هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
Within days of consolidating their military gains along the western coast, the Houthis began translating them into administrative control, drawing on an existing network of administrative, judicial and service institutions that they linked to local authorities and to ministries and agencies under their control in Sanaa. This underscores their effort to establish stability and legitimacy in the area, which helps the audience understand the depth of their influence.
Figures whom Sanaa had relied on in some cases even before taking control on the ground began to emerge. At the same time, some employees and files remained within institutions that resumed operations under the new authority.
The reorganisation of leadership and oversight then extended across several sectors. But questions remain over how some previous rulings and contracts will be treated, and where taxes, zakat and other fees will be remitted once collected.
The administrative shift followed a swift round of fighting that redrew the western coast’s map. In early September, Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces advanced in southern Hodeidah and seized Hays. Days later, the Houthis launched a counteroffensive, pushing south through Hays and Al-Khawkhah towards Mocha.
After government forces withdrew from the city, the Houthis continued their advance towards Dhubab and Bab al-Mandab, while clashes later continued in Al-Wazi’iyah. The new gains extended the group’s control along the Red Sea coast, after years when Mocha and large parts of the territory south of Hodeidah remained outside its control.
How is the administration being reshaped in the newly controlled areas?
The consolidation of administrative control in Mocha began almost immediately after the city changed hands on 10 September, as officials from Sanaa moved into government, security and service institutions, began reopening facilities, and linked them to local authorities and central bodies under their control. This ongoing process highlights the resilience of the Houthis’ administrative efforts, reassuring the audience of their sustained influence.
Yemen Press, a website close to the Houthi authorities, reported that Taiz deputy governors Hadi Taha al-Buraihi and Mohammed al-Rumaimah had inspected the government complex, the security administration and several executive offices. They were accompanied by Omar al-Shadhili, identified as the director of Mocha, and Ali al-Shadhili, the district’s security chief.
Omar al-Shadhili had held the title of “director of Mocha district” since at least 2020, despite the Houthis losing control of the city to government forces in February 2017. After recapturing Mocha in September 2026, the Houthis brought him back into the city in the same capacity, where he resumed his duties.
The local authority affiliated with the internationally recognised government continued to recognise Sultan Mahmoud as director of Mocha, creating two competing administrative structures for the district, with one now operating inside the city and illustrating governance fragmentation.
The same pattern emerged in other districts west of Taiz province and south of Hodeidah province. Sanaa dealt with Imad Abdulsalam al-Humairi as director of Mawza, Marwan Hulaisi as director of Hays, and Amjad al-Umaisi as director of Al-Khawkhah. At the same time, Amin Rabash appeared as director of Al-Wazi’iyah.
Al-Humairi was known locally in Mawza as a figure linked to the Houthis, while Hulaisi had held his position within Sanaa’s institutions before the latest territorial shifts. In both cases, the Houthis relied on local officials who were already part of their administrative structure.
Al-Wazi’iyah presented a different case. On 18 September, Amin Rabash appeared as the district’s director during the handover of service equipment, while the government authority continued to recognise Ali al-Dhafari as its director.
The following day, government forces took control of Jabal Nu’man as clashes continued in parts of the district. At the same time, institutions linked to Sanaa remained active elsewhere in Al-Wazi’iyah, leaving military and administrative control divided between the two sides. This division illustrates the ongoing complexity of governance in the area, which is crucial for the audience to grasp the situation’s intricacy.
An armed man walks beside an armoured vehicle in the Yemeni city of Mocha, in a still from a video published on Sept. 10, 2026, after the Houthis took control of the city. In the judiciary, the transition was clearer. On 12 September, Judge Ahmed al-Jarmouzi, head of the Hodeidah Court of Appeals under the Houthi authorities, inspected the courts in Hays and Al-Khawkhah. The security committees handed over the two buildings to the judicial authority, and staff reviewed files, documents, and records; they also ordered documentation of any missing or damaged archive materials.
Al-Jarmouzi met with administrative staff who remained at the two courts, although official judicial work was still suspended that day.
Two days later, Judge Fawaz al-Maqtari, head of the Taiz Court of Appeals in Sanaa, and Judge Abdullah al-Sanea, head of the Appeals Prosecution, arrived at the Mocha court and prosecution office. They met Deputy Prosecutor Judge Yasser al-Aghbari and reviewed the building’s needs and case files after operations had been suspended during the fighting.
