هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
“There is a constitution for this state, there is a constitution that we approved for this state, no one will touch it … no one will touch it.”
With these words, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi sparked widespread debate in political circles and among the Egyptian public. He was speaking during his address at the Armed Forces’ educational seminar on Wednesday, 14 October 2026, marking the 53rd anniversary of the October victories.
His remarks came amid online petition campaigns demanding that he remain in power for additional terms beyond 2030, when his current term ends under the constitution. The campaigns aim to submit these demands to parliament for discussion of constitutional amendments that would allow him to stay. They have prompted heated debate among Egyptians on social media.
Some welcomed and celebrated his assertion that the constitution was something “no one will touch”, interpreting it as a decisive statement ruling out any further amendment that would allow him to remain in power beyond 2030. But previous events and experience suggest another, more cautious reading, particularly when his remarks are considered closely in their broader context and in light of their timing. What, then, do they signify?
The context
El-Sisi’s remarks need to be considered in both their immediate and broader contexts. Much of his speech at the seminar focused on what he described as rumours and deliberate attempts to distort Egyptians’ understanding of events and inflame public opinion. He said some of these efforts aimed to destabilise the country and fuel domestic tension and unrest.
These warnings come as Egyptians face pressure on several fronts. Economic pressures are mounting, alongside fears of further price rises that would impose fresh burdens on large sections of the population already exhausted by years of inflation and declining purchasing power.
Another aspect of the controversy concerns growing discussion of who will hold power after 2030, and the recent campaigns calling for el-Sisi to remain president beyond his current term. Perhaps the most prominent calls for him to stay until 2050. This has angered some Egyptians who had hoped for a transfer of power and new leadership, particularly amid mounting criticism of the administration’s economic record and its policies’ inability to curb spreading poverty and ease the pressures of daily life.
The broader regional context is no less important. Egypt finds itself at the centre of many of the successive upheavals and crises gripping the region. It faces severe instability along most of its borders and across areas vital to its interests: the war and its repercussions in Gaza and the Red Sea to the east; the continuing Libyan crisis to the west; the war in Sudan to the south; and escalating tensions in the Horn of Africa and the areas that give Egypt strategic depth on the continent. Against this backdrop, fears are growing that regional crises could spill over into Egypt itself.
What is el-Sisi seeking to achieve?
In these circumstances, el-Sisi’s remarks can be read as an attempt to defuse the escalating controversy over constitutional amendments for now and reassure a public under growing economic and social pressure. They can also be seen as an attempt to prevent talk of extending his rule or amending the constitution from becoming another means of inflaming public opinion and turning sections of the population against the authorities.
The full speech reinforces this reading. El-Sisi sought to shift the focus from his own political future to the broader concept of “fortifying the state,” while repeatedly warning against attempts to inflame public opinion and destabilise the country. On the surface, his remarks about leaving the constitution untouched therefore carry a meaning beyond the immediate debate over the presidency. They form part of a broader argument linking domestic stability to the need to maintain the state’s cohesion and its ability to navigate a rapidly changing region with multiple flashpoints of conflict and tension.
Viewed this way, the message becomes clearer. For years, Egyptians have borne the heavy financial and everyday costs of economic policies whose failure has been demonstrated in practice. Already distressed and resentful over declining purchasing power and low living standards, they may see a debate over constitutional amendments to extend the authorities’ time in power as another reason for anger. With the state facing domestic pressure and simultaneous risks and tensions on several fronts, reopening that debate now is not in the regime’s interest.
The door is not entirely closed: the rest of the statement
Yet the full speech contains a striking paradox. Even as el-Sisi appeared to some listeners to settle the debate over constitutional amendments by repeatedly insisting that the constitution was something “no one will touch … no one will touch,” he left room in the same speech for further discussion and interpretation in a way that is difficult to dismiss as incidental.
Immediately after insisting that the constitution would not be touched, el-Sisi added: “And by the way, anything that gets done is something the people can either make succeed or not.” The National focused on this phrase, suggesting it could mean that a future constitutional amendment had not been definitively ruled out, despite the decisive tone of his preceding statement.
Under this reading, el-Sisi denied any current intention to tamper with the constitution while leaving the people’s will as the ultimate arbiter of whether a future initiative succeeds or fails. This has long provided an opening for successive amendments throughout Egypt’s political history since July 1952.
The precedent of 2019
History and previous experience offer a striking parallel. What is happening today closely resembles events about nine years ago. In a November 2017 interview with CNBC, el-Sisi spoke with much the same decisiveness as he did in his recent remarks: “I support adhering to two presidential terms, each of them four years, and I support not changing this system.” He added, even more explicitly: “I am not in favor of making any amendment to the Constitution during this period.”
El-Sisi went beyond denying a general move towards constitutional amendments to address presidential terms specifically: “I am not talking here about terms in the presidency; we will not interfere with those.” He then affirmed what appeared at the time to be a firm limit on his tenure: no president would be able to remain in office beyond the period permitted by the constitution and the law.
