هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
An Israeli plan drawn up during the 2026 war hinged on turning the Iraqi-Iranian border into an entry point for a ground front in northwestern Iran, led by armed Iranian Kurdish groups that have been based for years in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region.
The concept began with a force that Israeli officials estimated at about 15,000 to 16,000 fighters, preceded by airstrikes targeting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and security agencies to open the roads for its advance. The force would then expand inside Iran by recruiting local fighters and as protests spread to other areas.
Investigations that emerged during and after the war reveal that the Kurdish gambit was part of a broader vision for changing the Iranian regime, one that the Mossad helped push and that Tel Aviv discussed with Washington before the war broke out.
But between the scale of the ambition in planning rooms and the capabilities of the factions deployed on the ground, a wide gap emerged. Preparations ultimately ended with the halt of any mass crossing before it was carried out, while the border afterward remained the scene of limited infiltrations and clashes between Kurdish groups and Iranian forces.
What was the plan for the “Kurdish corridor”?
The outlines of the plan began to emerge on Feb. 11, 2026, when then-Mossad chief David Barnea and Israeli military Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir presented aspects of a regime-change scenario to US President Donald Trump, more than two weeks before the war broke out.
After the war began, Reuters revealed on March 4 that armed Iranian Kurdish groups were holding consultations with US officials about the possibility of attacking Iranian security forces in the country’s west and the scale of military and intelligence support required.
On March 6, the agency published a broader investigation pointing to Israeli contacts with these groups dating back about a year, as well as plans to seize border towns including Oshnavieh and Piranshahr in West Azerbaijan province.
The picture expanded with subsequent Israeli investigations. Haaretz said on July 13 that the Mossad assessment included about 16,000 Kurdish fighters in the initial assault. Yedioth Ahronoth then published an account on Aug. 4 putting the force at about 15,000 fighters, with a scenario in which it would later rise to between 150,000 and 200,000 people through the addition of local fighters.
A comparison with field estimates reveals the scale of the Israeli wager. Reuters estimated the total number of fighters in the Iranian Kurdish factions at about 5,000 to 8,000, while the Associated Press cited an estimate of 8,000 to 10,000, and France’s Le Monde put the figure at about 4,000 to 5,000.
That means the 15,000 to 16,000 figure was an operational estimate of the force planners wanted to assemble in the first phase, while independent estimates of the force already present in Iraq were far lower.
And Israel’s Channel 13 revealed on July 13 that the broader Israeli regime-change project carried the codename “Puss in Boots” and that the Kurdish move was one of its components. It said thousands of Kurdish fighters were transported to Israel for training on operational scenarios.
The operational sequence relied on an air campaign to clear the way for the ground force. An April investigation by Yedioth Ahronoth said that the phase involving the entry of Kurdish fighters was scheduled after about 100 hours of aerial activity, and that the Israeli Air Force had already begun striking targets linked to opening corridors inside Iran.
In the early days of the war, data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, or ACLED showed more than 20 US and Israeli strikes in Iranian Kurdish areas that hit at least 12 sites belonging to the Revolutionary Guard, police, border guards and security facilities.
The number of US and Israeli strikes recorded by ACLED in northwestern Iran had reached about 140 by the end of March, though the direct link between each strike and the “corridor” target list remained unclear.
According to Yedioth Ahronoth, the role of air power was to continue as the ground force advanced, targeting positions that blocked its path and securing the corridors through which it moved. After entering the cities, a phase of recruiting fighters from inside Iran was supposed to begin, in tandem with widening protests and the opening of other internal fronts to tie down regime forces.
According to the same newspaper, planners asked the factions to advance under the former Iranian flag bearing the lion and sun emblem, in an attempt to present the move as part of a broader Iranian project for regime change. The Kurdish forces, however, had their own political agenda.
On Feb. 22, 2026, five groups announced the formation of the “Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan,” placing the overthrow of the Islamic Republic and the Kurds’ right to self-determination among its goals. A Kurdish source told Reuters on March 6 that the long-term vision of some of these forces leaned toward autonomy or semi-autonomy within a federal Iran.
Uncertainty surrounds the arms file that was supposed to support the force. On June 4, Yedioth Ahronoth and Israel’s Channel 12 published reports saying the Mossad had transferred to Iranian Kurdish factions weapons seized by the Israeli military from Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. They also spoke of anti-tank weapons, bombs, vehicles, financial aid and training, with a role assigned to the CIA.
By contrast, leaders of two major factions told Reuters in an investigation published on April 8 that they had not received US weapons. In June, Abdullah Mohtadi, secretary-general of the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan; Khaled Azizi, spokesman for the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan; and Reza Kaabi, secretary-general of the Komala Party of the Toilers of Kurdistan, all denied receiving US or Israeli weapons.
