While Hong Kong’s Cathay Pacific and Singapore Airlines were enjoying success in the mid-1980s, Anthony Sampson made a striking observation in his 1984 book Empires of the Sky: “The size of airlines in Asia is not related to the population of their countries; we have two of the smallest states owning two of the most successful airlines.” He described them as “city-state” airlines.
A year after the book appeared, Emirates launched from Dubai. Qatar Airways followed in 1994, and Etihad Airways was founded by Abu Dhabi about a decade later. These carriers embodied the “city-state” concept even more clearly, but differed from Cathay Pacific and Singapore Airlines in one respect: they were government-owned and formed part of a vision extending beyond aviation.
Years of surprises and crises preceded the rise of Middle Eastern airlines and airports. By 2043, the region’s airports are projected to handle 530 million passengers, while aviation’s contribution to regional GDP is expected to rise by 150 per cent to $730bn.
A striking contrast emerged in the summer of 2015. Oil prices fell by about 70 per cent, putting mounting pressure on oil economies, yet the Middle East led the world in growth in airline seat capacity, with few other regions coming close. Gulf carriers and Turkish Airlines tripled their passenger numbers, carrying 155 million travellers that year.
The figures, presented by OAG, pointed to a broader shift in Middle Eastern economic policy, particularly among oil-exporting Gulf states: reducing dependence on oil revenues by developing other sectors, including aviation, that could help shield their economies from crises.
The contrast between falling oil prices and growing aviation reflected an ambition shared by the Gulf states and Turkey. Aviation was never merely a means of transport. By the start of the new century, it had become an integrated national project, although each state approached the prospect of a post-oil future differently.
Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Turkey each understood, in their own way, that an aircraft bearing the state’s logo carried more than passengers and baggage. It also carried the country’s image, relationships and soft power, alongside a wider economic project. Geography, however, has not always worked in their favour.
This article traces how the aviation projects of the Gulf states and Turkey began, what they carried beyond their economic value, and how far they had come by the time of the US-Israeli war on Iran. It also asks whether the current war will reshape the entire project or prove to be another passing crisis.
Geography: a curse and a blessing
The Middle East was supposed to enter a new era in 2023. Instead, that era brought little reassurance to many countries in the region, particularly the Gulf states and Turkey. They found themselves in a region being reshaped by a brutal war between Israel and its patron, the United States, on one side, and Iran and its allies on the other.
After successive rounds in 2024 and 2025, the war reached a peak before erupting more broadly in 2026 into a month-long conflict whose outcome remains unresolved. Its most striking feature was the violation of the region’s skies.
Drones and missiles proved capable of evading advanced air defence systems in the Gulf, including THAAD and Patriot, as well as Israel’s Iron Dome. Airspace became largely inaccessible to civilian aircraft as missiles and drones came to dominate it.
Aviation had promised a more sustainable economy beyond oil. Yet, like oil, it became hostage to war and turmoil in the Middle East, which appeared to be intensifying by the day.
Civilian airports that had received thousands of flights daily became prime military targets. Airports in Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar came under Iranian attack and bombardment. According to press reports, some of those countries moved aircraft to airports abroad as a precaution against potential damage.
Dubai International Airport was among the clearest examples, coming under attack several times during the current war. Videos circulating on social media showed shocked travellers inside the airport watching smoke and flames rise around it. Dubai is one of the world’s most important aviation hubs and the busiest for international passenger traffic.
The scene recalls the words with which British geographer Tim Marshall opened Prisoners of Geography: “The physical realities that underpin national and international politics are often ignored, whether in writing about history or in contemporary reporting on world affairs. Geography is clearly an essential part of understanding the facts and events and the reasons behind them. It may not always be the decisive factor, but it is certainly the one most worthy of consideration.”
Geography helps explain much about the Gulf’s aviation success. The region lies between Europe and East Asia, at the heart of the Old World. From Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Doha and Riyadh, travellers can reach most of the world’s cities on a direct flight or with just one stop.
