هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
Saudi Aramco’s decision to notify some European refineries that it cannot fulfil their scheduled shipments for October is more than a temporary disruption in crude supplies. Coming after Houthi attacks targeted several Saudi oil facilities and pumping stations, the move highlights the growing vulnerability of the kingdom’s export infrastructure at a time of mounting regional instability.
Several European refineries are already feeling the immediate impact, moving to secure alternative sources of crude. But the implications extend beyond individual shipments. Any sustained disruption to Saudi exports could affect global oil prices, supply security, and major markets’ ability to absorb shocks originating in the Middle East.
The development is particularly significant for Aramco because supply reliability is central to the company’s position in global energy markets. Long-term crude contracts depend not only on price and volume, but also on confidence that producers can maintain regular, predictable deliveries. Aramco has built much of its international standing on that reliability over decades.
The immediate question, therefore, is not simply how many shipments have been delayed or cancelled, but how resilient Saudi Arabia’s export system is under sustained pressure. How can Aramco respond if attacks on its oil infrastructure continue? What alternative routes can keep Saudi crude flowing to international markets? And how effective would those alternatives be if more than one export route came under threat simultaneously?
These questions point to a broader concern. If attacks or other disruptions persisted along Saudi Arabia’s export routes, the consequences would extend beyond the kingdom’s oil revenues. They could affect global energy markets, reshape calculations among major oil-consuming and producing states, and add another layer of uncertainty to an already volatile regional environment.
The East-West Pipeline under pressure: What happened?
Over the past few weeks, the Houthis have stepped up attacks on targets inside Saudi Arabia as part of the continuing escalation between the two sides. But the most consequential development for the kingdom’s oil infrastructure came on 18 September, when three of the 11 pumping stations along the roughly 1,200-kilometre East-West Pipeline were targeted. The attacks disrupted parts of the system and affected crude-loading and export operations through the Red Sea port of Yanbu.
The East-West Pipeline is a critical component of Saudi Arabia’s oil export infrastructure. It connects production facilities in the kingdom’s east to the Red Sea coast, allowing crude to reach global markets without passing through the Strait of Hormuz. In recent months, the pipeline has carried between four million and five million barrels per day, increasing its importance as risks to regional maritime routes have intensified.
The targeting of the pumping stations, therefore, was more than a localised strike on oil infrastructure. It exposed a key point of vulnerability in the network that gives Saudi Arabia flexibility over how and where it exports its crude. That vulnerability became particularly significant as disruptions to shipping through the Red Sea added pressure to an already strained export system.
The risks become more complex as threats extend across the entire chain, from pumping stations and pipelines to export terminals and major processing facilities. At the same time, key maritime chokepoints, including the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, remain exposed to conflict and disruption. The result is higher insurance and transportation costs and less room for Aramco to reroute supplies when individual routes come under pressure.
What is at stake, then, is not simply the repair of damaged infrastructure. It is the resilience of Saudi Arabia’s wider energy-export network — and its ability to keep crude flowing to international markets when multiple parts of that network are exposed to disruption at the same time.
Saudi Arabia’s energy network faces a crucial test
Saudi Arabia’s oil-export network rests on three strategic routes connecting its production fields to global markets: the East-West Pipeline, the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. Over decades, these routes have become critical to the kingdom’s ability to maintain its position as a major oil exporter and ensure the flow of revenues that underpin its economy, development plans and Vision 2030.
The first is the East-West Pipeline, which came under attack days ago when three of its pumping stations were targeted, once again exposing the vulnerability of a key artery in Saudi Arabia’s energy system. Stretching roughly 1,200 kilometres, the pipeline carries crude from production areas in eastern Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea coast and the port of Yanbu, providing the kingdom with an alternative export route when shipping through the Gulf is disrupted.
Its strategic value lies in its ability to move large volumes of crude to the Red Sea without passing through the Strait of Hormuz. With a capacity of around seven million barrels per day, the pipeline gives Riyadh an important degree of flexibility during periods of heightened tension or disruption in the Gulf. Any threat to that infrastructure therefore has implications beyond the facilities directly targeted.
The second route is the Strait of Hormuz, the kingdom’s principal eastern outlet for oil exports. Saudi crude leaves Gulf ports, including Ras Tanura and Juaymah, aboard tankers that pass through one of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints before entering the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The strait carries substantial volumes of oil and gas from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf producers, making its security a matter of global energy concern.
For Saudi Arabia, its importance is amplified by the concentration of its crude exports in Asian markets. Tankers departing from the kingdom’s eastern ports, particularly Ras Tanura, cross Hormuz before entering the Indian Ocean and continuing towards major Asian consumers such as China, Japan, India and South Korea.
The third route is Bab el-Mandeb, the southern gateway of the Red Sea and a major corridor for trade and energy flows between Asia and Europe. The strait connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, and is important to Saudi exports in two main ways.
The first involves crude transported to Yanbu through the East-West Pipeline and then shipped south towards Asian markets. Those cargoes must pass through Bab el-Mandeb to leave the Red Sea and enter the Indian Ocean.
The second concerns Saudi shipments bound for Europe from its Gulf ports. These tankers first pass through the Strait of Hormuz before heading towards Bab el-Mandeb and entering the Red Sea. From there, cargoes can continue north towards the Suez Canal or connect with Egypt’s SUMED pipeline before reaching the Mediterranean and European markets.
