هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
“We are coming with a roaring flood” was Hamas’ slogan at the celebration marking the 35th anniversary of its founding in 2022. That same year, Türkiye resumed normalising relations with Israel and welcomed Israeli President Isaac Herzog to the Turkish capital, Ankara. Neither side expected the slogan to become a reality that would shake the region and once again bring their warming relationship to a standstill.
Before the region had fully absorbed that upheaval, another followed: the Assad regime in Syria fell in a lightning operation. For the first time, Türkiye and Israel found themselves in direct conflict over their interests, taking tensions between them to an unprecedented level.
Three years after the “Al-Aqsa Flood”, the regional landscape has changed dramatically. Alliances have shifted, fighting continues and Israel continues to threaten further wars. The upheaval’s repercussions are still unfolding.
Understanding how Türkiye’s position towards Israel has changed over this period can help identify the possible paths ahead for Ankara and the region, although developments in the coming years are likely to remain difficult to predict.
Türkiye and Israel before 7 October
Türkiye was among the first countries to recognise Israel in 1949. During the Democratic Party’s rule under Adnan Menderes, the relationship developed into a broad strategic alliance spanning trade, industry, agriculture and defence manufacturing.
Relations fluctuated from the outset. Türkiye would downgrade diplomatic ties whenever Israel committed a violation or launched a war in the region, then resume normalisation and strengthen relations as regional tensions eased. This pattern continued after the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002, while trade grew and strategic partnerships expanded.
Relations first became strained under Erdogan during the 2008–2009 war. A year later, the Mavi Marmara sailed from Türkiye as part of an initiative by the Turkish humanitarian relief organisation IHH to break the blockade of Gaza. Israeli forces opened fire, killing 10 Turkish citizens and wounding 56 others.
The attack shook relations between Ankara and Tel Aviv. Türkiye recalled its ambassador, expelled the Israeli ambassador, downgraded diplomatic representation to chargé d’affaires level and suspended all military cooperation agreements.
In 2016, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim announced that relations with Israel would be normalised again, after Israel pledged to pay $20 million in compensation to the victims’ families and allow Türkiye to send aid to Gaza.
Normalisation peaked in 2022, when Türkiye welcomed the Israeli president to Ankara and declared that relations had returned to their previous high point. The following year, a month before the 7 October attack, Erdogan met Netanyahu in New York. They discussed possible cooperation in energy and technology, as well as expanding bilateral trade.
After 7 October: From caution to hostility
Türkiye initially responded to the 7 October attack cautiously, monitoring developments. The Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a general statement condemning the killing of civilians, urging all parties to avoid violence and renewing its call for a two-state solution.
As Israeli massacres in Gaza escalated over the following weeks, Turkish rhetoric hardened. Official statements accused Netanyahu of committing war crimes and threatening regional peace. The Justice and Development Party also organised a mass rally in support of Gaza, where Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused Israel of occupation and war crimes and vowed to pursue legal action against its leaders internationally.
In November, the Turkish Foreign Ministry recalled its ambassador in Tel Aviv for consultations in protest at the Israeli massacres in Gaza. Since then, diplomatic representation has remained at chargé d’affaires level, without either side formally announcing the change.
Over the following months, demonstrators in Türkiye demanded an end to trade with Israel after it emerged that commerce was continuing despite the war on Gaza. The largest protest took place on Istiklal Street in April 2024, when protesters faced police violence. The incident attracted extensive Turkish and international media coverage, forcing the government to announce a partial trade ban, followed the next month by a full ban.
Türkiye’s efforts at this stage focused on finding a way to end the war and prevent it from spreading across the region. It held numerous meetings with Hamas leaders and other parties involved. Those efforts did not succeed at the time, and during 2024 the war gradually spread to Iran and Lebanon.
Assad’s fall: Towards a point of no return
The dramatic fall of the Assad regime in late 2024 forced all parties in the region to reassess their positions. Türkiye was among the biggest beneficiaries: Syria abruptly changed from a neighbour ruled by hostile forces into an allied state. The withdrawal of Iran and its allies left a substantial political and military vacuum that both Türkiye and Israel sought to exploit.
Assad’s fall also changed the national security priorities of Türkiye and Israel. Ankara came to regard the unity of Syria under a strong central government as essential to its own security, since Syria’s partition would revive the hopes of separatists in Türkiye.
The Israeli government, meanwhile, viewed a unified Syria under a central government with “jihadist” roots as a major threat that could lead to future attacks similar to 7 October. It therefore supported partitioning Syria along ethnic and sectarian lines. For the first time, their conflicting interests and security concerns put Türkiye and Israel directly at odds.
Over the past two years, Israel has continued to provoke Türkiye in Syria. Increasingly frequent official statements accuse Ankara of establishing a hostile “jihadist” force on Israel’s border, while military operations have sought to prevent Türkiye from arming the Syrian army. Most recently, Israeli fighter jets bombed Abu al-Duhur Airport in Idlib province, just kilometres from the Turkish border.
Türkiye and Syria chose not to escalate during this period. Neither announced concrete measures against Israel in response to these provocations, limiting their public responses to official condemnations and calls for an end to the escalation. Both governments nevertheless continued working to equip, train and strengthen the Syrian army. This could be interpreted as a quiet response and preparation for a possible future confrontation.
Other Turkish measures could also be read as a quiet response to these threats. Ankara continues to develop its defence industries, particularly drones and unmanned boats, while substantially strengthening its navy. It has also announced an air defence system called the “Steel Dome”, intended to rival the Iron Dome.
