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Statements by Emergency and Disaster Management Minister Ra’ed al-Saleh diverged from the government’s timelines for ending the camps in Syria. He said work is underway to close the camps file by September 2027, while government officials in recent months promoted the slogan, “A Syria without camps before the end of 2026.”
The plan became public during a workshop held in January 2026 with the participation of several government bodies. President Ahmed al-Shara’a reinforced the plan in March through Decree No. 59, which stipulated the formation of a committee headed by al-Saleh to prepare infrastructure in devastated areas for residents’ return.
The plan is proceeding along six parallel tracks, including rehabilitating devastated areas; removing rubble, land mines and war remnants; supporting voluntary return; mobilizing funding and coordinating with the United Nations; regulation and governance; and preparing a comprehensive database on the camps, their populations and their needs.
Between the goal of ending the camps by the end of 2026 and the new deadline for closing them, this report examines the reasons behind the differing dates in official rhetoric, and the obstacles that still stand in the way of the return of hundreds of thousands of displaced people and refugees, despite the decline in the camp population from about 3 million to 800,000 since the fall of Bashar Assad’s regime.
800,000 Displaced Syrians Waiting to Go Home
On Sept. 10, Minister Raed al-Saleh said the ambition is to close the camps file in September 2027, noting that 141,000 families remain in the camps, equivalent to about 750,000 to 800,000 people, and that 20.8 percent of camp residents have returned to their areas since the ministerial committee was formed, while 201 camps have been closed in different areas.
Forty percent of the remaining families live in concrete buildings, including apartments and structures built in recent years to meet the needs of the displaced, while 40 percent live in shelters with concrete walls and tarp roofs, 17 percent in fabric tents, and 3 percent in prefabricated “caravans.”
Among these cases, about 8 percent of camp residents represent the ‘most difficult segment,’ including those who lack homes or land. Detailing the specific obstacles they face, such as unemployment or destroyed property, enhances awareness of the complexities in supporting displaced populations and the need for targeted solutions.
For nearly two months, voluntary return convoys have been departing daily from the camps, alongside projects to rehabilitate infrastructure in several areas, including schools, clinics, and water and electricity stations. Government bodies, local, U.N., and international organizations, as well as business donors, are taking part in these efforts. At the same time, the committee coordinates them and oversees preparations for a safe, dignified, and sustainable return, according to al-Saleh.
The minister said the camp issue is “multi-layered and complex” and requires several decisions, including those related to housing and concrete buildings. He cited the Kafr Jales camp as an example: it includes four-story buildings housing about 12,000 families and has sewage, water, and electricity services. He explained that among the options being considered for dealing with similar camps is to organize them administratively so they become towns, municipalities, or suburbs affiliated with nearby cities, which would require state budgets.
As for camps that include shelters with concrete walls and tarp roofs, al-Saleh pointed to a decline in the number of residents there, explaining that the focus is on persuading those living in them to move to new locations, amid the availability of about 7,500 vacant concrete shelters left behind by people who returned to their areas, which, he said, helps reorganize the camp situation.
The minister said the committee is directly targeting camps located in the most vulnerable areas, especially those set up in valleys and flood channels, to prevent them from being harmed in the event of flooding. He explained that work is underway to gradually relocate these camps, noting that they represent about 3% of the camps and still house between 4,000 and 5,000 families.
2026 for the Tents, 2027 for the Camp Question
Over the past months, the slogan “Syria without camps before the end of 2026” has been repeated by several ministers and officials, including the minister of finance Mohammed Yusr Barnieh, and the director of social affairs and labor in Idlib Governorate, Ahlam al-Rashid, and Aleppo governor Azzam al-Gharib, in addition to statements Other statements supported this direction, amid the participation of a large number of government bodies in the committee handling the camps file, which includes the ministries of health, education, social affairs and labor, public works and housing, local administration and environment, emergency and disaster management, and finance, in addition to the governorates of Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, Latakia, and Sweida.
At the presidential level, Ahmad al-Sharaa spoke in March 2026 about the government’s hope of closing between 70 percent and 80 percent of the camps during the year and enabling residents to return to their villages and towns. He then said on May 18 that Syria is committed to turning the page on the camps by 2027.
The end of 2026 also remained present in some statements and state media reports, alongside the ministerial committee’s vision of ‘Syria Without Camps,’ which enjoys international and UN support. Notably, Saudi Arabia’s $1.5 billion contribution underscores the geopolitical and financial backing that influences Syria’s displacement policies, providing context for the scope and potential impact of these efforts.
According to a clarification provided to NoonPost by the Media Communications Office at the Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management, the end-of-2026 deadline refers to closing tent camps, while the declared ambition for 2027 is to close the camps and the displacement file fully.
The announced timelines reveal a gap between public statements and actual progress, which may help the audience feel informed and reassured about the complexities involved in the camp closure process.
Poverty, Destruction and the Barriers to Return
The displacement and forced migration crisis remains complex amid a heavy legacy of destruction, crumbling infrastructure, land mines, war remnants, and poverty — all factors that continue to hinder return a year and nine months after Assad’s fall, despite a decline in the number of displaced people and tents. The U.N. refugee agency estimated that 2,009,506 internally displaced people returned to their areas of origin in Syria between December 2024 and Sept. 3, 2026.
The latest move under the “Syria Without Camps” vision was the announcement by Hama Governorate of a package of projects slated for implementation in the coming period, including 84 projects in 70 towns and villages at a cost of nearly $7.5 million, distributed across several sectors, including education, sanitation, water and wells, health care and clinics, roads, and infrastructure.
Living conditions and services in areas of origin remain an obstacle to the return of some displaced and uprooted people, according to Azzam al-Anan, who lives in the “Fath Dar” camp near Sarmada in northern Idlib after his home in the village of Sheik Mustafa in southern rural Idlib was destroyed. He explains that he cleared the rubble from his house’s foundations but cannot rebuild.
Azzam told Noonpost that while some families leave the camp, others return to it because they are unable to settle in their home villages, attributing this to extreme poverty and the absence of income sources, to the point that some families cannot even afford to pitch a tent where their destroyed home once stood.
He notes that assistance for returnees is often limited to transporting the family and its few belongings from the tent, or providing a food basket sufficient for several days or weeks, depending on household size.
He adds that job opportunities near the camps are another reason some families remain, as many fathers and their sons work in factories and companies in Sarmada, Harem, Salqin, and Al-Dana. At the same time, the original villages, as he describes them, lack job opportunities and income sources.
He also believes that the services around camps established for years, despite their scarcity and weakness, are better than those available in the original villages, pointing to nearby schools and water sources, even if supplied by tankers, which still come at a lower cost.
Testimonies from three families interviewed by Noonpost confirm part of these difficulties. One said returnees to Maarat al-Numan are forced to travel about 25 miles to access health care services, adding financial burdens, risks, and delays in treatment.
Despite the enormous challenges, Syria has a historic opportunity to address the displacement crisis, contingent on turning return into durable, safe, dignified, and sustainable solutions, in parallel with reconstruction, the restoration of services and livelihoods, guaranteeing the restoration of displaced people’s housing, land, and property rights, clearing landmines and war remnants, and sustaining international support for recovery and reintegration programs, according to Paula Gaviria, the special rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons. Betancur.