هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
A series of military developments has placed Yemen’s Zuqar Island at the heart of the recently escalating confrontation in the Red Sea between the Houthis on one side and the Yemeni government and other military forces opposed to the group backed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other.
On July 19, 2026, announced naval forces affiliated with the National Resistance a UAE-backed military formation led by Tariq Saleh, a member of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council that they had intercepted armed Houthi boats approaching the island and forced them to retreat toward the western coast.
The incident came amid the unraveling of the informal truce that had governed relations between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis since 2022. On July 13, Yemeni government forces targeted the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent an Iranian plane from landing, prompting the Houthis to respond by launching missiles and drones toward Abha airport after accusing Riyadh of being behind the operation.
On July 20, announced Houthi military spokesperson Yahya Saree the imposition of a naval blockade on the kingdom, before the group warned shipping companies against dealing with its ports, while the spokesperson for the Saudi-led coalition, Maj. Gen. Turki al-Maliki, announced measures to protect ships transiting Bab al-Mandab.
The escalation has increased the importance of islands close to shipping routes and Saudi ports on the Red Sea. At the center of this geography stands Zuqar as a forward position in the struggle to monitor ships, boats and supply lines in the southern sector of the Red Sea.
An island alongside maritime corridors
Located at 14 degrees 1 minute north latitude and 42 degrees 45 minutes east longitude, Zuqar Island lies within the Hanish archipelago in the southern Red Sea, in the maritime area between Yemen’s western coast and the Eritrean coast.
Greater Hanish, the nearest main island to it within the archipelago, lies about 30 kilometers to the south. On the Yemeni side, Zuqar is about 93 kilometers from Mokha and 96 kilometers from Hodeidah, while it is separated from Eritrea’s Assab port by about 111 kilometers.
This location places it between Yemen’s coastal ports on one side and the Eritrean coast on the other, along the sea route running north from Bab al-Mandab toward the northern Red Sea.
The island is about 166 kilometers from Mayyun and the heart of the traffic scheme in Bab al-Mandab, and this distance defines the difference in function between the two islands.
Mayyun lies inside the neck of the strait and divides it into two channels, while Zuqar is positioned to its north near a lane used by ships heading up from the Gulf of Aden toward the Suez Canal, giving forces stationed there a forward position between Yemen’s western coast, the Eritrean coast and the rest of the Hanish archipelago.
The island consists of a basaltic volcanic mass with rugged terrain and eruptive cones, and its summit rises to 624 meters. This elevation provides a wide field for visual and electronic surveillance when suitable equipment is deployed on top of it, and also makes its mass clearly visible to navigation radars from long distances.
Maritime guides describe Zuqar as radar conspicuous, meaning it produces a strong echo that is easy to distinguish on ships’ radar screens. This description relates to the island’s navigational visibility, while its military surveillance capability depends on the nature of the equipment and communications systems deployed on its heights.
East of Zuqar runs an organized shipping lane used by vessels heading north after crossing Bab al-Mandab. The lane is part of traffic separation schemes adopted by the International Maritime Organization to regulate ship directions and reduce crossing in congested corridors, and it is also linked to the maritime security transit corridor used by naval forces to direct ships and strengthen monitoring of the area.
The estimated distance between Zuqar’s shoreline and the nearest edge of the eastern lane is about 7 kilometers, while its centerline passes at a distance of roughly 8 kilometers, placing northbound ships within close range of the island.
Ships heading south toward Bab al-Mandab, meanwhile, use another scheme located west and south of Greater Hanish. Maritime traffic is thus distributed on both sides of the archipelago: northbound traffic passes east of Zuqar, while southbound traffic takes the western side of the Hanish group.
Ships coming from the Gulf of Aden first pass through one of the two Bab al-Mandab channels surrounding Mayyun, then continue north toward the lane east of Zuqar.
This geography gives Mayyun a direct position inside the strait, while placing Zuqar on the route for tracking traffic exiting it, supporting early warning, patrols and interception operations in the southern Red Sea.
Zuqar’s location can also be linked with Mokha, the rest of the Hanish islands and the sites spread along the western coast to cover a broader sector of the sea and monitor ships and boats moving between the Yemeni coast, international waters and neighboring islands.
A new runway raises its military value
For years, the known infrastructure on Zuqar remained limited, confined to anchorage coves, small moorings, stone huts and a simple water storage facility.
But that changed during 2025 with the appearance of a new pier and a paved airstrip on the island’s eastern and southeastern coastal plain, while ship movements and construction-material shipments linked the project’s supply chain to companies based in the UAE.
On Oct. 20, 2025, The Associated Press published an investigation based on images from the US satellite-imaging company Planet Labs, showing that work began in April with the construction of a pier to receive ships, before moving on to leveling and preparing the runway path.
By late August, an asphalt-like layer had appeared, while an image taken on Sept. 30 showed a paved runway under construction for an airport on the island. Its painted markings then appeared in an image dated Oct. 19.
The AP estimated the runway’s length at about 2 kilometers, while later analyses placed it within a range of 2.1 to 2.2 kilometers. The runway extends along the eastern plain in an approximate northeast-southwest direction.
The surface’s weight-bearing capacity, along with the size of fuel and maintenance facilities and navigational equipment, remain decisive factors in determining the types of aircraft and the scale of operations that can be run from it.
Depending on its level of outfitting, the runway gives the island a potential capability to transport personnel and equipment and to operate drones, reconnaissance missions and logistical support.
It also shortens the time needed for aircraft and drones to reach shipping lanes and Yemen’s western coast, and gives the force stationed on the island an air option in addition to naval patrols and observation points on the heights.
