هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
Three Palestinian families in Ras al-Ain, an area of Qusra south of Nablus, were cut off from the surrounding area for more than five weeks after a nearby settlement outpost was established in August 2026. According to documentation by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the presence of settlers and Israeli forces coincided with severe restrictions on movement. Residents could no longer pass through the military checkpoint as usual. A five-year-old could not reach kindergarten, and a teacher from one of the families could not regularly get to work.
The new outpost forced people who had lived on the land before its establishment to change their lives, and perhaps their futures. This was not simply the result of the seizure of land: the outpost’s founder had a partner controlling the checkpoint and the gun, and a backer controlling land allocation and budgets. The settler, the soldier and the minister exchange services, and their identities overlap.
The settler serves as a soldier, in uniform and with military equipment, at the checkpoint, and appears as an “Israeli civilian” with his equipment at the outpost. The minister is a settler who has taken his project from watching Palestinian fields to running the institutions that decide their fate, or a politician courting settlers to show that his rhetoric has delivered results.
Distinguishing between settler, soldier and minister helps explain their roles in a single project of land seizure pursued from the hilltop, the barracks and the government. Those involved have long moved between these positions. But 7 October stripped away the pretence that their roles were separate and placed their convergence within the “Israeli security discourse”.
The religious right seeks settlement expansion to cement Israeli control and prevent a Palestinian state. Other officials present it as a way to protect Israeli cities. These positions reinforce the expansion on the ground. In an interview with +972 Magazine, Israeli political sociologist Yagil Levy described army institutions led by settlers as “the gray arm of annexation.”
Levy places these tensions within a longer process: “the internal conflict between the army’s senior command, which is increasingly inclined toward settlement, and the settlers’ institutional leadership, and between them and the extremist settlers” — as if there were really any difference between them! — “is not a rupture, but a side effect of a long-term merger that began in 2005 and was restrained only by the military authority’s concern for Israel’s position in the West Bank, or by the prospect of unwanted international scrutiny.”
After three years of massive settlement expansion in the West Bank, the relationship now goes beyond sympathy and restraint. Settler groups mobilise people for settlement; the government distributes weapons and privatises land; and the army reinforces security and control. Together, these measures create a reality that appears neither easy nor likely to reverse.
The settler at the outpost
Large areas of the West Bank have no dense population centres. Some are grazing land, others orchards. Some lie next to Palestinian homes, but most stretch between towns. These expanses provided the ground for settlement expansion: scattered outposts became a means of cutting Palestinians off from fields, grazing routes and water sources.
According to a report by B’Tselem and Kerem Navot, military orders and settler violence are the two main factors preventing Palestinians from accessing their land. Since 2023, settler violence has become the leading factor. The growing number of peripheral outposts provides bases for attacks, leaving Palestinians afraid to reach their land.
The pattern is not new. According to B’Tselem, settlers have seized Palestinian agricultural land and farms by expanding outposts since 2021. In one case that year, settlers took control of more than 14,000 dunams of Palestinian farmland by grazing beyond their outpost’s perimeter and preventing farmers from reaching their fields. A small outpost could thus control an area far larger than its own footprint.
The practice of “cutting Palestinians off” is central to the cumulative process of settlement expansion. Denying a Palestinian access to land changes how that land is used. Those inflicting harm can then benefit from the land they have emptied of its Palestinian users. Once settlers’ use is recorded officially, ownership is settled according to the principle that “the land belongs to those who till and work it.”
The Supreme Court case involving the settler “Moshe Sharvit” illustrates this process. In June 2025, a rights group filed a petition on behalf of 12 farmers from Wadi al-Far’a in the Jordan Valley. They had been unable to access their land since October 2023 because of harassment by Sharvit, who had established a farm called “Emek Tirzah.”
The farmers waited months for a ruling. Meanwhile, the army demanded that they accept the restrictions imposed by Sharvit and cracked down on them when they refused. In March 2026, the court issued a temporary order requiring Sharvit and those working on his behalf to leave the land covered by the petition.
The area’s military commander, however, barred the petitioners from their own land. The next day, he sent troops to accompany Sharvit in attacks on the land, the destruction of fields, raids on farmers’ homes and threats against the farmers. This outcome is in some respects consistent with the “claims of democracy” made by Israeli law. It is more clearly consistent with the political, military and security programme known as the Decisive Plan, presented in 2017 by Bezalel Smotrich, the West Bank’s “master of settlement”.
The plan is a settlement project to be implemented on the ground: expanding into all empty spaces in the West Bank, entrenching settlements and pushing Palestinians to emigrate or submit. It originated with a settler before it became a politician’s programme. According to the profile on his party’s website, Smotrich lives in Kedumim settlement. His role in the Regavim organisation also underpins the project, alongside his partnership with Yehuda Eliyahu, the official responsible for settlement administration at the Ministry of Defence, and his ties to other settler organisations whose work on the ground runs in parallel with his plan.
