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Since October 2023, the war on Gaza has prompted widespread student protests, online campaigning and rights activism, alongside changes in how some young people in the West view Israel and the Palestinian cause. Three years on, what remains of those changes as protests and media attention have waned and competing narratives have gained ground?
This report examines how far those changes in young people’s attitudes have endured. It compares current western public opinion with attitudes in the war’s early months, traces the course of student protests, online campaigning and rights activism, and examines changes in western governments’ positions.
A widening divide within western societies
Western public attitudes towards Palestine in the war’s early weeks differed from those recorded later. A study published by More in Common in November 2023 offers a snapshot of British attitudes in the first weeks of the conflict. It found that the public was not split into opposing camps supporting Israel and Palestine: 18 per cent sympathised with Palestinians and 16 per cent with Israelis, while two-thirds described themselves as neutral, sympathising with neither side.
As the war continued through September 2026, polls recorded changing attitudes. In the US, Economist/YouGov polling showed a sharp narrowing of the gap between those who sympathised with Israelis and those who sympathised with Palestinians. In October 2023, the figures were 48 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. By September 2026, they were almost equal, at 26 per cent and 25 per cent.
British opinion moved in the same direction. Sympathy for Palestinians rose from 18 per cent in November 2023 to 26 per cent in September 2026, while sympathy for Israelis fell from 16 per cent to 12 per cent.
A More in Common report also indicates that the war has affected social relationships and public debate in Britain. People’s positions on the war have become more closely tied to their judgements of others. The report also notes declining trust in some key institutions, the media and political parties.
The latest European polls also show the depth and persistence of the war’s impact on public opinion. The 2026 HU/EF-Barometer, which surveyed people in Germany, France, Britain and Poland, found that respondents whose views had changed since the war began were more likely to have moved towards supporting Palestinians. The change was particularly pronounced in Poland, where support for Palestinians rose from 14 per cent in 2024 to 30 per cent in 2026.
These findings are consistent with Pew Research Center reports published in 2026, which recorded increasingly negative views of Israel compared with 2025 among substantial sections of the public in several European countries, including Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy, Germany and Britain.
The deterioration in Israel’s image was not confined to the war’s early months. Negative views continued to rise in several countries during 2026: from 64 per cent to 73 per cent in Germany, from 66 per cent to 75 per cent in Italy, from 61 per cent to 69 per cent in Britain, and from 53 per cent to 60 per cent in the US.
A 2026 Pew Research Center survey also shows a clear generational divide. In Britain, 78 per cent of respondents aged 18 to 34 held negative views of Israel, compared with 65 per cent of those over 50. In the US, the figures were 74 per cent among younger respondents and 49 per cent among older respondents. In Australia, they were 87 per cent and 73 per cent respectively, with similar gaps in France, Canada, Hungary and other countries.
The shift in attitudes towards Israel therefore appears to have outlasted the decline in media attention to the war. Polls suggest that Israel’s image has remained negative, or deteriorated further, in most western societies.
From campuses to online activism: Changing forms of protest
Universities in the US and Europe saw widespread protests after the war on Gaza began. The movement peaked in spring 2024, with sit-ins and large demonstrations involving students and faculty members. Protesters demanded an end to the war and called on universities to divest from holdings supporting the Israeli military.
ACLED documented the global spread of pro-Palestine protests. According to its latest data, more than 51,000 pro-Palestine demonstrations were recorded from October 2023 to the end of 2025.
As the movement grew, university administrations imposed strict restrictions on demonstrations, the pitching of tents and the use of loudspeakers. They also took disciplinary action against participants, including suspensions, expulsions and campus bans.
A joint report by the American Civil Liberties Union and Amnesty International, published in September 2026, documented disciplinary measures and restrictions on pro-Palestine protests, as well as police interventions and the use of force. It followed a two-year investigation covering 80 universities and colleges in 28 states.
The report also documented measures targeting foreign students and researchers, including arrest, detention, deportation and visa revocation. It documented pressure from the Trump administration on universities whose students engaged in pro-Palestine activism, including the withholding of funding and research grants.
The report argues that these measures, and the fear of punishment, retaliation or deportation, helped reduce the momentum of student protests. The decline in campus protests does not mean pro-Palestine activism has declined. The evidence examined in the report indicates that some protest activity shifted towards online campaigning, rights advocacy, boycotts and donations. Palestine also continued to feature in theatre and other cultural and artistic work.
Online, activists continued to use platforms such as TikTok and Instagram to share pro-Palestine content. A study published in 2026 confirmed that these platforms continued to carry Palestinian narratives. They have given such narratives and content more room to circulate beyond media outlets aligned with Israel.
Another study completed in 2026 analysed 4,700 English-language social media posts published between January 2024 and October 2025. It found that young people continued to call for boycotts of products linked to the war on Gaza as a form of political protest.
Osama Abu Irshaid said Israel had allocated enormous budgets and exerted sustained pressure to control algorithms and block or restrict content supporting Palestine. He said these efforts extended to attempts to buy major platforms and silence critical voices.