The challenge for Saudi Arabia is that all three routes are now facing varying degrees of security and geopolitical pressure. The East-West Pipeline has been targeted, disrupting some of its pumping stations. Tensions around the Strait of Hormuz have intensified amid the broader confrontation involving Iran, while Bab el-Mandeb has emerged as a key pressure point for Houthi attacks and threats against shipping in the Red Sea.
This makes the challenge facing Saudi Arabia’s energy system fundamentally different from a simple question of production capacity. Aramco may be able to maintain the ability to extract millions of barrels of crude each day, but production alone is of limited value if those barrels cannot reliably reach international markets.
The critical question, therefore, is no longer simply how much oil Saudi Arabia can produce, but how much of that oil it can safely and consistently move abroad when several strategic export routes are under pressure at the same time.
Four alternatives: How can Saudi Arabia keep its oil flowing?
Against this backdrop, Riyadh has four main options for containing the fallout and keeping Saudi crude flowing to global markets. None, however, offers a complete or risk-free solution. Each comes with logistical, security or financial constraints that could limit its effectiveness if disruptions persist.
The first is to increase exports through Gulf ports, particularly Ras Tanura and Juaymah, and use ship-to-ship transfers off Oman’s Port of Sohar before sending the crude on to Asian markets. Saudi Arabia has previously relied on this mechanism on a significant scale. Data show that around 60 million barrels were moved through ship-to-ship transfers in September and October last year, at rates of between one million and 1.5 million barrels per day.
The route, however, has a major strategic vulnerability: tankers leaving Saudi ports in the Gulf must still pass through the Strait of Hormuz to reach Omani waters. That leaves the alternative directly exposed to any disruption in the strait, particularly as tensions involving Iran have increased and control over maritime access through Hormuz has become a source of leverage in regional confrontation. Scaling up this option, therefore, would not eliminate the underlying risk to Saudi exports.
The second option is to accelerate repairs to the damaged pumping stations along the East-West Pipeline and progressively restore the line to full capacity. This is already underway, with estimates suggesting that repairs could take several weeks before the pipeline returns to broad operational capacity.
Strategically, this remains the most significant option because the East-West Pipeline is the principal route allowing Saudi Arabia to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and move crude directly to the Red Sea. But restoring the pipeline would not necessarily remove the threat. Its pumping stations and other infrastructure could remain vulnerable to further attacks, potentially increasing security and insurance costs and turning the protection of the pipeline into a longer-term challenge rather than a one-off repair operation.
The third option is to draw on Saudi crude inventories held near export centres, both inside the kingdom and at overseas storage facilities. These stocks could help Aramco meet short-term contractual obligations while buying time to adjust shipping schedules and redirect supplies.
Strategic reserves can provide a buffer against temporary disruptions to shipping or individual transport routes. But they are ultimately a short-term tool, not a substitute for sustained production and exports. Even substantial inventories cannot replace flows of several million barrels per day indefinitely. If disruptions were to last for months, the problem could therefore evolve from a temporary logistical shock into a more fundamental challenge to Saudi Arabia’s ability to honour its export commitments.
The fourth option lies in expanding crude-trading swaps and making greater use of Aramco’s international trading network. Through such arrangements, the company can purchase crude from other producers or conduct geographic swaps, allowing a European customer, for instance, to receive an alternative grade from a closer supplier while Saudi crude is redirected to Asian markets or other destinations that are more accessible.
This option becomes particularly relevant as European refineries look for alternative supplies, including North Sea crude, to offset potential shortfalls in Saudi deliveries. It could also give Aramco greater commercial flexibility, allowing it to maintain relationships with customers and limit the disruption to long-term supply contracts caused by logistical constraints.
Yet none of the four options amounts to a complete solution. Expanding exports through the Gulf remains dependent on the security of the Strait of Hormuz. Restoring the East-West Pipeline does not eliminate the risk of renewed attacks against its infrastructure. Strategic stockpiles can only provide a temporary buffer, while crude swaps depend on the availability, quality and price of suitable alternatives in international markets.
The challenge for Aramco, therefore, is not simply to find one alternative route, but to maintain several workable options at the same time. Such redundancy could allow the company to absorb disruptions to individual routes without bringing the wider export system under severe strain. But as disruptions persist and more pressure points emerge, the room for manoeuvre becomes increasingly limited. What begins as a problem of routes and shipping can ultimately become a test of the resilience of Saudi Arabia’s wider energy system and its ability to remain a reliable supplier to global markets.
The developments of recent weeks also highlight a broader shift in the way geopolitical crises can reshape energy flows, not only across the Middle East but across global markets. The vulnerability of infrastructure and maritime chokepoints challenges the traditional assumption that the strength of an oil-producing state can be measured primarily by the size of its reserves and production capacity.
For Saudi Arabia, the question is increasingly about what happens after the oil is produced. The kingdom may retain its position as one of the world’s largest oil producers, but its ability to convert that production into reliable exports depends on the security and flexibility of the network connecting its fields to foreign customers.
That gives energy security a broader meaning. It is no longer limited to protecting oil fields and maintaining production. It increasingly encompasses pipelines, export terminals, maritime corridors, tankers, storage facilities and the wider supply chains that connect Saudi crude to international markets.
For Riyadh, this means that resilience will depend not only on maintaining production capacity, but also on diversifying export routes, strengthening the protection of critical infrastructure and preserving enough logistical and commercial flexibility to absorb disruptions when multiple parts of the system come under pressure at once.