هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
The Azerbaijani authorities’ decision on schoolgirls’ attire, and the accompanying exclusion of students wearing headscarves from schools, have revived memories of one of the most sensitive periods in Türkiye’s political history: the period surrounding 28 February 1997, when sweeping restrictions were imposed on wearing the headscarf in educational institutions and public-sector jobs.
The scenes from Azerbaijan recalled an experience Turks lived through nearly three decades ago. They resonated particularly strongly because of the relationship between the two countries, long summed up by the familiar slogan: “One nation in two states.” How, then, can Ankara respond when a state it regards as both an ally and a brotherly nation adopts policies that remind part of Turkish society of one of the most significant battles over religious freedoms in its modern history?
Alliance calculations
The crisis comes as Türkiye seeks to preserve its regional alliances and avoid new sources of tension. Azerbaijan figures prominently in those calculations, given the political, security and economic interests linking the two countries, including energy and infrastructure projects. Erdogan faces a dilemma that goes beyond his position on the headscarf: how to protect the alliance, and how much political cost he can bear among his conservative supporters.
Opposition to restrictions on women wearing headscarves was a central part of his political career. Years of struggle and gradual change culminated in the lifting of headscarf restrictions in public institutions in 2013, a move that became one of the most prominent symbols of the transformation led by the Justice and Development Party in Türkiye. Calls from conservative supporters for him to take a clear position on the Azerbaijani measures were therefore to be expected.
Erdogan had criticised school headscarf bans in his address to the UN General Assembly on 22 September 2026, saying: “We see the headscarf ban implemented by some countries in schools as an assault on women’s most basic rights.” He made the remarks while discussing rising Islamophobia and discrimination against Muslim women, without naming Azerbaijan.
His adviser Oktay Saral, however, chose to address Baku directly. In a post on X on 12 October, he said: “Depriving veiled female students of their right to education in Azerbaijan is unacceptable.” He added: “We expect Azerbaijan to reverse this mistake as soon as possible.”
He described barring a student from school because of her religious commitment as contrary to justice and conscience, and rejected making the right to education subject to ideological dictates. Azerbaijan’s ruling New Azerbaijan Party responded by accusing him and Justice and Development Party lawmakers of interfering in the country’s internal affairs.
The headscarf dispute became intertwined with other disagreements, above all relations with Israel. A journalist close to Azerbaijan’s ruling party indicated that, from Baku’s perspective, the tension dated back to protests targeting the headquarters of the Azerbaijani oil company SOCAR in Istanbul in 2024 over oil exports to Israel. He argued that the Turkish authorities’ failure to take sufficient action against the protesters had contributed to deepening the rift.
Examining the roots of the dispute in greater depth, researcher Sam Harshbarger argues in Foreign Policy magazine that the headscarf crisis exposed a fundamental difference in how the two countries view their alliance. Ankara’s ruling elite treats Azerbaijan as part of Türkiye’s sphere of influence, while Aliyev seeks to consolidate his country’s independence and reject any relationship that casts it as a junior partner.
Harshbarger traces this sensitivity back to the 1995 coup attempt against Heydar Aliyev, in which Turkish political parties were involved. He notes that Baku’s fears of Turkish interference persisted despite the rapprochement that peaked after the 2020 Karabakh war. From this perspective, Azerbaijan’s escalation reflects an attempt to set limits on Turkish influence within the country, particularly amid the authorities’ concern about the influence of Turkish Islamist and nationalist currents in Azerbaijan.
On 14 October, Israeli President Isaac Herzog arrived in Baku to attend the summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, or CICA. He travelled on a commercial Azerbaijan Airlines flight that crossed Turkish airspace, despite Ankara’s restrictions on the transit of Israeli government aircraft. This added to the controversy over Baku’s closeness to Israel and the differing calculations of Azerbaijan and its Turkish ally.
The following day, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan represented Türkiye at CICA’s seventh summit in Baku and met Aliyev. Speaking to journalists, he made Ankara’s priorities clear: “Whatever the circumstances, the strategic nature of the relationship between Turkey and Azerbaijan takes precedence over all other issues.”
He explained that he had received instructions from Erdogan before the visit and had discussed the differing views and ways of addressing them with Aliyev. He stressed the need to address disagreements through dialogue, warning against using them for social media propaganda and damaging bilateral relations.
The dispute continued to escalate in the media after the visit. On 17 October, Caucasus Info, a website close to the Azerbaijani authorities, published accusations that Fidan had held secret meetings and interfered in internal affairs, as part of claims about activities targeting the country’s stability. The article was later deleted. The Turkish embassy in Baku issued a statement rejecting the accusations and describing them as an attempt to damage relations between the two countries.