There are cost advantages, too. Jet fuel is cheaper, airport fees are far lower than at European airports — sometimes less than a tenth of those charged at airports in Western capitals — and night flights face no restrictions. Aircraft can therefore operate more efficiently than in many other parts of the world, as researcher John O’Connell notes in The rise of the Arabian Gulf airline: An insight into the business model of Emirates Airline.
As relatively new entrants, Gulf airlines also invested in modern fleets suited to their business models. The twin-engine Boeing 777 initially offered an advantage, with about 300 seats and a range of roughly 7,000 nautical miles. Later, the Airbus A380 allowed carriers to move more than 500 passengers through congested airports where take-off and landing slots were scarce but operating costs were more viable.
“Competition led to lower prices, and Gulf airlines were a decisive game changer by adding new capacity to long-haul aviation markets, and even creating entirely new markets. Consequently, it was natural for that to lead to lower airfares,” says Andrew Charlton, an aviation consultant and expert.
In 2024, Dubai International Airport handled about 92 million passengers, making it the world’s busiest for international travellers. London Heathrow handled nearly 83 million. Abu Dhabi and Doha’s airports together received about 87 million passengers that year. Under normal conditions, the three Gulf airports collectively handle more than 3,000 flights a day, most of them operated by their national carriers.
Geography alone, however, cannot explain their success. Jordan, for example, has a relatively similar location and could theoretically have become a major aviation hub. Oil resources played a decisive role when small states such as Qatar and the UAE — whose combined citizen populations amount to barely half of Jordan’s population — chose to make aviation an integrated state project.
The same geography, alongside oil, can become these projects’ weakness when disaster strikes the Middle East and the Gulf, as the latest war showed. In the first four months of 2026, the region’s airlines recorded a marked decline in usage rates. Although the number of flights in January 2026 was 13 per cent higher than in the pandemic year of 2020, usage rates fell by about 55 per cent between January and March, alongside a similar drop in flight hours. Nearly 30,000 flights were cancelled in the war’s first days alone.
The Gulf economy above the clouds
The UAE and its flying embassies
Dubai was once a modest stop on long aviation routes. Luxury seaplanes travelling from the United Kingdom to distant parts of the British Empire, including India and Australia, refuelled there. By the 1960s, it had a simple runway amid the desert sands where aircraft could refuel before continuing their journeys.
When the first aircraft bearing the Emirates logo departed Dubai International Airport for Karachi and Mumbai in 1985, the UAE began a new chapter in Gulf aviation. The aircraft and crew were leased from Pakistan International Airlines, and the budget was no more than $10m. Even so, those flights marked the beginning of Fly Emirates.
By 2024, reports showed that Dubai International Airport had handled 92.3 million passengers in a year, while Emirates carried more than 43 million passengers annually. Aviation had become a mainstay of Dubai’s economy, contributing about 27 per cent of the emirate’s GDP. That share is expected to rise to 32 per cent by 2030. Oil, by comparison, now contributes barely 1 per cent.
Etihad Airways, Abu Dhabi’s national carrier, represents another part of the UAE’s aviation success. In 2025, Sheikh Zayed International Airport handled 32.5 million passengers for the first time, growth of 12.8 per cent. Etihad also launched 39 new routes. The expansion forms part of a plan to increase the airport’s passenger numbers to 39.3 million by 2030 and aviation’s contribution to Abu Dhabi’s GDP to about 90bn dirhams over the same period.
In April 2025, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) published The value of air transport to the UAE economy. Its assessment considers employment and GDP contributions across airlines, airport operators, businesses operating in airports, air navigation service providers and manufacturers.
On that basis, IATA estimated that aviation directly provides about 206,800 jobs in the UAE and generates $26.6bn in economic output, equivalent to 5.3 per cent of national GDP.
Tourism supported by aviation adds another $22bn to GDP and provides about 297,300 jobs. Other estimates suggest that visitors to the UAE spend about $47.7bn a year in the local economy on goods and services.
