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The ban on the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has thrust the country’s Islamic movement into a sweeping organisational transformation, the most significant since the founding of the Islamic Action Front party in 1992. For more than three decades, the Islamists’ political presence rested on a party that contested elections and conducted overt political activity, alongside an older and broader organisation responsible for ideological, educational and social formation.
The party itself described this relationship on its introductory page as “strategic”, presenting the Muslim Brotherhood as its “ideological and educational reference”. That arrangement continued to shape the division of roles within Jordan’s Islamic movement until the ban was imposed.
On 23 April 2025, Jordanian Interior Minister Mazen Al Farrayeh announced a ban on all Muslim Brotherhood activities, the closure of its offices and the expedited seizure of its assets. The move came against the backdrop of security cases in which authorities accused individuals linked to the group of involvement, while the Brotherhood rejected any organisational responsibility for their actions.
The Islamic Action Front, meanwhile, continued to operate as a licensed political party under Jordan’s Political Parties Law. Its then-secretary-general, Wael Saqqa, maintained that the party functioned as an independent political entity. The organisational rupture soon affected the Front itself, particularly in 2026.
The Independent Election Commission, Jordan’s official body responsible for overseeing elections and party affairs, reviewed the Front’s bylaws and called for amendments to provisions concerning the Constitution, the Political Parties Law and the party’s governance structure. The “Islamic Action Front” was subsequently drawn into a review process that culminated in April with the adoption of the name “Al Ummah Party” and a new set of bylaws.
On 19 September 2026, Muath Al Khawaldeh was elected secretary-general in the party’s first leadership contest since the name change and the Brotherhood ban. He entered the new phase with the party retaining its parliamentary bloc, branches, cadres and institutional structures.
The reconstruction of the movement is therefore increasingly tied to a fundamental organisational question: how to transfer functions historically divided between the Brotherhood and the political party into a single institution responsible for decision-making, recruitment, leadership development, financial management and policy formation.
What changed inside the party?
Al Ummah Party entered a new phase as the institutional continuation of the Islamic Action Front, retaining the numbering of its conferences through to its seventh general conference in September 2026. At the same time, the amended bylaws reorganised several internal bodies and reshaped how representation and powers were distributed among them.
The number of members on Al Ummah Party’s Shura Council increased from 90 to 103, following an increase in elected branch representatives from 70 to 80. The party’s general conference now elects 21 members to the council, up from 18, with the requirement that at least six of those seats be held by women and three by young people.
The general conference — the party’s broadest representative body, which elects members of the Shura Council — was also expanded to include party members holding positions in municipalities, the Greater Amman Municipality Council, trade unions, governorate councils and local councils, alongside representation for people with disabilities. The bylaws also require branch representatives elected by secret ballot to make up at least half of the conference’s members, whereas the executive office had previously determined their share.
The general conference’s role in amending the bylaws was also strengthened. Under the previous rules, the Shura Council had the authority to approve amendments, whereas amendments proposed by the Shura Council now require ratification by the general conference.
At the same time, the Shura Council retained its role in forming the executive leadership. The secretary-general nominates members of the executive office, whose appointment requires the council’s confidence. The Shura Council also elects the first deputy secretary-general and oversees general policy, the budget and the executive office’s performance.
The executive office retains broad powers to run the party, including admitting members; establishing, merging and dissolving branches; approving their elections; preparing the budget; managing party funds; forming committees and departments; and arranging electoral nominations.
The branches have gained greater weight within both the Shura Council and the general conference. In contrast, the party’s central leadership retains the power to establish branches, dissolve their governing bodies, and merge them. In August 2026, the party announced that it had completed elections for representatives of 41 branches in preparation for the general conference and Shura Council elections.
The amendments also affected the membership mechanism. Under the 2018 bylaws, applicants had to submit a membership application through a branch, obtain the endorsement of two members, receive a recommendation from the administrative body, and secure approval from the executive office. The process also included an oath enshrined in the bylaws, requiring a commitment to the “principles of Islam” and “Islamic morals”.
The 2026 bylaws retained the process of endorsement, recommendation and approval by the executive office, but moved the wording of the oath to a text adopted by the executive office. They also added a direct reference to the conditions stipulated in the Political Parties Law and introduced a more detailed classification of membership categories, including “supporting members”.
