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A project to link Iraq’s oil fields to Syria’s Mediterranean coast is moving forward amid efforts to redraw oil export routes in the Middle East, at an estimated cost of at least $15 billion. It is driven by Baghdad’s need to reduce its reliance on the Strait of Hormuz, Damascus’s desire to restore its role in regional energy trade, and US interest in expanding infrastructure investment in both countries.
But the project has raised questions about conflicts of interest following revelations of commercial and financial ties between Thomas Barrack, the US ambassador to Türkiye and special presidential envoy for Iraq and Syria, and Ziad Ghandour, a businessman who founded the US firm TI Capital.
A Reuters investigation published on 9 October 2026 highlighted the relationship and the legal questions it raises. The US State Department said Barrack was complying with ethics rules and denied that he had any financial interest in the pipeline.
The investors include a consortium led by a Qatari company and involving two US firms, while talks are under way for a major French group to join. Studies into the project’s financing, ownership and operation continue amid financial, security and technical challenges that could mean it takes years to implement.
From Barrack to Ghandour: A network of interests behind the oil project
The Reuters investigation found that Thomas Barrack encouraged TI Capital, founded by Ziad Ghandour, to become involved in a project to transport Iraqi oil to Syria’s Baniyas port. It cited three people familiar with efforts concerning the project, including two sources with direct knowledge of discussions with Iraqi and Syrian officials.
Barrack, an American businessman who founded the investment firm Colony Capital, has business ties with Ghandour dating back years before he took up his diplomatic post.
Documents filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission in March 2021 showed that the two men co-founded Falcon Acquisition, which sought to raise $250 million through an initial public offering. Barrack chaired its board, while Ghandour was its chief executive.
The company’s plans faltered after Barrack was arrested in July 2021 on charges related to acting on behalf of the UAE without registering under US law. A US jury acquitted him in November 2022. The acquisition company partnership ended, but Barrack retained other financial interests in a project managed by Ghandour’s company.
In a financial disclosure filed with the US Office of Government Ethics in March 2025, Barrack acknowledged retaining an interest in ACD-TI Oakley Investment, which is linked to a real estate project in Oakley, California, and managed by Ghandour’s company. Under the arrangement, he is entitled to receive 20 per cent of profits above a 15 per cent return threshold in exchange for services he previously provided to the company. He also disclosed that he provided it with advisory services during 2024.
In an ethics agreement signed on 7 March 2025, Barrack pledged to refrain from personal and substantial participation in government matters that directly and predictably affect his financial interests, unless he receives a legal waiver or a regulatory exception applies.
Ghandour has been arranging energy investments for more than two decades. US documents from 2003 and 2004 showed that his company contracted with the US energy firm Centroleum to help arrange negotiations with international companies, including Saudi Aramco and Spain’s Repsol. The agreements included financial arrangements tied to shares and financing.
Efforts concerning the Iraq-Syria oil project date back to May 2026, when Barrack floated the idea of involving Ghandour’s company during a meeting on the sidelines of the Milken Global Conference in Los Angeles. The two men also took part in a closed session on the need to develop new routes for energy supplies in the Middle East.
On 16 June, TI Capital was named in a statement issued by Barrack and Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Falih al-Zaidi. They praised progress towards signing a memorandum of understanding with the company to revive the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline. An announcement in July then unveiled a broader consortium that included US-based Chevron and Qatar’s UCC.
These developments show how the relationship between Barrack and Ghandour evolved from an investment partnership and financial interests to the diplomatic efforts that preceded Ghandour’s company joining the pipeline project.
Reuters quoted a person close to Barrack as saying the US envoy trusts Ghandour’s ability to help implement the strategy of President Donald Trump’s administration to draw Iraq and Syria closer to the US.
These efforts have raised questions among government ethics experts. Richard Painter, the former chief White House ethics lawyer and a law professor at the University of Minnesota, said Barrack’s relationship with Ghandour poses a serious problem under federal rules governing the impartiality of government employees. He argued that the US envoy should recuse himself entirely from discussions of the project.
