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Since the signing of the Wadi Araba Treaty in 1994, the water file has been one of the core pillars of cooperation between Jordan and “Israel”. Annex II of the treaty regulated the management of shared water resources, before arrangements between the two sides later expanded to provide Jordan with additional quantities of water amid its worsening water crisis.
In 2021, “Israel” agreed to supply Jordan with an additional 50 million cubic meters of water annually, on top of the quantities stipulated in the Wadi Araba agreement. Those amounts became an important element in meeting the kingdom’s water needs as it faces a deepening crisis driven by limited resources, population growth and the effects of climate change.
But Israel’s decision to freeze the renewal of the agreement covering these additional quantities has reopened a debate that goes beyond the technical side of the issue, reflecting a broader shift in how “Israel” uses vital files foremost among them water as tools of influence and political pressure.
To examine the dimensions of this decision and its political and security background, NoonPost conducted an interview with Dr. Walid Habbas, a researcher on Israeli affairs at the Palestinian Center for Israeli Studies (Madar), to discuss the place of the water file in Jordanian-Israeli relations, the implications of using vital files to manage political balances between the two sides, and the repercussions for the future of relations between Jordan and Tel Aviv.
How do you read Israel’s decision to freeze the renewal of the agreement to supply Jordan with additional quantities of water? What does this decision reveal about the nature of Israeli policy toward Jordan at the current stage?
This decision reveals not only the nature of Israeli policy, but also the nature of the relationship “Israel” has reached with Jordan. The decision to freeze the renewal of the agreement to supply Jordan with additional quantities of water should not be seen as a technical dispute over water volumes or the renewal of an existing agreement, but rather as a highly significant political indicator.
Israel’s refusal to renew the agreement reflects a shift in its dealings with Jordan from a stage that could be described as a stable relationship one whose components “Israel” was able to manage and control based on a peace treaty, security coordination between the two countries, and a degree of stability rooted in not directly harming the other side, to a more explicit stage of employing vital files and turning them into tools of political pressure.
Jordan had believed that these files, especially water, would remain insulated from political tug-of-war, and that Israel, as the stronger party in the agreement, would not use them as a means of pressure. It had also counted on the peace treaty to provide a degree of regional stability and security, and that Israel, whatever its policies toward the Palestinians, would not transfer that hostile approach to its relationship with Jordan.
What we are witnessing today, however, is a clear shift: vital files are now being used as political cards, and Israel has begun linking its dealings with Jordan to Jordan’s political and regional positions. In other words, “Israel” is dealing with Jordan according to the “carrot and stick” logic it previously used with the Palestinian Authority.
If Jordan adopts rhetoric or positions aligned with the Israeli vision and does not touch issues “Israel” considers sensitive, it is rewarded. But if it decides to play a political or regional role that does not align with Israeli interests, it is punished through vital files, foremost among them water.
That is the core message carried by the decision. It should therefore be viewed as a development that goes beyond the water file itself, because it reflects a profound shift in the nature of Jordanian-Israeli relations as though the tectonic plates on which this relationship was built have begun to move. And just as the movement of tectonic plates precedes earthquakes, this shift may be a prelude to bigger political tremors in the future of relations between the two sides.
To what extent is this decision tied to the shifts taking place in Israeli politics, particularly with the rise of the right, or does it reflect a broader trend toward redefining the relationship with Jordan according to political and security considerations?
To begin with, I do not believe this trajectory is tied only to the rise of the Israeli right in recent years, even if the rise of the far right and the religious current has helped accelerate and intensify it. In my view, however, this approach is rooted in the very nature of the Israeli state itself. In its “DNA,” Israel is a colonial, expansionist and aggressive state. This is not merely a slogan or a description used to embellish political rhetoric, but a characterization grounded in the nature of the Israeli project and its historical behavior.
When we say Israel is a colonial state, we mean that it is not a state that draws its borders, settles within them and lives peacefully with its surroundings. Rather, it is a state that constantly seeks to expand its influence and strengthen its dominance. Time and again, it works to extend its influence in the Middle East, control vital resources foremost among them water and transform itself into a dominant regional power that does not merely subjugate the Palestinians, but also seeks to impose its influence on the surrounding states and peoples.
As researchers in Israeli studies, we have seen that Israel’s aggressive and unethical influence has not been confined to the region, but has extended to Latin America and included interventions in Africa, including support for some coups and the arming of opposition groups in Sudan and Ethiopia. This, at its core, reflects the nature of Israeli behavior in managing its foreign relations.
From this perspective, Jordan, like other surrounding states, is not immune to this approach. Simply signing a peace treaty with Israel does not mean the relationship is insulated from pressure or political blackmail. The same applies to the Abraham Accords. Even the UAE, which may see itself as a partner of Israel, is not immune to this logic, because Israel, by the nature of its project, may turn on any partner when it sees that its interests require it.
