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Ankara is preparing to host the NATO summit on July 7 and 8, at a moment that could make it one of the alliance’s most important summits in recent years. The meeting comes amid rising tensions between Trump and the Europeans, with his threats to abandon the alliance, and at a time when the Russia-Ukraine war is entering one of its most sensitive phases. Kyiv is awaiting more NATO support, while Moscow is watching the summit’s decisions and threatening to widen the war to countries that continue backing Zelenskyy.
For Türkiye, which appears to be an exception to the tensions between the United States and a number of NATO countries because of the good relationship between Trump and Erdogan, this will be the second time it has hosted an alliance summit, after the 2004 Istanbul summit. The final communiqué will not be the only focus of discussion; the accompanying “Defense Industries Forum” will take center stage after officials at Türkiye’s Presidency of Defense Industries described it as an opportunity for Ankara to prove its position as a “central node” in the European industrial supply chain.
Behind this diplomatic language lies an industrial reality built over two decades: a network of nearly 3,000 Turkish companies feeding four names that are constantly heard at international arms fairs: Aselsan, Baykar, Roketsan and TAI.
In the past, Turkish companies were often described behind the scenes of the arms industry as dependent appendages that imported from the West and reassembled locally. But the figures that have begun to emerge recently paint a different picture: in 2025 and 2026, Türkiye appeared to be gradually shifting from a party that consumed NATO supply chains to a major supplier within them.
The Eagleton bill that created a military monster
When Türkiye invaded Cyprus in mid-1974, it created a state of confusion in NATO’s domestic politics. Out of that confused moment, in which alliance countries did not know how to respond, Sen. Thomas Eagleton introduced Senate Bill 397 to block further military aid to Türkiye, a move President Ford initially opposed publicly, saying: “Instead of strengthening America’s ability to persuade the parties to resolve the conflict, the embargo would jeopardize our relations with our Turkish ally and weaken us in the vital eastern Mediterranean region.”
But Congress’ insistence brushed Ford’s words aside, and the Senate approved an amendment calling for a halt to arms sales and military aid to Türkiye unless the president could reach a diplomatic solution by Dec. 10, 1974. He indeed failed to do so, and the decision took effect on Feb. 5, 1975.
That crisis did not push Türkiye to leave NATO, but it changed how Turkish elites viewed the alliance. By the late 1960s and 1970s, Turkish debates over NATO membership included claims that the alliance increased Türkiye’s exposure to nuclear attack, while offering little in return except restricting its freedom of action in Cyprus, complicating disputes with Arab states and deepening Türkiye’s dependence on the West.
But withdrawal was costlier than enduring continued frustration. There was intelligence cooperation and protection from Soviet pressure, in addition to access to weapons, equipment and spare parts. So the relationship continued, defined by necessity, bargaining and resentment. But the lesson of the arms embargo was clear: Türkiye had to become a country with weight in military industries, one that enjoyed freedom in foreign policy and a strong position within the alliance.
In 2002, Türkiye’s defense sector was still in its infancy, comprising just 56 companies engaged in 62 projects, with reliance on foreign sources reached about 80%. Compared with the figures we see today, we are looking at a revolution in the very concept of Türkiye’s military industry. Data from the Defense Industries Presidency, or SSB, indicates that Türkiye’s military-industrial network has expanded to include more than 3,500 companies and more than 1,400 projects exporting to 185 different countries.
On the other hand, a report prepared by the British firm PricewaterhouseCoopers offers a figure close to estimates of the size of Türkiye’s military industry, indicating that there are 3,000 companies employing nearly 80,000 workers.
These figures reflect a massive leap in the sector; defense and aerospace exports rose from about $248 million in 2002 to $1.6 billion in 2013, then reached $7.2 billion in 2024. That figure also increased by 47% between June 2025 and May 2026, reaching $10.9 billion. Total sector revenues more than tripled over 10 years, rising from $1.1 billion in 2002 to $15.5 billion by the end of 2023, while the share of domestic production increased from 20% to 83% over the same period, with a plan to reach 85% by 2028.
The crown jewel of that leap is the SAHA Istanbul exhibition, which began a decade ago with just 27 members and has now become Europe’s largest defense industrial gathering, bringing together more than 1,300 companies at the exhibition — a showcase of Turkish prowess in military manufacturing.
Türkiye has become a powerhouse in military manufacturing, ranking 11th globally among the world’s largest arms exporters. That reality is underscored by the entry of five Turkish companies at once into the world’s top 100 arms companies, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, report, in which Aselsan ranks 47th with revenues of $3.47 billion, followed by TUSAS in 65th place, Baykar in 73rd, Roketsan in 87th, and MKE in 93rd, marking the company’s first appearance on the list.
The combined arms revenues of these five companies reached $10.1 billion, and we will examine in detail the four giants on which Türkiye’s arms industry rests.
The Four Industrial Giants
Aselsan was founded in 1975 to meet the Turkish military’s communications needs, and today it has become the most valuable company by market capitalization on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. As 2025 coincided with its golden jubilee, Aselsan posted revenues of about $4.1 billion, a 15% increase.
Behind those figures were the company’s exports, which surged 89% to reach $958 million, while the value of export contracts signed during 2025 exceeded $2 billion, and its backlog stood at $20.4 billion.
For NATO, Aselsan is an important partner. In January 2026, the company signed a framework agreement with the NATO Support and Procurement Agency to supply the alliance with IFF identification systems used in man-portable air defense systems. In addition, in May 2025 it was selected, alongside only four other companies, to participate in the design of the alliance’s future Ground-Based Air Defence, or GBAD, system.
The company also signed a contractworth $410 million to supply Poland with electronic warfare systems in December 2025, in the first deal of its kind with a member state of the alliance.
