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Since 2015, Yemen has seen a proliferation of military and security formations with different loyalties and chains of authority. Some officially fall under the Yemeni army, but most operate through semi-independent structures and commands, sustained by networks of funding, arms supplies and external support.
The UAE emerged as the most active and influential backer of a number of these formations, establishing them and determining their deployment and roles. Saudi Arabia became another major player, though it used different methods.
The UAE’s nominal withdrawal from Yemen, following its escalating dispute with Saudi Arabia in late 2025, and the subsequent dismantling of the Abu Dhabi-backed Southern Transitional Council shook this military landscape and altered the positions of many armed formations.
Despite changes to some formations’ structures, funding sources and operational command, elements within them retained varying degrees of connection to Abu Dhabi. These ties reflected years of support, funding and arms supplies, alongside the development of networks of loyalty and influence.
But the latest military escalation, which began in September, has prompted a new realignment. A number of formations established by Abu Dhabi, or supported by it financially and militarily, have begun participating in operations under Saudi oversight. Others have retained their previous leaderships, networks of influence and relationships forged during years of Emirati patronage.
Influence within the anti-Houthi camp thus appears to be changing hands, rather than the military structure built during the war being dismantled altogether. Command and funding arrangements are changing, while military structures and networks of interests and loyalties built over a full decade remain in place.
Nearly a decade after most of these formations emerged, and as fighting against the Houthis intensifies again, the most pressing question returns: who is actually leading the battle for the western coast? How far has the balance of Emirati and Saudi influence within Yemen’s military formations changed? Does the shift of some forces to Saudi oversight mark a real decline in Abu Dhabi’s influence, or merely a change in how it is exercised? Most importantly, how will the continuing Saudi-Emirati dispute affect the future of these armed groups and the balance of power and influence in Yemen?
Emirati-Saudi rivalry: Yemen’s military formations
Since coalition operations began in Yemen nearly 11 years ago, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia have sought to strengthen their presence and influence by building networks of local military and security formations loyal to them. Their approaches have ranged from co-opting and rebuilding existing forces to creating entirely new formations, providing funding, training, arms, political backing and logistical support.
Over time, this policy produced a military structure parallel to formal institutions. Some formations became more closely tied to the external power funding and arming them than to Yemeni state institutions. Competition between Saudi Arabia and the UAE became one of the main factors determining where these forces deployed, the roles they played and their zones of influence.
Emirati-backed formations
Five main military and security formations were either established with Emirati support or successfully co-opted and reshaped by Abu Dhabi during the war.
The Southern Giants Brigades: Abu Dhabi’s strike force
The Southern Giants Brigades are among the largest and most prominent military forces in which the UAE invested during the Yemen war, providing training, funding, arms and logistical support. The brigades officially emerged in 2016 and are led by Abdulrahman Abu Zar’a al-Muharrami, a member of the Presidential Leadership Council.
They consist primarily of southern fighters, with Salafi leanings predominant in parts of the force. They proved their combat capabilities in battles along the western coast, particularly the large-scale offensive that reached the outskirts of Hodeida in 2018. They returned to the forefront of operations during the battles of Shabwa and Marib in early 2022, recapturing a number of districts seized by the Houthis.
The National Resistance – Guardians of the Republic: The western coast arm
The National Resistance, known militarily as the “Guardians of the Republic,” is one of the most important formations to receive Emirati patronage on the western coast. Its core was formed after the killing of former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh in December 2017. It is led by Brigadier General Tariq Mohammed Abdullah Saleh.
In its early days, it included former officers and soldiers from the Republican Guard and special forces. It gradually expanded into a military force with a high degree of organisational independence.
Abu Dhabi provided these forces with funding, training, arms and logistical support, while the city of Mokha and areas along the western coast became the military and political centre of Tariq Saleh’s project. Some estimates put the force’s strength at around 20,000 fighters, with a substantial arsenal relative to its size.
One of its clearest differences from a number of other UAE-backed forces is its position on the southern question. The National Resistance does not advocate southern secession, while Tariq Saleh presents himself as part of the republican camp that supports Yemeni unity and opposes the Houthis.
Shabwa Defence Forces: Abu Dhabi’s arm in the oil-rich province
The Shabwa Defence Forces are among the most prominent UAE-backed forces in the province. Their roots lie in formations linked to the “Shabwani Elite,” which carried out security and military tasks, including securing areas within the province and confronting the Houthis and armed groups.
Over the years, Abu Dhabi played a major role in funding these forces, paying their members’ salaries, and training and arming them. This made them one of its most important instruments of influence in Shabwa, given the province’s strategic and economic importance and its position linking southern Yemen to the east and its oil regions.
The Hadrami Elite: A specialist force on the Hadramawt coast
The Hadrami Elite emerged as an organised local force in late 2015, as part of UAE-backed security and military arrangements in Hadramawt. Abu Dhabi trained, armed and prepared its members before the force played a prominent role in driving al-Qaeda out of Mukalla in 2016.