As for Jordan specifically, Israel no longer deals with it today as a partner in the Wadi Araba Treaty as it did in the early years after the agreement was signed in 1994. The first two decades of the treaty can be described as a period of stability, or something like a “honeymoon” in relations between the two sides. Today, however, the equation has changed.
Israel now believes it is capable of repricing the relationship with Jordan that is, redefining its costs and terms in a way that serves its political interests. While this shift intersects with the rise of the Israeli right, it is not limited to it. Even in the absence of this right, Israel would likely have moved in the same direction, albeit at a slower pace.
On the other hand, the recent war forced Jordan to adopt sharper political rhetoric, not necessarily as a result of a change in its policies, but in order to preserve internal stability, given the presence of a broad segment of Palestinians within the kingdom. Jordan found itself compelled to declare a clearer political position on the war, even if that was not translated into practical steps on the ground.
Israel viewed this rhetoric as provocative and saw it as exceeding the ceiling it had expected from Jordan. From there, it began reopening the files of the agreement, especially the vital ones, such as water, to send a clear message to Amman that any political position not aligned with the Israeli vision will carry a cost, and that the pressure tools Israel possesses foremost among them water can be used to punish Jordan and recalibrate its political behavior. In my view, that is the essence of what is happening today.
To what extent have vital resources, especially water, become part of the tools of influence and pressure in Israeli policy toward Jordan?
This approach did not begin with the deterioration of relations between the two sides; it existed from the outset, even before relations saw any decline. In theoretical and abstract terms, when an agreement is concluded between two parties and one of them is the stronger side possessing the resources, the water and all the elements of power while the other side lacks comparable tools, then that agreement is, from the moment it is signed, built on unequal foundations.
In such cases, the stronger party always retains the ability to impose its conditions or reinterpret its obligations in ways that serve its interests when circumstances change. Therefore, Israel’s capacity to use water or other vital files as a tool of pressure is not something new; it is part of the very structure on which the agreement itself was built.
This is not limited to the Wadi Araba Treaty. It is almost a common feature of all the agreements “Israel” has signed with Arab parties, beginning with its agreements with the Palestine Liberation Organization, passing through the agreement signed with Lebanon in 1983, and ending with the peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt. In all these agreements, Israel was careful to retain the keys to power:
It controls resources, water, gas, energy, transport routes and logistics, in addition to security files, which gives it a permanent ability to control the course of the relationship.
That is why agreements that initially appeared to establish a state of stability, or something like a “honeymoon,” turned over time into tools of political maneuvering through which Israel can exert pressure, reinterpret its obligations, or even refrain from implementing some of their provisions when it sees that doing so serves its interests.
Perhaps the clearest example of this is the water file with Jordan. In 2021, “Israel” agreed to double the amount of water allocated to Jordan, reaching an additional 50 million cubic meters annually, which made Jordan rely on these quantities in a vital and growing way. Once that dependence became a reality, “Israel” acquired the ability to use this card as a tool of political pressure which is what we are seeing today through the freezing of the agreement’s renewal and the transformation of water from a cooperative resource into a means of political blackmail.
Does freezing the agreement reflect the transfer of the water file from the framework of cooperation established by the Wadi Araba Treaty to a logic of managing influence and political pressure?
Absolutely. In my view, the Wadi Araba Treaty, from the moment it was signed, was not merely an agreement for cooperation between two equal states. At its core, it was an agreement for managing influence and dominance. The relationship it established was not built on a real balance between the two sides, but on a clear imbalance in the balance of power, with Israel possessing the resources and the basic elements of power while the other side depends on it in vital files.
For that reason, anyone who read the agreement critically from the very beginning could have anticipated this outcome. Many studies argued that, over time, these agreements would shift from a framework of cooperation into tools of pressure in Israel’s hands. For many researchers, it was simply a matter of time.
The same was said about the Oslo agreement with the Palestine Liberation Organization, as many warned from the outset that it would turn into a burden on the Palestinian Authority because it did not establish an equal relationship, but rather one that gave Israel broad tools to control and manage the conflict.
The same applies to the Wadi Araba Treaty, which was expected, sooner or later, to become a burden on Jordan, as was also the case with the Camp David agreement with Egypt.
The reason for this lies not only in the agreements themselves, but in the nature of Israeli policy, which treats agreements as tools for enhancing influence and entrenching dominance. Therefore, when political or security calculations change, Israel does not hesitate to use the leverage these agreements provide to pressure the other side and impose its will on it.
How could this decision affect the future of Jordanian-Israeli relations, especially since it touches one of the most stable files of cooperation between the two countries?
