هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
Libya’s regional and international importance is growing. Its future is bound up with oil and global energy security, security and economic stability in the Mediterranean basin, and irregular migration.
As UN and regional efforts seek to revive Libya’s political process, attention is turning to the military balance on the ground. Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar is now 83, raising questions about who will take command after him and whether his successor can maintain control over eastern Libya.
Haftar has been making his own calculations. He has moved quickly to prepare for his departure, doing everything in his power to restructure his forces and entrench his sons in military, political, economic and social institutions. Among them, his youngest son, General Saddam Haftar, stands out. At just 35, he has established himself as the most influential and prominent of the brothers.
Saddam has risen in recent years through his management of military and security operations and his command of the Tariq bin Ziyad Brigade, a powerful force in his father’s struggle for power. From this position, he consolidated his influence in Cyrenaica, Fezzan and the Oil Crescent before extending his reach into the parallel economy, managing trade and smuggling networks and using energy revenues to advance his own ambitions.
Over the past two years, Saddam has focused on strengthening his political and social presence and improving his public image. His portraits now dominate Benghazi’s streets alongside those of his father. He has also stepped up his foreign outreach, seeking a central role in shaping any future political settlement. His travels have taken him to major international and regional capitals, including Washington, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Ankara, Cairo, Abu Dhabi and Islamabad, as well as countries in the African Sahel.
This report traces Saddam’s rise in less than a decade from a field commander accused of abuses in the Tariq bin Ziyad Brigade to the architect of a parallel economy and smuggling networks. It examines his growing control over security coordination and alliances stretching from Moscow to Washington and Tel Aviv, and his emergence as a formidable political player: the leading contender to succeed his father at the head of the eastern camp, and a patron of development positioned to lead Libya into its next phase.
Early years
Saddam Haftar was born in 1991 in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi into the al-Farjani tribe. Haftar’s youngest son, he was named after the late Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, with whom his father had an amicable relationship.
Accounts differ over Saddam’s dual nationality and upbringing. Many believe he was raised in the US state of Virginia, where his father lived in exile from December 1990 until his return to Libya in 2011 after the fall of Moammar Gadhafi’s regime.
Other accounts maintain that Saddam grew up in Benghazi, where his mother raised him while his father lived in exile. Little is known about his childhood and early years, except that he remained out of public view and obtained no university qualifications during that period.
Saddam was 20 when the revolution against Gadhafi’s regime broke out. His father returned from exile in the US, and Saddam became involved in military campaigns and activities in support of him. Despite having no military training at the time, he attracted attention in 2012 when he attempted to rob Al Aman Bank in Tripoli with a group of gunmen. He survived the incident with injuries, but it established his bad reputation.
Saddam’s fortunes began to improve in 2014, when his father launched “Operation Dignity” against rival armed groups. He took part in all those campaigns, beginning with the battles for Benghazi and the establishment of full control over Cyrenaica in eastern Libya by the “Libyan National Army”.
Saddam emerged from obscurity in 2016, aged 25, when his father entrusted him with command of the Tariq bin Ziyad Brigade. It later became the most powerful military formation affiliated with the eastern camp.
The brigade comprised irregular fighters and members of the Madkhali Salafi movement. Its advanced military equipment enabled it to deploy across areas controlled by the eastern camp.
It became a replica of Gadhafi’s notorious Revolutionary Committees, carrying out atrocities and systematic arrests from its base in “Sidi Faraj,” east of Benghazi, to suppress opponents. International human rights organisations documented systematic abuses by Saddam’s fighters amounting to war crimes, including unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, torture, rape and forced displacement, targeting opponents in eastern and southern Libya.
In 2017, Saddam began seeking to legitimise his military role. He graduated from the Royal Military Academy in Jordan with the rank of captain and enrolled in courses abroad covering special operations, unit management and artillery, and military intelligence. He also took an information security course in Russia and a counterterrorism course in Egypt.
Despite acquiring these qualifications late and previously lacking conventional training, Saddam bypassed the customary military promotion process under an exceptional decree issued by House of Representatives Speaker Aguila Saleh. He was swiftly promoted to major and then lieutenant colonel within a single year, before reaching the ranks of colonel and brigadier general by 2023.
