هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
Egypt’s recent moves to explore military support for Saudi Arabia against the Houthis have sparked widespread debate in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the wider Arab world. Together with President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi’s request for parliamentary authorisation to act should Riyadh ask, they have raised questions about the significance of this development and how far Egypt might change its approach to the Yemen crisis.
Recent developments also show that the confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis has extended far beyond the two sides. It can no longer be treated as simply another chapter in the Yemen war, which has dragged on since 2015, particularly as the threat has expanded to encompass the Saudi heartland, the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The strategic waterway has become one of the Houthis’ main sources of leverage in their regional conflicts. This has brought the confrontation into an area directly affecting Egyptian national security and Cairo’s vital interests in the security of the Red Sea, shipping and the Suez Canal.
Several questions are central to understanding these developments: does Saudi Arabia really need Egypt? How ready does Cairo appear to be for military involvement? Is that option about protecting Egyptian national security and securing the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, or does it reflect a broader redefinition of the strategic partnership between Cairo and Riyadh?
Then there is the question most frequently heard among Egyptians: to what extent can Egypt bear the economic, political and military costs of such involvement, especially if the confrontation drags on?
Does Saudi Arabia need Egypt to confront the Houthis?
Nearly 11 years of confrontation with the Houthis have exposed some of the limits of Riyadh’s ability to secure a decisive victory. Those limits have become even clearer during the latest round of fighting, which began in early September and continues today. Despite its advanced weapons, modern military technology, sophisticated air power and multiple air and missile defence systems, the kingdom still faces major difficulties containing Houthi attacks and limiting the group’s ability to strike targets inside Saudi territory.
Saudi Arabia’s central problem is not necessarily a shortage of weapons or equipment, but the adversary it faces and the nature of the threat. The Houthis are not a regular army that can be fought using conventional military rules and strategies. Improvements to their arsenal in recent years have also significantly strengthened their offensive capabilities.
Saudi Arabia’s vast territory, and the Houthis’ ability to reach widely dispersed areas with missiles and drones, make comprehensive defensive coverage extremely difficult and costly. The area stretching from Dammam in the east to Asir in the south includes cities, airports, oil facilities, power stations, ports and vital infrastructure.
The Houthis’ reliance on widely dispersed operations and attacks further complicates the task. These extend from the southern areas of Abha, Khamis Mushait, Najran and Jizan, through Medina, to King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh and Aramco facilities, and as far as King Fahd International Airport in Dammam and oil facilities in the Eastern Province. This geographical spread forces Saudi defences to cover a sprawling theatre of operations. It demands extensive surveillance, early warning and interception capabilities, alongside the ability to protect a huge number of vital targets simultaneously.
The extension of the threat to Bab el-Mandeb, one of the kingdom’s most important maritime routes, has compounded the pressure on Riyadh. It gives the Houthis another source of leverage with which to threaten shipping and Saudi interests.
That leverage carries greater weight given the disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, the most important maritime route for Gulf energy exports. The kingdom faces an extremely complex strategic challenge: two vital sea lanes could come under pressure and suffer disruption while the threat of missile and drone attacks inside Saudi territory persists.
Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia appears to be in urgent need of support from its allies and partners to confront the Houthi threat. That assessment is reinforced by reports of Saudi disappointment at the limited support received from some allies relative to the scale of the security and military challenges the kingdom faces.
What has changed in Cairo’s calculations?
Since the October 1973 war, Egypt has largely been cautious about becoming involved in military operations beyond its borders. Apart from its participation in the 1991 Gulf War, its direct, publicly declared combat role abroad has remained limited.
Even the Egyptian Air Force’s targeted strikes against armed groups in Libya in 2017 cannot be equated with a prolonged foreign war. These were limited, focused operations in response to attacks on Egyptian citizens and interests directly linked to national security.
When the Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm began in 2015, Cairo gave the Arab coalition political backing but kept strict limits on its military participation, which was closer to a symbolic contribution than a full commitment. Much of its role centred on naval missions to secure shipping and strategic waterways, while it avoided a broad ground war in Yemen. That reluctance did not fully meet Riyadh’s expectations for Egyptian participation and caused Saudi irritation at the time.
What, then, has changed to make Cairo consider military support for Saudi Arabia? The matter remains under study, with no detailed information on the nature, scale, level or operational limits of any potential participation. Yet raising the issue in this way and referring it to parliament for a decision is itself a significant step for Egypt. It marks a notable shift in Cairo’s traditional approach to military involvement abroad, one that is difficult to dismiss as a passing political measure.