The runway’s value is tied to the new pier, which allows construction materials, supplies, fuel and heavy equipment to be received more regularly. The AP tracked the cargo ship Batsa, which arrived at the island after sailing from the port of Berbera in Somaliland and remained near the pier for about a week.
SAFEEN Shipping and Marine Services also acknowledged receiving a request to supply asphalt to Zuqar on behalf of other UAE-based companies.
This activity outlines a supply chain linked to Emirati companies and aligns with the military and political support Abu Dhabi provides to Tariq Saleh’s forces on the western coast. The identity of the party that formally contracted to build and operate the runway, however, remained unknown.
Available images support the existence of a mooring facility, a runway, service roads and dredging works, while the nature of any permanent military equipment on the island has remained unclear.
The island’s military value is tied to three integrated functions: its heights provide suitable points for visual surveillance and sea-surface monitoring equipment; the pier provides a base for supplying boats and naval forces stationed on the island; and it can support coast guard patrols depending on the operating authority and the nature of the deployment.
Combining these functions makes it possible to establish a forward node linking maritime surveillance with air movement and communications with the western coast.
Iranian missiles add another dimension to the site’s theoretical calculations, as the International Institute for Strategic Studies places the range of the Noor missile, derived from the Chinese C-802 system, at about 120 kilometers, while the Qader’s range reaches around 200 kilometers, and the declared range of the Ghadir missile is about 300 kilometers. Deploying systems in these categories on Zuqar would place wide swaths of the southern Red Sea within their range.
At the same time, the island faces constraints that affect its ability to host a large force for extended periods. Its dry volcanic nature and limited water resources require supply lines to remain active, while its exposed spaces and visible facilities make it easier to target than sites distributed along the Yemeni coast.
The western coast offers broader land depth for storage and deployment, and Mayyun offers a direct position in the strait, while Zuqar stands out for its elevation, proximity to the shipping lane and advanced position at sea.
Sovereignty and influence in wartime
Zuqar’s political sensitivity goes back to the Yemeni-Eritrean dispute over the Hanish archipelago. In December 1995, a military confrontation broke out between the two countries over the islands, before the case was referred to an arbitration panel operating under the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague.
On Oct. 9, 1998, the panel issued its sovereignty ruling, awarding the Zuqar-Hanish group to Yemen, while granting Eritrea smaller islands and rocks located near its coast.
On Dec. 17, 1999, it issued its maritime delimitation ruling, adopting a practical median line between the two main coastlines. Since then, the island’s legal status has been settled under Yemeni sovereignty, while the force controlling it has changed with the course of the war inside the country.
After the Houthis seized Sanaa in September 2014 and expanded their advance toward western and southern Yemen, their influence reached Zuqar and a number of Red Sea islands.
In late 2015, coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, along with Yemeni forces opposed to the Houthis, took control of the island as part of operations aimed at securing the Hanish archipelago and the surrounding waters.
Zuqar later became part of the network of western coast forces, where the National Resistance — a military formation led by Tariq Saleh, a member of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council — established a presence.
These forces operate within the anti-Houthi camp and enjoy Emirati support, while maintaining command and organization independent of a number of Yemeni army units.
In a study published by the Italian Institute for International Political Studies in November 2023, researcher Eleonora Ardemagni pointed to the deployment of National Resistance forces on Zuqar and to a naval clash between them and the Houthis in June of that year. In its October 2025 investigation, The Associated Press described the island as a staging point for naval forces loyal to Tariq Saleh.
The Emirati role is more visible in training, supply and infrastructure development than through any declared administration of the island. The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington noted that Emirati personnel remained on Zuqar until October 2019 to help train the coast guard. Ship movements and asphalt shipments linked to the 2025 project then added new indications of an ongoing Emirati connection to the island’s military and logistical infrastructure.
This positioning has gained greater weight since late 2023, when the Houthis expanded their operations against ships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in connection with the war on Gaza.
The attacks prompted shipping companies to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope and brought about US and European military deployments, followed by US, British and Israeli operations against Houthi sites inside Yemen. In this context, the importance of sites capable of monitoring the western coast, smuggling routes and the movement of ships coming from Bab al-Mandab has increased.
Western coast forces use Zuqar as a forward base for patrols and reconnaissance, especially since it can be linked with Mokha and the rest of the Hanish islands to cover a broader sector of the sea, while the pier and runway increase its ability to receive personnel and equipment and maintain a continuous presence. Its location also makes it possible to track boats moving between the Yemeni coast, international waters and the scattered islands of the archipelago.
On July 19, 2026, the National Resistance announced that armed Houthi boats had approached Zuqar and that its naval units had forced them to withdraw in what it said was “an attempt to seize the island.”
The latest developments place Zuqar on a direct maritime front line, as approaching it allows for testing its defenses and monitoring troop movements and activity at the pier and runway, while also threatening the surveillance network being developed by Tariq Saleh’s forces and their allies with Emirati backing in the southern Red Sea.
The National Resistance’s presence on the island, supported by the new infrastructure and Emirati influence in training and supply, gives it greater capacity to track boats and ships and to link naval patrols with sites spread along the western coast.
Today, Zuqar encapsulates the overlap of sovereignty, influence and military geography in the Red Sea. The island is Yemeni by virtue of international arbitration, and forces loyal to Tariq Saleh are stationed there near a lane used by ships heading north after crossing Bab al-Mandab, while the pier and runway expand its ability to receive supplies and support reconnaissance and air operations.
Its sensitivity stems from its place within a network of surveillance and interception stretching between the strait, the Hanish archipelago and the western coast, tracking traffic exiting Bab al-Mandab toward the heart of the Red Sea.