The repercussions of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s surprise visit to the UAE on Sunday, 27 September 2026, continue to be felt across the region. The visit has sparked widespread debate over its significance and timing, at a sensitive moment for Israel and especially for Netanyahu.
Beyond the messages conveyed by the visit itself, the most controversial aspect was the reporting that representatives of several Arab countries, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya, had joined a meeting between Netanyahu and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed. If true, their participation would have significant political and security implications.
On Tuesday evening, 29 September, Israel’s Channel 14, which is close to Netanyahu, claimed that his meeting with bin Zayed in Abu Dhabi had taken place in two stages: a bilateral meeting, followed by a broader gathering with representatives of several countries. The channel alleged that 10 states had participated in total.
Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt denied reports that they had taken part. Nevertheless, the Hebrew-language channel quoted an unnamed Emirati source as confirming the attendance of representatives from those countries. According to that account, the talks covered stronger security and intelligence cooperation and efforts to build a regional framework to confront what it described as “shared threats.”
Whether or not those countries attended, direct and indirect contacts already exist between Israel and several Arab capitals. The leaks therefore raise questions: why were these accounts circulated now, and is Israel using them to gauge the prospects of deeper integration into the Arab region?
A more important question is what Israel can offer the Gulf states in return for this opening. Is this an attempt to establish a new regional arrangement in which Israel provides security, intelligence and military support against Iran and the Houthis in exchange for wider normalisation or reduced tensions with Israel, even without full political normalisation? What role is the UAE playing in advancing such an arrangement?
Why promote this account?
The systematic promotion of these claims across more than one Hebrew-language media outlet must be considered in the broader political context of the visit. Netanyahu’s reception in Abu Dhabi followed the striking scene at the UN General Assembly, where delegations from several countries walked out during his speech. It can be read as part of an effort to break Israel’s international isolation and ease some of the mounting pressure on its occupation government.
The Emirati decision to receive Netanyahu is also difficult to separate from Israeli domestic politics, especially as elections scheduled for the end of October approach. Netanyahu and his government face intense pressure and criticism from the opposition and sections of the public. Critics say his policies have contributed to Israel’s deepening international isolation and accuse his government of mishandling several issues in ways that have drawn widespread criticism.
In this context, the promotion of claims that representatives of several Arab countries joined Netanyahu and bin Zayed in Abu Dhabi serves Netanyahu politically, regardless of their accuracy. The account presents a picture directly at odds with claims of international isolation, suggesting that Israel can still communicate and coordinate with Arab states and sit at the same table to discuss shared regional concerns.
If Arab participation is confirmed, Netanyahu is likely to use it domestically as evidence of his continued regional presence and ability to maintain channels of communication with Arab capitals. That message could resonate during his electoral campaign, particularly against rivals who accuse him of weakening Israel’s international standing and deepening its isolation.
Denials do not rule out contacts
Saudi Arabia and Jordan, followed by Egypt, denied that their representatives had participated in the Abu Dhabi meeting. These denials do not necessarily mean that Israel and Arab states have no channels for communication and political coordination.
On several occasions over the past few years, contacts and understandings of varying scope have come to light between Israel and Arab capitals, including some of the countries named in the Israeli reports. Many of these contacts have remained out of public view, conducted through back channels or undeclared communications.
The preference for keeping meetings secret reflects several considerations. Foremost is the desire to spare Arab governments public embarrassment, as large sections of their populations continue to reject normalisation in its various forms. It also reflects a wish to keep coordination on specific security or political issues separate from any move towards publicly acknowledged relations or full political normalisation. Even so, recent years have seen both public and private contacts and meetings between Israeli officials and Arab officials and other figures.
What distinguished this visit was the UAE’s official announcement that it had received Netanyahu in Abu Dhabi. The announcement may have followed Israeli leaks that preceded disclosure of the visit, or reflected an Emirati desire to bring more of these contacts into the open. Either way, it marked a notable increase in the public visibility of UAE-Israeli relations.
The UAE’s lack of a definitive response to reports of Arab participation added to the uncertainty. As host, Abu Dhabi could have directly confirmed or denied those accounts. Its failure to do so left further questions about the nature of the meetings that took place and the extent of participation in them. It also raised a broader question about the role the UAE may seek to play in the next phase.
What does the UAE want?
The UAE’s recent dealings with Israel indicate a new direction that goes beyond traditional bilateral relations between the two countries. They point towards a larger Emirati role in promoting arrangements for closer regional cooperation involving Israel, particularly on issues related to Iran and regional security.