The “outpost” puts that plan and its objectives into practice. Not all outpost founders necessarily act on direct party instructions from Smotrich or politicians like him. But when attacks drive residents away, and grazing land and roads are closed to those who remain, more land becomes available for settlement. Palestinians, meanwhile, become less able to connect their communities and exercise effective control over them. The cumulative effects of violence reshape the map in line with the politician’s objectives.
Amnesty International’s documentation of events in Zanuta, south of Hebron, shows the connection between violence and political objectives. It set out its findings in a report titled “Ethnic cleansing in the West Bank.” The report documented attacks on Palestinians by settlers from Meitarim Farm, followed by raids on nearby Bedouin communities alongside army forces and threats against residents who refused to leave. These events began in October 2023 and culminated in a celebration of the displacement at the farm, held by Smotrich and Settlement Minister Orit Strock in April 2025. At the event, they distributed 19 all-terrain vehicles, cameras and night-vision equipment, funded by the government, to settlers at outposts in the Hebron area to enhance their capacity for violence.
The partnership between the government and the settlement movement extends beyond figures such as Smotrich and Strock. It also encompasses the “justice in the judiciary” that the occupation claims to offer. Law enforcement records show how far judicial procedures protect perpetrators. According to Yesh Din’s data for 2005–2025, 93.6 per cent of investigation files concerning crimes committed by Israelis against Palestinians were closed without an indictment. Only 3 per cent led to a full or partial conviction, most of which were later overturned on appeal.
The army is directly involved in this system. According to Settlement Division director Hoshaya Harari, it helps determine which farms receive support and what equipment is funded. Central Command’s approval is required to set the coordinates of lighting poles, cameras and gates, extend electricity supplies and even move equipment between outposts.
Government funding for West Bank settlement councils passes from Strock’s ministry through the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization and then to the councils. According to Peace Now, the ministry provided 15 million shekels for 68 farms in 2023. Funding rose to 39 million shekels in 2024.
This system of support explains the expansion of settlement control over the past year. Outposts and farms now control about one million dunams, nearly 18 per cent of the West Bank. That includes roughly 750,000 dunams seized by settlers since the current government was formed. According to Amnesty International reports, the number of outposts had reached 363 by the end of April 2026.
By mid-September 2026, the number of attacks originating from these outposts that caused injuries or damage had reached 1,600. They affected 275 Palestinian communities and displaced more than 2,600 Palestinians. UN reports count only attacks causing tangible harm; they exclude those whose effects are psychological, including fear, panic and threats.
The settler in the army
In July 2025, the Israeli press reported that a settler from Shaked Farm in the Yitzhar hills had been killed while operating engineering equipment in Gaza. He was named “Avraham Azulay.” The head of the Samaria Regional Council said Azulay had a long history of “preparing farms and paving roads,” and described him as one of the “builders of the hills.”
In Qaryut, south of Nablus, a soldier shot dead two Palestinians on 2 March 2026. The army described him as “a reservist in active service.” It confiscated his weapon, referred him for a military criminal investigation and withdrew dozens of members of the unit from the area because of their repeated assaults on Palestinians.
Another incident exposed the overlap between settlement and the army in late July 2026, when Palestinians in Tell, in the northern West Bank, confronted a settler attack. Four Palestinians and two armed settlers were killed. The army later revealed that one of the settlers was an officer serving as a unit commander in the Armoured Corps; the other was a soldier from the Jerusalem Brigade.
Settlers carry out attacks alongside members of the Israeli army — Times of Israel
These cases illustrate the army’s role in the settlement project. The army not only protects settlements but incorporates the settler community into its ranks and uses force to advance settlement. This intensified from 2014, when the Israeli organisation Yesh Din revealed that settlers receive weapons and training from the army, are tried in military courts and have powers to search, arrest and use force. Those powers strengthen the settlements they represent.
The overlap widened after 7 October 2023, when the army expanded the regional defence units operating in settlements, known as the hagramar. Within days, their personnel increased from 1,500 to 8,000, deployed across 201 settlements and farms. They were allowed to keep their personal weapons after completing reserve service.
This expansion took place amid social acceptance of settler abuses against Palestinians. Yehuda Cohen, deputy commander of the Binyamin unit, commented on armed settler conscripts’ involvement in attacks on Palestinians: “To be a soldier in regional defense means to be a fighter in the place where you live.” Other commanders said settler recruitment had multiplied. The deputy commander of the Yehuda unit said its personnel had increased sixfold, allowing it to reinforce guard duty and conduct offensive operations and other activities in the area.
Israeli rights groups describe this overlap through the figure of a “settler in uniform.” Their reports distinguish between three categories: settler-soldiers who exceed their authority while on duty; soldiers on leave acting outside official assignments; and settlers who put on uniforms and act on their own initiative.
The violations cut across these categories. Yet Israeli rights groups and official statements addressed to international audiences consistently distinguish the first category from the last. They disavow particular acts while ignoring the outcome they collectively embrace.
In arguing that merging the roles of settler and soldier is unlawful, Yesh Din points to Palestinians’ difficulty in distinguishing a regional defence soldier from a response-team member or a settler who has put on a uniform himself. Palestinians may also be unable to establish whether the armed man is serving as a reservist. This often undermines their complaints and allows the judicial system to evade responsibility for investigating.
