هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
Saudi Arabia links its oil fields to two opposing coastlines: most shipments leave from Gulf ports through the Strait of Hormuz, while the pipeline East-West Pipeline carries part of the crude to Yanbu on the Red Sea. From there, tankers head north toward Egypt and Europe or south through Bab el-Mandeb to Asian markets.
Yanbu’s importance grew during 2026 after disruptions in Hormuz pushed Saudi Arabia to divert a large share of its exports to the western coast. But that route itself entered the danger zone on July 20, when the Houthis announced a naval blockade on the kingdom and warned shipping companies against dealing with its ports.
The warnings and subsequent attacks prompted tankers carrying Saudi oil to change course inside the Red Sea and drove up marine insurance premiums, leaving Riyadh facing pressure at Bab el-Mandeb on the very route it had used to bypass Hormuz.
Main Saudi oil routes
Most Saudi oil routes begin in the fields and processing facilities of the Eastern Province, with Abqaiq serving as a key hub for crude processing and aggregation. From there, the network branches toward the Ras Tanura complex and the Juaymah terminal on the Gulf, or toward the pipeline East-West Pipeline, which stretches about 1,200 kilometers to Yanbu.
The US Energy Information Administration puts the pipeline’s operating capacity at about 5 million barrels per day, with the ability to raise it temporarily to 7 million barrels per day.
The eastern coast has remained the main outlet to Asia. In its October 2024 report on Saudi Arabia, the EIA estimated that about 6.2 million barrels per day of Saudi crude passed through the Strait of Hormuz in 2023, equivalent to 42 percent of all crude moving through the strait that year. Asian markets accounted for three-quarters of the kingdom’s crude exports, with China, Japan, South Korea and India topping the list of buyers.
The statistical bulletin issued by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC, in 2025 shows the scale of that linkage. OECD Asia-Pacific countries received about 1.79 million barrels per day of Saudi crude in 2024, while China received nearly 1.5 million barrels per day and India 624,000 barrels per day, compared with about 721,000 barrels per day that went to OECD European markets.
On the western coast, the port of Yanbu includes terminals for loading crude and refined products, and its berths can receive very large crude carriers. These facilities give the port a role in exporting crude and shipping diesel, kerosene and naphtha, linking western Saudi Arabia to oil and fuel markets in Asia and Europe.
Use of the East-West Pipeline rose during the US-Israeli war on Iran in 2026 to about 7 million barrels per day. Roughly 2 million barrels per day went to refineries and domestic consumption in the west of the kingdom, leaving about 5 million barrels per day available for export via Yanbu. With the pipeline reaching full capacity, the port’s ability to load tankers became the factor determining the volume of departing shipments.
Data from energy-flow tracking firm Kpler and London Stock Exchange Group showed crude loadings from Yanbu rising to about 4.6 million barrels per day in the final week of March 2026, compared with an average of 1.4 million barrels per day in February. The largest share of the increase went to Asia, with shipments sent to China during the month reaching about 2.2 million barrels per day.
Yanbu exports held near 4 million barrels per day in the weeks leading up to July, compared with about 973,000 barrels per day in the same period of 2025.
Vortexa, the shipping and energy data firm, estimated average crude and condensate exports from the port since the Hormuz disruption at about 3.75 million barrels per day, of which India, Japan, China and South Korea accounted for 62 percent, while 23 percent went to Egypt’s Ain Sokhna.
Shipments heading north take the Gulf of Suez route, where tankers discharge crude into the Suez-Mediterranean Pipeline, SUMED, operated by the Arab Petroleum Pipelines Company.
The pipeline carries oil through two parallel lines from Ain Sokhna to Sidi Kerir near Alexandria, with a total capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day, after which it is reloaded onto tankers bound for European and Mediterranean ports. Very large crude carriers use SUMED because draft restrictions prevent them from transiting the Suez Canal fully laden.