Don Fox, former general counsel and acting director of the US Office of Government Ethics, also said that a government official promoting a company with which he has a business relationship could violate rules barring the use of public office to endorse private entities.
US federal ethics rules govern officials’ participation in matters involving people or companies with whom they have business or personal relationships that could cast doubt on their impartiality. The rules also allow the relevant government authority to assess such cases and grant permission to participate.
A records request filed by Reuters showed that the US Office of Government Ethics had no waiver on record concerning Barrack’s participation in the project in light of his relationship with Ghandour’s company. The State Department, however, said Barrack has no stake, role or financial interest in the Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline. It said his actions are consistent with US policy encouraging regional integration in the energy sector and stressed his compliance with ethics rules.
Ghandour’s company also appeared in a consortium studying the development of the Akkas gas field in Anbar province, alongside UCC and the US oil company ConocoPhillips, according to the Reuters investigation. TI Capital’s website also lists its involvement in projects linked to Syria’s Tartus port.
The consortium and financing: Who will own and operate the pipeline?
On 4 July 2026, the Iraqi cabinet approved authorising the state-owned Basra Oil Co. to sign a preliminary agreement on principles and a non-disclosure agreement with a consortium including TI Capital, Chevron and UCC. The agreements cover technical and financial studies for two proposed oil export routes: one to Türkiye’s Ceyhan port and the other to Syria’s Baniyas port, through a network starting in Basra and passing through Anbar province.
The Iraqi government’s decision said the agreements concern preparing studies and assessing routes, while negotiations continue over the final financial and contractual commitments. The cabinet also approved completing an advisory contract with the US engineering services company KBR for the Basra-Haditha line inside Iraq.
On 17 July, the Iraqi and Syrian governments signed a memorandum of understanding to develop the oil corridor at a ceremony hosted by the US Chamber of Commerce in Washington. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Falih al-Zaidi attended, alongside officials from both countries and representatives of the participating companies.
The signing took place during a visit in which more than 50 agreements, memorandums of understanding and partnerships were announced, worth more than $60 billion in total, according to a US Chamber of Commerce statement issued on 18 July.
The following day, the investor consortium announced that it had signed separate agreements on principles with the two governments through three business entities: Qatar’s UCC OrbaCon for Investment in Concessions, Chevron Business Development for Europe, the Middle East and Africa, and Tech Infra 2, affiliated with the TI Capital Group.
According to the statement, UCC is coordinating the consortium, while the companies prepare technical and financial feasibility studies and an initial financing plan. A joint Iraqi-Syrian working group is also being formed to address cross-border issues. Ownership stakes, operating rights, transit fees and concession periods remain subject to the completion of negotiations and government approvals.
A prominent member of the consortium is Qatar’s UCC Holding, part of Power International Holding. Its chairman is Qatari businessman Moataz Al Khayyat, while his brother Ramez serves as chief executive.
The company has expanded its investments in Syria. In May 2025, the Syrian government signed a memorandum of understanding with a UCC-led consortium to develop power generation projects, with announced investments of about $7 billion. Thomas Barrack attended the signing ceremony in Damascus.
In November that year, final concession agreements were signed with a consortium led by the company to develop, expand and operate Damascus International Airport. The announced investments totalled about $4 billion and involved Turkish and American companies, as part of UCC’s expansion into Syrian infrastructure projects.
Chevron, one of the largest US oil and gas companies, is participating in the corridor’s preliminary studies as part of its broader interest in Iraq’s oil sector, including negotiations over the development of the West Qurna 2 and Nasiriyah fields.
The list of potential investors expanded when French energy company TotalEnergies entered talks on the project. On 14 September 2026, chief executive Patrick Pouyanne confirmed that the group was negotiating to acquire an investment stake in the Basra-Baniyas pipeline. The UAE’s The National quoted informed sources as saying it was seeking a stake of about 10 per cent.
The consortium map sets out the roles of the companies that signed the preliminary agreements and TotalEnergies’ position as a party negotiating to join, alongside financial estimates and the proposed operating model.