The visits marked the beginning of the Houthis’ takeover of the judicial system, starting with an inventory of facilities, documents, and staff before reconnecting courts and prosecution offices to the judicial apparatus in the capital, signalling efforts to consolidate institutional control.
The resumption of work depended in part on the staff who had remained. Administrative employees stayed at the courts in Hays and Al-Khawkhah, while judicial officials called on judges and other workers who had left to return. The Judicial Inspection Authority also praised those who had safeguarded citizens’ files and continued to follow up on cases.
In the health sector, ministry officials and provincial office staff worked with facility directors, programme coordinators and other personnel who remained on the job. They also inventoried facilities and assessed their needs to prepare to restore services under the new administration.
Joshua Rogers, a researcher on local governance in Yemen, documented a similar pattern in a study published in late 2020 by the Berghof Foundation, a German organisation focused on conflict transformation, examining provincial and district institutions in Houthi-controlled areas.
According to the study, after expanding their control from 2014 onwards, the Houthis retained large numbers of officials and employees within state institutions while placing a parallel network of “supervisors” inside them to oversee security, resources and mobilisation. Their authority subsequently expanded to include budgets, revenues and appointments, before Houthi loyalists gradually moved into formal government positions themselves.
Some supervisors came to control official seals, budgets and revenues, and to influence promotions and appointments. At the same time, local figures loyal to the Houthis increasingly entered the formal administrative structure, while employees and technicians with the expertise needed to keep the state apparatus running were retained.
On the coast, established officials, institutions, and administrative chains allowed the Houthis to connect existing structures to the new authority within a relatively short period.
How is daily life being managed under Houthi rule?
The judiciary entered a new phase of restructuring on 16 September, when Judge Abdulmomen Abdulqader Shujaa al-Din, head of the Supreme Judicial Council under the Houthi authorities, issued a decision transferring several judges.
Abdullah Abdulwahid Hazza Ali was appointed head of the Mocha court; Mohammed Hamid Ali Othman al-Najdi was appointed head of the courts in Mawza and Al-Wazi’iyah; Mukhtar Mohammed Ali al-Dhaibah was appointed head of the Hays court, in addition to his duties at the Zabid court; and Abdulbasit Mohammed Abdullah al-Sufyani was appointed head of the Al-Khawkhah court.
Three days later, however, when Judicial Inspection Authority chief Marwan al-Mahaqri inspected the courts, Abdullah al-Jundi appeared as head of the Mocha court, despite the Judicial Council’s decision appointing Abdullah Hazza to the post.
With the courts back in operation, cases involving property, debts, personal status, enforcement proceedings and detainees began moving through the judicial system administered by the Sanaa authorities. Visits to the institutions indicated that case files, documents and records remained in place and that citizens’ cases were still being processed.
So far, however, no circular specifically addressing the newly controlled areas has publicly set out what will happen to rulings issued before the change in control, enforcement and appeals files, contracts, powers of attorney or land records. No document has been published clarifying the transfer or use of official seals or the status of the land registry.
On the economic front, the Sanaa authorities moved to establish their administrative framework in Mocha from the first days after taking control. On 10 September, their ministries of finance, economy, industry and investment, transport, and public works announced a package of incentives for Red Sea ports, including Mocha. The measures included discounts of up to 50 per cent on fees for ships, containers, taxes, customs, and other services.
On 14 September, Zaid al-Washli, chairman of the Yemeni Red Sea Ports Corporation under the Sanaa authorities, visited Mocha port alongside Khaled al-Akhram, whom Houthi-affiliated media identified as the port’s director.
Al-Washli said the corporation would begin a phased programme to restart the port’s berths, equipment and facilities and restore commercial activity. The plan would effectively bring Mocha port under the administration of the Yemeni Red Sea Ports Corporation.
The port’s financial importance stands out in Yemen’s war economy experience. A previous study published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, concluded that taxes, customs, markets and trade routes had become major sources of financing for local authorities and armed groups.
The study documented the Houthis’ takeover of financial administrations inside state institutions and the placement of figures linked to them in positions controlling customs, fees and collections.
In Al-Khawkhah, the General Authority of Zakat under Sanaa launched a medical camp on Sept. 19 inside the rural hospital, funded by the authority, with the participation of the authority’s deputy Ali al-Saqqaf and officials from its Hodeidah office, alongside Naji Obeidal in his capacity as head of the authority’s branch in the district.
Over the years, zakat shifted from a resource managed by local authorities to one under greater Houthi control.