Where are the Kurdish groups based, and where were they planning to cross from?
The force the plan relied on was divided among parties and factions that differed in leadership and areas of deployment. The Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan included the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), the Khabat Organization for the Struggle of Iranian Kurdistan, and the Komala Party of the Toilers of Kurdistan.
On March 4, the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan joined the coalition. It is one of several Iranian Kurdish organizations that bear the name Komala as a result of earlier splits within the movement.
The Kurdistan Freedom Party was among the most prominent factions to emerge during the preparations. Reuters visited one of its training bases on the outskirts of Erbil in February and met its military commander, Rebaz Sharifi. The same site, along with a house used as headquarters and lodging, was later hit by an Iranian strike after the war broke out.
Le Monde estimated the force led by Sharifi at about 1,000 fighters, while Sharifi himself said his party relied on a network of activists, informants and smugglers inside Iran to maintain contact and facilitate movement across the border.
The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan maintains a prominent presence around Koysinjaq, known as Koya, in Erbil province, along with camps housing fighters and their families. Sites linked to it came under Iranian strikes during the war.
As for PJAK, which is politically and organizationally linked to PKK, its activity is concentrated in the Qandil Mountains area and the Penjwen axis directly near the Iranian border. Research estimates place its strength at between 1,000 and 3,000 fighters. Reuters documented the presence of one of its leaders in a tunnel complex near Penjwen, giving it a different position from parties based around Erbil and Koya.
Komala branches and the Khabat Organization are deployed mainly in Sulaymaniyah province and other parts of the region. A Komala headquarters in Sulaymaniyah was bombed during the war.
Security arrangements that preceded the war changed the shape of this deployment. Under the Iraqi-Iranian security agreement concluded in March 2023, Baghdad began in September of that year relocating Iranian Kurdish groups from sites near the border to camps deeper inside the Kurdistan Region.
Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein said in September 2023 that the groups had been moved away from border areas, while bases were closed and the factions’ movements restricted. By 2026, parts of the force slated for the operation were around Erbil, Koya and Sulaymaniyah, meaning they first had to move toward the border strip before any large-scale crossing attempt.
During the war, an official from the Kurdistan Freedom Party told the Associated Press that some of its forces had moved to positions closer to Iran in Sulaymaniyah province, while an official from Komala estimated that his forces needed between a week and 10 days to prepare for crossing once conditions were in place.
Geographically, the northern axis from Erbil through Haji Omaran toward Piranshahr and Oshnavieh in Iran’s West Azerbaijan Province stands out. These were among the towns that the factions were reportedly considering taking control of. The Qandil–Sidakan arc also contains mountainous areas historically used for smuggling and cross-border movement.
This axis is the closest to the towns mentioned in the investigations, while farther south runs the Penjwen-Bashmakh-Marivan axis, linking Sulaymaniyah province with Iran’s Kurdistan province.
PJAK’s presence around Penjwen increases the importance of this axis, which extends from Marivan toward Sanandaj, where security sites were struck in the first days of the war.
A third axis runs through the Parviz Khan crossing toward Qasr-e Shirin in Kermanshah province, though most references linked to the plan focused on West Azerbaijan and the areas farther north. The available information points to more than one possible crossing route, without sources disclosing an Israeli operational map specifying the path the force was supposed to take.
For years, the factions have used mountain smuggling networks to move people, messages and weapons across both sides of the border. Rebaz Sharifi said the Kurdistan Freedom Party paid smugglers, and at times some Iranian border guards, in exchange for getting individuals into Iran.
These routes are suited to the movement of small groups, whereas bringing in a force numbering in the thousands would require broader roads, staging areas, continuous supply and protection from surveillance and bombardment. That made air cover and freedom of movement inside the Kurdistan Region decisive elements in the Israeli concept.
Why did the “Kurdish corridor” remain on paper?
From the first days of the war, Tehran launched a military and security campaign to seal off areas that could turn into crossing points. It reinforced its presence inside Kurdish cities and along the border, while striking the groups’ bases inside the Kurdistan Region with missiles and drones.
By the end of March, ACLED had counted at least 388 missiles and drones launched by Iran and its allies at Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, with nearly half targeting sites linked to Kurdish parties and fighters. Five faction members were killed in the first wave of strikes, and headquarters used by their leaders for training and residence were hit in precise attacks.
On the Iranian side, residents near the city of Baneh, close to the border with Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, spoke of a convoy of about 50 buses carrying Revolutionary Guard personnel moving toward the border on March 22. Sharifi said moving fighters had become extremely difficult with the intensified security deployment and the rising cost of smuggling.
The Hamza Sayyid al-Shuhada headquarters of the Revolutionary Guard’s ground forces also announced during March and the spring that it had targeted armed groups and thwarted arms-smuggling operations on the Baneh axis.