Türkiye has also made significant progress in negotiations to acquire F-35 aircraft from the US. Tel Aviv has sought to obstruct the acquisition for years, fearing that Türkiye could come close to ending Israel’s air superiority.
Energy and trade: Tensions and prospects for reconciliation
Despite the tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv, Israel continues to import Azerbaijani oil through Türkiye without interruption. Oil arriving via Türkiye accounts for nearly half of Israel’s total imports.
Commercial vessels also continue to sail between Turkish and Israeli ports via indirect routes, despite Ankara’s announcement that it had ended all trade with Israel. Data from Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics indicate that bilateral trade continues, even as Türkiye denies this and maintains that its value has fallen to zero.
The Israeli figures put bilateral trade at $176 million in the first two months of 2026. That was higher than in the same period a year earlier, although still below the levels recorded in 2024 and before.
Other reports show that more than 57 ships departing from Türkiye’s port of Ceyhan this year docked at Israeli ports, contrary to the destinations declared before departure. This indicates that companies are circumventing Türkiye’s trade ban by initially heading towards a third country, then changing course for Israeli ports after entering international waters.
Shared interests thus continue to bind the two countries despite their tensions. Those interests could eventually help ease tensions and allow disputes to be settled peacefully.
Energy, however, is also a source of friction. Türkiye is seeking to consolidate its maritime claims under the “Blue Homeland” map. These cover vast areas of the eastern Mediterranean where oil and gas fields are expected to exist. Tel Aviv is trying to thwart Ankara’s efforts through alliances with Greece and Cyprus, seeking to impose maritime boundaries that would reduce Türkiye’s sphere of influence.
The eastern Mediterranean dispute has not yet escalated significantly. Diplomatic moves and indirect statements nevertheless point to conflicting interests that could produce further escalation.
What will shape the relationship?
Competing pressures make the future of Turkish-Israeli relations difficult to predict. Several factors, however, will help determine the most likely outcomes.
Israeli elections
Israel is preparing to hold general elections on 27 October 2026. Their outcome will be pivotal in determining Tel Aviv’s regional policy.
If Netanyahu wins and remains prime minister, he is likely to continue his aggressive regional policies. That would prolong Israel’s isolation and make it difficult to restore relations with Türkiye, while potentially worsening ties.
An opposition victory could bring less aggressive policies and renewed diplomatic engagement. This is most likely the outcome Ankara prefers. In all its statements and communiqués criticising Israel, the Turkish government deliberately identifies Netanyahu personally as the problem. A prime minister from another party could therefore prompt Türkiye to begin gradually restoring relations, as it has done more than once before.
US midterm elections
The US has an exceptionally close relationship with Israel, strengthened further by the ties between Trump and Netanyahu. Washington is also a close ally of Türkiye, and the cordial relationship between Erdogan and Trump has removed many obstacles to cooperation.
As Turkish-Israeli tensions in Syria intensified, Washington called for dialogue and de-escalation. It sponsored direct consultations between the Syrian and Israeli governments, while the US ambassador in Ankara, Tom Barrack, helped contain tensions. This mediation has so far prevented a major escalation, but it has not resolved the underlying dispute.
Trump and Netanyahu also appear to be developing different visions for the region’s future. The Trump administration tends to support strong central governments aligned with Washington, while Netanyahu’s government relies more heavily on military force against its adversaries.
These differences have emerged over Syria, particularly in the US position on the SDF and the Syrian government’s control of territory east of the Euphrates. They are also evident over the F-35: the Trump administration has shown a willingness to reconsider supplying the aircraft to Türkiye, while Congress continues to impose legal restrictions on the deal amid Israeli opposition.
The US midterm elections in November therefore carry added significance. They could reshape the political environment in which Washington manages its relations with Ankara and Tel Aviv. The composition of the new Congress will be especially influential in determining the future of the F-35 deal and Washington’s approach to Turkish-Israeli competition in Syria.
More voices critical of Israel would not necessarily mean greater openness towards Türkiye. Some of those same critics take hard-line positions on Ankara’s policies, making the elections’ effect on relations between the three countries difficult to predict.
Regional alliances
The war with Iran exposed the fragility of some regional security arrangements, prompting countries to rethink both those arrangements and their reliance on US protection.
Against this backdrop, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the Mecca Mutual Defense Agreement in August 2026. It stipulates that an armed attack on any of the three countries will be considered an attack on all of them, and establishes a framework for defence cooperation, defence manufacturing and collective deterrence.
From the Mecca Agreement signing ceremony – Türkiye TodayThe founding states insist that the agreement is defensive and targets no specific country. Some analysts nevertheless believe it could become the basis of a new regional security arrangement, potentially driven in part by the need to address the security repercussions of Iranian influence.
For Türkiye, the agreement’s significance does not necessarily lie in building an alliance against Israel. It lies in how far the agreement can expand Ankara’s strategic room for manoeuvre and reduce its dependence on US-led security arrangements.
If it develops into a more cohesive defence system, the agreement could give Türkiye additional means to manage its competition with Israel from a more independent position, particularly over regional issues where their interests intersect.
That possibility depends, however, on Saudi Arabia’s and Pakistan’s willingness to turn a mutual deterrence framework into a working mechanism for coordination during crises. It also depends on the continuing ties to Washington, and the differing interests, of all three countries.
Turkish governments have long favoured patience and caution, particularly under President Erdogan, preferring to avoid hasty decisions and risks. In the near term, Ankara is therefore most likely to respond to Israeli provocations with statements of denunciation and condemnation, without a comparable escalation in response.
Yet Türkiye’s strategic patience clashes with Netanyahu’s reliance on excessive violence and sudden moves, as well as with the changing regional environment.