliance that needs it from the Black Sea to the Middle East, even as it manages contentious issues with Ankara in parts of the region.
A commanding geography that constrains NATO’s rivals and regulates the Mediterranean
Türkiye’s first source of value within NATO lies in its location. Its accession to the alliance alongside Greece expanded NATO’s presence into the Mediterranean and the Black Sea through the southeastern flank.
During the Cold War, Türkiye was a frontline state on the Soviet Union’s southern flank. Afterward, the importance of its location shifted to the Balkans, Iraq, Syria, terrorism, energy and the Black Sea.
From this perspective, Türkiye’s geographic role did not decline after the Cold War ended; rather, its theaters changed and its directions multiplied, with Ankara now standing at the convergence of the Black Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Levant.
In the Black Sea, Türkiye’s weight is tied to the Montreux Convention of 1936, which regulates the passage of ships through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. Commercial vessels enjoy freedom of passage, while warships are subject to special rules that differ between Black Sea littoral states and countries coming from outside the region.
After the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Ankara activated the convention’s provisions in a way that restricted the passage of warships linked to the conflict, turning the straits into a practical tool for managing Russian and Western naval presence in the Black Sea, making the sea itself part of NATO’s deterrence line.
NATO describes the reinforcement of its eastern flank as stretching from the Arctic to the Black Sea, placing the southeastern flank at the heart of the alliance’s defense calculations after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and then launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Türkiye is one of three NATO countries on the Black Sea, alongside Romania and Bulgaria, but it is the state that controls the straits. This equation gives Ankara a distinct maritime weight within the alliance because it links deterrence in the Black Sea with the ability to regulate the sea route to the Mediterranean.
In the eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea, Türkiye appears as part of the security of the alliance’s southern flank and as one side in one of the most sensitive disputes between two NATO members.
At sea as well, NATO carries out Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean, which includes maritime situational awareness, counterterrorism and capacity building. It also conducts activity in the Aegean related to migration and smuggling in coordination with the Turkish and Greek coast guards.
In 2020, the alliance established a military deconfliction mechanism between Türkiye and Greece, an institutional acknowledgment that tensions between Ankara and Athens require permanent NATO management. For that reason, the eastern Mediterranean factors into Türkiye’s weight within NATO through two intertwined gateways: maritime geography and the management of disputes within the southern flank.
To the south and east, Türkiye lives the southern flank’s issues on its own daily borders. NATO links its security to terrorism and instability in the Middle East and Africa, and it recalls defensive measures it previously took in Türkiye’s favor during the Iraq crises.
This explains part of the difference between Ankara’s priorities and those of several European capitals. Türkiye places Syria, Iraq, terrorism, migration and security vacuums within its immediate security, while Europe has focused more heavily on Russia since the war in Ukraine.
This divergence has created many frictions within the alliance, but it has also made Türkiye the NATO state that translates Middle Eastern crises into security debates inside NATO.
This map is underpinned by NATO infrastructure on Turkish soil. In Izmir is the alliance’s Land Command, established in 2012 and headquartered in Türkiye.
In Kurecik, in Malatya province, there is a US early-warning radar within NATO’s ballistic missile defense system, linked to the alliance’s early-warning architecture.
Also, Incirlik Air Base is an important forward site in NATO’s southern region for protecting alliance interests and supporting forces and partners. Ankara also hosts the Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism.
Since around 2016, Türkiye’s relationship with NATO has entered a more complicated phase because of its purchase of the Russian S-400 system, its removal from the F-35 program, its dispute with Washington over Syria, and then its use of the consensus mechanism in the matter of Finland and Sweden’s accession.
But these complications have not touched the foundation of the relationship in place since 1952: Türkiye needs the NATO umbrella and its place within the Western security architecture, and the alliance needs Türkiye’s position in the Black Sea, the Middle East and the Mediterranean.
That is why the 2026 Ankara summit carries special symbolism. It is the second NATO summit hosted by Türkiye after Istanbul in 2004, and it comes at a time when Türkiye’s geographic position has become even more prominent because of the war in Ukraine and tensions in the Middle East.
Hard power makes Türkiye the alliance’s second-heaviest weight
Within NATO, Türkiye possesses a military mass that is difficult to ignore. According to official NATO data for 2025, the number of Turkish military personnel stands at 494,500, making it the second-largest military manpower among alliance members after the United States.
