هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
Iranian-Omani relations have entered an extremely sensitive test phase following repeated Iranian strikes on sites inside Omani territory, on the grounds that the attacks were aimed at US military facilities in the sultanate. The development threatens to shake one of Tehran’s most stable relationships in the region after decades in which the relationship between the two countries was defined by a distinct character and mutual understanding.
It appears that the Iranian approach of distinguishing between targeting the sultanate itself and targeting American facilities on its soil has not been accepted by the Omani side. Muscat rejected that justification, summoned the Iranian ambassador, and handed him a formal protest note, considering what happened a violation of its sovereignty and an attack on its territory a notable step that reflects the depth of Omani anger and points to an unusual shift in the course of relations between the two countries.
For decades, Oman has represented an exceptional case for Iran in its Gulf and Arab surroundings. It has served as the most important link and the most reliable diplomatic bridge between Tehran and a number of Gulf and Western capitals, in addition to its pivotal position in the security equation of the Strait of Hormuz, making it an extremely important partner for Iran and a mediator that enjoys exceptional trust from its leadership.
But Iran’s bet that Oman will continue to show patience in the face of repeated strikes on sites inside the sultanate may turn into a double-edged sword, especially since Muscat, despite its traditional commitment to avoiding escalation and preserving channels of communication, cannot ignore what it sees as a direct affront to its sovereignty and national security. This raises the most pressing question about the approach governing Tehran’s calculations in handling this file:
Does Iran believe the special nature of its relationship with Oman can absorb such repeated strikes without political and strategic costs? Or, in the midst of its confrontation with the United States, is it risking the loss of its most important Arab partner, its most trusted mediator, and the safety valve that has kept a door open for communication with the West for years?
The timing is controversial
Beyond the nature of the sites hit by the strikes inside Omani territory, the timing of the attack itself opens the door to a more sensitive reading of the crisis. The shelling came shortly after Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi left the Omani capital, Muscat, following a brief visit devoted to discussing navigation arrangements in the Strait of Hormuz with Omani officials.
The visit came within the context of a negotiating track preceded by steps to form a joint committee to examine the regulation of ship traffic, transit routes, maritime services, and the sovereign rights of the two states bordering the strait. But that track ran into clear differences in vision. While Tehran insisted that any new navigation arrangements must acknowledge its role in managing ship traffic inside the strait, Muscat sought to formulate understandings that would ensure the continuation of navigation and prevent the strategic passage from sliding into a permanent arena of confrontation.
During Araghchi’s visit, the two sides failed to reach a final agreement to settle those differences. Tehran later emerged with accusations that US pressure had prevented Muscat from moving forward with the proposed understanding. Not long after the Iranian minister’s departure, Omani territory came under repeated Iranian bombardment, in a sequence that gave the developments political dimensions far beyond any direct military explanation.
From here, the crisis appears to have moved beyond the scope of a technical dispute over navigation arrangements into a more complex space in which political and military calculations overlap. The Iranian behavior, regardless of the declared justifications, may have sent Muscat a deeply negative message: that the special nature of the relationship between the two countries is no longer enough to shield Omani territory from the repercussions of regional confrontation.
More dangerously, this conduct suggests that Tehran has begun to deal with Oman, when interests clash, according to the same rules that govern its dealings with states that do not enjoy the special standing the sultanate has held for decades in Iranian calculations.
That message appears to have reached the Omanis one way or another, which explains Muscat’s shift from its traditional language of containment to publicly expressing its rejection of the Iranian approach, culminating in summoning the Iranian ambassador and handing him a formal protest note. This notable shift cannot be separated from the trajectory of one of the region’s most cohesive and distinctive relationships.
The question, then, is no longer limited to why the shelling occurred or the nature of its targets, but extends to whether Tehran has begun, knowingly or not, to undermine the relationship that for years gave it a margin of trust, mediation, and communication it did not enjoy with most other capitals in the region.
Oman: an exceptional relationship
Oman cannot, by any measure, be placed in the Iranian approach in the same category as the traditional Gulf states. Historically, the sultanate has represented the clearest exception in Tehran’s relationship with its Arab surroundings, and over the years it has borne repeated political pressure because of its commitment to this approach. While Iran’s relations with a number of Gulf states were marked by mutual suspicion, deterrence, and attempts at containment, Muscat maintained a different relationship more open, more flexible, and based on pragmatism, communication, and joint action.
For decades, Oman insisted on preserving a thread of connection with Tehran, even during the most acute periods of tension between Iran and its Gulf neighbors, based on a firm conviction that the cost of completely shutting the door on Iran outweighed, in its view, the risks of keeping channels of communication open, even at their minimum. From that standpoint, Muscat maintained a permanent diplomatic window with Tehran and refused to fully join policies of isolation or rupture. Over time, this accumulated a great deal of trust and made the sultanate a reliable partner in Iranian eyes.
This role was not limited to managing a stable bilateral relationship. It went further, into playing highly sensitive regional and international roles. The sultanate repeatedly acted as a mediator in US-Iran negotiations, including nuclear issues and indirect channels of communication between the two sides. It also served as a link between Tehran and Gulf capitals, and as an acceptable bridge for rival parties seeking to avoid sliding into an open confrontation that could prove difficult to contain.
Politically and diplomatically, such a role should have granted Oman a special place in Iranian calculations and made dealings with it subject to a higher degree of caution and respect for the distinctiveness shaped by decades of mutual understanding and mediation.
This is inseparable from the pragmatic dimension of the relationship, as economic and trade ties between the two countries developed in a way that made each side, to varying degrees, an outlet and a necessity for the other in multiple files, reinforcing the nature of the relationship as one of mutual interests rather than merely a passing political understanding.