It later became a mainstay of security on the Hadramawt coast and gained a reputation as one of the best-trained local formations, particularly in security operations and fighting armed groups. This gave it influence within the province beyond what its numbers alone would suggest.
The Security Belt Forces: The STC’s security arm
For years, the Security Belt Forces were the most prominent security arm of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Aden, Lahj, Abyan and al-Dhalea. They also formed an essential part of the network of forces built and backed by the UAE in the southern provinces. They maintained close ties with Abu Dhabi, which provided training, arms and other support. The Security Belt became one of the most important sources of the STC’s military and security influence, and its units also fought the Houthis on several fronts in southern Yemen.
Saudi-backed formations
Saudi Arabia also played a major role in shaping Yemen’s military forces, supporting the government’s military institutions while establishing and funding new formations directly tied to Riyadh. This approach became more important as competition with Abu Dhabi intensified, particularly in the southern and eastern provinces. Saudi Arabia sought to build a network of forces capable of counterbalancing Emirati-backed formations and protecting its zones of influence and strategic interests in Yemen.
Nation’s Shield Forces: Saudi Arabia’s parallel force
The Nation’s Shield Forces are the clearest example of a military force under direct Saudi patronage. They were officially announced in 2023 through a decision by Presidential Leadership Council chairman Rashad al-Alimi. They were placed directly under the supreme commander of the armed forces, rather than incorporated into the Defence Ministry’s conventional structure.
The force includes a large number of southern fighters, with Salafi leanings predominant in parts of it. Its units have been deployed in several southern and eastern provinces. Riyadh has used the force to strengthen the government’s presence and counterbalance the influence of forces linked to the STC, particularly in Hadramawt and other areas where Saudi-Emirati competition has intensified. The Nation’s Shield has thus become one of Riyadh’s most important military instruments for reshaping the balance of power within the anti-Houthi camp.
Yemeni Emergency Forces: Riyadh’s military reserve
The Yemeni Emergency Forces are another major component of the network of military forces linked to Saudi Arabia. Their units are deployed near the Saudi border, as well as in Saada, al-Jawf and on other fronts. The force is regarded as a mainstay of Riyadh’s military network. Some estimates put its strength at between 30,000 and 40,000 personnel, although estimates of the size of most Yemeni formations remain approximate in the absence of independent, verifiable official statistics.
Hadramawt Protection Forces: The tribal factor in the struggle for influence
The Hadramawt Protection Forces differ somewhat from formations created directly under foreign patronage. They have local Hadrami tribal roots, but Saudi Arabia strengthened its relationship with them and significantly expanded its support from 2025.
As the struggle over Hadramawt intensified, Riyadh drew on this local force to counterbalance the expansion of the STC and Emirati-backed forces. Attempts subsequently began to reorganise it and bring it more closely into the government’s security and military structures.
The National Army and government forces in Marib
The National Army differs from the formations described above. It officially belongs to Yemen’s Defence Ministry and therefore cannot be described as a Saudi military formation in the direct sense. Saudi Arabia nevertheless remained the main external backer of the government’s military institutions throughout the war, providing funding, arms, training and military support, particularly to forces stationed in Marib, al-Jawf and the eastern regions.
Marib became a particularly important base for anti-Houthi government forces in northern and eastern Yemen. The forces deployed there, alongside local tribal resistance, formed one of the most important foundations of Saudi influence within the government camp.
Formations outside the Saudi-Emirati divide
Yemen’s military landscape also includes formations and forces with varying degrees of independence. It would be inaccurate to place them directly in either Riyadh’s camp or Abu Dhabi’s.
Foremost among these are popular and tribal resistance forces and the Taiz Axis forces, alongside some regular army units and local formations. These emerged primarily in response to military and political conditions specific to each province, rather than as direct extensions of a foreign power’s bid for influence.
This is even clearer in the case of tribal resistance formations in Marib, al-Jawf, al-Bayda and other provinces. These arose primarily from tribal and local dynamics linked to confronting the Houthis and defending their areas.
Although some later received financial or military support from the Yemeni government or Saudi Arabia, this does not necessarily mean they were fully incorporated into Riyadh’s network of loyalist forces. A significant proportion retained their local and tribal sources of authority and a degree of independence in their structures, leadership and movements on the ground.
These formations reveal a third dimension of Yemen’s military landscape, beyond the divide between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. External patronage alone does not determine the country’s armed landscape: tribal calculations, regional dynamics, local interests and the demands of confronting the Houthis also shape it.
Recycling power: From Emirati to Saudi patronage
After the UAE’s withdrawal from Yemen at the start of this year, many armed formations long linked to Emirati support faced a test of survival. Abu Dhabi’s political and financial backing receded at a time when these forces needed to preserve their structures, funding sources, arms and battlefield gains. At this point, Saudi interests converged with those of a number of these formations: Riyadh sought an existing, experienced military force, while the formations sought a new patron to guarantee their survival and funding.
