هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
Benjamin Netanyahu, the outgoing prime minister of the occupation government, and his rival Gadi Eisenkot, the former chief of staff of the occupation army, share the main goals shaping Israeli policy towards the Middle East: rejecting a Palestinian state, maintaining military control over the occupied territories, weakening Iran and its allies, and expanding regional alliances.
The right-wing Likud leader and the head of the centrist Zionist Yashar party differ, however, over how to achieve those goals. Their disagreements concern the management of the occupation and settlement expansion, the scope of military aggression and the conditions for ending it, and the use of relations with the US and Arab states to strengthen Israeli influence in the region.
The Israeli election results open the way to testing those differences. Estimates based on the count of about 91 per cent of the vote on the morning of 29 October gave Netanyahu’s bloc 53 seats, Eisenkot’s bloc 48 and Arab parties 19. Neither camp secured the 61-seat majority needed to form a government.
As Israeli President Isaac Herzog awaits the completion of the count and the start of parliamentary consultations, questions are emerging about how Israeli policy might change if power passes to Eisenkot. He served on the war cabinet that managed the assault on Gaza after October 2023, and his most notable military policy positions date back to his years leading the occupation army.
The Palestinian question
Netanyahu and Eisenkot both reject an independent Palestinian state and support maintaining Israeli security control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
In a comparison of the candidates’ security platforms published by the Hebrew-language newspaper Israel Hayom, Netanyahu repeated his pledge to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. Eisenkot described the two-state solution as a “grave mistake,” drawing on an Israeli narrative that traces the conflict with the Palestinians to the 19th century and attributes it to religious and nationalist motives.
In Gaza, both contenders make full military withdrawal conditional on ending Hamas rule and disarming the movement. Occupation forces would remain deployed behind what is known as the “yellow line,” which has become a means of expanding military control over the enclave since the October 2025 ceasefire agreement.
In mid-October 2026, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory documented an expansion in the area controlled by the occupation army, from 53 per cent of Gaza under the ceasefire arrangements to at least 60 per cent by 2 September. It also documented the establishment of nine new military bases.
The commission recorded the killing of 1,431 Palestinians in the enclave between 10 October 2025 and 30 September 2026. Its previous investigations had concluded that occupation forces had committed acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
The two candidates differ over how Gaza should be administered after the assault. Netanyahu insists on maintaining military pressure until Hamas is disarmed, while Eisenkot accuses him of prolonging the confrontation and obstructing the establishment of an alternative administration for reasons of coalition politics.
Speaking near Gaza’s border in mid-October, Eisenkot pledged to end Hamas rule within 18 months of becoming prime minister, either through President Donald Trump’s plan or through military operations aimed at dismantling the movement’s military wing.
In an interview with Israel Hayom, Eisenkot outlined a vision for Gaza over the next four years centred on a Palestinian technocratic government and a local force recruited from Gaza’s residents. Members of the force would be vetted and approved by Israel’s internal security service, the Shin Bet, with Arab participation and US supervision.
Eisenkot tied reconstruction to dismantling Hamas and Islamic Jihad, disarming both groups and changing educational curricula. He predicted that rebuilding the enclave would take about two decades. In an interview with The Times of Israel, he affirmed his commitment to Trump’s 20-point plan, which Netanyahu had formally approved, including the establishment of a civil administration and the deployment of an international force.
By contrast, the Israeli newspaper The Jerusalem Post reported, citing sources familiar with his thinking, that he is prepared to consider partial reconstruction alongside progress towards disarmament, while keeping the Palestinian administration subject to the occupation’s security conditions. In the West Bank, meanwhile, the differences centre on settlement expansion and the powers granted to settlers.
Netanyahu granted his finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, leader of the far-right Religious Zionism party, broad powers within the Civil Administration of the occupation army’s Ministry of Defence. This strengthened settler influence over the administration of Palestinian land, planning and construction, alongside accelerating settlement activity and escalating attacks on Palestinians and their property.