Once supply chains, employee spending and aviation-related tourism are included, the air transport economy contributes about $92bn, or 18 per cent of UAE GDP, and supports nearly 991,500 jobs.
Qatar Airways and the five-star battle
Skytrax was founded in London in 1989 to review, evaluate and rate airlines and airports. It has since become one of the sector’s leading reference points.
Skytrax consistently rates Qatar Airways as a five-star airline. Since its annual awards began in 1999, the airline has won “World’s Best Airline” a record nine times, most recently in 2025. The awards have been described as the “Oscars of the air transport industry.”
Qatar Airways and Hamad International Airport, which opened in 2014 as the centrepiece of Qatar’s aviation project, are among the Gulf’s most prominent non-oil economic success stories. The airport serves more than 170 destinations worldwide. Qatar Airways ranks 20th among the world’s largest airlines by capacity, according to OAG, but rises to seventh when measured by available seat kilometres (ASKs), reflecting its reliance on long-haul flights exceeding the global average.
Since the Covid-19 pandemic, Qatar Airways has continued to grow. Its operating capacity is now 12 per cent above pre-pandemic levels.
In 2024, the group’s profits rose 39 per cent, while passenger numbers increased 26 per cent year on year to more than 40 million. In the following fiscal year, it reported another record rise in profits of 28 per cent. Hamad International Airport was also expanded to raise its capacity to 65 million passengers.
The expansion forms part of Qatar’s broader economic vision. According to an investment plan for the logistics sector presented in 2024, the country’s logistics services market was worth about $10bn in 2022 and contributed 7.6 per cent of GDP. Logistics occupies a central place in the “Third National Development Strategy”, with growth projected at 7.1 per cent by 2027, ahead of many regional markets. The plan draws on infrastructure that includes Hamad Port, Hamad International Airport and Qatar Airways.
Riyadh and the gateway to a post-oil era
Smaller Gulf states made aviation an economic pillar for the post-oil era before the region’s largest and richest oil state entered the race in earnest. Saudi Vision 2030 placed aviation among the kingdom’s priorities as it sought to build an economy less dependent on oil.
Saudi Arabia aims to triple annual passenger traffic to 330 million by 2030. Among its major projects is the new King Salman International Airport in Riyadh, planned across 57 square kilometres. It is expected to handle 120 million passengers by 2030 and 185 million by 2050, figures that make it a contender to become the world’s largest airport.
The kingdom is also developing Red Sea International Airport, which relies entirely on renewable energy, and the smart Neom Airport as part of a wider aviation system.
Riyadh Air, launched in 2023, is central to that expansion and to Vision 2030. It is expected to serve more than 100 destinations by the end of the decade with a fleet of more than 150 aircraft, including 60 Airbus planes. Saudi Arabia is also investing heavily in Airbus aircraft: in 2025, it announced its largest deal with the manufacturer, a $19bn order for 105 A320neo aircraft for low-cost carriers, particularly flyadeal. Flyadeal aims to double its fleet to 100 aircraft by 2030.
Vision 2030 aims to create 200,000 additional aviation jobs and raise the sector’s contribution to GDP to $20bn. Aviation already makes a substantial contribution: according to Aviation Business Middle East, the sector accounts for 8.6 per cent of Saudi GDP, worth nearly $91bn, and supports about 1.4 million jobs. Those figures represent an increase of more than 150 per cent compared with 2016.
The publication expects aviation to generate more than $200bn in GDP by 2043 while providing about one million jobs. Before then, by the end of this decade, it suggests aviation’s contribution to non-oil GDP could exceed that of other major sectors, including mining.
Turkey and the centennial bet
Turkey’s aviation project differs in one fundamental respect: it is not an oil state seeking a post-oil economy. Its investment in aviation was intended as an economic and geopolitical tool to strengthen its regional and international position.
Turkish Airlines began operating in 1933 with five aircraft and fewer than 30 employees. By 2025, it served more countries than any other airline, with a network spanning about 130 countries and nearly 300 international destinations. The company aims to expand its fleet to 800 aircraft by its centennial in 2033. That ambition does not appear far-fetched given the scale of Istanbul Airport, opened in 2018 and ultimately designed to handle about 200 million passengers a year.
