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Israel is approaching elections for the 26th Knesset in the shadow of 7 October 2023. What began as an unprecedented security failure in the history of the occupation has become a defining event, reshaping Israeli politics as a whole.
These are the first elections since the attack and the war that followed: the genocide in the Gaza Strip, war in Lebanon and Iran, aggression against Syria and attacks in Yemen. In this militarised political climate, dominated by security concerns and unresolved questions, voters will judge the leadership that governed before the attack and conducted the war afterwards. For the occupation’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, the stakes are particularly high: he is determined not to end the longest tenure in the “state’s” history with his record defined by that day’s failure.
The attack shapes every aspect of the contest. Parties are disputing responsibility for the failure and the means of holding those responsible to account, redefining themselves through their campaign rhetoric, and competing to recruit candidates associated with that day. Political alliances, too, may depend on whether their members seek to oust Netanyahu or protect him as the leader of the Zionist right’s project.
Across these disputes, 7 October has become the benchmark against which parties and leaders are judged, the lens through which other issues are understood, and the turning point around which all sides are revising their platforms.
What matters to voters after 7 October?
The elections present a striking paradox. The failure of 7 October occurred during the outgoing Knesset’s term, yet it is the first Knesset to complete a full term since 1988. The 37th government is also the first to serve out its term since the 1973 elections.
The government on whose watch Israel suffered its greatest security failure has therefore survived to the end of its term. For all its political repercussions, the failure also helped hold together the far-right parliamentary majority, allowing Netanyahu and his partners to serve a full term with their “dream right-wing coalition.”
No commission of inquiry has yet been established, and no commission of any kind is likely to be formed for at least another six months. Election day thus becomes the first opportunity to hold the government to account. The vote is widely seen as a referendum on Netanyahu, his right-wing government and its handling of the attack.
That referendum rests on two conflicting narratives. One holds that the attack destroyed the image of the “master of security” on which Netanyahu built his career. In the competing narrative he has been trying to re-establish since autumn 2025, he presents himself as the man who saved the nation from annihilation through a series of military successes against Iran and its proxies.
The attack has also reordered the electoral agenda. Traditional questions, including positions on a two-state solution and competing approaches to managing the conflict, have receded into the background. The economy has largely disappeared from the debate, despite its importance in voters’ lives. Economist Manuel Trajtenberg, the founder and first head of the National Economic Council and a former executive director of the Institute for National Security Studies, describes elections overshadowed by 7 October, with security and political issues taking precedence over economic concerns.
Yet the attack’s influence on the contest does not mean it alone determines how people vote. In a survey by the Israel Democracy Institute, Jewish voters were divided in roughly similar proportions over which of five issues would most influence their choice: the return of the captives, the events of 7 October, Haredi conscription, the rising cost of living and judicial reform.
Three of these five priorities arose directly from the attack or were redefined by it. The survey also reveals a deep crisis of representation: the proportion of respondents who feel that a party closely reflects their views has fallen to about a quarter, its lowest level since 2003. This gap has likely created an opening for new parties built around a post-7 October identity.
Responsibility, accountability and the inquiry dispute
Responsibility for the failure has become central to election propaganda. The opposition treats the vote as a belated trial of the prime minister of the occupation state. Netanyahu’s camp seeks to shift blame to the security establishment or undermine the accusation itself.
The commission of inquiry has become a campaign pledge. The opposition promises to establish an official commission as soon as it takes power. The coalition, meanwhile, has advanced a bill for a commission appointed by politicians through its first reading. It has told the Supreme Court that it intends to complete the process if it forms the next government.
The dispute appeared early in campaign videos. Yashar, led by Gadi Eisenkot, released three clips, each opening with an image of Netanyahu and a question asking whether he remembered his positions before the attack. Likud petitioned the chair of the Central Elections Committee to have the videos removed. It argued that the clips presented misleading extracts from Netanyahu’s sources and statements, unfairly interfering with his campaign.
At the same time, a Likud source told Channel 12 about a deliberate campaign to promote theories of “treason” surrounding the attack, aimed at shifting responsibility away from Netanyahu at any cost. Netanyahu then publicly denied that any treason had occurred, seeking to benefit from the narrative among his supporters while avoiding its political cost among centrist voters.
Press leaks, however, shifted the debate from institutional to personal responsibility. On 8 September, Haaretz reported, citing a forthcoming book by journalists Shlomi Eldar and Ruti Yuval, that UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed had called Netanyahu about 10 days before the attack. According to the newspaper, he warned Netanyahu during the 45-minute call that Yahya Sinwar was planning a major move. Netanyahu calmly replied that “Israel” was prepared for any scenario and did not pass the warning to the heads of the security services. The Prime Minister’s Office described the report as an “absolute lie.”
