Whenever friction between Türkiye and Israel escalates, the scale of the costs each side can impose on the other acts as a brake on the shift from tension to direct war.
Israel has a clear advantage in air power, intelligence and precision strikes. Türkiye, however, has a large conventional army, geographic and industrial depth, and the capacity to sustain a prolonged confrontation. It is also a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, and has extensive military ties with the US and Europe.
These factors distinguish Türkiye from Iran in Israeli military calculations. In recent years, Tel Aviv has developed an approach to attacking Tehran that involves penetrating deep into Iranian territory, suppressing air defences and striking command centres and strategic facilities.
A confrontation with Türkiye, however, raises broader questions from the first strike: Ankara’s ability to respond and sustain the fight, the possible spread of war into Syria and the eastern Mediterranean, and the position of the US and NATO if escalation spirals out of control.
Syria provided the first practical test of these limits in 2025 and 2026. The Israeli army targeted Syrian bases that Türkiye had been considering using, after which the two sides entered talks to prevent a clash.
In August 2026, the strike on Abu al-Duhur air base brought the same danger back into focus. Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Türkiye and President Donald Trump’s regional envoy, said Ankara had tracked Israeli aircraft heading north without prior warning and that a Turkish response was a plausible possibility.
The incident ended with a US move to strengthen the deconfliction mechanism. It illustrated how deterrence now operates: Israel can use force, but its next move may trigger a confrontation whose course is difficult to control.
Türkiye is not Iran: How does the threat differ?
Over the years, Israeli’s military and security establishment has developed a clear operational approach to Iran. The Iranian threat has centred on its nuclear programme, long-range missiles, command centres, military infrastructure and network of armed forces linked to Tehran. The establishment developed the capacity to penetrate deep into Iran, strike these targets and then deal with waves of retaliatory missile attacks.
In an analysis published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on 10 October 2025, researchers concluded that the Israeli air force had achieved air superiority over Iran in less than four days during the June war that year.
The first wave of the new US-Israeli war, which began on 28 February 2026, relied on surprise and long-range munitions, including Israeli air-launched ballistic missiles and US Tomahawk missiles. These campaigns established an offensive model that begins with surprise, intelligence superiority and the suppression of air defences, before expanding into a campaign inside the adversary’s territory.
Türkiye requires Israeli military planners to consider additional factors from the outset. Its conventional armed forces can combine air power, naval forces, missiles, drones and air defences, and are linked to an extensive NATO and US security structure.
Syria’s geography gives the Turkish threat a direct bearing on Tel Aviv’s military calculations. Ankara can deploy radars, air defences, aircraft, drones and trainers close to the area where the Israeli army operates. This explains why recent Israeli studies have focused on the possibility of a permanent Turkish military presence in Syria.
Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies has warned that the introduction of advanced Turkish air defence systems into Syria could restrict the freedom of movement of the Israeli’s aircraft. This concern was reflected in military action in 2025, when the Israeli army targeted Syrian bases that Turkish teams had inspected for possible deployments.
Turkish forces near the Syrian border, where the most sensitive points of military friction between Ankara and Tel Aviv are concentratedAccording to an analysis by Turkish researcher Ömer Özkizilcik, published by the US-based Stimson Center in January 2026, a Turkish plan involving three bases in central Syria was halted following strikes carried out before Turkish forces had established themselves there. Talks then began in Azerbaijan to prevent friction.
Two schools of thought emerged within the Israeli establishment over this development. The Nagel Committee, appointed by the Israeli government in early 2025 to assess military capability requirements, warned of a scenario in which Turkish influence in Syria becomes an advanced threat and called for preparations for a possible future confrontation.
The report reflects a school of thought that favours factoring Türkiye into military planning early, before its capabilities are fully developed or political tensions become a direct confrontation.
Galia Lindenstrauss, a senior researcher and Türkiye specialist at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, offered a different interpretation in a study published on 18 November 2025, titled “Turkey Is Not Iran, but It Is a Threat.”
Lindenstrauss attributed the distinctive nature of the Turkish case to its NATO membership and relationship with the US. She argued that Washington has both an interest in reducing friction and the ability to prevent it from becoming a military confrontation.
Michael Milshtein, a senior researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, reached a similar assessment in the summer of 2026. He highlighted the danger of recasting Türkiye from a “strategic challenge” as an enemy against which Israel is preparing for all-out war. Such planning, he noted, would have to account for one of NATO’s largest armies and a state with deep military ties to Washington.
In the same debate, Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz also focused on Syria as the nearest potential flashpoint, particularly the possibility of Turkish bases or systems that would restrict Israeli air operations.