The Turkish government continues to invest heavily in infrastructure linked to the airport. At the start of 2026, Turkish Airlines announced plans to invest more than $2.3bn in an integrated aviation system there, including an expanded air cargo terminal, an engine maintenance centre and catering facilities.
Over the past decade, Turkish Airlines has strengthened its position in passenger transport and air cargo. Its cargo operation grew from a mid-sized business into one of the world’s three largest, helped by the development of the SmartIST terminal at Istanbul Airport.
The company is now working on the project’s second phase, aiming to double annual cargo handling capacity from about 2.2 million tonnes to 4.5 million by 2027. If realised, that would put Istanbul among the world’s largest integrated logistics hubs, connecting Asian manufacturing centres with European consumers and growing economies in Africa and the Middle East through a single hub.
IATA’s 2025 report on aviation’s value to Turkey puts the air transport economy’s contribution at about $82.4bn, or 7.4 per cent of GDP, including supply chains, employee spending and tourism. It supports about two million jobs, 53,000 of them directly in aviation.
Turkish Airlines’ centennial plan, “Vision 2033”, goes further. Its central goal is to nearly double the airline’s contribution to the national economy to $144bn by that year, while employing about 150,000 people within the company itself.
How did airlines conquer the world’s stadiums?
The figures so far describe aviation’s economic achievements. They do not capture everything an aircraft carries besides passengers, or everything a national airline can achieve beyond contributing to GDP.
Soft power is another measure of success for airlines built as national projects. In Turkey’s soft power capacity: Geopolitics of aviation and Turkish Airlines, researcher Necati Anaz writes that “efficiently managed national carriers can improve global perceptions of the host state. After all, aviation is a great facilitator of soft power because it shortens distances and connects peoples, cultures, companies and ideas.” He argues that Turkish Airlines embodies this principle.
Researchers Zachary Kennedy and Kristian Alexander call this “aviation diplomacy” in their study of Emirates: a form of soft power through which states strengthen national identity and project an image abroad. Emirates and Etihad carry the UAE flag around the world, while Dubai Airport’s role as a transit hub between Europe, Asia and Africa reinforces the city’s image as modern and world-class.
A separate academic study published in 2020 found that Emirates’ marketing and onboard services had contributed positively and tangibly to travellers’ perception of Dubai as a tourist destination. In effect, the airline introduces the city before visitors arrive.
Emirates offers international passengers a relatively affordable form of luxury travel that is not limited to business class. Food, drinks, entertainment and the linguistic diversity of cabin crews are central to the experience and have helped promote the UAE’s image abroad.
The airline also offers passengers with long stopovers free accommodation, meals and entry visas, encouraging them to visit Dubai. Its soft power extends further than the aircraft, however.
In the summer of 2024, Real Madrid signed French footballer Kylian Mbappe. According to a claim cited by El Chiringuito, Spain’s most famous sports programme, more than 20 million people watched his unveiling, while about 80,000 fans filled the Santiago Bernabeu Stadium. The actual audience may have been larger, given the event’s global coverage and engagement across platforms.
Amid the spectacle, the “Fly Emirates” logo was visible throughout. As Real Madrid presented one of football’s biggest stars, its airline sponsor gained vast global exposure.
Real Madrid has used Emirates’ Airbus A380 aircraft for overseas travel since 2011, and the airline’s logo has occupied the most prominent space on the club’s shirts since 2014. Emirates also sponsors clubs including Arsenal, Benfica and AC Milan. Its branding appears at Wembley during the FA Cup final, when red ribbons bearing “Fly Emirates” hang from the trophy.
Emirates will pay about €74m a year over the next five years to extend its principal sponsorship agreement with Real Madrid through 2031. The deal illustrates the scale of its investment in a global brand that also serves as a UAE soft power tool.