The Islamic reference also remains embedded in the party’s definition and objectives. The new bylaws link its work to the “provisions of Islam, the Jordanian Constitution and the Political Parties Law”, refer to development from an “Islamic perspective”, and affirm the Islamic reference of the state and society, alongside support for religious culture and institutions.
The amendment therefore places the name change and reorganisation of membership within a legal and organisational process that nonetheless preserves the ideological identity that has shaped the party since its founding.
The party’s internal judicial system was also set out in greater detail. The bylaws specify the composition of branch courts, the central court and the supreme court, as well as membership requirements, procedures for objection and appeal, and deadlines for ruling on challenges to decisions taken by the executive office, branches and internal electoral bodies.
The bylaws also classify participation in an organisation operating within the party outside its approved organisational structures as a violation that can result in the suspension or termination of membership.
These amendments were introduced as part of the correction process overseen by the Independent Election Commission. In early February 2026, Al Mamlaka TV reported, citing correspondence from the commission, that the dispute over the party’s name was linked to legal provisions prohibiting the establishment of parties on a religious, sectarian, ethnic or factional basis.
Thabet Assaf, the party’s organisational spokesman, said after receiving official approval on 26 April that the amendments followed “a series of internal dialogues” and were intended to develop the organisational structure in line with the law.
Mousa Al Wahsh, deputy head of the Shura Council, presented the discussions held inside the council in February as part of an assessment of the party’s performance and an effort to strengthen shura and institutional work. He linked the increase in the number of Shura Council members, the expansion of the general conference and changes to representation ratios to an internal process that accompanied the legal correction process.
Muath Al Khawaldeh: From “March 24” to party leadership
Muath Al Khawaldeh, born in 1985, belongs to a generation that entered Jordan’s public sphere during the 2011 protests and subsequently rose through the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front over the following 15 years.
He first emerged as a young figure in the “March 24” movement, which took shape during the wider Arab Spring protests and called for political and constitutional reforms. He became one of its most prominent spokespeople during the sit-in it organised at the Interior Circle in central Amman in March 2011.
Four years later, Al Khawaldeh moved to the forefront of the Muslim Brotherhood after its executive office selected him as its media spokesman in March 2015, during a period marked by a sharp internal split and a dispute over the group’s legal status and leadership.
Al Khawaldeh later became one of the Brotherhood’s public faces before moving into roles within the Islamic Action Front, including membership in the Shura Council and the party’s political committee. His trajectory culminated in his election as secretary-general of Al Ummah Party after the Brotherhood was banned.
He contested the secretary-generalship against MP Ahmad Al Qatawneh, a prominent party figure in the House of Representatives. Al Khawaldeh won 382 votes in the first round to Al Qatawneh’s 369, out of 751 voters — a margin of 13 votes — after which Al Qatawneh withdrew from the runoff.
MP Yanal Freihat, a member of the party’s Shura Council, said the result reflected the candidates’ platforms, an internal debate over combining party and parliamentary positions, and the party’s established internal balances. In his reading, the narrow margin pointed to a closely contested internal race rather than a decisive victory for a single current.
The Politics and Society Institute, a Jordanian research centre based in Amman, places Al Khawaldeh within what it describes as a more flexible tendency in managing relations with the state, while associating Al Qatawneh with a more hard-line tendency.
In an assessment published on 20 September 2026, the institute said these classifications reflected political and organisational tendencies within the party. It added that the narrow margin in the leadership vote, combined with the composition of the Shura Council, would require the new secretary-general to build broad consensus as it forms the executive office.
The Shura Council’s composition also reflects the continued presence of several generations at the centre of decision-making. Veteran figures with long-standing roles in the Islamic movement secured seats, including Hamza Mansour, a former secretary-general of the Islamic Action Front; Jamil Abu Bakr, a former Muslim Brotherhood leader; Ali Abu Al Sukkar, a former MP and party leader; and Abdul Hamid Al Dhunaibat, alongside MPs and younger figures.
Al Khawaldeh is therefore leading a party whose secretary-generalship has passed to a younger generation. At the same time, figures with extensive organisational experience remain on the council that grants confidence to the executive office and helps shape general policy.
Following his election, Al Khawaldeh outlined a vision centred on turning the party’s committees into specialised central departments operating like a “shadow government”, producing policy proposals on the economy, education, health and other sectoral issues. He also called for strengthening the branches, expanding membership and developing the party’s digital media and social-media presence.
He said the party wanted to preserve its identity while renewing its methods and mechanisms, and spoke of continuing along the path of political modernisation and expanding partnerships with national forces.
