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Türkiye is redistributing its energy sources, a large share of which had become tied to Russia in recent years, taking advantage of broader options for buying oil and gas, rising domestic production, and expanding infrastructure for LNG and renewables.
The clearest signs of this shift emerged in June 2026, when the United States became the single largest supplier of crude oil to the Turkish market, while Russian gas retained its weight within the supply system Ankara has built around pipelines and long-term contracts.
Russia remained the largest supplier that same month when crude and refined petroleum products were counted together, and it also retained the lead in crude imports during the first half of the year, making the rise of the US part of a broader expansion in Türkiye’s supplier mix rather than a stable shift to a single new source.
This change is unfolding within a broader policy that includes increasing the number of suppliers, expanding LNG import and storage capacity, raising gas production from the Black Sea and oil production from the Gabar region in Sirnak province in southeastern Türkiye, and increasing the share of renewables and nuclear energy in electricity generation, giving Ankara greater room to weigh prices, volumes and contract terms.
In its review on Sept. 4, 2026, the International Energy Agency said Türkiye’s dependence on imported fuels is a structural challenge that continues to weigh on its energy and economic security.
How did Türkiye reduce its dependence on Russian oil and increase imports from the US?
Russian crude deepened its presence in the Turkish market after the war in Ukraine, when discounts on Urals crude allowed refineries to cut refining costs.
Data from Kpler, which specializes in tracking commodity and energy flows, show that Russia’s weight began to decline during 2025 after reaching elevated levels the previous year, before Türkiye’s supplier basket expanded more clearly in 2026.
The refinery balance began to change as the risks of dealing with Russian producers and tankers increased. In February 2025, Levent Bayar, executive director of investor relations at Tupras, Türkiye’s largest oil refiner, said the company stopped buying Urals after new US sanctions, then resumed purchases in April as the economics of Russian crude improved under Western price-cap rules.
In June, Urals crude flows returned to high levels as the discount widened, confirming that price continued to shape refinery decisions alongside sanctions.
Pressure intensified in the second half of 2025 with tighter US, British and European sanctions. Then, in January 2026, European rules took effect, banning the import of refined products in third countries when the crude used was of Russian origin. This made the issue more sensitive for Tupras and the STAR refinery owned by Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR, as both continued to export some products to European markets.
During this period, Turkish refineries also expanded their experience in handling crudes from Brazil, Guyana, Nigeria, Libya and Norway, in addition to Iraq’s Basra crude and Kazakhstan’s KEBCO crude, which is similar in characteristics to Urals. This diversity gave Turkish buyers more flexibility to choose based on prices, transport costs, refinery requirements, and regulatory constraints.
The US-Israeli war on Iran accelerated this path after Gulf exports and energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz were disrupted, pushing more Atlantic Basin crude toward markets east of Suez.
The International Energy Agency estimated in its June report that Atlantic Basin crude exports to those markets had risen by about 3.5 million barrels per day since the war broke out, supported by production in the Americas and the US release of strategic reserves.
The shift then deepened with disruptions in the Black Sea. Estimates from the Kyiv School of Economics, a Ukrainian research institution that tracks Russian energy exports, showed that seaborne Russian crude to Türkiye fell in July by about 54 percent from the 2025 average, while US shipments continued. Supplies arrived from Gabon, Angola, Brazil and the UAE.
In August, the same pattern extended to refined products, as diesel purchases from the United States and India increased and Russia’s share dropped to around one-fifth after broad dominance during 2025.
This path gives Turkish refineries greater flexibility to change the barrel’s origin when risks rise, or the Russian discount narrows. At the same time, Urals can regain market share when its price advantage improves. The cost of sanctions compliance, the variety of available crude grades, and refineries’ experience in using them have become fixed factors in Turkish purchasing decisions.
Why does Russian gas remain important to Türkiye despite expanding alternatives?
Türkiye’s gas mix is changing more slowly than its oil mix. The market expanded during 2025, and supplies from Azerbaijan and US LNG increased, while Russian volumes remained near previous levels, reducing Moscow’s share of total imports without a comparable drop in the quantities it sells to Türkiye.
This pattern is tied to existing infrastructure. Russian gas arrives via the Blue Stream pipeline, which runs from Russia under the Black Sea to the city of Samsun in northern Türkiye, and the TurkStream pipeline, which crosses the Black Sea to the Kiyikoy area in Kirklareli province in the country’s northwest. Together, the two lines provide steady flows to a market whose demand rises sharply in winter.
When the main contracts with Russia’s Gazprom expired in December 2025, Türkiye’s state pipeline and energy company Botas extended both contracts for one year until the end of 2026, keeping large annual volumes within Türkiye’s gas mix.
Adam Michalski, a researcher at the Center for Eastern Studies in Poland, argued on March 17, 2026, that the LNG boom had expanded Ankara’s room for maneuver in negotiations with Moscow, and that the short extension preserved Botas’ flexibility before determining the shape of future contracts. LNG market volatility also adds value to stable Russian flows when prices rise or shipping routes are disrupted.
Alternatives expanded in parallel, as Azerbaijan boosted pipeline supplies and became the largest supplier in this category in June 2026, while Algerian gas retained its place within LNG supplies.
As for Iran, its long-term contract with Türkiye was due to expire in July 2026. Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said in April that negotiations to extend it had not begun because of wartime conditions, increasing the importance of other suppliers in Ankara’s calculations.