In 2009, researcher Guilherme Lohmann estimated Emirates’ sports sponsorship spending at about $300m as part of its global branding efforts. That figure has clearly multiplied many times since then: the Real Madrid agreement alone is worth more over the coming years.
But what does all of that actually mean?
The soft power of an authoritarian state
Emirates is one example. Gulf and Turkish airlines are increasingly prominent across global sport. Riyadh Air has naming rights to one of Spain’s biggest stadiums, Riyadh Air Metropolitano, and its logo appears on Atletico Madrid shirts. Emirati airline names are also associated with Arsenal’s Emirates Stadium and Manchester City’s Etihad Stadium.
Qatar Airways’ logo appears on the shirt of Paris Saint-Germain, the European champion and one of the world’s best-known clubs. Turkish Airlines sponsors the UEFA Champions League, described here as football’s most important and most watched competition, and appears on the shirt of Argentina’s River Plate.
Football is only part of the picture. These airline brands are also prominent in tennis, motor racing, golf and combat sports.
In 2023, the UAE entered the top 10 of Brand Finance’s global soft power index for the first time, rising five places. The ranking crowned broad investments in soft power, from Expo Dubai, foreign aid, the climate conference and the Mars exploration project to the global reach of its airlines.
Despite falls in the rankings of several Gulf states in the 2025 index, and accusations concerning the UAE’s role in conflicts from Gaza to the Horn of Africa, the country remained in the top 10.
Some critics call this “sportswashing of image”, arguing that sport, aviation and entertainment work together to reshape the state’s image abroad. In their view, the Gulf model goes beyond, to some degree, Joseph Nye’s traditional conception of soft power by turning those activities into tools of influence, image-making and political and cultural reach across borders.
Nye argues that authoritarian regimes cannot sustain effective soft power over the long term because a lack of domestic freedoms dries up its sources and limits its influence. The Gulf case appears to challenge that framework. Gulf states have deployed media, sport, aviation and entertainment as soft power tools without broad internal political reform, leading researchers Paul Brannagan and Richard Giulianotti to describe the model as a form of “image laundering.”
One case illustrates a further paradox. Emirati investor Salem Al Shamsi owns Egypt’s Pyramids FC, winner of the latest CAF Champions League. Its shirts bear the logo of ADQ, a leading Abu Dhabi-linked investment company chaired by Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan. ADQ’s investment network includes aviation: it is a leading shareholder in Abu Dhabi Aviation, which owns 50 per cent of the private aviation company RoyalJet.
Egyptian poet Abdelrahman Youssef al-Qaradawi was deported from Lebanon to the UAE aboard RoyalJet aircraft A6-RJA. The handover went ahead despite RoyalJet having received a letter from MENA Rights Group warning that the operation violated Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, which enshrines the principle of non-refoulement.
The company appeared little concerned. According to rights reports, it had previously been implicated in the similar handover of a Bahraini dissident from Serbia in 2022 without facing consequences. That appears to have encouraged it to repeat the operation.
The incident shows another side of “aviation diplomacy”: aircraft that project the image of a modern, open city can also be used to deport dissidents and people wanted for political reasons towards unknown fates.
Closed skies
Previous crises offer a way to assess the current threat to Middle Eastern aviation. What do they show about the vulnerability of the region’s aviation projects and their capacity to endure?
On 6 June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt closed their airspace to Qatari aircraft during the diplomatic crisis later known as the “blockade crisis”. Qatar Airways had to reroute flights through Iranian, Turkish and Omani airspace, raising fears about aviation’s future in a region that was home to many of the world’s largest carriers.
OAG data showed that about 70 flights across the region were suspended in the crisis’s first hours, the vast majority operated by Qatar Airways. More than 30 flights were cancelled at once at Hamad International Airport that morning, leaving the usually busy airport eerily quiet.
The Australian aviation consultancy CAPA estimated that the blockade damaged Qatar Airways more than any other Middle Eastern airline. Longer routes through Iranian and Turkish airspace meant higher operating costs, longer journeys and greater fuel consumption.
