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The muezzin law: Why is “Israel” targeting the call to prayer in Jerusalem?

Sondos Bairat8 July 2026

هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية

Against the backdrop of the Knesset’s preliminary approval of the “muezzin law,” debate is intensifying over the call to prayer as an Islamic religious rite, in a move that shifts this issue from the realm of political rhetoric to the legislative track and reflects a change in how the Israeli establishment approaches religious symbols in Jerusalem.

The bill comes after repeated attempts since 2011 to restrict or ban the call to prayer, proposals that were introduced in different forms before stalling, only to be revived today in a political environment dominated by the Israeli right, where calls are growing to reorganize the religious sphere in line with its vision for the city.

This step does not appear to be an isolated legislative measure, but rather part of a broader trajectory that is redrawing the relationship between religion and politics in Jerusalem, raising questions about the future of freedom of worship, the limits of state intervention in the administration of religious rites, and the implications for the city’s identity.

From that standpoint, NoonPost conducted two interviews with Sheikh Ikrima Sabri, former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the Palestinian territories, head of the Supreme Islamic Council and preacher at Al-Aqsa Mosque, and with writer and political researcher Jihad Harb, to examine the dimensions of this legislative path and its political background, and to assess its repercussions for the religious and political reality in Jerusalem and for the ongoing struggle over the city’s identity and religious symbols.

The Knesset’s approval of the “muezzin law” in its preliminary reading reflects a shift in the debate over the call to prayer from political rhetoric to an attempt to codify it into law. How do you read this approval, and what impact will it have on the freedom to practice Islamic rites in Jerusalem? 

The issue of the call to prayer is not new in Israeli political discourse. Attempts to restrict or ban it date back to 2011, and these attempts have been repeated several times, though they failed each time. Even so, they continue to be brought back repeatedly.

This time, extremist Jewish groups are seeking to give the issue of the call to prayer a legal character, turning it into legislative text in line with their vision, with the aim of restricting or banning it, in addition to imposing limits on the use of loudspeakers for the call to prayer and also raising the possibility of punishing the muezzin if he violates the instructions of the occupation authorities. This is the substance of the bill currently before the Knesset in its preliminary reading.

We affirm that the call to prayer is a religious rite connected to the salah, and it is a fundamental pillar of Islam. Muslims have the religious right to practice this rite and raise the call to prayer as an intrinsic part of their worship. Any interference in this matter constitutes an infringement on freedom of worship and on deeply rooted religious traditions that have continued for many centuries, and it runs counter to freedom of worship as recognized and enshrined in international principles and conventions.

Historically, the call to prayer is a religious rite that has extended since the earliest days of Islam. Its first symbolism is associated with the esteemed companion Bilal ibn Rabah, may God be pleased with him, the first to raise the call to prayer during the era of the Commander of the Faithful Umar ibn al-Khattab, may God be pleased with him, in 636 CE. It has continued to be raised in mosques of all kinds, including Al-Aqsa Mosque and all the mosques of Palestine, over many centuries for roughly 15 centuries.

Accordingly, any attempt to restrict or ban it constitutes a violation of the principles of freedom of worship and of the relevant international norms and conventions. It also reflects a conflation of the political and religious dimensions, whereas the call to prayer remains a purely religious rite that must not be subjected to political considerations. It is a rite that has continued for 15 centuries and must not be stopped.

Recently, we have seen an escalation in Israeli political rhetoric targeting the call to prayer, particularly in the statements of Itamar Ben-Gvir. How do you read this escalation, and what does it reveal about the nature of the struggle over Jerusalem today?

We believe that every Israeli measure or statement in Jerusalem falls within a trajectory aimed at Judaizing the city, including positions related to the call to prayer. They regard the call to prayer as an Islamic rite they do not want to continue in the city in its current form, within the context of broader policies aimed at imposing a Jewish character on Jerusalem, which they declare to be the capital of the Jews — not only the Jews of Israel, but the Jews of the world.

