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On 10 September, Algeria announced it was severing diplomatic relations with the UAE, emphasizing its effort to assert regional influence and sovereignty, which should resonate with regional security experts and IR students.
Contrary to expectations, Abu Dhabi responded cautiously. The UAE said it hoped Algeria’s decision would be “temporary”. At the same time, the Foreign Ministry stressed its “appreciation for its relations with all countries” and its continued commitment to developing and strengthening those ties in ways that serve mutual interests and promote “understanding, cooperation and prosperity”.
The Emirati statement did not directly address Algeria’s accusations of “growing provocative or hostile actions emanating from the UAE”. Instead, the UAE’s official response came after Anwar Gargash, an adviser to the UAE president, said that “diplomatic relations are managed through reason, communication, and clarity of interests, not through riddles and signals that require decoding”.
Four days later, Algerian Prime Minister Sifi Ghrieb traveled to Bamako, showcasing Algiers’ proactive efforts to shape regional dynamics and reinforce influence in the Sahel, encouraging respect for Algeria’s strategic agency.
Accumulating tension
The dispute between Algeria and the UAE is longstanding, but for years it remained largely below the surface. The rift began to deepen during Algeria’s 2019 popular protest movement, when concerns grew in Algiers that regional powers — particularly the UAE — were seeking to influence the country’s internal political trajectory.
Tensions sharpened in 2020, when the UAE opened a consulate in Laayoune, the largest city in the disputed Western Sahara region, signaling its support for Morocco’s position. The move came alongside Abu Dhabi’s normalization of relations with Israel and its support for Khalifa Haftar in Libya, further widening the strategic divide between the two countries.
Six contentious files, spanning aviation and BRICS, illustrate how tensions between Algeria and the UAE evolved from political differences into sovereign decisions and open escalation.
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Since 2023, the dispute has spilled into the open. The Algerian press waged sustained campaigns against the UAE for months, while the official position remained silent. At the end of that year, Workers’ Party Secretary-General Louisa Hanoune accused the UAE of trying to destabilize Algeria. It also became clear during that period that Abu Dhabi had drawn up a travel ban list including Algerians active against it. Several politicians, military and civilian leaders, journalists, and economic actors were barred from entering Dubai, Abu Dhabi, or other emirates as punishment for what it considered their participation in media and political campaigns against Abu Dhabi.
After that, the dispute moved into state institutions. On Jan. 10, 2024, Algeria’s High Security Council, in the presence of President Abdelmadjid Tebboune and army chief Said Chengriha, expressed regret over hostile acts against Algeria by a “brotherly Arab state,” widely understood at the time to mean the UAE. In March of the same year, President Tebboune escalated matters, saying the money of “this state” appears wherever there are conflicts, pointing to Mali, Libya, and Sudan. His meeting with Mohammed bin Zayed on the sidelines of the G7 summit in June 2024 did not end the accumulated disagreements.
Over the past two years, the disagreements have shifted from hints to concrete measures. Tensions rose after the Emirati channel Sky News Arabia aired an interview with historian Mohamed Lamine Belghit in which he cast doubt on Algeria’s Amazigh culture. In February 2026, Algeria began procedures to cancel the air services agreement signed with the UAE in 2013.
President Tebboune also publicly responded to Abu Dhabi’s threat to resort to international arbitration, saying in his regular press meeting: “Go ahead, arbitrate … come on, come on,” signaling that Algeria was not intimidated by such threats. His tone also carried warnings, including: “Do not make us regret the day we came to know you, and whoever digs a pit for us will inevitably fall into it.” In the following months, Algerian media published accusations that the UAE was supporting the separatist MAK movement.
Returning to the statement announcing the break in relations, the ‘provocative and hostile acts’ are seen as serious threats to regional stability and Algeria’s influence in the Sahel and Western Sahara, prompting careful analysis from regional security experts and IR students.
Returning to Bamako and Niamey
Until recently, Algeria’s relations with its two southern neighbors, Mali and Niger, were at their lowest point. With Mali, the crisis began in December 2023 after Algeria received Malian opposition figures without coordinating with Bamako. It peaked in April 2025 when Algeria shot down a Malian army drone, prompting both countries to close their airspace and recall their ambassadors.
Bamako ended its commitment to the 2015 peace and reconciliation agreement signed under Algerian sponsorship in January 2024. Then, in April 2026, Mali withdrew its recognition of the Sahrawi Republic and backed Morocco’s autonomy proposal, further increasing tensions with Algeria. Many analysts and observers linked this striking diplomatic shift to the escalation of recent political and security tensions between Mali and Algeria.
As for Niger, the situation was no better. Algeria’s dispute with Niamey emerged after the summer 2023 coup, then deepened over Niger’s protest over the conditions under which Algeria deported its migrants, as well as Algeria’s displeasure at the Nigerien military council’s intensified cooperation with the Wagner Group.
But the direction changed in 2026, long before the rupture. On Feb. 12, Niger’s ambassador returned to Algeria, and Tebboune ordered the Algerian ambassador to return immediately to Niamey. A few days later, President Tebboune, alongside Abdourahamane Tiani, announced the start of implementation of the trans-Saharan gas pipeline through Nigerien territory. The Algerian side then launched work on the pipeline in the Oulf area of Adrar province on June 4, in the presence of two ministers from Niger and Nigeria. The project stretches about 4,128 kilometers, is estimated to cost more than $13 billion, and is intended to transport between 20 billion and 30 billion cubic meters of gas annually.