As Saudi Arabia moved towards deeper involvement in the current military confrontation with the Houthis, it faced a reality shaped by years of war. A number of irregular formations, or forces operating in parallel with the formal military, had acquired combat experience and a presence on the ground that exceeded the capabilities of conventional Yemeni army units on some fronts. Relying on these forces therefore became a practical option for Riyadh, even though a significant proportion had been established and sustained for years through Emirati support.
The kingdom consequently adopted what could be described as a strategy of “recycling power.” Rather than dismantling the military structure the UAE had spent years building, training and arming, Riyadh moved to absorb parts of it and put them to use within a new system of influence. It provided funding, paid salaries and supplied support and arms, while restructuring some forces and gradually linking them to formal military and security institutions, particularly the defence and interior ministries.
The Southern Giants Brigades, the Shabwa Defence Forces, the Hadrami Elite and elements of the former Security Belt are among the most important formations with Emirati origins to have entered, to varying degrees, new military and security arrangements under Saudi oversight. Abu Dhabi spent years building, funding and preparing these forces before Riyadh began absorbing parts of them, reconnecting them to state institutions and incorporating them into operational arrangements more closely tied to Saudi command.
This has changed how influence is exercised within Yemen’s military formations. The decisive question is no longer simply who created these forces, but who pays their salaries today, who supplies their weapons and funding, who can appoint or reshuffle their leaders and, most importantly, who orders them to deploy and fight.
These changes are particularly important in determining who is currently directing the battle for the western coast. Abu Dhabi helped build and prepare a number of the most prominent forces on the ground, but the transfer of some control over funding, command and operations to Riyadh is reshaping the balance of influence within the anti-Houthi camp. Saudi Arabia appears to have a greater say in directing the current phase, even when operations are carried out by forces whose origins and military structures owe much to years of Emirati patronage.
The future of armed formations: Three scenarios for the struggle for influence
Recent shifts among armed formations operating outside Yemen’s conventional military structures have revealed the depth of the dispute between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. They show that the dispute extends far beyond disagreements over the STC, to which some interpretations have reduced it. A central part of the conflict concerns the future shape of the Yemeni state, the distribution of military and security power within it, and which side can wield influence in its strategic centres.
These disputes create considerable uncertainty about the future of formations that emerged and expanded during the war, particularly if Saudi-Emirati competition continues. The absence of a direct Emirati military presence does not necessarily mean the end of Abu Dhabi’s influence. Years of funding, training, arms supplies and relationships with local leaders continue to shape a number of these formations, allowing indirect influence to endure even as the UAE’s declared presence recedes.
Against this backdrop, three main paths appear to lie ahead for these forces.
The first path: A gradual shift to Saudi control
This scenario envisages the gradual transfer of these formations from Emirati to Saudi influence, eventually reshaping their loyalties and tying them more closely to Riyadh. The shift will depend less on slogans or political positions than on control over the practical sources of power: who provides funding, pays salaries, supplies weapons, reshuffles leaders and ultimately decides on movement, deployment and combat. The more Riyadh succeeds in monopolising these functions, the more Abu Dhabi’s ability to exert direct influence over formations it helped build will decline, and the more these forces will shift from military assets with Emirati origins to formations operating within the Saudi sphere of influence.
The second path: Dual loyalty
This scenario assumes that Saudi Arabia succeeds in becoming the main military and financial patron of most of these formations, leading major operations and meeting a substantial share of their needs, without necessarily severing their old ties to Abu Dhabi.
The UAE may retain relationships with some of the military and political leaders and networks with which it built longstanding partnerships during the war. This would create dual loyalties: Saudi operational and financial control alongside Emirati political and personal ties and shared interests. The survival of these networks could give Abu Dhabi a strategic reserve to draw on if it decides to renew its involvement in Yemen, or if the balance of power and its relationship with Riyadh change.
The third path: Shared influence and a geographical redistribution
This scenario rests on an explicit or implicit arrangement to redistribute zones of influence between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, reducing the likelihood of direct confrontation between their local networks. The western coast and Bab al-Mandab could become an area of coordination or shared influence, given the presence of formations with historical ties to the UAE and the area’s strategic importance to Abu Dhabi. In exchange, Saudi Arabia would further consolidate its influence in Aden, Hadramawt, al-Mahra and other areas directly important to its security and geopolitical calculations.
The success of this scenario, however, remains contingent on several factors. Chief among them are Riyadh’s ability to sustain funding, retain local leaders’ loyalty and manage conflicting interests among the formations, as well as the nature of its future relationship with Abu Dhabi.
Ultimately, the future of these formations will be determined not solely by the state that helped create them, but by which side can retain control over the sources of power in the long term. The Saudi-Emirati struggle over Yemen may therefore move from “building formations” to the more complex task of “redistributing loyalties” — a battle that may be less visible than direct military confrontation, but will be more consequential in determining the future shape of the Yemeni state and the balance of power within it.