Domestic cost
As vigils and criticism in Türkiye spread, Baku took steps that made the crisis more sensitive. On 21 October, it announced that 31 Turkish figures had been barred from entering the country, including New Welfare Party leader Fatih Erbakan, Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party lawmaker Omer Faruk Gergerlioglu, and cleric Mehmet Boynukalin.
Press reports also said Baku had demanded Saral’s dismissal and action against people it accused of insulting Aliyev.
That same day, Erdogan called Aliyev and discussed bilateral relations and regional and international developments. He invited him to the Organization of Turkic States summit in Ankara and affirmed his commitment to developing cooperation between the two countries. The published statement, however, made no mention of any discussion of the headscarf restrictions or a request to reverse them.
Efforts to contain the dispute then took a more sensitive turn in Ankara. On 25 October, Saral confirmed to journalist Talat Atilla that he had left his post on Erdogan’s instructions. When Atilla asked him, “Was that because of your statements regarding Azerbaijan?” he replied: “Yes, that seems to be the case.”
The next day, he announced his resignation, affirming his commitment to the values he defends and his continued support for Erdogan. The newspaper Nefes also quoted him as saying that taking certain decisions was natural given the sensitivity of the relationship with Azerbaijan, while acknowledging that he had not known all the details of the decision.
His removal drew criticism from conservative circles, most notably Fatih Erbakan, who accused Erdogan of sacrificing his adviser in response to Aliyev’s wishes. The debate thus shifted to the domestic price the government was paying to protect its relationship with Baku, and whether that was consistent with the principles that had underpinned its rhetoric for years.
The repercussions spread as measures were taken in Türkiye against some critics of the Azerbaijani government. Mohammed Emin Yildirim, the Istanbul representative of the Koklu Degisim media organisation, was detained on 26 October, and Fatih Arshahin was summoned for questioning. Both were subsequently released.
The following day, the organisation’s representative in Hatay, Ahmed Saba, was detained. Press coverage linked the investigations to posts about Aliyev and his policies.
Amid the crisis, Azerbaijan’s foreign ministry on 27 October welcomed the UAE’s nomination of Lana Nusseibeh for UN secretary-general, at a time when Ankara was considering nominating its former foreign minister Feridun Sinirlioglu.
By the Organization of Turkic States summit in Ankara on 30 October, efforts to ease tensions faced a test at presidential level. Aliyev did not attend despite Erdogan’s invitation and was represented by his foreign minister, Jeyhun Bayramov. The Azerbaijani news agency Report attributed his absence to previously scheduled commitments, including attending the closing ceremony and prize-giving for the Under-15 FIFA World Cup in Baku, which coincided with the summit.
Turkish writer Merve Sebnem Oruc interprets his absence in the context of the dispute over Israel. She suggests it may have been a response to Erdogan’s absence from the Baku summit and the Turkish delegation’s withdrawal when Herzog began his speech there. She believes Ankara took steps to contain the headscarf dispute, and that the continuing tension points to an Azerbaijani attempt to influence Ankara’s position on Israel.
The facts also allow Saral’s removal to be interpreted as a limited political concession to Baku. It met a demand that, according to press reports, Azerbaijan had conveyed, and drew criticism of Erdogan from within his own camp. This interpretation remains possible alongside the account linking the decision to the adviser’s breach of instructions governing public statements.
That cost matters given the presence of a conservative rival that has attracted voters from the Justice and Development Party. In the 2024 municipal elections, the New Welfare Party came third in the popular vote, benefiting from discontent with government policies and from its criticism of continued trade with Israel. The Azerbaijan crisis gives it another issue on which to appeal to the same audience.
In that sense, Türkiye’s policy appears closer to active containment of the dispute, including diplomatic communication and the removal of a presidential adviser, while maintaining its general opposition to headscarf restrictions. The dilemma is that Türkiye’s clearest step was taken in Ankara, while the Azerbaijani reversal it sought did not feature in the announced outcomes. Aliyev’s absence from the summit made it even harder to demonstrate a direct gain from this approach.
Erdogan therefore faces a difficult political calculation: the longer the dispute continues without tangible Azerbaijani concessions, the greater the domestic cost of de-escalation becomes. His flexibility shifts from an attempt to preserve a strategic alliance into a vulnerability his opponents may exploit to question Ankara’s ability to influence the decisions of its closest allies.