They view any Islamic manifestations in Jerusalem as conflicting with the Judaization project according to their vision. It must be emphasized that Islamic manifestations in the city of Jerusalem are not recent, but have extended for roughly 15 centuries. Therefore, any attempt to undermine or restrict them is based on no historical or legal right and represents an assault on a firmly established religious and historical reality in the city.

What are the main forms of restriction that mosques in Jerusalem face today, whether in raising the call to prayer or in practicing religious rites, and do you see these measures as reflecting a systematic policy toward Islamic holy sites?

Yes. In addition to the issue of the call to prayer, there is a set of measures targeting mosques in Jerusalem. These include preventing worshippers from entering some mosques and imposing expulsion orders on worshippers for periods that may reach six months or be renewed for similar periods.

These measures also include preventing the establishment or construction of new mosques, as well as restricting mosque restoration work or requiring prior approval from the occupation authorities before carrying out any maintenance or restoration. These policies are not limited to Al-Aqsa Mosque alone, but extend to the mosques of Jerusalem and various parts of Palestine, covering multiple aspects such as the call to prayer and all other manifestations of worship.

What does the call to prayer mean today for the Islamic presence in Jerusalem, and do you believe targeting it affects the city’s religious and cultural identity?

The call to prayer is a religious rite, and when it is raised in Jerusalem, it reflects the Islamic presence and gives the city its clear religious character. Therefore, any attempts to target it are understood in the context of efforts to diminish that presence and weaken its symbolism.

There is no doubt that the call to prayer is part of the religious and cultural identity of Muslims in the city, as it is tied to its history and civilizational fabric. The minarets and the raising of the call to prayer are also a clear sign of the presence of Islamic life in the place.

From this perspective, the call to prayer is seen as a symbol of that presence, as it expresses the continuity of the religious bond with the city. Therefore, any infringement on it is understood as an infringement on part of Jerusalem’s religious and cultural identity.

What are you asking today of the Islamic world and the international community to protect the call to prayer and Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem?

As for the international community, we do not place much hope in it in light of past experience, as we see that its positions are often influenced by international politics and by the United States, which has major influence over it. Therefore, it is not viewed as a sufficiently effective actor in this file.

As for the Islamic world, we stress that Al-Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem, and Palestine are not the cause of Palestinians alone, but the cause of all Muslims across the world. From this standpoint, responsibility toward them is a shared responsibility, and Al-Aqsa is a trust upon the shoulders of every Muslim.

Accordingly, we believe that duty requires assuming this responsibility collectively, and that every Muslim should contribute to supporting and defending this cause, without falling short in backing the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, Al-Aqsa, and Palestine.

Writer and political researcher Jihad Harb offers a political reading of the renewed introduction of the “muezzin law” in the Knesset, explaining the dimensions of its use within Israeli right-wing discourse and its repercussions for the conflict in Jerusalem. This section also addresses the significance of the legislative shift and its impact on the city’s religious and political landscapes.

What political messages does the renewed introduction of the “muezzin law” in the Knesset carry, and what explains its timing now? Is it linked to internal contexts related to the ruling coalition or the Israeli right?

The renewed introduction of the “muezzin law” carries clear political messages, most notably the use of this issue to reinforce the hard-line discourse of the Israeli right and mobilize electoral support ahead of elections. The return to raising the issue of banning the call to prayer, or limiting the reach of its sound through loudspeakers in Israel, comes in two main contexts. The first is the continuation of a policy of restricting the lives of Palestinian citizens in the Palestinian interior, a policy that has persisted for many years.

The second is tied to the election campaign led by the Israeli right, particularly Itamar Ben-Gvir, with the backing of the Likud party and the Religious Zionism parties, within the framework of political competition, bidding wars, and the effort to attract right-wing voters ahead of the anticipated elections. 