Rights groups and legal organisations in the West also continued to press for Palestinian rights and accountability for the war. In Britain, specialist organisations such as Lawyers for Palestinian Human Rights continued their work on Gaza, settlements and accountability before international courts. In 2026, they submitted legal briefs and motions to the International Criminal Court concerning cases related to Gaza and the West Bank.
In Britain, there were also signs that Palestine had become more prominent in electoral politics and institutions. The Palestine Solidarity Campaign said the issue had gained prominence in elections and trade unions. It reported that its individual membership had risen from about 7,800 at the beginning of 2023 to nearly 17,000 in 2026, while newsletter subscriptions had increased from about 70,000 to 300,000.
The campaign also said that 34 local councils in England and Wales had committed to divesting their pension funds from companies that activists believe are linked to Israel.
Gaza continued to feature in theatre and cinema, with new works exploring the war, its consequences and its portrayal in the media. In September 2026, the play The First Year of the Gaza Genocide in the Media was staged in London. Based on Palestinian testimonies from Gaza, it examines the relationship between coverage of the war and the shaping of public opinion.
In cinema, NAZA was among the latest films to address the war. It was screened in Italian cinemas during September and October 2026, attracted large audiences and topped the Italian box office before being released in other countries.
Donations also remained a form of solidarity after mass protests declined. UNRWA announced that contributions from individuals and private entities accounted for about 12 per cent of its total income in 2025, despite falling funding. The agency described this public support for Gaza as unprecedented.
This solidarity continued in 2026 through individual, institutional and artistic initiatives. In Britain, Artists for Gaza raised more than £142,000 through four events involving more than 40 artists.
Concern Worldwide relaunched its Cook for Gaza campaign for a second year, inviting individuals and families to organise events and raise funds for Gaza. In Spain, a University of Barcelona campaign raised €7,546 for humanitarian aid in Gaza in 2026.
In the US, the Artists for Aid concert in Los Angeles raised about $5.4m in January 2026 for relief organisations working with Palestinians in Gaza and people in Sudan. Artistic networks such as Musicians for Palestine also continued to organise solidarity activities and raise money for relief projects in Gaza.
To mark the war’s third anniversary, more than 200 organisations in more than 60 countries announced a “global mobilization for Palestine” from 9 to 11 October 2026. Planned activities included demonstrations, gatherings, cultural and artistic events, and actions to pressure governments.
Western governments review policies while maintaining alliances
Over the past three years, some western governments have changed their positions on Israel and Palestine. These changes have extended beyond recognition of Palestinian statehood to reviews of arms exports, sanctions on West Bank settlers and reassessments of trade relations with Israel. Political divisions have also emerged within Israel’s two main bases of support in the US: the Democratic and Republican parties.
These changes have not amounted to a break with Israel. Western governments have continued to emphasise Israel’s security and maintain various forms of cooperation with it. The policy changes have also coincided with protests and shifts in western public opinion.
Recognition of Palestinian statehood has been one of the most prominent diplomatic changes during the war. Since October 2023, another 18 countries have recognised the state of Palestine. Ireland, Spain and Norway did so in May 2024. Britain, Canada, Australia, Portugal, France and Belgium followed in September 2025, alongside other European countries.
Spain has taken steps that go beyond recognition to restrict aspects of its relationship with Israel. It stopped issuing new licences for arms sales in October 2023, recognised Palestine in May 2024 and joined South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice.
In 2025, Spain called for an arms embargo, a ban on trade with settlements and the suspension of some cooperation programmes. In September that year, it approved a permanent legal ban on the arms trade with Israel and banned imports of settlement products.
Economic and trade relations with Israel have also come under review. In May 2025, Britain announced that it was suspending negotiations on a free trade agreement with Israel. The European Commission proposed suspending some of the trade privileges granted to Israel.
16 plans to build 3,821 new settlement units, and 3 martyrs … The Wall and Settlement Resistance Commission publishes the toll of settler attacks in the occupied West Bank during the past month https://t.co/UbjBVTsOU9
— NoonPost (@NoonPost) October 3, 2026
Britain suspended 30 arms export licences in September 2024. By September 2026, it had announced the suspension of more than 80 licences linked to arms exports to Israel because of the war in Gaza, while continuing to emphasise its support for Israel’s security. In August 2025, Germany announced that it was suspending exports of military equipment that could be used in the Gaza Strip.
Joint western statements criticising settlement expansion and reaffirming a commitment to a two-state solution offered further signs of a widening diplomatic divide with the Israeli government. Delegations also repeatedly walked out of the UN General Assembly hall during Benjamin Netanyahu’s speeches in 2024, 2025 and 2026.
These developments do not, however, represent a unified shift in western policy from supporting Israel to supporting Palestinians. A further attempt to impose EU sanctions on Israel failed. The debate within the bloc illustrates the differences between governments: Germany and Italy continued to favour dialogue, while Spain, Ireland and Belgium called for tougher measures.
Pro-Palestine activists nevertheless believe that the war on Gaza has become part of electoral and wider public debate in some European countries. They argue that mobilisation among the public and young people has helped keep Palestine on the political agenda over the past three years.
Three years of war on Gaza appear to have left traditional western alliances intact, while breaking political taboos and laying the foundations for a popular movement encompassing rights advocacy and cultural activity.