The biggest shift came from US LNG, whose imports rose sharply during 2025. Estimated the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, an international center specializing in energy markets and financing, said the United States supplied about 60 percent of LNG imported into Türkiye in the first quarter of 2026.
Part of LNG purchases shifted from spot deals to long-term contracts. In September 2025, Botas signed a group of new agreements, including a 20-year contract with Swiss energy trader Mercuria to supply about 4 billion cubic meters annually starting in 2026, with flexibility over the source of the gas and the delivery point.
The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies placed this expansion within the framework of Türkiye’s contract reshuffle through the rest of the decade. In a study published in October 2025, it said that growth in domestic production and LNG contracts would reduce the size of the market available to external suppliers and strengthen Botas’ position in negotiating prices, volumes, withdrawal terms and contract length, while Gazprom would remain a strong competitor thanks to abundant gas and existing infrastructure.
Turkish infrastructure supports this shift. LNG regasification capacity has multiplied several times since 2016, alongside expanded underground storage at the Silivri facility west of Istanbul and Tuz Golu near Salt Lake in Aksaray province in central Türkiye.
These facilities allow Türkiye to buy gas on the global market and store it at opportune times. At the same time, Russian, Azerbaijani and Iranian pipelines continue to cover a large share of ongoing demand.
Movements in July 2026 reveal the flexibility of this mix. The Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air estimated that Russian pipeline gas flows to Türkiye exceeded double their June level, showing that a decline in Russia’s annual share can coincide with large monthly increases in flows depending on market conditions.
How is Türkiye using energy diversification to reduce its dependence on the outside world?
Import costs remain the heaviest factor in this policy. More suppliers reduce the risk of supply disruptions and give Ankara greater bargaining power, but the economy remains exposed to global prices and the need for foreign currency. That is why increasing domestic production and renewables matters beyond simply diversifying the countries shipments come from.
The energy bill rose again during 2026 despite the widening supplier map. Charles Lichfield, director of geoeconomics analysis at the Atlantic Council, believes the energy price shock was directly reflected in the current account, reserves and the lira. At the same time, S&P Global Ratings estimated that energy imports could amount to between 3.5 percent and 4.5 percent of GDP in shock years.
The Sakarya field in the Black Sea carries growing weight in this equation. In its Sept. 4, 2026 review, the International Energy Agency estimated that once its development phases are complete, its output could cover more than a quarter of Türkiye’s 2024 gas consumption, reducing the volumes Botas needs to buy under external contracts and increasing competition among suppliers for the Turkish market.
But demand is moving in the same direction. Turkish electricity consumption has grown at the fastest pace among International Energy Agency member states over the past two decades, and the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources expects consumption to increase by about a quarter by 2030. That makes energy efficiency and grid development decisive elements in turning higher domestic production and renewables into an actual decline in imports.
Renewable energy is expanding alongside this growth. The International Energy Agency expects wind and solar to gain a larger share in electricity generation and gas use in power generation to decline in the coming years, with greater need for grids and storage to ensure the power system benefits from new capacity.
The Akkuyu nuclear power plant, under construction in Mersin province in southern Türkiye, adds a different dimension to Ankara’s relationship with Moscow. The project, which costs more than $20 billion, is being carried out by Russia’s state nuclear company Rosatom under a build-own-operate model. As its units enter service, part of gas and coal consumption in electricity generation will decline. At the same time, a long-term link with Russia will continue through financing, technology, nuclear fuel, and plant ownership.
Ankara is also seeking to capitalize on its location and the infrastructure it has built in regional gas trade. Botas has supply arrangements with Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, and in May 2026 Bulgaria’s Bulgargaz bought a US LNG cargo that arrived in Türkiye before being transferred through the Botas network to the Bulgarian market.
Türkiye’s gas network combines supplies coming from Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran, alongside LNG and domestic production, strengthening Türkiye’s position between the markets of the Caspian, the Middle East and Europe.
Ali Riza Alaboyun, a former Turkish energy minister, believes Türkiye’s evolution into a trading hub requires a more competitive market and broader private-sector participation. In contrast, Eser Ozdil, a gas market expert and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council, ties the success of this path to opening infrastructure to multiple parties and reducing Botas’ dominance over imports, supply and network operations.
Turk-Stream adds a geopolitical dimension to this ambition, having become one of the most important remaining routes for Russian gas to southeastern Europe after transit through Ukraine stopped, while the European Union is moving ahead with a gradual ban on Russian gas imports that extends to long-term pipeline gas contracts by fall 2027, increasing the importance of gas origin and the transparency of blending and re-exporting in the expansion of Türkiye’s trade with Europe.
Estimates from S&P Global Commodity Insights, which specializes in energy and commodity market data and analysis, point to continued growth in Türkiye’s LNG imports through 2028, alongside rising domestic demand. Ankara’s ability to reduce external dependence thus depends on how much Sakarya, renewables, and consumption efficiency add relative to demand growth.
Today, the shift appears more advanced in oil than in gas. Turkish refineries have become more capable of switching among multiple suppliers, and Russian crude’s centrality has declined from its previous peak. In contrast, Russian gas has retained greater weight thanks to volume, infrastructure, and stable flows.
The import bill and demand growth set the ceiling for this path. Rising output from Sakarya and Gabar, along with renewables, reduces part of the need for external supplies, while LNG terminals, storage and pipelines provide broader flexibility in choosing suppliers. As these options expand, Türkiye is moving toward a wider distribution of risks and supply sources. At the same time, the clearest measure of how far this shift has advanced through the end of the decade remains a decline in net energy imports.