How can the transformation of the call to prayer from a religious/social issue into a tool in Israeli political discourse be explained, and what does that reflect about the nature of the conflict within Israel itself?

In my view, the repeated attempts to negate the Arab Palestinian and Islamic presence are not new, but have continued from 1948 to the present day. This indicates that attempts to ban the call to prayer fall within policies adopted by the extremist Israeli right, aimed at entrenching the negation of Palestinians, whether in terms of their physical or symbolic presence inside the territories occupied in 1948.

These policies come within an ongoing process of “Israelization” and attempts to reshape the identity and behavior of Palestinians, alongside restricting their access to their religious rites and cultural traditions. The call to prayer is part of this Arab religious and cultural heritage in the Palestinian interior, and therefore targeting it can be understood within broader attempts to erase this heritage and recast reality in a way that suits the prevailing Israeli vision.

Can the “muezzin law” be seen as legislation that is actually enforceable, or does it remain more of a political tool inside the Knesset than a practical law?

It is difficult to view the “muezzin law” as legislation that is actually enforceable, so it is likely to remain in the corridors of the Knesset. Even if it is passed, it could face challenges before the Supreme Court on the grounds of unconstitutionality, especially in light of the positions of human rights institutions and Islamic religious groups in the Palestinian interior of 1948.

Accordingly, this law may be frozen or suspended until after the elections, pending the political balances that emerge. This also opens the door to the possibility that any subsequent government, if it seeks a degree of stability, may move to reconsider such measures or roll back policies adopted by previous governments, whether in the territories occupied in 1967 or inside Israel, which sought to entrench new political and legal realities.

How does the issue of the call to prayer contribute to entrenching the Israeli right’s vision for Jerusalem, and how is it connected to reshaping the city’s religious and political reality?

Politically, the issue of the call to prayer is not limited to the cultural dimension, but also extends to the geographic dimension, given that Jerusalem is one of the central elements in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The issue of Al-Aqsa Mosque and the raising of the call to prayer there, which resonates across the city of Jerusalem, is linked in the thinking of the Israeli right to ideas about eliminating Al-Aqsa Mosque, demolishing or destroying it, and building the Temple in its place.

Accordingly, this proposal cannot be understood as a momentary or isolated move, but rather as a gradual and cumulative trajectory. It reflects a tendency among segments of the Israeli right toward long-term policies aimed at reshaping reality in Jerusalem, including reducing the Palestinian presence on both the material and symbolic levels, in addition to the geographic dimension tied to Islamic holy sites in the city and in the rest of the Palestinian territories, as well as in Arab cities inside Israel.

How might the continuation of this kind of rhetoric and legislative initiatives affect the future of Israeli policies in Jerusalem, and what do Palestinian reactions, including the stance of official institutions, signify?

Israeli right-wing and extremist discourse seeks to create a state of chaos and find justifications for Israeli violence by pushing Palestinians in the الداخل into direct confrontations with the Israeli right.

By contrast, the possible positions that can be taken by Knesset members and Arab institutions inside Israel may follow two main tracks: the first is the legal track through recourse to the courts, and the second is the popular track, consisting of protests in various forms, while taking care not to slide into a broad confrontation at the current stage, in order to preserve lives on the one hand and avoid any political repercussions that could affect Palestinian parties as they head toward the coming electoral contests on the other.

Official Palestinian responses as well, whether through statements of denunciation or condemnation issued by institutions such as the presidency, the Ministry of Awqaf, and the Foreign Ministry, reflect a clear rejection of these Israeli measures, including those related to banning the call to prayer. The same applies to what is taking place in the city of Hebron, where similar statements were issued regarding Israeli measures at the Ibrahimi Mosque.

TagsAl-Aqsa Mosque ، Judaization of Jerusalem ، The Israeli Occupation
TopicsAl-Aqsa Mosque ، Jerusalem ، The Israeli Occupation ، The Palestinian Cause

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