During the failed offensive against Tripoli in 2019–2020, Saddam was absent from the front lines, focusing on logistical support and securing weapons and ammunition through airlines and covert supply networks.
Saddam’s biggest and fastest career advance came in 2024, when the Egyptian Military Academy for Postgraduate and Strategic Studies announced that it had awarded him a doctorate in military science. The announcement prompted disapproval and ridicule among observers. That same year, he was appointed chief of staff of the ground forces. Just three months after that appointment, in August 2024, Haftar promoted him to lieutenant general.
His rapid rise culminated on 11 August 2025, when Haftar appointed Lieutenant General Saddam as his deputy in command of the Libyan National Army. This formally made him the second most senior figure in the eastern camp and his father’s de facto successor.
The shadow economy and oil
Saddam Haftar’s attempts to plunder public funds began with the failed robbery of Al Aman Bank in Tripoli in 2012. As his military influence expanded, these efforts became more organised. In July 2017, after the battles for Benghazi ended and Haftar’s forces took the city, Saddam seized control of the Benghazi branch of the Central Bank of Libya.
Reports by the UN Panel of Experts indicate that Saddam ordered his men to transfer huge sums from the bank to an unknown destination. These included €160 million, 639 million Libyan dinars and $2 million, as well as thousands of silver coins. According to those reports, he made off with more than half a billion dollars in multiple currencies in one of the largest bank heists in history.
According to a December 2022 report by Africa Intelligence, Saddam tightened his grip on eastern Libya’s banking sector to fund his forces and bolster his financial influence. He also installed loyalists and close associates in the management of the Central Bank of Libya in Benghazi.
Saddam also began using the Military Investment Authority to loot Benghazi’s infrastructure and the remnants of war, confiscating factories and selling them as scrap, as well as seizing agricultural projects in the south.
Khalifa Haftar established the Military Investment Authority in 2016 as the economic arm of his forces in eastern Libya. It was granted tax and customs exemptions, along with a monopoly on supplying ships with fuel and exporting scrap metal. Multiple reports indicate that Saddam exercised extensive influence over its economic activities and used it to expand economic patronage networks affiliated with the eastern camp.
He also founded the Tariq bin Ziyad Services and Production Agency, which secured a growing number of government contracts for road maintenance, waste collection and urban reconstruction. The agency faced widespread criticism after it was accused of seizing properties in central Benghazi and forcing their owners to relinquish them for meagre compensation. It was later renamed the National Development Agency.
Saddam’s economic activities expanded as the cost of military operations rose. International reports pointed to his involvement in running networks smuggling scrap metal, fuel, gold, cannabis and Captagon through the ports of Tobruk and Benghazi and distributing them across Africa. They also pointed to his involvement in organising secret flights transporting gold between Africa and Latin America, and to his indirect influence over the local airline Berniq.
International reports and organisations also alleged that Saddam was linked to human trafficking operations. Survivors of the migrant boat disaster off the Greek coast said networks tied to the eastern camp oversaw the departure of boats carrying irregular migrants from Libya towards Europe.
After the fighting in Tripoli in 2019–2020 ended, Russia’s Wagner forces redeployed around key oil facilities. Their presence strengthened Saddam’s control over institutions and companies operating in eastern Libya’s oil sector, where he emerged as the most influential figure.
This prompted criticism of the lack of transparency in the management of oil and fuel revenues, which one senior Libyan financial official described as a “black box.” International reports also documented Saddam’s involvement in oil smuggling networks.
Saddam’s control over the oil sector reached its peak in 2023 with the breaking of the National Oil Corporation’s historic export monopoly. A private oil company called Arkno was established and, within months, had become an oil giant with major contracts.
UN panels of experts say Arkno is under Saddam Haftar’s direct but undeclared control. The company signed service agreements to operate major strategic fields, including Sarir and Messla, and began exporting crude oil on its own account, collecting millions of dollars in revenue.
The changes that have reshaped the oil sector since 2022 have enabled Saddam to expand his influence over most land and sea crossings in eastern Libya and tighten his control over oil and fuel exports.
