هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
A drone launched from Iraq toward a target in the Gulf covers hundreds of kilometers on a journey that can take hours, while detecting and intercepting it becomes more difficult because of its small size, slow speed, and low-altitude flight.
These aircraft are prepared on mobile launch platforms, then loaded with the target’s coordinates and waypoints before being launched toward fixed installations. Responsibility for tracking them during the flight then shifts among Iraqi surveillance networks, the defenses of any countries they may pass through, and Gulf warning systems.
These flights became an open security issue between Baghdad and the Gulf states in 2026, after the US-Israeli war on Iran. On April 24, announced Kuwait that two drones had struck two border sites, saying they had been launched from Iraq.
On May 17, Saudi Arabia intercepted three drones that entered its airspace from Iraqi airspace, while another drone coming from Iraqi territory struck an electrical generator outside the inner perimeter of the Barakah nuclear power plant in the UAE on the same day.
The issue escalated on July 27, when announced Saudi Arabia that it had intercepted several drones it said were launched from Iraq and targeted oil facilities in Riyadh and the Eastern Province. It accused Iran-backed Iraqi groups of carrying out the attack, while Baghdad opened an investigation into the information provided by the Saudi side.
The launch sites, the models used, and the radar tracks have remained unknown, raising questions about how these drones are prepared and cross borders, who tracks them, and what gaps allow them to approach their targets.
Where do they launch from, and how do they cross borders?
Gulf statements refer, in varying language, to Iraqi territory or Iraqi airspace, while the precise launch sites remain unknown. But the most significant geographic indication appeared in an investigation published by Reuters on June 19, 2026, based on eight Iraqi military and security sources and leaders of armed groups.
The sources said Iran’s Revolutionary Guard had set up small cells operating outside the known structures of Iraqi factions, and that these cells carried out at least seven attacks between April 20 and May 17 from desert areas near Basra and Samawah, targeting sites in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
The nature of long-range loitering munitions allows them to be launched from open desert spaces without an air base or runway. The describe Center for Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, and the Royal United Services Institute, or RUSI, describe the Iranian Shahed family as being launched from angled containers mounted on trucks or from transportable single-rail launchers.
A rocket booster gives the aircraft its initial thrust, then separates after the rear piston engine starts, allowing it to transition into cruise flight toward the designated coordinates.
The mobile platform makes it possible to move, conceal, and prepare the launcher within a limited period, while locating it requires prior surveillance, satellite imagery, recording the moment of launch, or radar tracking that begins in the first minutes. The launch process starts with preparing the platform, checking the engine, loading the coordinates and waypoints into the navigation system, then aligning the launcher and firing the booster.
Once the aircraft stabilizes in the air, the flight relies on an inertial navigation system supported by signals from satellite navigation systems, including GPS and Russia’s GLONASS.
This architecture allows the aircraft to head toward a fixed target without a continuous control link over the full distance, while RUSI analyses have pointed to a digital communications unit in some Shahed 136 versions that may allow limited in-flight coordinate updates. Oil facilities, power stations, bases, and border posts remain targets well suited to a system that relies on coordinates prepared before launch.
The distances between southern Iraq and the Gulf give a sense of the scale of the journey, as shown in the following infographic.
Flight speed also helps estimate the duration of the trip. If the aircraft flies at around 180 kilometers per hour a reference speed cited in several technical estimates for the Shahed family reaching the Eastern Province or Riyadh from southern Iraq could take between three and five hours, while a flight to Barakah could take about five to seven hours.
That period represents the time the aircraft spends in the air, while the actual warning time depends on when it is detected, classified, and linked to a potential target. The target may appear on a radar only after covering a large part of the distance, especially when flying at low altitude or moving between different coverage zones.
The expanse stretching from southern Iraq to Kuwait and eastern Saudi Arabia is broadly flat and lacks major mountain barriers. Flying close to the ground gives the drone a chance to remain below the line of sight of some long-range radars during parts of the journey because of the Earth’s curvature, while reflections from the ground, coastline, and industrial facilities make it harder to distinguish a small target from the surrounding background.
The explains Joint Air Power Competence Centre of NATO explains that small, slow, low-flying drones may appear intermittently on surveillance networks, making it difficult to build a continuous track and reducing the time available to decide on an interception.
Which drones can make the trip?
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE have not announced the models of drones used in the incidents of April, May, and July 2026, so the technical comparison relies on the range of loitering munitions developed by Iran or seen with groups linked to it in the region.
The Shahed 131 and Shahed 136 family stands out as the closest match in terms of range, launch method, navigation system, and record of targeting fixed installations.
The Shahed 131 and Shahed 136 use a delta-wing design and a rear pusher engine, and they also resemble each other in overall appearance, making it difficult to distinguish between them when wreckage is damaged or size measurements are unavailable. For that reason, some open-source documentation databases group incidents under the classification “Shahed 131/136” when the specific version cannot be determined.
Shahed drones carry the coordinates of fixed targets and move between programmed waypoints using inertial navigation and satellite signals, then dive onto the target and explode on impact. This mechanism suits oil facilities, power stations, border sites, and military bases, while striking a moving target would require additional updates or sensors.
Data on strike accuracy remains limited, but tests and operational use analyzed by RUSI have shown these aircraft capable of hitting large fixed installations and carrying out repeated strikes on the same site.