From this perspective, any Iranian step that touches Omani sovereignty appears more dangerous than a mere passing security incident, because it puts this entire accumulated balance to the test and raises the question of whether Tehran still views Muscat as an exceptional partner, or whether the imperatives of regional confrontation have begun to overshadow even its most distinctive and stable Arab relationship.
A thread of connection
Despite the Iranian attacks the sultanate has faced since the outbreak of the war, Muscat has tried, as much as possible, to contain the crisis and absorb its repercussions, based on its understanding of the nature of the Iranian approach, which seeks to exert the maximum possible pressure on the United States and its allies without necessarily meaning that Tehran wants to open a direct front with Oman.
From this standpoint, the sultanate has so far avoided taking steps that could be interpreted as a prelude to dismantling the relationship with Iran. It has not severed ties, has not abandoned its mediating role, and has not closed political and diplomatic channels of communication with Tehran. Instead, it has limited itself to clearly expressing its anger and rejection of the violations affecting its territory, culminating in summoning the Iranian ambassador and handing him a formal protest note.
At the same time, however, it has maintained its active engagement in the Strait of Hormuz file and continued talks with the Iranian side as part of efforts aimed at ensuring freedom of navigation and preventing the strategic passage from becoming an open arena of confrontation.
The sultanate has also continued to put forward proposals for organizing maritime corridors and preserving its position as a mediator between Iran and the United States, in a clear indication that Muscat still distinguishes, at least for now, between its rejection of violations affecting its sovereignty and its desire to preserve the role it plays in reducing regional escalation.
This approach is reinforced by the fact that, after the sultanate came under bombardment and after the Iranian ambassador was summoned, the Omani foreign minister put forward a vision for Gulf security based on moving from a policy of “containing Iran” to integrating all countries in the region into a shared security system. That vision shows that Muscat, despite its anger, has not abandoned its traditional philosophy that Gulf stability cannot be achieved by isolating Iran or pushing it toward further confrontation.
The sultanate proceeds from a firm conviction that any broad explosion in the region would carry a heavy cost for everyone, and that cutting the last threads of communication between Tehran and the Gulf capitals could open the door to repercussions that would be difficult to contain. For that reason, Muscat continues, with clear pragmatism, to absorb a great deal of tension and preserve channels of dialogue, even at moments when its relationship with Iran is undergoing harsh tests.
But that pragmatism itself raises a more pressing question: How long can Tehran continue to count on Muscat’s patience? And does it assume that Omani policy, based on de-escalation and containment, means an unlimited willingness to endure violations?
What if Tehran loses Muscat?
Tehran understands full well that losing Oman would not be merely a setback in a bilateral relationship with a neighboring state, but a strategic loss that goes far beyond ties between two countries. Losing Muscat would mean losing an important bridge to the Gulf, a pivotal window onto Washington, and a rare channel for mediation and regional diplomacy, in addition to losing a Gulf state that for years has been among the strongest opponents of the idea of fully isolating or besieging Iran.
The sultanate’s importance to Tehran lies in the fact that it has not merely maintained relations with it, but has consistently adopted an approach based on integrating Iran into the regional security system and dealing with it as part of the stability equation rather than as a threat that must be isolated and excluded.
Any substantial deterioration in relations between the two countries could therefore deprive Iran of one of the most important Gulf voices that has long pushed for containment and dialogue instead of isolation and confrontation.
Tehran also understands that threatening its relationship with Muscat could push the sultanate, even if gradually, to move closer to the United States and its Gulf allies and to strengthen its reliance on alternative security and defense systems. That would align with the American and Israeli view, which has long treated the special nature of Omani-Iranian relations as an exception that does not fit with efforts to tighten Tehran’s regional isolation.
For that reason, it is difficult to imagine that Iran would deliberately gamble with a relationship of this magnitude, even if its aim in escalating is to send messages to the United States or the rest of the region. Such a strategy remains fraught with risks, because a military message that exceeds its bounds can turn from a tool of pressure into a factor in dismantling a strategic relationship built up over decades.
The question therefore remains open: How long can Muscat continue its policy of strategic patience? And can Tehran manage the escalation with enough precision to keep its strikes within the context of political and military messaging without slipping to a level that threatens the core of its relationship with the sultanate?
Could Oman become an adversary of Iran?
Objectively speaking, it is unlikely that Oman would suddenly turn from a partner into an adversary of Tehran. The nature of Omani policy is based on calm, gradualism, and assessing developments through a long-term lens, not on the basis of a single incident or a temporary crisis imposed by exceptional regional circumstances.
But that does not mean Oman’s strategic patience can be treated as a blank check. Continued pressure and violations could gradually push Muscat to redefine its relationship with Iran not through an immediate rupture, but by moving from a phase of “trust” to one of “risk management.”
Here lies the most dangerous scenario for Tehran. There is a major difference between Oman viewing Iran as a partner with which understandings can be reached and dealing with it as a neighbor that cannot be ignored but whose behavior must be anticipated and whose risks must be prepared for. At that point, Iran may not lose Oman formally, but it could lose the special character that has distinguished their relationship and gradually forfeit that rare reserve of trust, mediation, and openness that it has not enjoyed with most Gulf capitals.
In the end, Tehran faces an extremely delicate test in keeping its relationship with Muscat on course so that its tools of pressure and message-sending do not become a factor threatening the future of the relationship itself. But managing this equation requires a great deal of sensitivity and precision, because the line between calibrated pressure and damaging a strategic relationship may be narrower than Tehran imagines. The question remains: Can Iran manage this escalation without losing the partner it may need now more than ever?