As for shipments bound for Asia, they pass through Bab el-Mandeb to the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. On July 23, 2026, the tankers Shin Long Yang and Cosnew Lake, chartered by Unipec, the trading arm of China’s Sinopec, were carrying 4 million barrels of Saudi crude from Yanbu to two Chinese ports. They continued southward even as other tankers turned back north toward Suez after threats escalated.
The impact of the maritime route extends to refined products. Kpler data for the first week of June 2026 showed that European Union and UK imports of Saudi jet fuel loaded in Yanbu reached 118,000 barrels per day, the highest level since August 2025, while Vortexa estimated the flows at about 140,000 barrels per day.
A new threat: Bab el-Mandeb under pressure
Saudi export routes through the Red Sea entered a new phase on July 20, 2026, when the Houthis announced a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia and warned shipping companies against loading or unloading vessels at the kingdom’s ports. The threat came as Yanbu was handling a large share of the exports Riyadh had diverted from the eastern coast after tanker traffic through Hormuz was disrupted.
The repercussions appeared the following day, when three tankers carrying Saudi crude to China and India changed course inside the Red Sea and headed north toward Suez after having been bound for Bab el-Mandeb. The number of tankers altering course later increased, alongside security warnings and additional attacks.
Bab el-Mandeb lies between the Yemeni coast and the coasts of Djibouti and Eritrea, linking the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea to the Red Sea, and then to the Suez Canal and SUMED in the north.
The EIA estimated in its May 2026 update that average oil flows through the strait during the first quarter of the year stood at about 5.4 million barrels per day, including 3.2 million barrels of crude and condensates and 2.2 million barrels of refined products.
The route’s vulnerability became clear after Houthi attacks on ships began in November 2023, as oil flows through Bab el-Mandeb fell from 8.7 million barrels per day in 2023 to about 4 million barrels per day in the first eight months of 2024, while volumes routed around the Cape of Good Hope rose from 6 million to 9.2 million barrels per day.
That shift followed decisions by shipping companies, shipowners and insurers to send voyages along the longer African route.
Saudi shipments have faced similar threats before. In July 2018, two tankers operated by the National Shipping Company of Saudi Arabia were attacked near Bab el-Mandeb, prompting Riyadh to temporarily suspend oil shipments through the strait.
In May 2019, drones targeted two pumping stations on the East-West Pipeline. Then the tanker BW Rhine was attacked near Jeddah in December 2020, and in June 2024 a commercial vessel was hit by a projectile near Hodeidah while heading to Dammam, before the threat entered a new phase after the latest Houthi announcement.
Data from London Stock Exchange Group showed that three tankers carrying Saudi crude to China and India changed course on July 21 and headed north toward Suez after having been sailing south.
The number of tankers changing route increased the following day, alongside a recommendation issued by the European Union naval mission Aspides advising ships linked to Saudi, US or Israeli interests to avoid danger zones in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
On July 22 and 23, the Houthis announced that they had targeted the tankers Innselia and Layla with missiles and drones, while the UK Maritime Trade Operations agency reported that Innselia had been struck by an unidentified projectile and that its bow caught fire near Jazan, with the crew remaining safe.
Ship movements during those days showed variation in company decisions: some tankers continued toward Bab el-Mandeb, while others turned back north or waited for security conditions to change.
The impact of these threats extends to trade through the marine insurance market, as war-risk premiums rose for transiting the Red Sea during July 2026 from about 0.3 percent to 0.75 percent of a vessel’s value, according to insurance-sector sources.
That means additional cover for a tanker valued at $100 million can reach about $750,000 for a short transit period, before adding fuel, security and potential delay costs. Rising premiums, or the inability to obtain coverage, reduces the number of companies willing to use the route.
The effects of the disruption emerge gradually, beginning with attacks on specific ships and some companies’ reluctance to transit, then leading to lower traffic, delayed shipments and tankers turning back north. Saudi Arabia bears that cost even before any broad closure of the strait, through higher transport expenses and pressure on ports, inventories and delivery contracts.