Such distinctions work to the advantage of settlers and soldiers, rather than Palestinians. Reporting that soldiers or police carried out only 30 organised group attacks between 2023 and 2026 reinforces the government’s narrative that settlers “act without organization and are random.” It fails to reflect the reality every Palestinian knows: the occupation as a whole is a militarised society.
The overlap extends beyond the uniform to the religious nationalist community. Its military weight roughly doubled after 7 October, rising from 14.7 per cent of Jewish men aged 21–44 to 27.4 per cent in 2024. These figures are also linked to greater representation in combat roles, particularly infantry and armoured units.
The figures include religious nationalists living inside Israel. Even so, they show the influence of a community that supplies an important part of the settlement movement and helps secure military and political agreement in its favour. It draws on connections, influence and access to institutions, and can present its demands as those of a community bearing the burden of combat.
The merger places the settler in two positions at once: someone with an interest in expanding a settlement, and someone exercising security authority over Palestinians nearby. When protecting the settlement project becomes a military duty performed by a settler in uniform, the soldier is, in practice, a settler.
This dual role also places some state authority in the hands of the settler community. The settler who knows a village’s roads and fields may be the same person authorised to exercise security powers around it. The authority of the uniform makes it harder to determine which institution should hold its wearer accountable.
The settler in government
Official support for outposts predates Smotrich, though he has been the most vocal politician, drawing attention to himself. A government report issued in 2005 identified the Ministry of Housing, the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization, the Civil Administration and the Ministry of Defence as bodies involved in establishing unauthorised outposts.
It documented funding for infrastructure and public buildings, land allocations and purchases of mobile homes. Of 140 mobile homes placed in the occupied territories, 90 were in unauthorised outposts. Some had been installed before the tender for their manufacture was even published. The report also acknowledged failures to enforce the law and thousands of unimplemented demolition orders for temporary homes.
These details show what official support means in practice: budgets, purchases, approvals and equipment, including vehicles, binoculars, and surveillance and tracking devices. They also amount to an “under-the-table recognition” of outposts within the Israeli system, even though that recognition does not confer international legitimacy.
In its 2024 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice found that the settlements and the system associated with them violate international law. The “regularization of outposts” therefore takes place within Israel’s own system. Changing their administrative designation does not alter the nature of settlement on occupied land. This distinction does not matter to Smotrich.
In February 2023, Smotrich’s powers within the Civil Administration were formalised, and the Settlement Administration was established under his authority in the Ministry of Defence. In May 2024, Hillel Roth was appointed civilian deputy head of the Civil Administration and given broad powers. Military Order No. 2195 sets out the division of delegated powers, including those concerning land, planning and expropriation.
In a speech in mid-2024, Smotrich explained how ministerial policy could direct what he presented as the optimal use of land — settlement — without disrupting the existing military framework. He proposed a separate civilian system for settlers, with the military commander formally retaining authority. This arrangement was intended to make the change easier to secure politically and legally without presenting it as a declaration of annexation. He defined the purpose of expansion and the division of powers as preventing a Palestinian state.
Funding was subsequently redirected to support this policy. Seventy-five million shekels were allocated to outposts considered illegal even under Israeli rules, including about 39 million for pastoral farms. Smotrich’s ministry, acting for the government, recognised 70 outposts as eligible for funding and infrastructure and incorporated them into development and expansion plans. The plans included supplying water and electricity and constructing public buildings through state institutions before the outposts’ formal regularisation was complete.
Financial and legislative measures to expand settlement continued in 2026. According to Israeli media reports, on 25 March 2026 the cabinet announced its intention to establish 34 settlements: 10 outposts to be regularised and 24 new settlements. Although the decision was not officially published, planning and regularisation procedures are continuing while full political approval remains pending.
The process extends beyond Area C, where, since Oslo, the Palestine Liberation Organization has relinquished security and administrative control to the occupation and its settlers. Reports have documented 26 outposts in Area B, alongside the withdrawal of Palestinian powers and the issuing of seizure orders in Areas A and B. Settlement activity and government action proceed together: the spread of settler presence coincides with greater powers for Israeli agencies, army protection and security incursions into places supposedly under Palestinian administration.
The Israeli side is staging a single play, with one script and one ending, performed by three actors. The settler on the hilltop draws boundaries through violence. The soldier protects those boundaries and helps expand them. The politician signs off on the violence and the seizure of land, and funds them through his budget.
The politician presents the settler to the world as someone outside the “consensus of the Middle East’s only democracy,” while the settler accuses the politician of “liberalism,” which has no place in the Holy Land. The soldier moves between settlement, military service and politics until the project matures and the play reaches its conclusion.
Between them stands a Palestinian who has lost interest in the “nature” of his coloniser or his “professional background.” For him, the hilltop, the barracks and the ministry are different names for the same act. They create a reality through cumulative steps that denials cannot undo. The script must be read in what happens on the ground, rather than in speeches of condemnation. The Palestinian must recognise this script early, and understand all three roles in it, before suffering the consequences of its “ending”.