هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
The border triangle between Sudan, Egypt and Libya has become a focus of competition over gold and military supply routes during Sudan’s war. Control of desert sites at Jabal Uweinat gave the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) a strategic route into southeastern Libya. There, active trade and smuggling networks linked to armed groups loyal to the putschist Libyan military commander Khalifa Haftar connect to regional and international gold markets.
The area has grown in military and economic importance since June 2025, when the Sudanese army withdrew from its positions and the Rapid Support Forces militia, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, took control. Sudanese accusations that Haftar’s forces participated in the attack were later reinforced by a UN investigation documenting the role of Libyan armed groups in facilitating the arrival of fighters, fuel and military equipment.
The change in control disrupted mining and displaced thousands of workers. Gold extraction later resumed under RSF supervision, with arrangements to share the proceeds with miners and traders.
At the same time, international investigations and accounts from the ground revealed networks transporting Sudanese gold through Libya and Egypt to markets in Dubai and Istanbul. Cairo strengthened its military presence near the Sudanese border while maintaining its close ties with Haftar and its support for the Sudanese army.
Airstrikes on 10 October 2026 that targeted gold prospectors in Jabal al-Aqaydat on the Sudanese-Egyptian border and killed several people further heightened tensions over resources along the border, amid accusations that Egyptian aircraft carried them out.
These developments place the triangle’s mines and access routes at the centre of a web of interests involving military forces, traders and middlemen. They raise questions about who controls gold production and its revenues, and about the Egyptian and Libyan roles in reshaping the balance of influence in the region.
The border triangle’s mines: Where is the gold, and who controls it?
The triangle lies at Jabal Uweinat in the Sahara Desert, where the borders of Sudan, Egypt and Libya meet. Its economic activity extends across wider desert areas encompassing mining sites and traditional markets.
Gold prospecting in the area began around 2012, according to a study by African affairs researcher Ahmed Soliman and Suliman Baldo, founder of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, published by the British institute Chatham House. The triangle market became a hub for collecting gold and exchanging goods, connected by a supply network to the al-Khanag market in Sudan’s Northern State.
In an investigation published by the Sudanese platform Atar on 9 July 2026, trader Abdel Jabbar Hassan al-Obeid explained that trucks used to carry water, food supplies and mining equipment to the area. They would return with goods from Libya and gold-bearing stones for processing in al-Khanag’s mills. This trade provided livelihoods for truck drivers, porters, restaurant owners, grocery shopkeepers and goldsmiths.
The change in military control disrupted production and trade. In testimony published on 21 August 2025 by Darfur 24, a website specialising in coverage of Darfur, miner Mohamed Othman said the RSF militia had asked workers to continue prospecting after entering the area. A wave of displacement then began as a result of looting that he accused some RSF members of carrying out.
Production continued for about 33 days, then stopped after drone strikes targeted water sources in Jabal Kaso and the Katmat market. Othman accused the Sudanese army of carrying out the strikes, noting that one killed eight miners and injured others.
Conditions for miners worsened in the following months. On 9 November 2025, Darfur 24 reported accounts from three workers who had arrived in Wadi Halfa. They said the RSF militia had expelled workers from the mines during October and seized the mining sites.
Miner Mohamed Issa Sharaf al-Din recounted how an armed force surrounded the work sites and gave those present one week to leave through the Egyptian border. Others described the displacement of large groups after an attack on the “Umm al-Khair” well, one of the mines’ main water sources, 70 kilometres from the market.
Mining activity gradually resumed in April 2026, after the RSF militia allowed traders and investors to return to work.
In an investigation published by Darfur 24, miner Walid Abkar revealed that the mines were operating under agreements dividing shares of production between investors and workers. Stone mills had restarted, and mercury was being used to extract gold.
Miner Ishaq Ibrahim explained that a company linked to the RSF had begun buying “al-karta,” the stone waste left after gold extraction, to reprocess it in exchange for a share of the recovered metal. A local trader described understandings with the forces controlling the area to secure markets and mines and curb looting and kidnapping. Gold shops, grocery shops and restaurants resumed limited operations, and goods began arriving again from Kufra in Libya.
An RSF member, identified by the website only by the initials “M. A.,” named the commander of the forces in the area as Abdullah Abkar Pasha, known as “Abdullah Gurosh,” and said he was in the UAE when the investigation was published.
These arrangements indicate that the force controlling the area benefits from mining revenues through production shares and waste reprocessing. Details of the percentages allocated under these agreements and the identity of the company buying “al-karta” remain unavailable.
Mining faced further disruption in May 2026, with military build-ups around the triangle and restrictions on miners’ movements because of security threats and drone activity. Accounts from traders published by Atar in July showed that the old trade route to al-Khanag remained cut off despite the reopening of some mines, after much of the trade shifted to Libyan routes.