Recent weeks have brought striking changes to the regional dynamics surrounding Yemen. The Houthis now have broader influence and a clearer regional agenda than they did in the war’s early stages, alongside growing military and missile capabilities. Most importantly, their ability to threaten Bab el-Mandeb and Red Sea shipping has extended the impact of the Yemen crisis into an area directly affecting Egyptian interests.
Disruption to Red Sea shipping has severely affected traffic through the Suez Canal, with Cairo reporting losses exceeding $10 billion. For Egypt, this has taken the threat in the southern Red Sea beyond the Yemen crisis, bringing it close to one of the country’s most important economic arteries and sources of foreign currency. Against this backdrop, Cairo has become more concerned about the growth of Houthi capabilities and how they might reshape the balance of influence and security in the Red Sea.
Economic considerations are also inseparable from any potential change in Egypt’s approach. Cairo and Riyadh share a broad network of economic interests, encompassing Saudi investments in Egypt, deposits and financial support provided by the kingdom at various stages, and the large Egyptian workforce in Saudi Arabia. Those workers’ remittances are an important source of foreign currency for Egypt. The kingdom’s stability is therefore directly tied to Egypt’s economic interests.
Questions of sovereignty and politics also matter. Cairo is seeking to preserve its position in a rapidly changing region, where multiple international and regional powers are competing for influence and over security arrangements.
The growing US presence, concerns about expanding Israeli influence, Russian and Chinese moves, and European interests all form part of these calculations. Cairo may see leaving highly sensitive strategic areas, particularly the Red Sea, exposed to competition among these powers as a threat to its interests, national security and regional standing.
Amid these complex, overlapping calculations, the form of any Egyptian military involvement in support of Saudi Arabia remains key to understanding how far, and in what direction, Cairo’s position may shift. There is a vast difference between providing defensive and intelligence support and securing the Red Sea, and taking part in offensive operations or an open-ended ground war in Yemen.
The question therefore shifts from Egypt’s motives to what a change in its position would mean in practice: what can Cairo offer Riyadh at this stage, and what limits would it need to set on its military role to avoid sliding into a long war of attrition?
What Riyadh wants
Riyadh sees Cairo as a partner that can strengthen its capabilities in this confrontation in three main ways.
The first is military. Egypt could help extend defensive coverage against Houthi attacks across the kingdom’s eastern, western and southern areas. This could ease pressure on Saudi defence systems and strengthen their ability to protect vital facilities and sites.
Egypt could also provide greater strategic depth in the confrontation. Its geographical position allows it to operate from the northern Red Sea and help secure shipping lanes leading towards the Suez Canal. It could also provide intelligence and information support, strengthening surveillance, early warning and information-sharing capabilities.
The second is political. Cairo’s involvement would give Riyadh breathing space and greater room for manoeuvre at home and abroad. This is particularly relevant after years of the Arab coalition’s campaign in Yemen, accompanied by international criticism, differences and disputes among some coalition members. These ultimately affected the coalition’s ability to secure a decisive victory despite the large disparity in military resources and capabilities.
The third is broader logistical and strategic support. This would move the confrontation beyond its narrow Saudi-Houthi context and place it within a broader framework of Arab security, Red Sea security and freedom of navigation through its strategic waterways. It would strengthen the kingdom’s position and help it share the burden of the confrontation, particularly given the limited direct military involvement of several of its western allies.
Cairo’s options
Cairo has several possible levels of support to choose from. The first is intelligence cooperation, reconnaissance and the exchange of information on the movements of Houthi drones, missiles and naval platforms.
Egypt’s position on the Red Sea arguably gives it an important advantage in this area, allowing it to contribute to surveillance, monitoring and information-sharing operations. This would extend the security and naval roles Egypt has undertaken since joining the Arab coalition and Operation Decisive Storm in 2015.
The second level involves maritime defence and securing navigation in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. This includes monitoring sea lanes, helping protect ships and vital facilities from attacks, and perhaps escorting commercial vessels in the areas most exposed to threats.
Egypt’s membership of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) since April 2021 makes this scenario more plausible. The multinational maritime partnership includes dozens of countries and works to strengthen maritime security and freedom of navigation. Egypt’s relatively advanced navy has also previously commanded Combined Task Force 153, which is responsible for the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden.
The third level, the most advanced and sensitive, requires a clear political decision by the Egyptian state. It involves helping strengthen the defence of facilities and vital sites inside Saudi territory, whether through air defence equipment and systems or support from technical and military personnel. There is precedent for this: Egypt has provided this type of support to Gulf states, including the UAE and Bahrain, since the start of the US-Israeli war on Iran.
The fourth level remains the most dangerous and costly: deploying Egyptian ground forces inside Yemen and participating directly in military operations against the Houthis. This appears the least likely option, given the highly complex political, military and economic considerations involved. It could also become a long-term commitment that Cairo may not currently be prepared to bear. Cairo also retains difficult memories of Egypt’s direct military involvement in Yemen in the 1960s.