The political response showed how responsibility was being used as an electoral weapon. Eisenkot challenged Netanyahu’s central defence — “They didn’t wake me up” — by asking who had failed to wake whom. He said there were mounting signs that Netanyahu had led “Israel” into failure with his eyes shut. Naftali Bennett described what had happened as “criminal negligence.” Yair Golan declared that the “They didn’t wake me up” narratives were over and called for Netanyahu to be jailed. The four opposition leaders issued a rare joint statement demanding an immediate investigation into what Netanyahu knew, when he knew it and why he had not informed the security establishment.
Likud attacked the source of the leak rather than refuting its substance, claiming that Eldar had received money from a left-wing organisation linked to Golan’s party. It also questioned a secret visit Golan and former Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar had made to the UAE two months earlier, calling for a criminal investigation into what it described as electoral interference by “foreign elements”.
Further leaks followed. In a report on 22 September, Channel 12 cited three Emirati sources who said UAE intelligence had warned the Shin Bet in September 2023 of a possible act of violence by Hamas. According to those sources, Mohammed bin Zayed called Netanyahu to ensure the information had reached him, and Netanyahu reassured him that the matter was “being handled.” A senior security official believed that the direct warning to Netanyahu may have provided the final impetus for a deeper investigation.
In a Yedioth Ahronoth investigation, Ronen Bergman reported that Netanyahu had repeatedly been told that the Qatari funds he allowed into Gaza were financing Hamas’s military wing. Bergman quoted a senior military intelligence officer who estimated that about $4m a month went to the Qassam Brigades, accounting for nearly half their budget. Netanyahu’s office dismissed the allegations as “recycled lies.”
The timing of these leaks during the election campaign is likely to have two effects. They give the opposition campaign material that turns a general accusation into specific questions about what Netanyahu knew. They also allow Netanyahu to portray them as an electoral conspiracy and rally his supporters.
Campaign rhetoric and election platforms
Parties are redefining themselves in response to the attack, with three main approaches emerging.
The first is Likud’s claim to offer leadership capable of seeing the war through. In a recorded address on the eve of Tisha B’Av, the day in the Jewish calendar commemorating the destruction of the Temple, Netanyahu announced his intention to form a “broad national government” after the elections. Maariv sees his decision to make the slogan central to his campaign as a shift from seeking victory to trying to avoid defeat.
The second is a right-wing approach that uses the attack to advance the displacement project. Its ideological plans are producing far-reaching strategic changes in line with the “decisive victory” plan. Itamar Ben-Gvir has announced a proposal for what he calls “voluntary emigration,” aimed at removing 1.86 million Palestinians from Gaza over seven years. He has made the creation of a “Ministry of Emigration” one of his main conditions for joining the government, alongside his demand to hold the war portfolio himself.
Reserve Brigadier General Ofer Winter has joined him in advocating this approach, declaring that emigration is the only solution in Gaza and that there will be no Palestinian state. Winter has framed the elections as a referendum on the doctrines that preceded the attack, under the slogan “What was will not be.”
The third approach, led by Gadi Eisenkot, presents itself as an alternative to the leadership that failed. The opposition is united in promising an official commission of inquiry. It also accuses Eisenkot of keeping Hamas in power, warning that the US framework for implementing Trump’s plan in Gaza would leave the movement in control.
The differences narrow considerably on security doctrine. Like Netanyahu and Bennett, Eisenkot wants to maintain a broad security zone in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. This suggests that the dispute concerns who manages the war, bears its costs and conducts it more effectively within a rigid security doctrine, rather than the war itself.
Candidates and electoral lists
Agence France-Presse identified nine candidates who had a relative killed or taken captive, or who came to prominence during the fighting on the day of the attack. Most parties with a realistic chance of winning seats have recruited such figures, competing to claim the symbolism of that day.
At the launch of his Likud list, Netanyahu appeared alongside Talik Gvili, the mother of a police officer killed in the attack, rather than one of his ministers. He gave her the guaranteed ninth place. For Lagfili, the symbolism lies in the fact that her son’s body was the last in the Gaza Strip and marked the closure of the hostage case. Netanyahu also reserved places for Elisha Medan, the reservist who lost both legs in Beit Hanoun and was one of the founders of the Avigail settlement, and retired Colonel Amir Avivi, founder of the “HaBitchonistim” Forum, rendered in Arabic as the “Security Personnel Forum.”