A party without the Brotherhood: How is it rebuilding its strength?
The Muslim Brotherhood had provided the Islamic movement with a space for ideological formation, cadre-building and social networks before some of its members moved into party and electoral activity — a role reflected in the party’s former description of the Brotherhood as its “ideological and educational reference”.
With the Brotherhood banned, its offices closed and its assets confiscated, the party now faces the need to expand its membership, develop leaders and organise local activity through its own branches, sectors and institutional bodies.
Jordanian researcher Mohammad Abu Rumman, a former minister who specialises in Islamic movements, believes that relationships and organisational culture built over decades will continue to shape the party during the transitional period. In his assessment, the party’s independence will depend on its ability to make decision-making, recruitment and leadership development function through its own institutions.
The membership rules preserve a clear role for the existing cadre in that process. Joining the party requires going through a branch, securing the endorsement of two members, obtaining a recommendation from the administrative body and receiving approval from the executive office. Positions on the Shura Council and the secretary-generalship also require seniority within the party.
At the same time, in early September 2026, the party began developing training programmes under its own name with the launch of the “Pioneers of the Nation Academy”, aimed at developing knowledge and leadership capacities and preparing young people to participate in public life. This was accompanied by a reorganisation of the youth and women’s sectors.
The party’s introductory pages do not provide an updated figure for its total membership in 2026. The party has, however, announced that 41 branches took part in electing representatives to the general conference and the Shura Council in August.
With Al Khawaldeh making expanded membership and a stronger social presence among his priorities, attracting new members and preparing them through the party’s branches and sectors will be one of the defining challenges of the new phase — particularly among people whose political and organisational experience was not formed within the Muslim Brotherhood.
On the financial side, the party’s audited financial statements for 2025 show its resources during the year the Brotherhood was banned. Revenues totalled about 390,300 Jordanian dinars, including 228,500 dinars in donations, 124,800 dinars in government support, and 34,800 dinars from subscriptions and membership fees.
The party also recorded about 2,200 dinars in investment returns. Donations therefore accounted for about 58.6 per cent of total revenues, government support for roughly 32 per cent, and subscriptions and membership fees for about 8.9 per cent.
During the same year, the party recorded about 113,000 dinars in office rent, 78,600 dinars in salaries and wages, and 38,700 dinars in allowances and bonuses, along with spending on media, events, and other operating costs.
The statements cover both the months preceding the Brotherhood ban on 23 April and those that followed. They show that the party maintained its own budget, offices, employees and legally audited accounts during the year of the ban.
The statements also disclose the total value of donations without identifying individual donors. They do not provide separate budgets for individual branches. However, the 2026 bylaws introduced more detailed rules governing the separation of government support, and the channels through which it is spent, from the party’s other resources.
The party also enters the new phase with a parliamentary base established before the Brotherhood was banned. The Islamic Action Front won 31 of the 138 seats in the September 2024 parliamentary elections, making it the largest opposition force in the House of Representatives.
That result predates both the Brotherhood ban and the party’s name change. Al Ummah Party has yet to contest a national election under its new name, so there is no electoral result to compare its support base with the 2024 performance.
The parliamentary bloc provides the party with a centre of political influence alongside its organisational institutions. According to the House of Representatives’ records, Saleh Al Armouti remains its head. However, Ammon News reported on 20 September that he was inclined to hand the position over to Ahmad Al Qatawneh.
Power within the party is therefore distributed across three institutional centres: the secretary-generalship, which runs the executive apparatus; the Shura Council, which grants confidence to the leadership and oversees its performance; and the parliamentary bloc, which represents the party inside parliament.
This structure places Al Khawaldeh at the centre of an effort to connect these institutions. His stated plan rests on expanding membership, developing new cadres and transforming the party’s committees into specialised departments capable of producing policies that the parliamentary bloc can take into parliament.
In Abu Rumman’s assessment, the next phase will depend on Al Ummah Party’s ability to develop its own decision-making, leadership and organisational mechanisms after the Brotherhood’s removal from the legal sphere.
Al Khawaldeh’s trajectory encapsulates the nature of this transition. He began as a face of a youth protest movement in 2011, became a spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood during its internal crisis, and then moved into the institutions of the Islamic Action Front. Fifteen years later, he finds himself at the head of a party tasked with reorganising the Islamists’ political and organisational presence after the Brotherhood was banned.