In Iraq, the plan ran into the official position in Baghdad and Erbil. During the war, Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al-Araji said an Iranian official had requested measures to prevent opposition groups from infiltrating, and that Baghdad had sent reinforcements to the border and was committed to preventing its territory from being used to carry out attacks on Iran, in compliance with the 2023 security agreement.
On March 5, the Kurdistan Regional Government said that neither it nor the ruling parties were involved in arming Iranian Kurdish factions or sending them into Iranian territory. At the end of the same month, regional President Nechirvan Barzani reaffirmed that the region’s policy was to stay out of the war.
Erbil deployed forces to the border to prevent Iranian groups from crossing, while Revolutionary Guard commanders threatened to shell those forces if they remained near the border strip. Iranian pressure also increased the cost for the Kurdistan Region itself: On March 24, a barrage of six ballistic missiles killed six Iraqi Kurdish fighters and wounded about 30, according to the regional government.
And people close to the Iraqi Kurdish leadership told Reuters that Masoud Barzani had informed Trump of his desire to keep the region out of the war, fearing that Iraq’s Kurds would bear the cost of turning their territory into a base for attacking Iran. With thousands of fighters in camps and bases inside the region, carrying out the operation required freedom of movement, assembly and supply that local authorities would have to allow — a condition that was absent as Baghdad and Erbil tightened border controls.
Turkish pressure moved in the same direction. Reuters reported on Jan. 14, 2026, that Turkish intelligence had informed the Revolutionary Guard of attempts by armed Kurdish elements to cross from Iraq during that month’s protests.
In March, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan pressed US lawmakers against a cross-border Kurdish operation, warning that its effects could extend to Turkey and Syria. Later Israeli investigations added that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke with Trump and warned him of the repercussions of a Kurdish incursion and the possibility of Turkish-Israeli friction.
As for Washington, its reservations existed before the war broke out. According to Yedioth Ahronoth, CIA Director John Ratcliffe, Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President JD Vance expressed doubts during a Feb. 12 meeting about the chances of turning minority movements and protests into a path leading to the regime’s fall.
After the war began, Israeli preparations reached an advanced stage. The newspaper said Trump ordered the invasion halted hours before the crossing, while Channel 13 said the veto came about three days after the campaign began. On Aug. 4, Yedioth Ahronoth reported that the Kurdish force was capable of moving within 48 hours and that the Israeli military had begun preparing air support, but the final order to cross was never issued.
A parallel dispute also emerged within the Israeli establishment over the viability of the wager itself. Israeli military intelligence, Aman, prepared an assessment lowering the chances of the regime’s collapse and raising concerns about the difficulty of relying on the Kurds and the uncertainty of the scale of US support. Its chief, Shlomi Binder, also warned of the effect of internet shutdowns on coordinating an internal uprising and of the implications of a failed attempt to topple the regime for Iran’s nuclear calculations.
By contrast, the Mossad and political officials pushed to continue the project of “creating the conditions for regime change,” and after the war the dispute turned into a blame game over responsibility for its suspension.
In early June, new Mossad chief Roman Gofman ended the duties of his deputy, known in Israeli media by the letter “Aleph,” an official whom Israeli reports linked to the regime-change project. Channel 12 then reported on Aug. 6 that he had also removed the head of the intelligence directorate and the head of the Iran division from their posts, both of whom had participated in drafting the plan based on using minorities and protests.
Israeli accounts diverged between officials who believed the project’s assumptions had collided with a different reality on the ground and former officials who said Washington stopped it before it reached its decisive phase.
After the large-scale incursion was halted, Kurdish armed activity inside Iran remained on a much smaller scale. In late June, clashes linked to PJAK took place near Mahabad, and four members of its armed wing were reported killed. In early July, the Revolutionary Guard said a group from the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan had entered a mountainous area near Piranshahr and that several of its members were killed.
On July 2, Reuters reported the killing of two Revolutionary Guard members in an attack in Kermanshah province that, according to the Kurdish rights organization Hengaw, was claimed by a newly formed Kurdish group. On Aug. 2, an Iranian army base near Marivan came under attack by two small drones and rocket fire, and the Iranian military attributed the operation to PJAK.
As of Aug. 18, 2026, the planned incursion with an initial force of about 15,000 to 16,000 fighters had still not been carried out. What remained on the ground was a pattern of small cells, limited infiltrations and localized clashes, alongside continued Iranian shelling of faction positions in Iraq.
The original plan, meanwhile, required at one moment a force larger than what was available in the field, air cover and continuous supply, freedom of movement through the Kurdistan Region, US approval, and an internal Iranian environment that would allow the force to expand after entering. As those conditions receded one after another, the “Kurdish corridor” ended up as a project that reached an advanced stage of preparation but remained short of the mass crossing point for which it had been designed.