هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
Security coordination between Syria and Türkiye is advancing in noticeable steps, with its scope expanding from border security to combating armed groups, cells and wanted suspects, along a path whose roots stretch back to the years when Hayat Tahrir al-Sham controlled the border city of Idlib.
At the time, the group sought to impose security in the areas under its control and present itself as a party capable of managing security threats and preventing their spillover into neighboring countries, despite its transnational jihadist legacy.
After HTS led the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation that toppled Bashar Assad’s regime, dissolved itself, was removed from terrorism lists, and saw its leaders take over the administration of the state, Syria entered a different security phase. Damascus joined the international coalition to combat the Islamic State group as part of efforts to restore order, reimpose state authority, achieve stability and create the conditions for refugees to return.
The change in Syria and the nature of its relationship with Ankara carry significance that goes beyond the bilateral dimension. Türkiye, which shares Syria’s longest land border at 911 kilometers, is a NATO member and one of the pillars of the alliance’s southern flank, at a time when NATO views the “southern neighborhood” as a flexible security approach that does not rely on a single model and instead uses different tools for cooperation with countries in the Middle East and North Africa, depending on the nature of the challenges in each area.
Against the backdrop of this growing security relationship between Damascus and Ankara, Türkiye’s hosting of the NATO summit, and the meetings Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa held on its sidelines with a number of presidents and officials, this report examines the possibility of this relationship developing into a new model of cooperation within NATO’s approach to its southern neighborhood, similar to the partnership formulas the alliance has adopted with partners outside its membership, as well as the factors that could drive such a path and the obstacles standing in its way.
From Idlib to Damascus: years of coordination
The relationship between Türkiye and HTS, which emerged under the name Jabhat al-Nusra at the end of 2011, was not cordial in its early stages. Abu Mohammad al-Julani — now President al-Sharaa — used to criticize Ankara’s policies, and the disagreement between the two sides was primarily ideological. But the nature of the relationship later began to change, taking a direction more closely tied to geopolitics and interests.
While Türkiye classified Jabhat al-Nusra and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham as terrorist organizations in line with UN designations, Turkish officials refrained from establishing any formal relations with the group, at least politically or diplomatically. However, after the Russian-Turkish mediated ceasefire agreement in March 2020, it appeared that Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organization, which had been involved in the Syrian file for years, showed signs of changing its position and establishing closer ties with HTS.
According to our monitoring, some incidents over the past years revealed the existence of coordination and communication between the two sides, whether on bilateral issues, files linked to third countries and parties, or matters shaped by shared geographic considerations, especially in cases involving the handover of abductees and wanted individuals. Despite the secrecy that usually surrounds security coordination and operations, a number of these incidents exposed one aspect of that cooperation.
Among those incidents was the announcement by the Salvation Government, HTS’s civilian front, in March 2022 that it had arrested Bruno Carbone, the leader and heir of the “Camorra mafia” and one of the internationally wanted suspects, while he was crossing into Idlib, before later handing him over to the Italian authorities, while extending “thanks to the Turkish side for providing the necessary facilitation.”
The Salvation Government also handed over Yasmine, a French girl, to her country’s embassy in Türkiye in December 2018, after she had been abducted in Idlib in 2017 by French fighters. In February 2018, it handed over two Canadian citizens to Türkiye after coordination with the Canadian Embassy.
The killing of the fourth leader of the Islamic State group, Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi, in 2023 was tied to two different accounts. Türkiye announced that he had been killed in an operation carried out by its intelligence service in Jindires in the Aleppo countryside, while the group said he was killed during clashes with HTS in a town in Idlib, indicating that his body was handed over to Türkiye — something HTS denied.
The case of Ajnad al-Kavkaz commander Rustam Azhiev, known as Abdul Hakim al-Shishani, also raised questions about the route of his movement. He left Idlib for Ukraine in October 2022 with a number of his group’s members after coordination with Chechen groups fighting alongside Ukrainian forces, while circulating accounts suggest that he passed through Türkiye, though the details of his departure and the route he took remained far from fully clear.
After Syria’s liberation, Türkiye was the first country to arrive diplomatically in Damascus through visits by Turkish officials, led by intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin, on Dec. 12, 2024, 13 years after the last official Turkish visit. This was followed by publicly announced security coordination between the two sides, including the arrest of Turkish officer Onder Sigircikoglu, accused of handing over defected officer Hussein Harmoush to the ousted regime, in addition to a joint operation last May that resulted in the arrest of 10 members of the Islamic State group and their transfer to Türkiye.