The clarity of these statements and repeated assurances led many Egyptians to regard them as an explicit acknowledgement that the rules governing presidential terms and the transfer of power would remain unchanged. They understood that el-Sisi would leave office after the two terms permitted by the original 2014 constitution.
Less than two years later, however, the position changed fundamentally. In 2019, a wide-ranging package of constitutional amendments was approved. Chief among them was a change to Article 140 extending presidential terms from four years to six. A special transitional article also revised the terms applicable to el-Sisi, allowing him to complete his second term in 2024 and then run for another ending in 2030.
Despite the assurances, statements and pledges, the constitutional rules had changed. Under the provisions in force before the 2019 amendments, el-Sisi’s presidency was supposed to end in 2022. The new framework allowed him to remain until 2030.
Could it happen again?
There is, so far, no conclusive evidence that the events of 2019 will be repeated, or that the authorities have decided to introduce further constitutional amendments allowing el-Sisi to remain in power beyond 2030. Equally, it would be difficult to regard his recent remarks as a definitive assurance that the issue is settled for good.
The clear and emphatic statements of 2017 did not prevent constitutional changes less than two years later. It is therefore entirely legitimate to consider that precedent when interpreting the statement “no one will touch it”. It also allows for readings that look beyond public statements to the political landscape and the surrounding facts and indicators.
When the authorities moved to amend the constitution in 2019, el-Sisi was still relatively early in his rule, and the regime’s structure had not necessarily taken the form it appears to have today. After more than a decade in power, the political landscape is more tightly controlled. The security services have an extensive presence, space for political competition has narrowed, and forces and parties aligned with the authorities dominate much of the public sphere and elected institutions.
There is a striking paradox here between the reassurance offered by the president’s statement and the political reality. If the authorities are moving towards a presidential transition in 2030 and have no intention of pursuing constitutional amendments to allow additional terms, why are they not taking practical steps to open up political life and create conditions in which genuine alternatives and organised competition for power can emerge?
Why does pressure on opposition groups and critics continue? Why do restrictions on public life, political activity and journalism remain in place? Why do human rights organisations continue to complain about the detention of journalists, people expressing their views and political opponents because of their activities or political expression? And why do forces and parties aligned with the authorities retain such dominance over party politics and parliament if the next four years are supposed to culminate in the first presidential transition since el-Sisi came to power?
What comes next?
Two interpretations dominate discussion in the wake of the remarks. The first, more sceptical of el-Sisi’s rhetoric, holds that his insistence on leaving the constitution untouched is simply an attempt to contain public anger amid mounting economic and political pressure. On this reading, he is seeking to defuse the constitutional debate at an exceptionally sensitive time for the state, without necessarily abandoning the option of extending his rule.
Proponents of this interpretation suggest that the next two years may gradually follow the path that preceded the 2019 amendments. Political and media discussion could begin by stressing the sensitivity of the moment and the exceptional circumstances facing the country, arguing that domestic and regional conditions cannot withstand the “adventure” of a change in leadership. The idea would then reach parliament, with lawmakers from the majority calling for Article 140, which governs presidential terms, to be reconsidered. Alternatively, they could seek a transitional or exceptional arrangement granting the president another term without necessarily making it a general rule for his successors.
Under this scenario, individual proposals may develop into a broader argument adopted by media outlets and political figures aligned with the authorities. They would begin preparing public opinion through narratives such as “exceptional regional circumstances,” “preserving stability,” “the need to complete projects,” and “the absence of a ready alternative.” An amendment could later be presented as a response to public demands rather than a presidential initiative, leaving the final decision to the “will of the people”. Proponents of this reading connect that possibility to el-Sisi’s closing phrase: “Anything that gets done is something the people can either make succeed or not.”
A second interpretation envisages a different course. El-Sisi may indeed leave the constitution unchanged, but this would not necessarily mean relinquishing power entirely. Those who favour this reading cite the “Putin-Medvedev” precedent in Russia. Vladimir Putin left the presidency in 2008 because of constitutional limits on consecutive terms. Dmitry Medvedev served as president for four years, before Putin returned to the Kremlin in 2012.
Applied hypothetically to Egypt, this model could involve backing a figure acceptable to state institutions, particularly the military, to serve as president for an interim period. This would interrupt the sequence of consecutive presidential terms, theoretically reopening a constitutional route for el-Sisi to contest the presidency in a later election, if the current provisions remain unchanged.
A third interpretation, less prominent in the debate, is that el-Sisi may indeed mean what he says about leaving the constitution untouched. His term would end in 2030 after 16 uninterrupted years in power, and Egypt would undergo a genuine presidential transition, with a new figure brought to power. Yet developments on the ground and previous experience quickly undermine this reading at its foundations. It remains a possibility, even if the probability is close to zero.
The coming months will provide the basis for judging which interpretation proves correct. The test will be the direction of developments on the ground, rather than the president’s statements alone. Will the regime begin preparing political life for a post-el-Sisi era by opening up the public sphere, easing its grip on the opposition and allowing even a little more freedom? Will a process of manufacturing a “political necessity” for him to remain gradually begin? Or will an arrangement be sought that preserves the existing regime while temporarily changing the person at its head?