Eisenkot supports retaining settlements approved by the occupation authorities in Area C, which falls under Israeli control under the territorial divisions established by the Oslo Accords. He pledges, however, to remove outposts not authorised by Israel in Areas A and B, revoke Smotrich’s powers and return the Border Police to the occupation army’s command.
He has also announced plans to resume the use of administrative detention against settlers involved in attacks and restore the Palestinian Authority’s ability to manage civilian affairs, while the occupation retains military and security powers.
The disagreement extends to the E1 settlement project, which Netanyahu is pushing to implement and which threatens to sever the northern West Bank from the south and isolate East Jerusalem from its Palestinian surroundings.
Eisenkot claims to oppose proceeding with the project at this stage. He also supports allowing Palestinian workers to return to jobs in the territories occupied in 1948 under Shin Bet supervision, a step Netanyahu opposes, according to Israel Hayom.
In his interview with The Times of Israel, Eisenkot raised the possibility of eventually establishing a form of Palestinian self-rule or an entity with limited sovereignty, barred from having an army and subject to Israeli security control. Settlements recognised by the occupation authorities would remain.
He linked his position to preserving the Jewish majority in Israel and avoiding the annexation of millions of Palestinians. This explains his insistence on keeping the Palestinian civil administration separate from Israeli institutions while maintaining the occupation army’s control.
Ghassan Khatib, a former Palestinian planning minister and professor at Birzeit University, says competition among Israeli parties is taking place amid a rightward shift in public opinion, limiting the prospects for a fundamental change in policy towards Palestinians.
He noted the broad consensus against a Palestinian state and predicted that an Eisenkot-led government would seek to curb some settler attacks and reduce visible signs of settlement expansion to improve Israel’s international image, while maintaining its core policies towards the occupied territories.
In its advisory opinion of 19 July 2024, the International Court of Justice affirmed that Israel’s continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territories is unlawful and called for an end to settlement activity and the evacuation of settlers.
Those obligations conflict with the continued settlement activity supported by both contenders, despite their differences over outposts unauthorised under Israeli law and the powers the occupation grants for administering Palestinian land.
Iran
Netanyahu and Eisenkot share the goal of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and reducing its missile capabilities and regional influence. But the military confrontations of 2025 and 2026 highlighted a disagreement over the war’s objectives and the conditions for ending it, particularly after the outgoing prime minister made overthrowing the Iranian regime part of his declared strategy.
At a security briefing on 18 October, Netanyahu presented a doctrine that prioritises attacks and pre-emptive strikes, stronger Israeli military and technological capabilities, and reduced reliance on US weapons supplies. He declared himself ready to act unilaterally against Iran when necessary and stressed that he had directed the military and intelligence services to work towards toppling the Iranian regime.
Netanyahu spoke of plans for regime change in coordination with the Trump administration, despite the Iranian government’s survival after sanctions, military strikes and the assassination of senior leaders. He offered no details of how he expected to bring about its collapse.
Eisenkot, by contrast, opposed making regime change a war aim. In his interview with Israel Hayom, he argued that changing Iran’s government through aerial bombardment was unrealistic. He called instead for a focus on removing enriched uranium from the country and imposing strict oversight to prevent the resumption of a military nuclear programme.
His vision still includes the continued use of military force. He has backed bombing the entrances to Iran’s four main nuclear sites and designating the surrounding areas as military target zones under constant surveillance. He also supports striking any movements aimed at restarting the facilities or transferring nuclear materials until Tehran accepts an agreement requiring the removal of enriched uranium.
Israeli military analyst Yonah Jeremy Bob reported in a report published by The Jerusalem Post that Eisenkot envisages long-term US monitoring of sites containing Iran’s highly enriched uranium. He also envisages expanded operations by Israel’s foreign intelligence service, Mossad, against the ballistic missile programme as well as nuclear facilities.
Eisenkot links these measures to the possibility of an agreement that would include reopening the Strait of Hormuz and easing economic restrictions, with the aim of addressing the confrontation’s effects on the global economy. Netanyahu, meanwhile, is betting on continued sanctions, blockade and military operations to weaken the Iranian regime and ultimately bring it down.