At the same time, relations with Mali improved noticeably. On July 10, Algeria reopened its airspace to Malian aviation after about 14 months of closure. Then, on Aug. 9, the two prime ministers held a phone call at Algeria’s initiative. Malian Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maiga visited Algeria on Aug. 24. Algerian Prime Minister Seifi Ghrieb’s visit two days ago — the first by an Algerian official to the country since 2023 — continued this path. He carried a message from Tebboune to Gen. Assimi Goita and announced Algeria’s readiness to reactivate bilateral cooperation mechanisms.
This chronology makes a causal link between the break with the UAE and the rapprochement with Mali and Niger inaccurate. The two tracks unfolded in parallel and then converged at a single moment. Some Algerian readings even invert the equation, arguing that restoring ties with Bamako and Niamey secured Algeria’s strategic depth before it broke with Abu Dhabi.
Even so, two recent developments gave Algeria a vital opportunity to strengthen its presence. The first was the military move in Niamey on the night of Aug. 28-29, which targeted sensitive sites including the airport, Air Base 101, and the area around the presidential palace. The second was the rupture itself, which ended the ambiguity in Algeria’s position and turned competition with Abu Dhabi in the Sahel from an undeclared struggle into an open one.
As for the first development, which is the pivotal one, Algeria responded by sending four Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets and two support aircraft at the request of the Nigerien leadership, in a step military experts see as a shift in the doctrine of the Algerian army, which has begun using military power as a diplomatic tool. Accusations varied over who was behind the attempt: Nigerien television accused France, while Nigerien media quoted an army officer speaking of contacts from Dubai and Belgium to support the rebels. Independent sources have not yet confirmed these accounts.
Between the security cordon and political polarization
The latest developments — from Algeria’s decision to sever diplomatic ties with the UAE to its efforts to deepen cooperation with neighboring Sahel states — could set the stage for two broad trajectories.
The first is Algeria’s attempt to establish a security and economic cordon around its southern flank. Geography is one of Algiers’ strongest assets: Mali and Niger form a security belt along its southern borders, while Tuareg trade routes extend across more than 2,000 kilometers of frontier. The gas pipeline reinforces this as a long-term economic link, as does Algeria’s military presence in Niamey and its efforts to revive cooperation mechanisms with Bamako.
If this trajectory takes hold, Algeria could seek to restore its traditional role as an important partner in security, energy and development across the Sahel, rather than acting primarily as a mediator. But its ability to do so depends on factors beyond Algiers’ control, including the stability of Niger’s ruling authorities, amid signs of divisions within its military establishment. The security of the pipeline route across vast and volatile areas is another constraint, as is Algeria’s ability to offer sustainable economic incentives rather than relying primarily on political and security cooperation.
The second trajectory is counter-polarisation. The UAE’s role cannot be overlooked, particularly given its economic leverage. Following the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger between 2020 and 2023, Abu Dhabi moved to fill part of the resulting vacuum through capital, commercial projects and logistical capabilities. This has given the UAE avenues of influence in a region where Algeria has traditionally relied more heavily on security coordination, mediation and the advantages of geographic proximity.
Gold is central to this relationship, as UAE-linked companies extract a large share of Mali’s output. Abu Dhabi also provided an estimated $750m in aid to Sahel states between 2018 and 2023. These resources intersect with a competing Moroccan initiative: the Atlantic Initiative, which seeks to give Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad access to the Atlantic through the port of Dakhla. Mali’s aforementioned position on Western Sahara suggests that Bamako is prepared to navigate between competing regional axes. In this context, the UAE does not need to displace Algeria entirely — a difficult prospect in any case. It only needs to raise the cost of Algerian initiatives and encourage Sahel capitals to hedge their bets by offering financial incentives and other forms of support.
The outcome is therefore unlikely to fall entirely in either side’s favor. The military-led governments in the Sahel have generally pursued a balancing strategy, seeking security cooperation from Algeria and Russia, while also pursuing joint projects with Algeria and competing sources of financing from the UAE, alongside potential access to the Atlantic through Morocco. This leaves Algeria’s recent gains in Bamako and Niamey vulnerable to reversal unless it translates them into durable economic interests and institutional arrangements.
Algeria’s decision to sever diplomatic relations with Abu Dhabi ultimately brought years of largely undeclared disagreements into the open, transforming disputes that had previously played out through media exchanges and competing regional agendas into a direct diplomatic confrontation. At the same time, Algiers had already begun strengthening its engagement with its southern neighborhood. Its renewed outreach to Niger, particularly Niamey, began in February; work on the NIGAL trans-African gas pipeline began in June; and efforts to repair relations with Bamako gained momentum over the following two months. The break with the UAE, coupled with the attempted mutiny in Niger, has given this trajectory additional momentum, clearer political cover and greater media attention.
The real test for Algeria, however, lies beyond diplomatic visits and deploying military aircraft or other forms of security support to neighboring countries. It is whether Algiers can convert its recent gains into durable political, economic, and institutional arrangements. Algeria has geographic advantages and military capabilities, while the UAE has greater financial resources, flexibility, and a broad network of regional partnerships. In a region where military-led governments are seeking to diversify their alliances rather than rely on a single external partner, Algeria’s strategic depth will ultimately depend on its ability to establish itself as a partner that cannot easily be replaced — rather than simply trying to push its rivals out.