Greek researcher Eva Koulouriotis, a specialist in Middle East affairs, says Ankara has intensified its contacts with Syria’s new leadership in several areas since the fall of the Assad regime, with security and military cooperation at the top of the agenda.
In remarks to NoonPost, the researcher says that Türkiye, by virtue of its influence over a number of armed opposition factions, helped push them toward integration into the Syrian Defense Ministry and also supported Syrian army operations in the east of the country against the SDF. On the security level, coordination between the two sides continued, especially on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and the Islamic State group, through intelligence sharing and joint operations, particularly in northern Syria.
A potential partnership driven by three factors
Although there is skepticism about the ability of the partnership and cooperation models that NATO has pursued with Middle Eastern countries to achieve a lasting security impact and although many are seen as having remained limited to dialogue and technical and training cooperation without fully achieving their declared goals shifts in the regional security landscape, especially in Syria, open the door to discussion about the possibility of similar or different forms of cooperation emerging from previous models.
One such model is the “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,” launched by the alliance at its Istanbul summit in 2004. It aimed to strengthen bilateral security cooperation with Middle Eastern countries. Four Gulf states — Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE — joined it, while Oman and Saudi Arabia participate in some of its activities. Its areas include defense planning, counterterrorism, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil preparedness, as well as political dialogue and the exchange of expertise.
As for Türkiye, it has been one of NATO’s pivotal members since joining in 1952, benefiting from its geographic position at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and the Black Sea. It has the alliance’s second-largest army, is a key player in security files related to NATO’s southern flank, and ranks seventh in the value of its financial contributions to the alliance.
The matter is not limited to the relationship between Syria and Türkiye or Ankara’s standing in NATO. It also extends to an approach adopted by Damascus based on reducing tensions with its neighbors, addressing security concerns, and presenting itself as a partner in achieving regional stability rather than a source of threats after years in which Syrian geography turned into an arena for conflict and wars.
Based on the growing relationship between the two countries, Eva Koulouriotis believes that signing an agreement between Syria and Türkiye, similar to the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative between NATO and the Arab Gulf states, is highly likely. She believes that “concluding such an agreement will not be delayed, given that it serves the interests of both countries.”
Koulouriotis bases this assessment on a set of shared factors and files between Damascus and Ankara, foremost among them border security. The length of the land border between the two countries makes it both an area for cooperation and a source of risk at the same time, whether in relation to the movement and transit of Islamic State group members, who still maintain a presence in the Syrian desert, or the SDF file, especially its non-Syrian fighters, whom Ankara primarily views as members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, and whose presence on Syrian territory it considers an ongoing threat to Turkish national security.
Therefore, cooperation between the two countries on the land border file will be crucial and necessary for both sides.
The researcher also points to the maritime border file in the eastern Mediterranean, considering it a sensitive issue because Türkiye, which supports the claims of “Turkish Cyprus” in the island’s exclusive economic waters, wants Damascus to back its vision for the eastern Mediterranean. In return, Damascus views its exclusive economic zone as a promising opportunity, hoping for oil or gas discoveries that would strengthen the Syrian economy on its path to recovery.
The second file is counterterrorism. Koulouriotis believes that the continuing threat posed by the Islamic State group and the PKK makes cooperation between Damascus and Ankara a shared interest, with Syria potentially benefiting from Türkiye’s experience in counterterrorism operations.
The third file is military cooperation and capacity building, which Koulouriotis sees as a potential area for partnership, given Damascus’ need to reorganize its forces and build a unified army after dissolving and integrating armed factions. She notes that Türkiye, by virtue of its military experience and standing within NATO, can provide support in training including joint land and naval exercises armament, and cooperation in defense industries, including drones, with the possibility of cooperation between the two countries in military manufacturing by allowing Ankara to establish factories inside Syrian territory.
In the same military context, the two governments share the conviction that growing Israeli influence in the region poses a threat to the stability of both countries, making military cooperation a necessity to protect their shared interests, according to the researcher.
The researcher told NoonPost that Syria has now embarked on a path of military and economic recovery despite the setbacks and challenges it has faced in recent years. Even so, the road remains long for the new Syrian leadership if it wants to restore Syria’s former standing from decades ago — that of a sovereign state with military capabilities enabling it to confront internal challenges such as terrorism and external ones such as the Israeli threat.
On the other hand, the researcher notes that Türkiye does not want Syria to leave its sphere of influence, seeing the current phase as an opportunity that may not come again. Deepening cooperation between Ankara and Damascus within the framework of security and military agreements would enhance Türkiye’s security and strengthen its ability to consolidate its influence in the Middle East.
Accordingly, a comprehensive, long-term security and military agreement between the two countries serves the interests of both Türkiye and the new Syria.