As documented by Waddah al-Awlaqi, a researcher at the Sanaa Centre for Strategic Studies, the group’s Finance Ministry directed in June 2017 that zakat revenues be transferred from local authority accounts to a special account at the Central Bank in Sanaa, before the General Authority of Zakat was established in May 2018.
Al-Awlaqi explained in a study published by the centre in 2020 that establishing the authority transferred financial powers previously granted to provinces and districts to a central body responsible for collecting and administering zakat. This reduced local authorities’ ability to control and allocate the revenues generated from it directly.
The administrative reconnection also extended to public services. Branches of the Cleaning and Improvement Fund in Mocha, Mawza and Al-Wazi’iyah received equipment from the fund’s administration in Taiz province under the Sanaa authorities. Health officials and provincial offices also began assessing the needs of health facilities and their staff in the newly controlled districts.
Mohsen Atef, deputy minister of agriculture, fisheries and water resources for marketing affairs, and Hussein al-Attas, head of the Red Sea Fisheries Authority, visited Mocha and Al-Khawkhah to inspect fish landing, cooling, storage and export facilities. They also reviewed arrangements for regulating the work of fishermen and fish traders.
In the education sector, Hodeidah University and education authorities affiliated with Sanaa began following up on the College of Specific Education and educational centres in Al-Khawkhah. Discussions focused on resuming classes, assessing the status of teaching and administrative staff, and handing over offices and classrooms for operation under the university’s supervision.
Is the coast being integrated into Sanaa?
For years, the Sanaa authorities have operated through a structure that combines formal state institutions with a parallel network of Houthi officials known as “supervisors,” who oversee state bodies in provinces and districts and report directly to the group’s leadership.
According to a previous study by the crisis analysis organisation ACAPS, this system links the Houthi leadership to local administration, giving supervisors effective influence over governors, district directors, and security bodies. Since late 2017, the Houthis have increasingly moved to integrate a growing number of them and the group’s loyalists into formal institutions.
Over the years of war, this model expanded from supervising institutions to reshaping them and tying local elites to the centre. A study published in the journal Civil Wars in early 2025 concluded that the Houthis consolidated their rule through a mix of co-opting local elites, repression and institutional reengineering, allowing them to manage shifting local alliances and maintain control over the areas under their rule.
This path gives Sanaa an administrative and security apparatus it has already tested in areas under its control, and can expand into new areas by combining local officials, existing institutions, and a leadership network tied to the centre.
On the financial side, a study by the Berghof Foundation documented a gradual shift since 2017 toward depositing local revenues into accounts at the Central Bank in Sanaa and transferring parts of the resources once managed by provinces and districts to the centre, while local authorities’ ability to directly dispose of what they collect has diminished.
This experience makes the destination of revenues in the new coastal areas a key indicator of the extent of their financial integration into Sanaa’s system, especially taxes, zakat, customs, market fees and port fees, whose management and remittance will determine how much financial authority the districts retain locally.
Mocha port has been brought under the fee-and-incentives policy issued by Sanaa; the Red Sea Ports Corporation has taken a role in its management, and the Zakat Authority has begun operating in Al-Khawkhah.
The expansion on the coast increases the volume of resources, facilities and population centres now within the Houthis’ reach, and broadens their security, administrative and service responsibilities, while creating greater opportunities for recruitment, arms flows and commercial networks, after the group evolved over years of war from an armed insurgency into an authority that combines military tools with institutions of governance.
And linked Majed al-Madhaji, co-founder and president of the Sanaa Centre and a specialist in the Yemeni conflict and Red Sea security, control of the coast to expanding the Houthis’ ability to influence Bab al-Mandab and communication and smuggling networks across the Red Sea.
Internally, new population centres, roads and facilities now require security, courts, salaries, health care, education and services, which expands the base of potential resources while also increasing the cost of administering them.
A study by Berghof on local governance recorded a decline in local operating and investment budgets alongside increased centralisation of revenues, as well as the dependence of some service sectors on aid, local communities and user fees.
And linked Katharina Jautz, a researcher at the Berghof Foundation specialising in local governance in Yemen, in September 2026 the stability of local governance to the ability of the centre and the provinces to settle the distribution of resources and powers and ensure the continuity of services.
The next phase depends on the Sanaa authorities’ ability to tighten control over the decision-making chain and revenues while preserving institutional functioning and service financing, especially since each new area adds employees, facilities, and residents to an apparatus already suffering from limited resources.
Revenue trends, how previous rights and documents are handled, and what returns to the districts in the form of salaries, services, and investments will be among the most important indicators of the new administration’s stability and ability to endure.