Qatar Airways also risked losing its most important regional market. The UAE had accounted for about 7.3 per cent of seats departing Doha and Saudi Arabia for 6.8 per cent, making them its two largest markets. Together, the blockade states accounted for about 19 per cent of the airline’s weekly traffic.
The crisis came when Qatar Airways was already under financial pressure and operating on narrow profit margins. As researchers Emmaline Johnson and Grant Hoxham explain: “There is an established fact in this industry: first-class and business-class seats generate profits, while economy-class seats help cover operating costs.” The airline had announced an operating loss of $703m for the fiscal year ending in 2017, despite receiving nearly $500m in support and subsidies.
Commerzbank transport expert Stefan Schupner said at the time: “Growth had been moving at a rapid pace. They ordered a large number of aircraft, and now the company is under pressure to fill those planes with passengers.” He added that shareholders’ patience was beginning to wear thin. The ruling family owned about half the airline’s shares, while oil and gas revenues and global energy prices were falling.
The worst-case scenarios did not materialise. Despite financial losses and a fall of roughly 9 per cent in passenger numbers by March 2018, Qatar Airways sought new routes and markets. It added 24 destinations and strengthened partnerships with European and Asian carriers to reduce reliance on the regional market. That year, profits grew 23 per cent and air cargo revenues rose 34.4 per cent.
The airline subsequently maintained steady growth and continued winning awards, including the “World’s Best Airline” title. The blockade ended in 2021, and Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 World Cup gave its aviation project a much greater economic and symbolic boost. The airline generated about $21bn in annual revenue after carrying 31.7 million passengers, up 71 per cent year on year. During the tournament alone, it operated about 14,000 flights and carried more than 1.4 million fans to and from Doha.
Grounding during the pandemic
Qatar faced the blockade particularly acutely. The Covid-19 pandemic then imposed a different kind of blockade on the entire world. Middle Eastern airlines, which had been presented as the world’s most successful model, could not escape its severe effects.
In April 2020, IATA published projections for the losses lockdowns and quarantine measures would inflict on Middle Eastern aviation. It warned that about 1.2 million jobs in the sector and related industries were at risk — half of the region’s 2.4 million aviation-linked jobs.
With air traffic down 51 per cent against 2019, IATA projected a decline of about $66bn in aviation-related GDP in the Middle East, from a previously estimated contribution of around $130bn.
IATA’s expectations were borne out. In 2021, after the fiscal year affected by lockdowns, Emirates announced its first annual loss in more than 30 years, of about $5.5bn, and a 31 per cent reduction in its workforce.
Dubai’s government was forced to intervene with nearly $3.1bn in support to ease the losses and keep the airline operating. Turkish Airlines lost an estimated $761m, while its total debt rose by more than 47bn Turkish lira.
Qatar Airways also suffered. Between April and July 2020 it had the largest share of global passenger traffic of any airline, at 17.8 per cent, but still recorded losses of about $4bn during the pandemic year.
Saudia, already facing financial difficulties, lost $7.5bn during the pandemic year, prompting the Saudi government to provide about $7bn in direct support.
The “miracle” and its explanation
Middle Eastern aviation recovered sooner than expected. IATA had not anticipated a substantial recovery before 2023 and expected only narrow profit margins before then. Qatar Airways’ then-CEO had said the sector would not recover fully until 2024. Yet signs of recovery appeared in 2022.
The speed of the recovery drew IATA’s attention. At a 2024 conference, one of its vice presidents spoke of a “Gulf miracle” in aviation, saying European, American and Asian carriers still burdened by pandemic debt were trying to replicate the Gulf recovery model.
The “miracle”, however, had a material explanation. In 2021, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states led moves in energy markets that helped raise oil prices by nearly 66 per cent, seeking to offset some of the economic losses caused by the pandemic. IATA warned at the time that higher oil prices would hamper global aviation’s recovery, while repeatedly urging governments to support airlines to prevent widespread bankruptcies or losses that would be difficult to contain.