In May 2026, Ryan Gingeras, a professor of regional and international studies at the US Navy’s Naval Postgraduate School, warned against treating Türkiye’s future weapons projects as capabilities it already fully possessed.
He pointed to the continuing development of the Kaan fighter jet, the Kizilelma unmanned combat aircraft and several missile systems, alongside persistent gaps in air defence. At the same time, he argued that directing Turkish military modernisation towards a confrontation with the Israeli state could fuel an arms race and increase the risk of friction over time.
Türkiye’s relationship with the West gives these distinctions added weight. Its defence industry exports exceeded $10 billion in 2025, with exports to Europe and the US reaching about $5.6 billion. This has coincided with Turkish companies’ expansion in the European defence market and the continued dependence of some advanced programmes on Western engines, components and technologies. Military calculations therefore also have to account for an extensive network of arms and supply relationships.
In a study published on 16 June 2026, based on interviews with senior Turkish officials and diplomats, Asli Aydintasbas, director of the Brookings Institution’s project on Türkiye, concluded that Washington still regards Ankara as an important regional power that should remain firmly anchored within NATO. She also concluded that managing Turkish-Israeli competition before it becomes military confrontation has become a US interest.
This is the fundamental difference from Iran. Tel Aviv can confront Tehran through an offensive model already tested inside Iranian territory, based on destroying strategic capabilities and securing broad freedom to operate in the air.
Türkiye, by contrast, directs Israeli military calculations towards preventing the emergence of an advanced military presence in Syria, striking sites before Turkish forces are stationed there and enforcing red lines while keeping communication channels open. Preventing confrontation thus becomes part of managing the threat.
Power without a quick victory: Why would a decisive outcome be difficult?
The Israeli army retains a clear qualitative advantage in the most critical aspects of air warfare. The campaigns against Iran in 2025 and 2026 demonstrated its considerable ability to combine stealth aircraft, intelligence, long-range munitions, electronic warfare and the suppression of air defences in a single campaign.
Tel Aviv is also working to expand its fleet of F-35 and F-15 fighter jets and increase domestic munitions production to preserve this advantage in the coming years.
Türkiye’s deterrent power rests on different foundations: its extensive territory, numerous facilities and bases, and an industrial base that produces drones, munitions, vehicles, radars, ships and electronic warfare systems.
These assets give Turkish forces considerable scope to move units, repair facilities, compensate for some losses and sustain operations beyond the first days of war. Their deployment in northern Syria also provides a forward position from which to bring some of this military power close to the area where the Israeli army operates.
Can Kasapoglu, a defence specialist at the Hudson Institute, summed up the importance of this industrial base by saying that modern wars have demonstrated the importance of “industrial depth and sustainability” alongside the quality of military platforms.
In May 2026, Turkish shipyards were working on more than 40 naval vessels, while Aselsan, Türkiye’s largest defence electronics company, accelerated production of radars, electronic warfare systems and components for the Steel Dome air defence project.
Gaps still limit some of Türkiye’s capabilities. Ankara is working to complete a multilayered national air defence system and continues to develop the Kaan fighter jet and unmanned combat aircraft, while still relying on Western technologies, engines and fighter jets in several areas.
The confrontation with Iran in 2026 demonstrated the importance of Türkiye’s NATO-linked air defence structure when Iranian missiles entered its airspace. With its current capabilities, Türkiye can raise the cost of Israeli operations and deploy radars, air defences, aircraft and drones in nearby theatres. The Israeli army, however, retains an advantage in precision strikes and the ability to penetrate airspace in the initial stages.
The Israeli state’s ability to sustain a long war depends heavily on US supplies and military cooperation. In January 2025, its Defence Ministry signed contracts with Israel’s Elbit Systems to expand domestic production of heavy bombs and raw materials, as part of efforts to reduce the impact of dependence on imports during wartime.
Its core air power depends on US fighter jets, spare parts, munitions and interception systems supplied through military cooperation with Washington. The wars with Iran demonstrated the importance of this dependence. CSIS concluded in 2026 that intensive use of interceptors from the US THAAD system and long-range strike missiles had put parts of US stockpiles under pressure, and that replenishing some categories could take years.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies also highlighted the US and Israeli need to replenish missile defence stockpiles after large numbers of interceptors had been used.
This experience makes the duration of a war central to any military calculation involving Türkiye. Sustaining a broad campaign requires a continuous supply of munitions, interceptors and spare parts.
This is the basis of deterrence: the Israeli army can strike Turkish targets and inflict significant losses, but Türkiye’s size, numerous facilities and industrial base make it extremely costly to use those strikes to bring its fighting capacity to a rapid end.