This disagreement extends to relations with Washington. Eisenkot seeks to commit the US to long-term monitoring and military arrangements that would prevent Iran from restoring its nuclear capabilities, while preserving Israel’s ability to target missiles independently. Netanyahu is focused on using cooperation with Trump to broaden the confrontation to the point of regime change.
Bob believes Netanyahu is more willing to risk new attacks on Iran and may choose to escalate sooner than Eisenkot.
He identifies another difference in their likely responses to any US nuclear agreement with Tehran. Netanyahu is expected to oppose it publicly to put pressure on Washington and American public opinion. Eisenkot is more likely to seek changes to its terms through private channels, although both men retain the option of military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and missile capabilities.
Syria and Lebanon
In Lebanon, Netanyahu and Eisenkot agree on weakening Hezbollah and preventing it from rebuilding its military capabilities. Both support continuing to occupy parts of the south and linking withdrawal to the future of the group’s weapons and the Lebanese army’s role.
On 22 June, Netanyahu insisted that the occupation army remain in the strip of Lebanese territory his government calls the “security zone,” and affirmed that military operations inside Lebanon would continue. He reiterated that position in a joint statement with his defence minister, Israel Katz.
According to a Jerusalem Post report, Eisenkot has indicated a conditional willingness to reduce the depth of the occupied strip to eight kilometres. Netanyahu is inclined to retain areas that, in some places, extend more than 10 kilometres into Lebanon.
Eisenkot’s approach is intended to push the threat of anti-tank missiles further away from northern settlements and reduce the burden of military deployment, while maintaining pressure on the Lebanese government and army to confront Hezbollah.
The two also differ over international arrangements. Eisenkot supports greater French involvement alongside the US in monitoring security agreements and supporting the Lebanese army. Netanyahu has sought to reduce France’s role amid strained relations with Paris over its criticism of the Israeli assault on Gaza and Lebanon.
Eisenkot has also raised the possibility of eventually reaching broader political understandings with Beirut, while continuing to insist on Hezbollah’s disarmament.
Eisenkot’s military record is associated with the “Dahiya doctrine”. In 2008, as commander of the occupation army’s Northern Command, he threatened to repeat in every Lebanese village from which attacks were launched against his forces the destruction inflicted by the occupation on Beirut’s southern suburbs during the 2006 war. He affirmed that the use of disproportionate force was an approved military plan.
Karim Safieddine, a Lebanese researcher at the Washington-based Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, believes Israeli election rhetoric reveals a continuing consensus in favour of occupying southern Lebanon.
He noted that the candidates were competing over the conduct and outcomes of military operations, with neither pledging to withdraw from Lebanon or treating the occupation as a crisis that must end. He argued that these positions reflected a broader attitude towards Lebanese territory within the Israeli establishment.
In Syria, Netanyahu insists on continuing to occupy sites seized by the occupation army after the fall of Bashar Assad’s regime in December 2024, particularly on Mount Hermon and in areas adjoining the occupied Syrian Golan. He also demands that Syrian forces be kept away from the border and that military systems capable of hindering Israeli air strikes be prevented from deploying.
Tensions with Türkiye escalated after the occupation army launched eight strikes on Abu al-Duhur air base in northwestern Syria on 18 August 2026, following Israeli accusations that Damascus had allowed Turkish forces to be stationed there.
Ankara condemned the attack as a violation of Syrian sovereignty. Tom Barrack, the US special envoy to Syria and ambassador to Türkiye, described the strikes as an unnecessary escalation that threatened regional stability. He pointed to Washington’s efforts to establish a coordination mechanism to prevent a direct confrontation among the three parties.
Eisenkot, meanwhile, calls for using occupied Syrian territory as a bargaining chip in US-sponsored negotiations over new security arrangements with President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government. He has proposed revisiting the 1974 disengagement agreement, which regulated deployment lines after the October 1973 war, in exchange for moving Syrian forces away from the border and restricting the foreign military presence.
