هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
History has a strict logic: some events mark a turning point, sometimes breaking with what came before. When the US and Israel attacked targets in Iran on the morning of 28 February, the conflict reached far beyond the region. China, one of the main buyers of Iranian oil, could be harmed by the war. Yet it also has a strong interest in preserving a status quo that drains the US, in keeping with the Confucian principle often followed in Chinese foreign policy: “Sit on the riverbank and wait for your enemy’s corpse to float by.” Russia, for its part, benefits in many ways from the diversion of US resources and the turmoil in energy markets.
So far, the European Union, NATO and the G7 do not want to become militarily involved in the conflict. Even without taking part in the fighting, however, they face serious challenges arising from the war, particularly its economic and energy repercussions. Oil and gas prices have risen sharply across the EU, potentially bringing inflation and an economic slowdown in the near future.
This comes as the EU seeks to abandon Russian fossil fuels entirely, despite their relatively stable, inexpensive and predictable supply. In member states more open to accepting refugees, the war has also heightened the risk of terrorism and increased migration pressures. The conflict with Iran has created tensions within NATO between the US and its European allies, yet some EU leaders appear determined to use the situation to maintain support for Ukraine.
These conflicting interests reveal one of the consequences of this devastating war. Economic blocs and military alliances such as NATO, BRICS, the G7 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are supposed to unite their members’ interests against those of another group. Yet interests within the same bloc can clash so sharply that they may lead to members breaking away and alliances failing, as could happen with NATO and the G7, or cause organisations such as BRICS to fail in their infancy. What effects has this war had so far on regional and international alliances? And can their eventual outcomes be predicted?
An alliance on a volcano
The US, Canada, the UK, France, Germany and Italy are major NATO members. Together with Japan, they also belong to the G7 group of industrialised nations, whose members cooperate on economic matters. These countries are therefore economic partners as well as presumed supporters of a shared geostrategic security vision encompassing global security, the Middle East, maritime security and the protection of supply chains.
At the 2025 summit in The Hague, France insisted on classifying Iran as a hybrid threat to NATO and regional security because of its alliances with Russia and China and its militias in the region. Yet when the war on Iran broke out, NATO appeared to treat that designation as little more than words on paper. Its major members unanimously rejected the war, especially once its economic effects quickly became apparent in Europe.
Donald Trump appeared unconcerned by Europe’s complex positions and the way security and economic interests are intertwined among NATO members. Speaking in Miami Beach in the early hours of 28 March, he said: “Is this breaking news? I think we have breaking news,” suggesting that he was seriously considering leaving NATO, which he described as having become a burden on the US.
Trump has repeatedly made such statements, including before the Iran war, making it difficult to determine whether he is serious or joking. For Europe, however, his remarks raise a host of questions about NATO’s readiness for a future without US leadership. Since the war on Iran began, those fears have become more real than ever for European leaders, especially as Secretary of State Marco Rubio continues trying to persuade NATO countries of the war’s merits and soften the impact of Trump’s statements on member states.
U.S. President Donald Trump (right) meets with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte during a meeting on the sidelines of the annual World Economic Forum gathering in Davos, Switzerland. File photo/Associated Press”Our father — Daddy, in the original — likes to use harsh words sometimes.” With these words, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte flattered Trump in June 2025, when the US president was on the verge of using an offensive term in an official conversation. When the war on Iran broke out, Rutte declared NATO’s absolute support for Trump, saying: “He is doing this to make the whole world safer; let us not be naive. Iran has been a source of chaos in the region and the world for many years, and what the United States is doing is undermining that capability, and I support it. As for the differences among European countries over entering the war, I think it is only a matter of time before Europe unites behind a single position to enter the war and support President Trump.”
Rutte’s words illustrate a classic wartime dilemma: should security serve the economy, or the economy serve security? Most NATO members appear unwilling to flatter Trump as Rutte has. Indeed, some now seem prepared to suggest publicly that relations have reached breaking point.
“We were surprised by an American ally — still an ally — but one that is becoming increasingly erratic and does not bother to inform us when it decides to launch military operations. That threatens our security and our interests … We went into Afghanistan for the Americans, who invoked NATO’s Article 5, and then they chose to withdraw without informing us. And now they have decided to enter the Middle East without informing us.” These were the words of General Fabien Mandon, the French army chief of staff, who is known for stirring controversy.
The contrast between his position and Rutte’s reflects the fractures in the West’s longstanding relationship with the US. The first signs of strain emerged in 2018, when Trump threatened to withdraw from NATO. Tensions then escalated during his second term, from the tariff crisis to disputes over Greenland and Ukraine, and now the Middle East.
NATO and the G7: Angry partners
The old monastery founded in the 12th century in the town of Les Vaux-de-Cernay, now owned by the Rothschild family and run as a hotel, is one of the quietest places in France for anyone seeking a peaceful, contemplative retreat. It offered no such respite to the beleaguered Rubio during another failed attempt to bridge differences between the US and the rest of the G7.