The same data estimates Ankara’s defense spending for 2025 at about $22.181 billion, or 2.33 percent of GDP according to NATO methodology, with 31.20 percent of spending allocated to equipment.
These figures give Ankara standing on two benchmarks NATO has pressed its members to raise since the war in Ukraine: the level of spending and the share of equipment in defense budgets.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, which specializes in military spending and arms transfers, offers another reading of the rise in Turkish spending.
In its report on global military spending in 2025, the institute estimated Turkish military expenditure at about $30 billion, up 7.2 percent from 2024 and 94 percent from 2016.
The report noted that a significant part of this increase is tied to investment in the domestic defense industry, and that allocations from the special fund supporting the defense industry accounted for 22 percent of Türkiye’s total military spending in 2025.
Ankara distributes its strength across land, sea and air. On land, the size of its forces and its long borders give it accumulated experience in conventional and unconventional military operations. At sea, the straits, the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean make it a constant player in navigation, maritime deterrence and mine-risk management.
In the air, the Turkish Air Force relies on US-made F-16 fighter jets as its backbone, alongside a US modernization track and domestic upgrades, while the gap in advanced fighter capability remains one of the consequences of Ankara’s removal from the F-35 program after the Russian S-400 crisis.
This picture places Türkiye in the position of a major military power within the alliance, but it also reveals continued dependence on Western arms and technology channels in the air domain.
Türkiye also participates in NATO’s operational structures beyond its borders. The alliance notes that the commander of the Kosovo Force, KFOR, since October 2025 has been Turkish, with a visible Turkish contribution to NATO forces and missions, especially in Kosovo.
In 2025, command of a NATO air staff element also passed to the Turkish side within the Allied Reaction Force structure. This presence gives Ankara a role in alliance operations in the Balkans and in air-readiness structures, making its military contribution broader than defending Turkish territory or hosting bases.
Türkiye’s defense industry has also become a core element of Ankara’s weight. Defense and aerospace exports reached about $10.05 billion in 2025, while the sector’s turnover hit $20 billion, with more than 3,500 companies and more than 100,000 employees, according to Türkiye’s Presidency of Defense Industries, or SSB.
In a NATO context pushing for increased production and munitions after the war in Ukraine, these figures give Türkiye the ability to present itself as a producing state, not merely a traditional consumer of Western arms.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute confirms this shift. In its report on the world’s 100 largest arms-producing and military services companies for 2024, five Turkish companies entered the list with combined arms revenues of $10.1 billion.
In terms of arms exports, Türkiye became the world’s 11th-largest arms exporter during the 2020-2024 period, with a 1.7 percent share of global exports, while its exports rose 103 percent compared with 2015-2019.
These figures place Türkiye as a rising arms exporter and explain why NATO treats its defense industry as part of its broader supply capacity, especially in munitions, drones, and land, naval and electronic systems.
Turkish products are expanding across multiple fields. In unmanned aircraft, the Presidency of Defense Industries says tactical, operational and strategic drone projects have been delivered and are in field use.
In advanced aviation, Ankara is advancing the KAAN national fighter project to meet the future needs of its air force, alongside the HURJET trainer and light attack aircraft.
In the naval field, Türkiye showcases the MILGEM national ship program, dedicated to building domestically produced naval vessels including corvettes and frigates, among them Istanbul-class frigates, alongside new submarine projects and the multipurpose amphibious assault ship.
On land, in air defense and in electronics, the ALTAY tank, wheeled armored vehicles, amphibious and unmanned vehicles, the SİPER long-range air defense system, the KORAL-2 electronic warfare system, early-warning radars, and communications and sensing systems all stand out.
On April 22, 2026, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte said in a speech at the technology base of ASELSAN, the defense electronics company, that what had happened in Türkiye’s defense industry amounted to a “revolution,” and he described Türkiye as a highly valuable ally.
Despite this rise, significant gaps remain in Turkish power. Integrated long-range air defense is still under construction through SİPER and the “Steel Dome” system, while US Patriot and Franco-Italian SAMP/T systems remain among the cooperation options.
The Turkish Air Force also continues to live with the consequences of the S-400 crisis and the F-35 exit, while F-16 and Eurofighter tracks have returned to the forefront. Engines and some sensitive components also remain points of dependence on the West.
For that reason, Türkiye’s military weight within NATO appears as a major and rising power, but one tied to a network of cooperation and mutual dependence in aviation, air defense and advanced technology.