Oil surpluses helped fund the government aid described earlier, although Qatar’s case had its own features. In 2022, as Qatar Airways posted the record profits noted above, Emirates reduced its losses from $6bn in 2020 to about $1.5bn, while Etihad cut its losses from $1.7bn to $470m.
Across the UAE, national carriers recorded growth of 72 per cent, equivalent to $23.4bn. Saudia recovered about 85.7 per cent of its seat capacity that year, while Turkish Airlines reported net profits of $2.72bn.
Direct government intervention was central to this recovery. States protected their national carriers as a matter of economic and sovereign security. The result exposed a paradox: aviation had been promoted as an alternative to oil, yet in a crisis it appeared unable to survive at all without oil revenues.
That dependence may have embarrassed companies keen to present their success as the product of operational efficiency alone. Qatar Airways CEO Akbar Al Baker repeatedly denied that the airline had received government support, saying: “Qatar Airways has its own reserves that it is using, and it will not receive government support.” In September 2020, however, he contradicted that position by announcing that it had received $2bn from the government to cover its losses.
Turkey, without oil revenues, responded somewhat differently, although there were serious discussions about possible support for Turkish Airlines from its sovereign wealth fund. In 2021, the airline’s chairman, Ilker Ayci, said: “We refused to receive any government support, and we also refused to lay off any of our employees. The government support our competitors receive is unfair. More importantly, the company found its own way to use its resources intelligently and effectively through successful management decisions and careful capacity planning.”
Turkish Airlines was able to respond quickly to shifts in demand, helped by its extensive international network. Olivier Ponti, a tourism research and destination marketing expert, believes the airline “redirected its flights toward the routes with the highest demand and adapted more effectively to the constant changes in travel restrictions.”
That flexibility helped again after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Turkish Airlines put more large aircraft on Russian routes to meet growing demand from tourists and business travellers. By June 2023, traffic on those routes had risen by nearly 300 per cent against the same month in 2019.
Relatively low operating costs provided another advantage. Labour costs are paid in Turkish lira, while most revenues are calculated in dollars or euros, benefiting the airline as the lira’s value fell sharply, according to researcher Omar Cenk and his co-authors in Turkish Airlines: A new era after the pandemic. The company also cut total expenses by 53 per cent, saving about $1.1bn — the highest rate of cost reduction among European airlines.
Those savings came at a price. Management took pride in retaining all 66,000 employees, but their salaries were cut. In 2021, the Turkish government helped the airline reach a union agreement to reduce wages by as much as 50 per cent.
War and an uncertain future
Ian Scott was travelling from Melbourne to Venice via Doha when his flight from the Qatari capital turned back mid-air after war broke out between Israel and the United States on one side and Iran on the other. He spent several days in a hotel before travelling across the desert to Oman, where he finally caught a flight to his destination.
In a BBC interview, Scott’s words sounded almost like a grim prophecy. He said he would avoid travelling through Gulf states in future, even after the war, because he did not “trust” that the region’s problems would end there.
His words may capture Middle Eastern aviation’s predicament better than an economic figure. Francis Fukuyama devoted an entire book, Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity, to the idea that prosperity and sustainability depend on trust, both in principle and in practice. If travellers lose confidence in the safety of flights through Middle Eastern airspace, that alone may be enough to bring down an entire aviation economy.
Iran’s response to the attacks of 28 February 2026 was broad and swift, and civilian airport terminals became part of the war. Terminal 3 at Dubai International Airport was evacuated after a drone strike. At Sheikh Zayed International Airport, one person was killed and seven injured.
What followed was extraordinary even by modern aviation’s standards: Emirates, Etihad Airways and Qatar Airways suspended all their flights. These were airlines that had continued operating at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic. According to aviation analytics company Cirium, major Gulf carriers had collectively been carrying about 90,000 transit passengers a day before the crisis.