The split is evident in the steady stream of statements challenging Trump’s swaggering rhetoric. Member states are trying to express their positions diplomatically but firmly. As British Prime Minister Keir Starmer stressed: “We will not be dragged into this war. Our forces can only be deployed under well-considered plans and in lawful operations.” At Rubio’s fruitless meeting with G7 leaders on Friday 27 March, French Defence Minister Catherine Vautrin also stressed that “this war is not our war,” adding in radio remarks: “The diplomatic approach is the real objective, because it alone can guarantee the return of peace.”
The meeting’s outcome reflected the widening gap between the allies. Doubts have grown about what the US war can achieve, while the six countries condemned military attacks on civilians in Iran without naming those responsible, signalling considerable irritation with the US. More importantly, allied countries expressed concern that the war in the Middle East could affect Washington’s commitment to Ukraine. Rubio’s response was hardly reassuring: “Our position on Ukraine is clear. We are still moving ahead with arms sales deals without any reduction, but if the war in the Middle East requires it, there will be no avoiding it.”
On the same day, further afield, the Japanese government announced that “the oil crisis resulting from the war in the Middle East could lead to long-term inflationary pressure on the Japanese economy in the coming quarters.” Japan’s economy had only recently begun to recover, growing by 1.3 per cent in the final quarter of last year, from October to December, before being hit by the current war’s fallout and its expected long-term consequences.
Japan has not yet explicitly rejected the war as its European counterparts have, but it has stated unequivocally that it is not considering sending forces to secure navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Even so, the economic pressures it faces leave it, as a G7 member, caught between the “priority of security” as understood by the US and the “priority of the economy” as understood by its partners, especially given that about 90 per cent of Japan’s crude oil imports pass through the strait. The war and its repercussions have therefore emerged as a threat that could undermine the government’s efforts to raise wages and strengthen state support.
History may remember the two days in Les Vaux-de-Cernay as a turning point, or larger events may overshadow them until they are forgotten. For an assessment of their outcome, we can turn to what Reuters wrote before the meeting: “This group, which first met as six members in nearby Rambouillet 50 years ago, has been accustomed to tackling its core economic and geopolitical challenges with broad consensus. That cohesion has diminished since Donald Trump returned to the US presidency in 2025, with the United States now seen as a destabilizing force, from tariffs to Ukraine, and now the conflict in the Middle East, which diplomats and European officials say lacks clear objectives or an exit strategy.”
Eastern blocs: An uncertain picture
Unlike during the Twelve-Day War, BRICS has yet to issue a joint statement condemning the war on Iran. South Africa, China and Russia have each separately expressed clear support for Iran, while India’s position so far suggests considerable unease. Egypt, a regional heavyweight that recently joined the group, appears torn between condemning the aggression against Iran and aligning its interests with those of its Gulf partners and the US.
There is no doubt that the Iranian president feels deeply let down. He made that clear in a call with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, appealing to him, as the current BRICS chair, to secure an independent position from the group on the war and the management of the conflict.
For the East and the countries of the Global South, the current conflict makes clear that Russia, Iran and China do not form the unified bloc often portrayed in Western discourse. Their relationship is closer to loose cooperation based on overlapping interests. Even so, the three countries are increasingly emerging as an informal strategic triangle, managing their relations in part through multilateral platforms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. They cannot, however, be regarded as a homogeneous bloc: each country’s policies reflect its own national priorities.
If the crisis places a strain on multipolar institutions, the differences between them and organisations such as NATO and the G7 should not be overlooked. For the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which Iran joined as a full member in 2023, these events are a real test of security solidarity. Diplomatic coordination between Russia and China at the UN Security Council, together with previous intelligence and technical cooperation, could help accelerate practical measures. These include developing formal intelligence-sharing protocols, as some reports suggest, organising joint exercises to protect energy routes, and drawing up contingency plans to counter hybrid threats.
The pressure appears even greater within BRICS, which Iran joined in 2024. In her report, “Strategic Patience: How China Navigates the Iran War,” China researcher Ika Khurshudyan argues that unilateral Western military action against a member state underscores the need to move from rhetoric to practical measures. That means expanding energy trade in the Chinese yuan as part of a “de-dollarization” process, with the currency already an established benchmark for Iranian oil. Other measures include creating alternative payment channels protected from secondary sanctions and developing collective energy security arrangements to reduce the risks of “strangulation wars.” Disruption in the Gulf also strengthens Russia’s position as a key supplier to both China and India, deepening interdependence within the group.
One crucial point remains. The researcher notes that a realistic assessment must acknowledge the limits: neither the Shanghai Cooperation Organization nor BRICS can currently match US-Israeli military power. But this “trial by fire” could push these blocs towards stricter economic and security agreements, reflecting the East’s preference for gradual rebalancing over direct confrontation.
By contrast, Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin, does not regard security as BRICS’ central purpose. As he says: “It is certainly not a military alliance, and member states are under no obligation to support one another … And if any party hopes to turn BRICS into an alternative to the G8 or other Western blocs, those expectations will not be met.”