Ankara can also extend the confrontation into Syria and the eastern Mediterranean, drawing on its air, naval, missile and drone capabilities. Israeli air and intelligence superiority, meanwhile, gives the Israeli army an advantage in seizing the initiative and delivering strikes in the early stages.
The absence of a shared land border limits the options for securing a decisive military outcome. The confrontation scenarios discussed in studies therefore focus on air and missile strikes, electronic warfare, air defences, naval clashes and Syria.
These means can inflict heavy losses, but translating them into a decisive political outcome would require a longer, more draining war. This explains why Israeli studies focus on deterrence, deconfliction and managing friction.
The experience with Iran itself offers a warning against equating air superiority with a decisive outcome. The confrontation continued until early September 2026 despite the scale of US and Israeli strikes, with heavy expenditure of munitions and interceptors.
That experience has added significance in Türkiye’s case, where geographic depth combines with a larger industrial base and institutional ties to NATO and Western defence economies.
What keeps confrontation below the threshold of war?
Türkiye’s NATO membership adds political and strategic costs to any confrontation with Israel, but its effect depends on where a clash occurs and what form it takes. Article 5 of the treaty states that an armed attack on one member is considered an attack on all, while each member decides what assistance it deems necessary.
Article 6 defines the geographic scope of that commitment, including Turkish territory and the Mediterranean Sea under the conditions set out in the treaty. Membership therefore does not mean that every clash with Turkish forces would automatically trigger a war between Israel and the alliance.
This distinction matters in Syria, the nearest potential flashpoint, where Turkish forces operate outside Turkish territory and the direct geographic scope defined by Article 6.
If Turkish soldiers were killed in an Israeli strike inside Syria, Ankara could request consultations within the alliance under Article 4, exert political pressure and decide on its own response. The incident would remain outside the direct application of Article 5. Even so, the killing of Turkish military personnel would increase the cost of containing escalation and force Ankara to consider its deterrent credibility and that of its army.
The stakes change if a clash moves to the Mediterranean or Turkish territory. Article 6 covers alliance members’ ships and aircraft in the Mediterranean, while Turkish territory clearly falls within the alliance’s geographic scope. Even then, how the incident is handled remains a political decision for the alliance and each member state. The crisis would, however, become a broader NATO issue, increasing the likelihood that Washington and European capitals would become involved in efforts to contain it.
The US role comes into clearer focus here. Washington is linked to Türkiye through NATO and extensive military ties, while also providing Israel with funding, arms and broad defence cooperation, and officially maintaining its qualitative military edge.
A confrontation would therefore present Washington with a crisis involving a NATO ally and a central military partner in the Middle East. This explains its direct interest in containing escalation before it spreads.
Writing on 8 July 2025, Alper Coskun, a former Turkish diplomat and researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, argued that Washington needed to manage Turkish-Israeli rivalry to prevent it from becoming a military confrontation. He identified Syria as the foremost arena requiring arrangements to reduce friction.
This role was evident after the Abu al-Duhur strike in August 2026, when Washington announced work on a stronger deconfliction mechanism involving Türkiye, Israel, and Syria, following an incident that came close to provoking a Turkish response.
In an analysis published on 27 August 2026, Carmit Valensi and Amal Hayek, researchers at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies, recommended combining limited military deterrence with dialogue and mechanisms to prevent clashes.
This assessment reflects an understanding within the Israeli security establishment that strikes on Turkish interests in Syria become more dangerous as Turkish forces move closer to the targeted sites. Keeping a communication channel open reduces the likelihood that a limited strike will be interpreted as the start of a broader confrontation. The most dangerous escalation thresholds lie in the shift from targeting sites Türkiye might use to targeting Turkish forces already on the ground.
In 2025, and again at Abu al-Duhur in 2026, the raids occurred before Turkish forces had established themselves at the sites, keeping escalation within defined limits. But the killing of Turkish military personnel in a strike, the downing of an aircraft or damage to a Turkish ship in the eastern Mediterranean would raise the cost of a response and make the situation more sensitive within NATO.
Targeting Turkish territory represents the highest threshold, because it would turn the crisis into a broader NATO issue and place it on the alliance’s agenda. The deterrent importance of NATO and Washington therefore lies in raising the cost of the next move and opening channels to contain escalation, without guaranteeing a predetermined position by the alliance or its members if a confrontation occurs.
Syria remains the arena closest to testing these limits, particularly if a potential Turkish deployment becomes an actual presence of forces and manned systems. At that point, the room to pull back that has so far allowed Ankara and Tel Aviv to manage friction without sliding into war narrows.