The war showed how exposed the Gulf aviation industry was. In a paper on the conflict published by Australia’s Lowy Institute, researcher Kazimir Lee argues that Iran deliberately targeted airport terminals rather than runways. Conventional military logic would favour destroying runways to disable airports, but Lee says Iran chose terminals primarily for their symbolic value. It appeared to be attacking “trust” itself: the image Gulf states had spent decades building of themselves as stable, safe, neutral, modern and open.
Middle Eastern airlines’ direct losses from cancellations and higher fuel prices during the war’s first phase were estimated at between $2.5bn and $3bn. The larger question is what comes next.
According to Charlton, the answer depends largely on the conflict’s duration. If it ends quickly, Gulf airlines will probably recover their position rapidly, offsetting losses by offering large numbers of low-priced tickets. A prolonged war, however, could give alternative connecting hubs — Singapore, Bangkok, Hong Kong and Tokyo — an opportunity to take traffic that Gulf carriers might lose.
Charlton believes any lasting reduction in Gulf airlines’ operating capacity would inevitably raise ticket prices worldwide. European carriers have already adjusted schedules and added services that avoid Gulf connections. British Airways, for example, increased weekly flights to Bangkok and Singapore, while Lufthansa and Air France-KLM added flights to Asia.
IATA director general Willie Walsh believes European airlines lack the capacity to replace Gulf carriers, which account for about 9.5 per cent of global aviation capacity. He therefore expects Gulf aviation to recover quickly once the conflict subsides. Turkish Airlines, meanwhile, was less surprised by the crisis, given its experience of operating in complex conditions. Turkey, as Europe’s top tourist destination, depends heavily on flights to Istanbul, which account for about 80 per cent of the airline’s traffic.
An analysis by the Beyond Emerging Europe Institute put it this way: “Turkish Airlines is doing what it always does: flying to places others find complicated, letting the numbers speak for themselves. While Gulf airlines are preoccupied with dealing with the effects of the Iranian war, Istanbul’s hub is becoming busier and more important as a vital transit point above the conflicts.”
Turkish Airlines reported notable profits in the first quarter of 2026, driven by sharply higher ticket prices and operating partnerships, including its cooperation with Ethiopian Airlines. It recorded net income of $226m through 31 March, against a loss of $44m in the same period a year earlier. Revenue rose 21 per cent year on year to $5.9bn, while passenger numbers increased 13 per cent to 21.3 million from 18.9 million.
French aviation expert Jean-Louis Baroux sees a different longer-term prospect. He argues that the ambition to make Gulf cities major aviation hubs cannot coexist indefinitely with open conflict between Israel and Iran. In his view, missiles were therefore bound to be directed at those airports, leaving the model inherently vulnerable while it remains within range of attack.
Economist Mohammed Karkouti points to another difference between the pandemic and the current war. Fuel continued to flow normally during the pandemic, whereas the war has pushed energy prices up, potentially for as long as the fighting continues. In his view, that threatens an aviation sector which, despite showing resilience, cannot maintain it if operating costs keep rising.
Even if the war ended tomorrow, its effects would linger. Without considerable flexibility and innovation, airlines would face a long and difficult recovery. The sector has suffered another major shock less than six years after the pandemic. Alongside higher fuel, service and insurance costs, even the temporary loss of highly profitable destinations would add to the burden.
Past crises suggest that the major Gulf airlines will probably survive this war, particularly if governments can intervene once the conflict subsides. Their economic and sovereign importance makes the cost of losing them far greater than the cost of saving them, whatever the immediate damage.
Yet Gulf aviation’s greatest geographical advantage may also subject it to its harshest test, perhaps one more severe than the pandemic. Political will, capital and an understanding of global demand turned the region’s location into a competitive strength. The war showed that airspace long regarded as neutral and safe can become a battlefield, and that airports awarded the highest ratings by Skytrax and other travel platforms can become military targets within hours.
The skies above the Middle East have always extended beyond the borders of its states, carrying intertwined dreams, ambitions and interests. When missiles and drones fill them, however, those ambitions leave a simple question for every aircraft departing Dubai, Doha, Riyadh or Istanbul: where are we going?