BRICS: Structural crises
Researcher Oliver Stuenkel’s argument in his Foreign Policy article, “BRICS Is Divided on Iran. So Are NATO and the G7,” merits closer attention. His response to the familiar criticism that BRICS is ineffective appears to offer an important way of understanding the group, or at least how it defines itself.
Stuenkel says: “This view is based on a false premise, assuming that BRICS acts as a formal alliance with shared positions on security. In reality, BRICS is not a geopolitical bloc, and it never has been. From the outset, it brought together countries with sharply divergent geopolitical priorities. The leaders of Brazil, Russia, India and China held their first meetings in 2009, before South Africa joined a year later. Even then, its members did not share a unified global outlook. Russia, and to a lesser extent China, have long sought to use the group as a counterweight to the G7 and the West, especially after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. By contrast, Brazil, India and South Africa pursued a strategy of multialignment.”
Stuenkel stresses that contradiction is not an incidental flaw in BRICS but part of its structure and identity. As he puts it: “The group’s latest expansion, backed by China and Russia but opposed by Brazil, India and South Africa, brought these contradictions into even sharper relief. With Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates joining in 2024, the group became more diverse and more divided. Images of Iranian drones carrying out strikes on the UAE — with one BRICS member attacking another — illustrate the scale of the geopolitical rivalries this major expansion has introduced.”
Stuenkel concludes that contradictions are so deeply embedded in BRICS that they cease to be evidence of weakness. Instead, they are a structural feature that cannot be judged by the standards of traditional alliances. He gives practical examples: “BRICS expansion has paralyzed decision-making within the group, particularly on reform of the U.N. Security Council. Brazil, India and South Africa have long sought permanent seats, but there is no consensus within the group on what those changes should look like. African members, including Egypt and Ethiopia, have resisted any formulation that appears to tilt the balance in South Africa’s favor. Tensions peaked at last year’s BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting, when participants failed to agree on a joint statement for the first time in the group’s history.”
He adds: “BRICS showed similar hesitation after previous U.S. escalations against Iran. When the United States attacked Iran last June, the group issued a brief statement expressing deep concern and describing the strikes as a violation of international law, but it avoided mentioning Washington, in a clear attempt to avoid provoking internal disagreements, especially as some of its members — most notably India — were engaged in sensitive negotiations with the United States.”
Stuenkel concludes: “BRICS’ divisions over the renewed conflict in Iran are not surprising, nor do they reveal anything of decisive significance. If disagreement over a major military crisis were a measure of ineffectiveness, many Western alliances themselves would fail the same test; NATO and the G7 are also divided over the war in Iran.”
Possible scenarios hinge on China’s decision
Alicia Garcia-Herrero, a researcher on Eurasian Asian affairs at the Bruegel Institute, outlines the worst-case scenario for these organisations. Quoted in the report “What does the war mean for China?”, she says:
“the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement in 2023, brokered through deft Chinese mediation, was a historic achievement in promoting stability and countering US hegemony in the region. The agreement also strengthened China’s role as a neutral mediator within the framework of its Global Security Initiative. Likewise, Iran’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2023 and to BRICS in 2024 reinforced multilateral frameworks aligned with Beijing’s vision of a multipolar world order, thereby weakening Western dominance.
Therefore, a US victory, amid limited Chinese support for Iran, could shake these structures and force China to reassess its alliances. Failing to stand by a country that China welcomed into its core circles could also undermine its credibility among Global South countries, particularly in the security sphere, as these countries may expect more tangible solidarity in the face of what they regard as Western aggression.”
Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun, center, alongside several defense chiefs, including Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, right, and Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, left, before a meeting of defense ministers from member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the city of Qingdao, in China’s Shandong province, on June 26. (Photo: Associated Press/Ng Han Guan)Garcia-Herrero argues that China must demonstrate its commitment to Iran to defend the future of BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Outlining the best-case scenario, she adds: “By contrast, a sudden US withdrawal — perhaps as a result of domestic pressure, rising costs, or Iran’s resilience — could open the way for an expansion of Chinese diplomacy and investment, and could reshape how countries of the Global South view the winning side in the conflict. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 should serve as a reminder of the far-reaching consequences of such shifts, and of the scale of the gains China could reap.”
Many researchers therefore believe that the future of multipolar institutions now depends largely on China’s decisions, more than on those of any other active member, whether Russia, India, Brazil or even Iran itself. Stuenkel offers a different perspective: he believes these organisations may endure regardless of the war’s outcome, even if Iran is defeated, because that is not the existential challenge they face.
Stuenkel concludes: “This group was not designed to impose unified positions on every geopolitical crisis; rather, it serves a different function: It is a platform that enables major rising powers to coordinate selectively, hedge against geopolitical uncertainty, and expand their influence in a world still dominated by Western institutions. In that sense, BRICS is not an alliance in the literal sense, but a diplomatic space and a forum for states that share concerns about Western dominance and seek to explore alternatives without committing to a unified strategic agenda. The current divisions over Iran are merely another reminder of BRICS’ nature: a loose, often unstructured bloc whose members cooperate where their interests intersect and differ where they diverge.”