Yemen’s complex geography, the nature of irregular warfare, the spread of armed groups and the interlocking political, tribal and military structures mean a broad ground intervention could quickly turn from an operation with limited objectives and a defined timeframe into a prolonged, open-ended war of attrition. Many of these complications are even more acute today than they were more than half a century ago, given the number of armed actors, changes in the means of warfare and the growing extent of regional and international intervention in Yemen.
Although less likely than other forms of support, this remains a possible option, particularly if the confrontation escalates or threats expand in ways that force Egypt to reassess the limits of its participation. With the situation fluid and its course difficult to predict, the most sensitive question remains: what if Egypt does choose direct military intervention? Can it bear the cost?
A heavy cost: can Egypt bear it?
The first potential cost of direct involvement is that Egypt would itself become a party to the war, exposing its territory, interests and vital facilities to Houthi threats. This scenario cannot be ruled out, given the development of the group’s missile and drone capabilities in recent years and its demonstrated ability to attack sites far from the areas it controls.
The distance between the Houthi-controlled theatre of operations on Yemen’s western coast and the nearest Egyptian locations on the Red Sea, at Halaib and Shalateen, is roughly 1,100 to 1,200 kilometres. In theory, this is within the range of some of the missiles the Houthis have demonstrated they possess. Their success in attacking targets even further away heightens these concerns. Most recently, they targeted the King Fahd Airport area in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, more than 1,300 kilometres from potential launch sites in Yemen.
Egypt’s air defence system already faces the extremely complex task of securing a vast area against threats from multiple directions. It must account for the country’s long western border with Libya, a southern front linked to developments in Sudan, highly sensitive north-eastern borders with the Gaza Strip and Israel, and long coastlines on the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.
A new missile and drone threat from the direction of the Red Sea would therefore place additional demands on surveillance, early warning and air defence capabilities. Any attack that penetrated those defences and struck facilities, tourist areas or other vital locations could also have economic and security repercussions beyond the immediate damage, particularly for tourism and market confidence.
The Houthis also have another option that may be quicker and less costly: intensifying attacks on shipping in Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea, further disrupting vessels heading towards the Suez Canal.
This could be a more effective way to put pressure on Cairo than trying to strike Egyptian territory directly, given the canal’s strategic and economic importance as a major source of foreign currency. Any further decline in shipping traffic would also compound the pressures already weighing on the Egyptian economy.
Politically, direct military participation could change Cairo’s position within regional conflicts and threaten the balance it has sought to maintain in its relations with different parties, particularly Iran and its allied forces and factions. The repercussions could extend beyond Yemen. Prolonged military operations could also leave Egypt bearing some of the war’s political and humanitarian costs, especially if operations expand or civilians are killed.
Even before those consequences arise, economic costs remain one of the main constraints on any Egyptian decision to intervene directly. Already under significant pressure and facing major financial obligations, Egypt’s economy may not be equipped to bear the costs of an open-ended military confrontation, even assuming financial contributions or compensation from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Prolonged wars cost more than the deployment of troops and the use of weapons. They also require supplies, maintenance, munitions and protection for forces and facilities, while indirectly affecting investment, tourism, trade and shipping.
The risks increase if limited participation becomes a prolonged, open-ended confrontation. This could drain Egypt’s economic and military resources at a time when Cairo needs to devote much of its capacity to domestic challenges and its immediate borders. It also has implications for public sentiment, particularly as some Egyptians are wary of involvement in a foreign war whose immediate theatre Egypt has so far remained outside.
Cairo’s dilemma is therefore not simply whether it has the military capacity to participate, but whether the expected strategic gains justify the costs and potential risks. There is a vast difference between providing limited defensive support to Saudi Arabia and securing the Red Sea, and becoming a direct party to an open-ended war with the Houthis. Deciding to enter may be far easier than determining when and on what terms to leave.
Ultimately, whatever happens regarding the form and level of possible Egyptian military support, developments appear to point towards an Egyptian attempt to redefine its strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia. This would move the relationship beyond one based primarily on economic interests and political coordination towards a broader security and strategic partnership. Such a partnership would treat the security of the Gulf, the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal as closely interconnected parts of a single security theatre, difficult to separate from one another.
The real test for Cairo and Riyadh therefore lies less in deciding to confront the Houthis than in managing and ending that confrontation. It means setting political and military limits from the outset and drawing a line between deterrence and defence, and sliding into an open-ended war. The more complex challenge will be controlling the use of their forces and capabilities, rather than simply deploying them: defining the objectives and conditions for withdrawal so that limited support does not become a long-term military commitment whose course or cost would be difficult to control.