If we want to understand the root of the problem in the relationship between Jordan and “Israel”, we must point out that this relationship rests on two contradictory tracks. On the one hand, there is cooperation based on the Wadi Araba Treaty, full security coordination and military cooperation. But on the other hand, there has been a state of ongoing tension that has not disappeared since the treaty was signed.
This tension is linked to several factors, most notably the Palestinian file. Jordan is the country hosting the largest number of Palestinian refugees, and Palestinians of different backgrounds make up a large part of Jordan’s social fabric, while refugee camps still exist to this day. This file is highly sensitive for the Jordanian state because it is tied to preserving internal balance and the future of the Palestinian cause, and it is a file that is always present in both Jordanian and Israeli calculations.
The other factor relates to what is known as the “Jordanian option” in some Israeli conceptions for resolving the West Bank issue. With continued settlement expansion and the rise of the Israeli right, which views the West Bank as part of “Judea and Samaria,” this raises Jordanian fears that these policies could create demographic and political pressures on Jordan. For Amman, this constitutes a threat to national security, while for Israel it forms part of its security and strategic calculations.
The decision to freeze the agreement to supply Jordan with additional quantities of water therefore cannot be read in isolation from the nature of this complex relationship. It reflects Israel’s ability to use vital files, such as water, as tools of political pressure when the positions or interests of the two sides diverge.
As for the future of Jordanian-Israeli relations, it is tied to how these files develop. Regarding water specifically, there is more than one possible path. There may be regional movement or a political conference that helps contain the dispute, and the United States or the international community may also exert pressure to recalibrate the relationship between the two sides.
Likewise, political shifts inside “Israel” whether after elections or as a result of the formation of a new government could change the nature of its dealings with Jordan, allowing the relationship to return to a calmer and more stable level.
But regardless of the possible scenarios, the central issue remains that “Israel” has the ability to use vital files such as water, Al-Aqsa Mosque, or the Hashemite custodianship over the holy sites in Jerusalem as political cards to exert pressure and manage the relationship with Jordan. That ability is one of the elements of ongoing tension between the two sides.
Does Jordan have political or diplomatic cards to deal with this development, or do its limited water options leave it with only a narrow margin for maneuver?
Of course, Jordan has many files and cards that it can use as tools of pressure, or as winning cards in managing its relationship with Israel. Some of them can even be considered “joker cards.” But the problem lies not only in possessing these cards, but in the political ability to use and deploy them.
The problem is that many Arab regimes do not use the pressure tools they possess in a way that can achieve their interests, because they often operate within calculations of fear and preserving existing balances, rather than always from an independent vision of the concept of national security.
In many cases, these regimes’ calculations are tied to preserving their relations with the United States, ensuring the continued flow of economic and political aid, and avoiding confrontations or crises that could affect their internal stability. As a result, their priority becomes preserving the existing equations rather than entering paths that may carry political and security risks.
Here the paradox appears: Arab states possess many cards that could give them greater influence, yet they hesitate to use them because of these calculations. They find themselves facing two options: either remain within the existing system of alliances that provides them with protection and support foremost among them the relationship with the United States and relations with “Israel” or move to a more escalatory path that could expose them to pressures and challenges threatening their stability.
Therefore, the problem is not the absence of cards. Jordan does indeed possess many tools. Rather, it lies in the nature of the political environment and the calculations that determine when and how these cards can be used.
If Israel continues to use vital files, foremost among them water, as tools of political and security pressure, how will that affect the future of Jordanian-Israeli relations, and could its impact extend to regional stability?
I do not believe this path will continue to the very end, in the sense that Israel is unlikely to go so far as to sever the relationship or turn the water file into an open crisis with Jordan, because the decision essentially carries a clear political message more than it represents a radical change in the nature of the relationship.
But whether this path continues or recedes depends on the nature of the relationship between “Israel” and Jordan in the coming phase. Israel understands that moving into a stage of “breaking bones” with Jordan is not in its interest, because it has no real alternatives to this relationship. Therefore, the use of the water file seems closer to a pressure message or a political “ear twist” aimed at conveying a certain position to Jordan, rather than reaching a rupture or a comprehensive confrontation.
As for the future of Jordanian-Israeli relations, it cannot be viewed in isolation from the broader regional environment. The relationship between the two sides does not unfold in a vacuum, but is affected by the transformations and developments taking place in the region.
To understand the trajectory of this relationship more accurately, we must look at the full regional picture: what is happening in Syria and its impact on Jordan, developments in Lebanon, Israeli expansion in the region, the future of confrontation with Iran, and the future of the Abraham normalization agreements.
All these files are interconnected, and any major change in them will be reflected in the nature of the relationship between Israel and Jordan. Therefore, the water decision cannot be read in isolation, but must be placed within the broader regional scene in order to understand the direction and future of relations between the two sides.