The companies have differing approaches to financing the project. On 6 October, Chevron chief executive Mike Wirth told the Energy Intelligence conference in London that his company prefers to limit the amount of its own capital allocated to pipeline projects, with other parties potentially providing most of the financing.
At the same conference, Pouyanne confirmed TotalEnergies’ interest in helping develop pipelines that bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Meg O’Neill, chief executive of British energy company BP, questioned the wisdom of committing shareholders’ money to large-scale pipeline projects, given investment priorities and expected returns, according to a Reuters report published on 6 October.
In August, Iraqi Oil Minister Bassem Khudair said new pipeline projects and the development of the domestic transport network require investments of at least $15 billion. MEES, the oil and gas industry publication, reported that Baghdad is considering a build-own-operate-transfer model. This would allow the investor to finance, build and operate the project during a concession period before transferring ownership to the government entity under the terms of the contract.
On 27 August, Iraq’s Oil Ministry announced that talks were continuing with a UCC delegation on the contract type, timetable, and technical and economic aspects of the routes. Weekly meetings were being held to agree on the project’s economic model.
These negotiations are proceeding alongside the development of the Basra-Haditha line inside Iraq, a key part of the proposed transport network.
On 28 April 2026, the office of then Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani announced the allocation of about $1.5 billion that year, through the Iraq-China agreement mechanism, to finance part of a project with an estimated total cost of about $5 billion. This followed government contracts signed in 2024 and 2025 to build the line and supply the pipes.
Ownership and financing terms are particularly important because the project spans two countries. The final contracts will determine who is responsible for collecting transit fees, guaranteeing export volumes, and covering maintenance and protection costs, as well as investors’ rights and the two governments’ shares of revenues.
From Kirkuk to the Mediterranean: Oil, influence and viability
The Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline dates back to 1952, when the Iraq Petroleum Co. established a route to transport crude from the Kirkuk fields in northern Iraq to Syria’s Mediterranean coast, with a capacity of about 300,000 barrels per day.
Political disputes between Baghdad and Damascus repeatedly shut down the line. Most notably, it closed in 1982 during the Iran-Iraq War and resumed limited operations in 2000, before it was damaged during the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and taken out of service.
In an investigation published by Reuters on 17 August 2026, two sources with direct knowledge of the project said restoring the corridor would require building an almost entirely new pipeline network, although parts of the historic route could be followed. They said the old network has deteriorated, and its intact sections do not meet the required technical specifications.
The plan includes developing a main line to transport southern Iraqi oil from Basra to Haditha in Anbar province. It would then branch into one route towards Syria’s Baniyas port and another towards Iraq’s export system through Türkiye. Faisal Hammadi Ramadan, director general of Iraq’s North Oil Co., said in September that the proposal targets a capacity of 1 million barrels per day for each route, although final capacities depend on technical studies and investment agreements.
The following map shows the proposed routes from Basra to the Mediterranean, distinguishing between the Syrian and Turkish branches. It also shows the main stations along the historic Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline and the challenges facing construction of the new corridor.
On 27 July, Ahmad Qabbah Ji, deputy head of the Syrian Petroleum Co. for transport and storage affairs, said the project was undergoing technical and financial study. He said the Syrian proposal includes a line 1,520 kilometres long with an initial diameter of 52 inches, and expected the work to be completed within 30 months of the final contract being signed.
But the two sources directly involved in the project who spoke to Reuters in August estimated that construction would take at least four years, given the scale of the work needed to rebuild the network and develop transport and export facilities.
The project’s importance to Baghdad stems from its economy’s heavy dependence on crude oil exports, most of which pass through the southern ports and the Strait of Hormuz. Disruptions to shipping during the US-Israeli war on Iran in February 2026 exposed the scale of the risks associated with that dependence. Maritime restrictions and rising shipping and insurance costs caused a sharp decline in export flows.
Before the confrontation began, Iraq was exporting about 3.6 million barrels per day, most of it through the Gulf. In an analysis published by the US-based Stimson Center on 20 August, Omar al-Nidawi, programme director at the Iraq Center for Peacebuilding and a non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, said more than 3.3 million barrels of Iraq’s daily exports had been passing through the southern ports and the Strait of Hormuz before the crisis.