Its role can therefore be read as broader than conventional mediation between Israel and Arab parties interested in expanding their relations with it. The UAE may be seeking to establish itself as a regional intermediary capable of managing contacts and understandings between Israel and Arab parties on Gaza, Yemen, the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, and perhaps broader Gulf security arrangements in future.
The region faces overlapping challenges, notably escalation linked to Iran, Houthi threats and the security of shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. These issues shape the calculations of Israel, the Gulf states and other Arab countries alike.
Abu Dhabi is trying to use these shared challenges to build broader security and political understandings that could bring Israel and Arab states together on specific issues. This need not lead to a formal or publicly declared alliance in the near term.
The UAE’s approach may therefore extend beyond deepening its own relationship with Israel. Abu Dhabi may also seek to use that relationship to strengthen its position in regional security arrangements and regain greater influence over regional affairs. Its ability to maintain communication with opposing parties at the same time could help it pursue this role.
Iran, normalisation and the Abraham Accords
Current indications suggest that a possible regional arrangement is taking shape, with the UAE acting as a link between the parties. It would involve expanded cooperation between Israel and Gulf states on challenges related to Iran and the Houthis in exchange for greater rapprochement with Israel. This need not begin with publicly declared political or diplomatic normalisation: it could start with security and intelligence cooperation outside conventional official frameworks.
Such a model appears closer to a flexible network of regional security cooperation than a formal military alliance along the lines of a “Middle East NATO.” Existing interests and threats could provide common ground. Israel could offer its intelligence capabilities, air defence technology, and surveillance and early warning systems as a basis for closer security coordination with Gulf states.
As cooperation develops, economic and political relations may gradually expand. States that remain reluctant to pursue full normalisation, or consider its political costs and the risk of public opposition too high, may initially limit themselves to security contacts or reduced tensions without establishing full diplomatic relations.
The UAE’s close ties with Israel and its network of Gulf and Arab relationships give it room to manoeuvre among the parties. Abu Dhabi may seek to use shared concerns about maritime routes, energy security and escalation with Iran and the Houthis to promote Israeli-Arab cooperation, whether through a declared framework or undeclared security coordination.
The likely approach, then, is to build interdependent security interests that make cooperation with Israel more acceptable and feasible for some regional states, rather than necessarily announce a new alliance. This could gradually open the way for broader rapprochement, easing tensions and curbing the recent escalation driven by Israel’s criminal policies in the region.
A gift for Israel
The UAE’s potential role in reshaping cooperation between Israel and regional states would offer Israel substantial political, security and logistical gains. Foremost would be recasting Iran as a shared regional threat, rather than an adversary of Israel alone. Israel could present itself to Gulf states as a security partner with useful capabilities for addressing common challenges, rather than solely as a party to the traditional Arab-Israeli conflict.
This repositioning could allow Israel to expand its role in regional defence arrangements through monitoring and early warning systems, intelligence sharing, and coordination on air defence and the interception of missiles and drones, strengthening its security and capacity for early deterrence.
If this develops, it would also increase regional pressure on Iran and its allies and encourage a gradual expansion of the forms of cooperation that began with the Abraham Accords. Cooperation might initially focus on security before taking broader political or diplomatic forms.
The scenario nevertheless faces substantial obstacles. The continuing war and its repercussions in Gaza, escalating settler violence in the West Bank and persistent tensions elsewhere in the region all raise the political cost of publicly declared Arab rapprochement with Israel. They also constrain efforts to turn security cooperation into a broad, lasting regional arrangement.
Any Emirati attempt to promote a new regional framework will therefore depend on a difficult balance between competing pressures. Shared security interests push some parties towards closer coordination with Israel. At the same time, the Palestinian cause and the continuing conflict impose high political costs and risk public opposition.
Abu Dhabi may use its position as an intermediary to strengthen its regional influence. Its success will depend on the parties’ ability to reconcile security imperatives with the sensitivities of Arab politics.
The region appears to be entering a period in which its political relationships are being reshaped by rapid change and shared challenges. These pressures may encourage approaches that depart from longstanding principles and the historic foundations of Arab nationalism in favour of more pragmatic calculations based on security and mutual interests.
With states such as the UAE pursuing this approach, Israel’s integration into broader regional arrangements may accelerate through political or diplomatic normalisation and deeper security, economic and intelligence ties. The central question is whether the region has already moved beyond debating normalisation and entered a new phase marked by a more complex and interconnected regional partnership.