Three alternatives for Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia’s alternatives differ depending on which passage is disrupted and the shipment’s destination. If Hormuz remains available, it can redirect Asian-bound cargoes back to Ras Tanura and Juaymah. SUMED remains the closest route to Europe and the Mediterranean, while sailing around Africa is the longest route for shipments leaving Yanbu for Asia.
Returning to Gulf ports is the shortest route to China, India, Japan and South Korea, as the International Energy Agency estimates that about 90 percent of energy volumes passing through Hormuz in 2025 were headed to Asia, reflecting the continent’s refineries’ dependence on Gulf ports. Redirecting shipments requires redistributing crude among pipelines and eastern terminals, and securing new tankers and loading schedules.
SUMED gives Saudi Arabia an outlet to Europe with capacity of 2.5 million barrels per day, and Aramco owns a 15 percent stake in the project. Storage capacity reaches about 18.4 million barrels at Ain Sokhna and 19.5 million at Sidi Kerir, while the pipeline’s operating capacity limits its ability to absorb the full increase in Yanbu exports, and its facilities are shared among several producers and users.
Tankers heading from Yanbu to Asia can sail north to Suez, then enter the Mediterranean, exit via Gibraltar and loop around Africa to the Indian Ocean. But this route adds up to four weeks to some voyages to India and East Asia, and may raise the cost of a single cargo by more than $5 million because of fuel, transit fees, vessel hire and insurance.
Shipping market analysis estimated that rerouting Asian-bound flows leaving Yanbu to the African route could raise demand for very large crude carriers by about 14 percent. Longer voyages keep ships occupied for more time and reduce the number of trips the fleet can make during the year, with the increase then feeding into freight rates, refining margins and product prices.
Saudi inventories abroad give Aramco additional time to deal with disruptions. On June 18, 2026, company chairman Yasir Al-Rumayyan said Aramco has storage facilities in South Korea and Japan and is studying an expansion of its global network.
Those inventories help fulfill some contracts during the first weeks and rearrange shipments, while the continuity of supplies remains tied to the return of port and sea-lane traffic to regular levels.
Saudi Arabia bears the direct cost of higher insurance, longer voyages, tanker congestion and delayed deliveries, and the effects then spread to importing markets. China, India, Japan and South Korea are among the countries most exposed to a decline in shipments leaving Yanbu southbound, and changing suppliers requires adjustments to contracts, crude grades and refinery delivery schedules.
European markets also face pressure tied to crude and refined products arriving from the Red Sea. For example, Poland’s Orlen relies on Aramco for about 40 percent of the oil it processes, while disruptions at Yanbu and the Suez Canal affect supplies of jet fuel and diesel bound for the European Union and the United Kingdom.
Egypt is also harmed by reduced traffic through Bab el-Mandeb because of its direct connection to the Suez Canal and SUMED. In 2025, the canal received about 4,991 tankers, while oil traffic generates revenue from transit, storage and pumping. When ships divert around the Cape of Good Hope, Egypt loses part of that traffic, and the impact extends to shipping companies, insurers, refineries and airlines.
A short disruption begins with higher insurance premiums, postponed bookings and route changes for some ships. As the crisis continues for weeks, the need for SUMED, Gulf ports and the African route grows, tanker demand rises, and refineries’ ability to receive supplies on schedule declines.
Simultaneous pressure on Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, meanwhile, pushes the East-West Pipeline, Yanbu port and SUMED closer to their operating limits, making inventories and the redistribution of supplies among markets a central part of crisis management.
The maritime chokepoints crisis shows that the flexibility of Saudi Arabia’s export network depends on ships’ ability to reach markets after leaving port. When Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb come under pressure at the same time, the problem shifts from finding an alternative outlet to managing the costs of transport, insurance and delayed deliveries, making maritime route security a direct component of Saudi export security.