The Samad 3 is among the models technically capable of covering long distances, though its public record is primarily associated with the Houthi group in Yemen. By contrast, the Samad 2 and Qasef 1 cover shorter ranges, making them less suitable for deep strikes launched from southern Iraq.
The size of the warhead affects the nature of the expected damage, as even a limited payload can cause a fire or disable a sensitive part of a facility containing tanks, pipelines, generators, pumping stations, and control equipment. That helps explain the targeting of oil infrastructure and power stations with long-range loitering munitions that are relatively low-cost.
Wreckage analysis can reveal the aircraft family, navigation system, engine, warhead configuration, and the source of some electronic components, while serial numbers and industrial markings can be compared with previous incidents.
Determining the location of the launcher and the crew responsible, however, requires data on platform movement, communications, launch commands, and the radar track — details that remained unknown in the Saudi and Kuwaiti incidents. The UAE announced the results of technical tracking without publishing the evidence that led it to Iraq.
Who tracks them, and where do defense gaps appear?
The effort to counter a drone begins with long-range warning radars monitoring broad airspace, then shifts to sensors dedicated to low-altitude targets before the data reaches the command center and the interception unit.
The effectiveness of this chain depends on continuous tracking across countries and the speed of classifying the target and passing on the warning. A drone’s journey may take hours, but the opportunity to engage it may be limited to minutes if detection is delayed.
In recent years, Iraq has begun upgrading its airspace monitoring network. On Sept. 26, 2022, inaugurated Iraqi Defense Minister Jumaah Enad the first Ground Master 403 radar system in Diwaniyah province, produced by France’s Thales.
The minister later said Baghdad had received two of the four radars, and that they would operate alongside US AN/TPS-77 radars within a new air defense operations command center.
The Iraqi announcement confirms the arrival of two radars and the operation of at least one system by the end of 2022. Iraqi radar systems were damaged during attacks in June 2025, however, and after the Gulf incidents the Defense Ministry did not publish details clarifying the level of coverage in the country’s south or when the drones first appeared on Iraqi radar screens.
Thales describes the Ground Master 403 as a 3D early-warning radar with a stated range of more than 500 kilometers against certain categories of aerial targets. The actual detection distance for a drone depends on its altitude, radar cross-section, antenna position, the curvature of the Earth, and surrounding reflections. As a result, a small target flying close to the ground may remain outside radar line of sight until it nears the border or the facilities.
In Kuwait, the Patriot system operates within the air defense network, as confirmed by the US State Department’s approval on Jan. 14, 2026, of a deal to support and maintain the program and provide spare parts and training.
Washington also approved a potential deal on May 1 for the Integrated Battle Command System, or IBCS, designed to collect data from multiple radars and connect it to weapons units within a unified air picture. The system was still in the contracting and implementation phase during the incidents of April and May.
US bases in Kuwait also include systems dedicated to protecting sites from small drones, including the LIDS system, which combines the KuRFS radar produced by Raytheon, the Coyote interceptor, and a command-and-control system produced by Northrop Grumman.
US military materials showed training on the mobile version of the system at Camp Buehring and the Udairi Range in 2022 and 2023. Its role is focused on protecting nearby bases and assets, while Kuwait remains responsible for managing its airspace and national defense network.
Saudi Arabia has operated Patriot systems for years, and the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces also commissioned the first THAAD unit on July 3, 2025.
On Jan. 30, 2026, the US State Department approved a potential deal including 730 Patriot PAC-3 MSE missiles at an estimated value of up to $9 billion. The deal represents a future reinforcement of interceptor stocks, while the Saudi Defense Ministry did not name the system used to intercept the drones on May 17 and July 27.
US Central Command, or CENTCOM, provides a regional structure for sharing warnings and coordinating air defense among its partners. On Jan. 12, 2026, opened the command the Middle East Air Defense Operations Cell inside the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.
In a statement published the following day, it said the cell includes US officers and representatives from regional countries and is responsible for sharing warnings, coordinating air and missile defense, and linking partners’ national command centers.
Published US statements do not mention Iraq among the countries connected to this cell, leaving open questions about how quickly a track picked up by Iraqi radars is passed to Gulf warning networks.
A drone may appear inside Iraq for a short period and then drop below the line of detection, or enter a neighboring country’s airspace without a continuous track from launch, or reach the targeted state only after it has already covered most of the journey.
Tracking becomes more difficult because of the small radar cross-section, slow speed, and low-altitude flight — characteristics that may place the drone amid ground reflections or make it resemble a light aircraft on some screens.
When detection occurs near the facility, the decision chain is compressed into a limited period that includes identifying the target, confirming its direction, choosing the interception method, and obtaining authorization to engage.
That is why militaries add close-in layers of protection to long-range radars, including short-range radars, electro-optical and thermal cameras, acoustic sensors, and jamming tools.
The US Army’s Center for Army Lessons Learned explained in a paper published on April 30, 2026, that passive acoustic networks can pick up the sound of piston engines and provide local warning, while cameras and short-range radars help confirm the target and guide interceptor missiles or guns during the approach phase.
Radar recordings, border-crossing times, and command-center logs remain key to determining which side first detected each drone, how the warning moved between Iraq and the Gulf states, and which system carried out the interception.
The published information points to a multilayered surveillance and defense network, while its actual readiness and the level of integration between its parts remain beyond the available public statements, making it difficult to determine at what stage tracking of the drones was lost during the attacks of 2026.