By 2024, Saddam was also using the energy sector to exert political pressure. In August that year, he ordered the closure of Sharara, the country’s largest oil field, operated by Spain’s Repsol.
The shutdown came in immediate response to notification from the Italian authorities of an arrest warrant and legal notice issued against him by Spain, after Spain seized 10 vessels carrying weapons and military equipment bound for Benghazi.
Manufacturing popular legitimacy
The first signs of an effort to reshape Saddam Haftar’s public image emerged in 2021, when he became highly active on social media, using his official accounts to publicise his activities.
His posts range from videos of inspection tours of public service and urban reconstruction projects and meetings with tribes to photographs of diplomatic meetings with world leaders. They also highlight his sponsorship of regular religious activities and competitions, as well as youth sports tournaments.
By 2022, Saddam was seeking political legitimacy for his growing influence. This was most clearly reflected in his father’s decision to appoint him as his representative in negotiations that led to an oil revenue-sharing agreement with Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, prime minister of the Government of National Unity.
Saddam also devoted considerable attention to extending his influence in society, building a social and religious support base that strengthened his political standing and public presence. Under the banner of the “Journey of Loyalty”, he made extensive tours to engage with tribes in the south, meeting sheikhs and notables.
Dignitaries and leaders in Sirte also gave him a notable welcome. He inspected progress on vital projects, including the maintenance and expansion of Sirte’s eastern and western roads, public service projects and a 1,500-unit housing project in Kufra.
His efforts to build support extended beyond tribes and public services to religion, young people, relief work and reconciliation. He sponsored Islamic activities, organising repeated trips to perform Umrah and inaugurating the Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Mosque in Marj after its renovation. He also sponsored religious study sessions in Benghazi’s mosques and major Quran competitions, including the “Dhu al-Nurayn” competition and the “Memorizers of the Nation and Its Heroes” competition, as well as hosting scholars and sheikhs.
These efforts culminated in his supervision of prisoner releases as part of national reconciliation efforts and a series of inspection tours of oil fields and companies. He also sought a prominent public role by receiving Libyan fishermen released by Egypt after 10 years in detention.
Saddam led an inspection tour with maintenance engineers at the Great Man-Made River project’s water tank sites in Shwayrif. His military expansion continued into Libya’s far south-west, and he inspected security forces along the Algerian border.
In a step that cemented his formal rise as his father’s de facto successor, Saddam attended the 61st Police Day celebration in Sabha as deputy commander-in-chief of the army. Before an audience of military and civilian officials, he declared that the pursuit of stability was a reality the armed forces would impose by force of arms.
Saddam Haftar’s international alliances
Since 2016, Khalifa Haftar has been paving the way for Saddam, introducing him to diplomatic circles and arranging meetings on his behalf. Saddam’s first publicly announced foreign mission as his father’s envoy was a meeting with Jordanian military officials in 2016.
As his powers expanded, Saddam went from being his father’s envoy to one of the eastern camp’s most prominent representatives abroad. He took part in high-level meetings with Russian officials. Moscow maintained strong relations with his father, supplying him with weapons and experts, but a crisis of confidence continued to cloud the relationship. Moscow has avoided relying on Khalifa Haftar as a permanent strategic partner and regards him as “America’s man” in Libya.
Seeking to preserve its influence after Haftar, Moscow moved to establish new, direct channels with Saddam. It pledged to strengthen and expand military relations with him so that he would become the main guarantor of its interests and presence in eastern Libya.
Saddam’s diplomatic efforts to secure international and regional support took a notable turn in 2021. In November, press reports revealed that he had visited Israel, held a secret meeting with Israeli officials and delivered a message from his father expressing willingness to join the “Abraham Accords” and normalise relations in exchange for military and diplomatic support. The visit was coordinated with and backed by UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed.
When war broke out in Sudan in April 2023, Saddam aligned himself with Abu Dhabi’s vision by supporting the Rapid Support Forces led by Hemedti, angering the Egyptian regime. Despite this tension, he maintained good relations with the Egyptian military establishment. Sisi also received Haftar and Saddam, while Saddam held a separate meeting with the Egyptian defence minister to discuss strengthening cooperation and border security. Cairo backed his appointment as deputy commander-in-chief of the Libyan National Army.