Eisenkot, by contrast, placed former Shin Bet chief Yoram Cohen second on his list and Shira Shapira, the mother of Aner Shapira, 10th. He also assigned the symbolic places from 110 to 120 to figures including Ohad Ben Ami, who was taken captive from Kibbutz Be’eri, and the parents of conscript Liri Albag. Noam Tibon took sixth place on the Bennett-Lapid list. Lieberman’s list included Sharon Sharabi, whose two brothers were taken captive and one of whom died in captivity.
The same pattern extends to the far right. Vinter’s list included Sigal Krawnik-Atiya, the widow of the Be’eri kibbutz security officer killed on the day of the attack, and Lali Deri, the mother of a soldier killed in Gaza, alongside conscripts who fought that day. Smotrich’s list included Eitan Mor, the father of a released captive, Reut Ben Haim, who leads an organisation that obstructed supplies entering Gaza, and one of the founders of the reservists’ “Generation of Victory” movement.
Does this represent a shift in the composition of political elites, or an electoral use of symbolism? The available evidence suggests both. The symbolic places on Eisenkot’s list offer no realistic prospect of election. Netanyahu, meanwhile, turned to “safe” candidates after failing to recruit prominent figures from outside Likud. Both suggest that parties are using these figures for electoral purposes.
The guaranteed places, however, and the emergence of an entire party built around the identity of “those who paid the price and did not share in the failure,” suggest a deeper transformation. Families are also taking an explicitly political role: a group of “bereaved families” has urged Vinter to withdraw for fear that he would split the right-wing vote. Analyst Miriam Schirmer warns that sympathy for these figures may not last long in the confrontational world of Israeli politics.
Alliances and the next coalition
The attack has redrawn political divisions around responsibility for the failure and Netanyahu’s continued hold on power. The opposition brings together security hardliner Avigdor Lieberman and Yair Golan, who is open to cooperation with Arab parties. Its leaders have established a “permanent forum” to draw up a shared platform centred on the constitution and universal conscription.
Netanyahu’s camp remains united around protecting him and postponing accountability. Vinter has made his position clear, announcing that he will recommend Netanyahu for prime minister. Polling averages nevertheless show “Yashar” slightly ahead of Likud, with two closely matched blocs, neither reaching a majority.
The attack also shapes which coalition partners are considered acceptable. Professor Ofer Kenig, a senior researcher at the Israel Democracy Institute, believes most Israelis want a broad government that excludes extremists, Haredim and Arabs. Bennett rejects including any Arab party, while Golan advocates partnership with them.
The opposition faces a dilemma: the discourse around 7 October that gives it momentum also raises the political cost of the partnership it may need to secure a majority. Kenig does not rule out Netanyahu betting on the opposition’s failure to achieve a majority, allowing him to remain at the head of a caretaker government until another election.
Domestically, the attack has redefined the debate over Haredi conscription. Support rose from 67 per cent at the start of 2024 to 84.5 per cent at the start of 2025. The military is short of 12,000 soldiers, while about 90,000 people are classified as draft evaders or are close to receiving that designation. The overwhelming majority are Haredim.
Many reservists served between 80 and 100 days in 2026 because of the war on Iran. Security spending rose to nearly 8 per cent of GDP, or about a quarter of the budget. Lapid highlighted this tension by accusing the government of taking money from reservists and giving it to draft evaders.
The war has also brought judicial overhaul back into the debate, after the Shin Bet identified the erosion of internal cohesion as one of the factors that encouraged the attack. Right-wing platforms are nevertheless pursuing the issue with greater momentum. Religious Zionism calls for a broader judicial overhaul, while Tally Gotliv’s platform includes dismissing the government’s legal adviser as soon as the government is formed.
After the elections
Whichever coalition forms the next government, the available evidence suggests that competition to prove who can restore deterrence and prevent a repeat of 7 October will remain the main driver of Israeli security policy. Eisenkot, Netanyahu and Bennett agree on maintaining security zones in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. Lieberman calls for the elimination of Hamas, Hezbollah and the Iranian regime, while Benny Gantz insists on preventing Iran from reviving its nuclear programme.
These positions point to the continuation of hardline military policies in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, greater military freedom of movement in Lebanon and Syria, and continued heightened tensions with Iran.
The differences between the two possible governments are likely to be limited to specific domestic issues, all closely connected to the impact of 7 October and its central place in Israeli politics: the form of the commission of inquiry and the limits of accountability; the position on Trump’s plan and who governs Gaza; and the fate of the displacement project if Ben-Gvir enters government on his terms. In either case, 7 October appears set to remain central to Israeli political consciousness, an event against which Israel and its leaders will be judged for years to come.