Eisenkot has made any negotiations over Mount Hermon and the occupied sites conditional on the withdrawal of Turkish and Russian forces and stringent US guarantees. The Jerusalem Post also quoted sources familiar with his thinking as saying he wants to retain the site held by the occupation army on Mount Hermon, while remaining open to negotiating partial withdrawals from other Syrian areas and expanding the role of the UN Disengagement Observer Force, or UNDOF, which monitors the 1974 agreement.
Eisenkot also makes any arrangement conditional on preventing Turkish forces from being stationed near the southern border and preventing the deployment of Turkish air defence systems and radars that could limit Israeli air strikes inside Syria. He warned that armed resistance groups could emerge against the occupation in southern Syria and turn to explosive devices and guerrilla warfare, potentially raising the cost of a long-term Israeli military presence.
James Jeffrey, the former US envoy to Syria and former ambassador to Türkiye and Iraq, warns in an analysis published by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy that the security doctrine that has taken root in Israel since October 2023 now prioritises early military action against potential threats. He sees this as a trend that extends beyond the personality of the prime minister.
Jeffrey links the continuation of this policy in Syria and Lebanon to the composition of the next Israeli coalition and Washington’s ability to contain flashpoints. He notes that Israeli military operations have weakened the diplomatic support Israel needs to manage its regional relations.
The US
Netanyahu and Eisenkot both regard US support as central to preserving Israel’s military edge and expanding regional alliances. But the Likud leader has made his personal relationship with Trump a major selling point of his election campaign. He draws on their military and political coordination during the confrontations with Iran and presents his experience of dealing with the White House as a guarantee that support will continue.
In the security doctrine he announced on 18 October, Netanyahu stressed the need to strengthen domestic production of weapons and ammunition and retain the option of unilateral military operations, while using the US alliance to expand military and political influence in the region.
This approach follows tensions with previous US administrations over weapons supplies and the limits of military operations, as well as growing criticism within the Democratic Party of the assault on Gaza and settlement activity.
Eisenkot, by contrast, calls for repairing relations with US government institutions and both the Republican and Democratic parties. He warns against tying Israeli interests to a single US administration. He criticised the widening gap between US and Israeli interests during Netanyahu’s tenure and called for long-term strategic understandings on Iran, Gaza, Lebanon and Syria.
Eisenkot supports maintaining the agreements Netanyahu’s government reached with Washington, foremost among them Trump’s plan for Gaza, while remaining committed to ending Hamas rule and disarming the movement.
He is also counting on US guarantees to secure new arrangements in Syria and Lebanon, including partial Israeli withdrawals in exchange for moving local and foreign forces away and restricting their military capabilities.
Dror Shalom, who headed the political-military bureau at the occupation army’s Ministry of Defence between 2022 and 2026, believes the institutional foundations of relations with Washington are eroding despite extensive military cooperation during the confrontation with Iran.
In an analysis published by the Atlantic Council, Shalom holds Netanyahu’s government partly responsible for this decline, citing its obstruction of understandings on Gaza and its exaggeration of the prospects for toppling the Iranian regime through air power. He calls on the next government to rebuild political and military coordination with the US and propose a US-sponsored political process for the Palestinian issue.
The disagreement also extends to relations with Europe. Eisenkot accuses Netanyahu of deepening Israel’s isolation and endangering its economic and military interests. He calls for repairing relations with France, Britain, Germany and Italy.
He believes a change of government, adjustments to settlement policies and a different approach to Western initiatives would help ease political and economic pressure. Netanyahu is focused on increasing domestic arms production and diversifying external partnerships to counter potential sanctions.
These approaches remain tied to Western states’ positions on the occupation, settlement activity and the assault on Gaza. On these issues, the two men remain broadly aligned despite their differences over how to deal with European governments and international institutions.
Normalisation and regional relations
Netanyahu and Eisenkot agree on expanding normalisation with Arab states and strengthening relations with the UAE and Bahrain under the Abraham Accords signed in 2020. Both also support developing military, intelligence and economic cooperation with countries in the region.