At the beginning of 2024, Saddam began a series of extensive tours of European, Arab and African countries. In Rome, he met Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto, using his control over irregular migration to court Italy and other European countries.
Among neighbouring African countries, Saddam’s official visit to Chad produced a notable development on the ground: Haftar’s armed forces announced the formation of a joint military force with the Chadian army to secure the border. Saddam also travelled to Amman at the Jordanian leadership’s invitation to discuss joint military cooperation. His travels included Morocco, Niger and Burkina Faso, as well as Algeria and the United Arab Emirates.
During an official visit to Pakistan in July 2024, Saddam met Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and army chief General Asim Munir to advance defence cooperation and technology transfer. He made further visits in 2025 and 2026.
Saddam’s intensive diplomatic engagement with the US began in October 2024, when he visited at the joint invitation of the State Department and the CIA. The invitation was part of an effort to persuade the Haftar family to scale back its military and political ties with Moscow.
This engagement deepened in April 2025, when Saddam returned to Washington as his father’s official envoy and met Massad Boulos, a senior adviser to US President Trump. The visit came as USS Mount Whitney docked at the ports of Tripoli and Benghazi.
At the start of 2026, Saddam received US presidential adviser Massad Boulos in Benghazi to discuss the latest political developments. He subsequently met Lieutenant General John Brennan, deputy commander of US Africa Command (AFRICOM), to discuss joint counterterrorism efforts.
Just one month later, in February 2026, Saddam held further talks on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference. These included a series of meetings with Boulos and General Dagvin Anderson, commander of AFRICOM.
This intensifying diplomatic activity culminated on 28 June 2026, when Saddam arrived in Washington for a high-level official visit that received extensive media coverage. Observers saw it as part of the arrangements and practical preparations for him to lead Libya’s next phase.
This US outreach was preceded by notable European outreach in May 2026. During a particularly significant visit to Paris, Saddam was formally received at the Elysee Palace and met French President Emmanuel Macron, expressing his desire to develop military relations with France.
Alongside US engagement in Libya, Ankara has begun a new phase of outreach to the eastern camp. After Turkish military support helped repel Haftar’s assault on Tripoli in 2019–2020, Ankara adapted to changing military and political realities. It expanded its contacts beyond the Tripoli government, opening direct channels with Saddam.
This shift culminated in two official visits to Ankara in April and November 2025. Saddam held high-level talks with Defence Minister Yasar Guler, Land Forces Commander Selcuk Bayraktaroglu, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and the head of Turkish intelligence.
The outreach continued in June 2026, when the head of Turkish intelligence travelled to Benghazi to meet Saddam. That visit followed a direct meeting between Saddam and President Erdogan in Istanbul on the sidelines of the SAHA International Defense, Aerospace and Aviation Exhibition.
An heir without consensus
This consolidation of power on the ground, backed by regional and international actors, is seen as a series of practical, systematic steps to prepare the Haftars to take over and impose de facto authority by force of arms. Despite his rapid rise, Saddam does not enjoy broad popularity in Libya. He lacks charisma or any legitimate claim to rule beyond being the most influential and ruthless of his brothers.
The situation recalls Moammar Gadhafi’s approach to succession. He gave his sons every opportunity to gain prominence in politics, the media, the economy, sport and the military. When the moment of truth arrived, the entire house collapsed.
Today, similar fears appear to be emerging within the eastern camp itself, where Saddam’s succession does not appear to command consensus. Some of Haftar’s traditional backers take a rational stance, opposing the transformation of the eastern camp into a family inheritance and remaining committed to building the army as an institution.
Analysts and Libyan commentators believe Haftar’s appointment of Saddam as his deputy will significantly delay the country’s unification. Others believe Saddam lacks the backing of major tribal leaders, Misrata clans and prominent political figures, particularly in the western region. Haftar does not control that region, which is home to about 70 per cent of Libya’s population and the country’s active political and civil forces.