The ambition does not stop there. The company has moved beyond the Atlantic sphere to establish a subsidiary in South Africa to produce military electro-optical sensors.
On the other hand, the fate of Baykar Makina, an automotive parts manufacturer founded in 1984, was to transform at the start of the millennium into a drone developer. Its Bayraktar TB2 entered active service in 2014, and today Baykar has led the armed drone market for the third consecutive year after posting $2.2 billion in exports in 2025 out of total revenues of $2.5 billion. The significance of those figures is that 88 percent of the company’s income comes from abroad.
The company is currently bound by export agreements with 37 countries, including six NATO member states and four European Union countries, the latest of them being Croatia in November 2024. But the company’s most prominent partnership lies in the LBA Systems alliance it established with Italy’s Leonardo, alongside its acquisition of the Italian aerospace company Piaggio, giving it a foothold within Europe’s established military industrial system.
At the heart of the Russia-Ukraine war stands Baykar’s factory in Ukraine, a $100 million investment that contributes to Ukraine’s wartime production with 120 aircraft Annually.
Turkish defense products also reach 50 other countries, including those made by Roketsan, which was founded in 1988 to supply the Turkish military with missiles before becoming one of the leading suppliers in the arms market today. The company posted notable growth in 2025, with its CEO announcing that exports had risen by more than 50% to reach $750 million.
Roketsan is also working on the long-range Tayfun ballistic missile program, whose latest version, Tayfun Block 4, has joined the ranks of hypersonic missiles, alongside the Yildirim missile unveiled at the SAHA Expo, with a range of up to 6,000 kilometers, making it the first missile with that range to be developed entirely domestically in Türkiye. In cooperation with Aselsan, the company is also involved in the Steel Dome multilayer air defense system.
In Türkiye’s aviation and aerospace industry, Turkish Aerospace Industries holds a prominent position. The company is 54% owned by the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation and 45% by the Presidency of Defense Industries. The company’s flagship project, founded in 1973, is the fifth-generation Kaan stealth fighter, which entered the live testing phase in 2026.
In June 2025, Indonesia signed a contract to purchase 48 fighters of this model for nearly $10 billion, in the largest defense export deal in Türkiye’s history. In August 2025, Spain suspended its plans to acquire US-made F-35 fighter jets, a move that reflected its intention to replace them with the Turkish fighter, and formally requested information on Kaan as a potential alternative.
That came after Madrid signed a $2.6 billion contract to purchase 30 Hurjet training aircraft from Turkish Aerospace Industries, in the first Turkish export deal for a jet aircraft to a NATO member state.
From Dependency to Full Partnership
Türkiye now has a new face, and the data confirms it. According to 2025 figures, about $5.6 billion in Turkish defense and aerospace exports went collectively to EU countries, NATO members, and the United States, accounting for 56 percent of total exports of $10 billion. According to one report, Turkish companies supplied European armies with about 27 percent of the new military equipment they acquired in 2024, putting Türkiye ahead of the United States itself.
With this rapid rise, Türkiye’s military industry has begun extending its presence into different parts of the world. Alongside Poland, Croatia, and the arms deals we have reviewed, it is building RomaniaToday, more than 1,000 Cobra II armored vehicles are covered by an 857 million euro deal with Türkiye’s Otokar, while Estonia is producing Turkish artillery ammunition locally. He also expressed Mark RutteHe spoke about this shift during his most recent visit to Ankara in April 2026, describing the landscape as a transition from an “unhealthy dependency” to “an Atlantic alliance based on a genuine partnership.”
Germany’s position also reflects this shift. The two countries have come a long way since Germany banned arms exports to Türkiye in the early 1990s, culminating in German Chancellor Merz’s visit to Ankara in October 2025 a trip that revived strategic dialogue between the two countries and ended with Berlin backing Türkiye’s inclusion in the joint procurement agreement under the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), in a bid to reduce the alliance’s reliance on Washington alone for air defense.
Türkiye has become a model in the military industries that is drawing German attention, as confirmed by the SIPRI ranking we reviewed; the presence of five Turkish companies compared with four German ones in the ranking points to a new reality.
But Türkiye’s military leap still faces its challenges. It would be an exaggeration to portray matters as though they had reached the level of the Chinese or American military industries. According to a paper StudyAccording to the U.S.-based Brookings Institution, Turkish supply chains remain relatively fragile, relying largely on state-owned or newly established suppliers, making them vulnerable to isolated weak points that can be easily disrupted.
The industrial base also suffers from excessive centralization in some critical components. The KAAN fighter jet, the pride of Turkish industry, still runs on an American engine until the alternative enters service, which is not expected before 2032 at the earliest. The European funding instrument dedicated to strengthening the European defense industrial base also excludes Türkiye from the preferred partnership track, though it is not entirely shut out. Through major European contractors, it remains a partner in European supply chains.
What is hindering the transition from dependency to full partnership between Türkiye and its allies is the same thing that hindered that relationship in the past as well. Many of Türkiye’s Western partners view Turkish geopolitical considerations with suspicion, as does the conflict that repeatedly flares up between Türkiye and its partner Germany over the Kurdish issue.
Another fact remains: when NATO delegations meet in Ankara, the most significant change since the Istanbul summit 22 years ago will not be Türkiye’s military weight alone, but its position within the alliance’s own political economy.
Thanks to a network of nearly 3,000 companies, Ankara has transformed from a country seeking exemptions from arms embargoes into a supplier courted alike by Poland, Spain, Romania, Portugal and Estonia. The question remains: To what extent will European and official structures allow this growing industrial integration to evolve into a full institutional partnership, or will it remain hostage to scattered bilateral agreements outside any unified collective framework?