Netanyahu presents these agreements as among his main political achievements. He seeks to bring Saudi Arabia into them by drawing on shared security interests and threats linked to Iran and its allies.
In September 2026, Israeli journalist Ben Caspit revealed in a report published by the US website Al-Monitor that Netanyahu’s government was trying to capitalise on the Houthi threat to Saudi Arabia to open channels for security and intelligence cooperation. It hoped to revive US-sponsored normalisation efforts despite the continuing dispute over the Palestinian issue.
Riyadh continues to insist on an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. The Saudi foreign ministry officially reaffirmed that position on 5 February 2025, also stressing its rejection of settlement activity, the annexation of Palestinian land and attempts to displace people from their land.
Eisenkot proposes expanding relations with Arab states through a US-sponsored regional security alliance. In his interview with The Times of Israel, he described it as resembling a Nato for Sunni states, with Israeli participation in intelligence-sharing, early warning systems and air defence. He believes security and economic cooperation could strengthen existing ties and pave the way for normalisation with more countries.
Eisenkot acknowledges the difficulty of reaching an agreement with Saudi Arabia in the near term because of its conditions regarding a Palestinian state and the repercussions of the assault on Gaza. He noted Arab states’ demands for tangible changes in the West Bank and in the treatment of Palestinians. But he tied the measures he intends to take, including curbing settler attacks and improving economic and security conditions, to Israeli interests, while continuing to reject Palestinian sovereignty.
Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at the UK’s Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, believes Netanyahu’s departure could create room for better diplomatic communication with Gulf states, particularly over Gaza and the West Bank.
Vakil linked the prospects for normalisation with Saudi Arabia to a credible path towards a Palestinian state. She noted that a change of Israeli government could ease regional tensions, while policies towards Iran and the Palestinians would continue to influence Israel’s relations with Gulf states.
In relations with Egypt and Jordan, Eisenkot prioritises strengthening the peace treaties and easing political tensions that have accumulated because of the assault on Gaza, settlement expansion and fears of Palestinian displacement. He warns against taking the continuation of these relations for granted and calls for stronger political and security coordination with Cairo and Amman. He also supports completing military fortifications along the Jordanian border.
Relations with Türkiye remain competitive, primarily over Syria. Netanyahu opposes the expansion of Turkish military influence, while Eisenkot likewise insists on preventing the deployment of air defence systems and Turkish forces that could limit Israeli air strikes. Any improvement in diplomatic relations is tied to developments in the Syrian conflict and Ankara’s positions on the assault on Gaza and the Palestinian issue.
These platforms face the parliamentary arithmetic of forming the next governing coalition. Netanyahu relies on religious and settler parties on the right, particularly the Religious Zionism party led by Minister Bezalel Smotrich and the Jewish Power party led by Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir. Both push for expanded settlement activity and annexation.
Eisenkot, meanwhile, needs to reach understandings with political forces including the alliance between Together, led by former occupation prime minister Naftali Bennett, and Yesh Atid, led by former prime minister Yair Lapid; Yisrael Beiteinu, led by former occupation defence minister Avigdor Lieberman; and the Democrats, led by former deputy chief of staff of the occupation army Yair Golan.
Forming a government is further complicated by the 19 seats won by Arab parties, according to the preliminary results, after Eisenkot ruled out their participation in his coalition during the campaign. Yousef Jabareen, an Arab lawmaker and head of the Joint List, has expressed readiness to help bring down Netanyahu from outside the government, although disagreements with Eisenkot over his policies towards Palestinians persist.
Mansour Abbas, a lawmaker who heads the United Arab List, has also announced his readiness to join an alternative government, amid opposition from Jewish parties in Eisenkot’s camp to relying on Arab support.
These political constraints could leave Eisenkot’s ability to change settlement policies and the administration of the occupied territories dependent on his right-wing partners. Major military issues, meanwhile, remain subject to broad consensus within the Israeli political and security establishment.
The composition of the next government will therefore affect how policies are implemented and at what pace. The goals of controlling Palestinian land, rejecting an independent state, preserving military superiority and expanding regional influence remain part of both candidates’ declared platforms.