Türkiye’s cards of power and influence inside NATO
Türkiye’s weight is converted into political influence through NATO’s consensus mechanism, as the alliance’s major decisions are issued after consultation and agreement among member states. This rule gives every member an institutional ability to influence outcomes, but it becomes more important when it concerns a country of Türkiye’s size and location.
Issues of enlargement, deterrence and armament do not pass within the alliance without Ankara’s approval, or that of any other member, and this became especially clear after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO and Türkiye tied its approval to addressing its security concerns related to terrorism and judicial and political cooperation.
At the Madrid summit in 2022, the NATO secretary-general signed a trilateral memorandum with Türkiye, Finland and Sweden to address what the alliance described as “Ankara’s legitimate security concerns.” Helsinki joined in April 2023, while Stockholm’s path was delayed until 2024 after lengthy negotiations.
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which Türkiye, the United States and the European Union classify as a terrorist organization, was at the heart of Türkiye’s demands, turning the enlargement file into a direct example of Ankara’s ability to move its domestic and border security concerns onto NATO’s decision-making table.
From here, the Syria file became a natural extension of the alliance’s counterterrorism test. Ankara considers the security of its southern border to be tied to the activity of the PKK and its Syrian extensions, while NATO places terrorism among the direct threats to the security of its member states.
The issue became even more sensitive because the United States and Western allies cooperated during the war against ISIS with the Syrian Democratic Forces militias, which Ankara views as linked to the PKK.
That is why the Syria dispute within NATO at the time appeared as a test of the allies’ ability to deal with Türkiye’s perception of threats on the alliance’s southern flank, especially when Ankara used its place within the consensus system to seek clearer commitments on combating the groups it classifies as terrorist.
Another test appears in Ukraine, Russia and the Black Sea. Ankara supported Kyiv militarily and politically in some respects, hosted mediation efforts, kept its lines open with Moscow, and refrained from joining European Union sanctions on the Kremlin.
On the ground, closing the straits to warships linked to the conflict, and forming a Black Sea mine countermeasures group with Romania and Bulgaria, turned Turkish geography into a practical instrument of influence.
This policy gives the alliance a decisive position in the Black Sea, while giving Ankara wider room for maneuver than most European allies in dealing with Russia.
In the eastern Mediterranean and with Greece, an internal test emerges between two NATO allies. Tensions between Ankara and Athens revolve around maritime boundaries and rights in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean, with all the implications that carries for resources, aviation and military activity.
Because both sides are NATO members, the dispute becomes an institutional matter affecting the security of the southern flank. The alliance has remained a platform for managing tensions through the 2020 deconfliction mechanism and its activity in the Aegean.
In this sense, the eastern Mediterranean falls within one of NATO’s most sensitive arenas because of the convergence of the sea, energy and military disputes between two alliance members.
As for armament, it reveals a sensitive side of Türkiye’s relationship with the West. The US Department of Defense said in 2019 that Türkiye’s continued participation in the F-35 program was not possible alongside the introduction of the Russian S-400 system, and Ankara was then removed from the program.
Military cooperation later returned through other channels, most notably the F-16 deal, which the US State Department included among examples of fiscal year 2024 sales at a value of $23 billion, as well as aerial munitions deals in 2025, followed by a 2026 notification to Congress regarding engines for the KAAN program.
This trajectory shows that tensions over armament did not stop mutual dependence, because Türkiye’s air and defense needs, and the West’s need to keep Ankara inside the NATO network, open new channels of cooperation whenever other channels become more complicated.
Days before the Ankara summit, Turkish rhetoric became clearer about the country’s place in European security. On June 29, 2026, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for a focus on the alliance’s unity and resilience, and asked for the lifting of defense trade restrictions on Türkiye and for deeper Turkish inclusion in Europe’s security.
The following day, Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler said that NATO is adapting to the new security landscape, stressing the need for the United States to remain within the alliance and for greater spending and production.
These statements come at a moment when the defense industry has become part of the center of NATO debate, as Ankara wants to turn its location, military and factories into a larger place within European security arrangements.
These files reveal the nature of Türkiye’s weight within NATO. NATO enlargement, counterterrorism, the Black Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, armament and European security initiatives all pass through direct Turkish interests.
That is why Ankara’s influence does not stem from its military size alone, but from its position at the intersection of decisions that require its approval while also needing its geographic, military and industrial capabilities.