Al-Nidawi said Iraq’s exports fell by more than 85 per cent from March through June, while monthly oil revenues dropped from about $7 billion to less than $1.5 billion, putting heavy pressure on public finances and government spending.
He argued that creating export routes through the Mediterranean is a long-term investment in protecting Iraq’s economy from future crises, but one that carries high financial, political and security costs, particularly given the pressure on Iraq’s budget and the need to finance infrastructure and public services.
Baghdad is exploring several alternatives to reduce its dependence on the strait, including expanding exports through Türkiye’s Ceyhan port and reviving the Basra-Aqaba pipeline project to Jordan on the Red Sea.
The Turkish route benefits from an existing network, despite the political and legal disputes that have disrupted its use in recent years, particularly over Kurdistan Region exports. The Aqaba project, meanwhile, faces Iraqi objections and questions over cost, feasibility and the risks associated with shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
The Syrian route would give Iraq access to European markets via the Mediterranean, but it depends on Baniyas port’s ability to receive large quantities of crude, store it and load it onto tankers. Al-Nidawi highlighted the port’s currently limited operating capacity, citing reports that it can handle one Aframax tanker roughly every seven to 10 days. Those loading rates are equivalent to about 100,000 barrels per day.
Increasing export capacity to 1 million barrels per day would require major investments in oil storage tanks, pumping stations, tanker-loading berths and marine facilities. It would also require protecting hundreds of kilometres of pipeline passing through areas that have seen armed-group activity and sabotage.
For Syria, the project could generate revenue from oil transit, storage and export fees, alongside investments to rehabilitate energy and port facilities.
Syrian Energy Minister Mohammed al-Bashir has spoken about the project’s importance in restoring Syria’s role in regional energy transport networks. Qabbah Ji also raised the possibility of linking the pipeline’s development to additional industrial projects, including refining and petrochemicals facilities.
But the corridor’s commercial viability also depends on its target markets. China, India and other Asian countries account for a large share of Iraqi crude exports, and the southern ports have a geographical advantage in reaching them via the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
In an analysis published by Britain’s Chatham House on 25 September 2026, Renad Mansour, deputy director of the centre’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, said the Iraq-Syria pipeline project could allow Baghdad to shift some of its exports to routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz, reducing the impact of Iranian disruption to regional energy flows.
Mansour noted that most Iraqi oil exports go to Asian markets, which can be reached more quickly from the Gulf than from the Mediterranean. This makes the new pipeline less about commercial profitability alone than about diversifying routes and markets and strengthening Iraq’s ability to withstand disruptions.
He linked the project to a broader trend in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon towards redeveloping energy, trade and transport routes, with US interest in encouraging corridors that reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz and allow the three countries to expand their economic ties and attract investment.
Mansour warned of challenges arising from weak institutions, corruption, the number of armed actors and foreign interference. He noted that the countries’ ability to benefit from the new corridors depends on their capacity to manage projects and contracts, protect infrastructure and ensure revenues are distributed under stable economic arrangements.
These risks are particularly apparent in light of attacks on energy facilities during the regional confrontation, including the Khor Mor gas field in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. Threats also persist from remnants of the Islamic State group and armed factions in western Iraq and eastern Syria.
US support for the project is tied to expanding energy export corridors and reducing dependence on the Strait of Hormuz, as well as strengthening economic ties with Baghdad and Damascus and increasing US companies’ participation in the oil and infrastructure sectors.
On 8 August 2026, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent predicted that new overland pipelines would make it possible within two years to divert between 50 and 70 per cent of energy exports passing through Hormuz to other routes. That forecast envisages a shorter timetable than the estimate of at least four years given by the two sources involved in the Iraq-Syria project.
Baghdad is betting on the corridor to secure its exports and reduce the impact of maritime crises, while Damascus is seeking to restore its place on energy trade routes. The terms of financing, ownership, operation and pipeline security will determine who manages the corridor and controls its revenues, as multibillion-dollar investment interests intersect with political considerations and regional influence.