These developments are consistent with the RSF’s previous experience of managing gold mines. Soliman and Baldo explained in the Chatham House study that, before the war, the militia benefited from companies affiliated with the Dagalo family’s al-Junaid Group and from protection arrangements imposed on workers and traders. Some of its units also participated directly in gold extraction.
This model emerged at the Jebel Amer mines in North Darfur and Singo in South Darfur, before similar arrangements for sharing production and processing mining waste appeared in the triangle.
From the mines to the markets: Who runs the gold smuggling networks?
Gold extracted from the triangle is first collected by traders in the mining markets, then transported along desert routes to Libya and Egypt.
In testimonies published by Darfur 24 on 21 August 2025, miners confirmed that most production was being smuggled to the two countries because it fetched higher returns than sales in Sudan’s domestic markets. They also confirmed that the disruption to security after the RSF takeover led to lower prices for workers and a decline in the movement of buyers and vehicles.
Kufra, in southeastern Libya, is one stop in this trade, where networks transporting goods, fuel, migrants and gold from Sudan and Chad converge.
In March 2025, the Sudanese platform Atar traced trade and smuggling routes between Sudan and Libya. It explained that caravans used to travel from Nyala and El Fasher through Kabkabiya, Kutum and Uweinat to Kufra. The war caused some traffic to shift towards Mellit and routes with checkpoints operated by the forces controlling those areas.
The platform noted that raw gold extracted from mines in Darfur and Kordofan is transported through smuggling networks to Libyan markets, while fuel, spare parts and goods flow in the opposite direction, amid the growing influence of armed groups over cross-border trade.
On 3 January 2026, Darfur 24 reported, citing four sources in North Darfur, that commercial traffic had resumed between the Sudanese town of al-Malha and Kufra along a route through the Rebiana oasis and the border triangle. This followed the RSF’s capture of El Fasher in October 2025.
Traders said dozens of people were travelling each week to bring back fuel and food supplies in small vehicles, though heavy trucks still struggled to cross. The renewed traffic helped reduce the prices of some goods in parts of North Darfur.
On the Libyan side, the Subul al-Salam Battalion, led by Abdul Rahman Hashem al-Kilani, plays a key role in securing roads from Kufra. The battalion is linked to Haftar’s forces and the Zuwayya tribe, which is influential in the city.
According to a Chatham House study published in February 2025 on Libya’s migrant smuggling economy, the battalion operates checkpoints that charge fees on goods and transit. A local arrangement established in 2017 distributes these revenues through the “Kufra Reconstruction Fund.” Subul al-Salam receives half the proceeds in return for providing security and collecting fees, while the other half goes to the local council.
These routes connect to a broader Libyan network that receives gold from the Kouri Bougoudi, Tibesti and Ezri mines near the Libyan-Chadian border, as well as from the Sudanese-Egyptian-Libyan triangle.
According to the Soliman-Baldo study, Libya has become a hub for collecting gold and transporting it to foreign markets. Commanders of armed groups affiliated with Haftar participate in this trade, which uses flights to Istanbul and Dubai and routes through Misrata and Mitiga airports.
Libya’s Internal Security Agency announced that it had thwarted an attempt to smuggle 100.8 kilograms of gold and €1.5 million in four suitcases on a Turkey-bound flight at Misrata airport on 21 September 2024. The incident illustrates one of the air routes used for smuggling through Libya.
US sanctions documents revealed companies linked to the trade in Sudanese gold and the financing of the RSF militia in connection with the UAE market.
On 7 January 2025, the US Treasury Department announced sanctions against Hemedti and companies and individuals linked to his militia’s financing networks. Prominent among them was Abu Dhar Abdel Nabi Habiballah Ahmed, a Sudanese businessman who owns and manages Capital Tap Holding Group, a UAE-based company that the department said provided money and military equipment to the RSF.
The sanctions included Al Zumorod and Al Yaqoot Gold & Jewellers, known as AZ Gold, a UAE company managed by Abu Dhar. The US Treasury said it bought gold from Sudan and transported it to Dubai, and suggested that the purchases were made on behalf of the RSF.
The department revealed that al-Qoni Hamdan Dagalo, Hemedti’s brother and the official responsible for the force’s procurement, had access to the company’s UAE bank account, which held millions of dollars.
The network also included Next Generation for General Trading, which Abu Dhar co-owns and manages. Abdel Rahim Hamdan Dagalo, Hemedti’s brother and the RSF’s deputy commander, had previously been a minority shareholder.
The company held a stake in Gulf Bank, which was under the militia’s control and used to finance its operations, according to the US Treasury. These networks are connected to an older economic structure built by the Dagalo family around the al-Junaid Group, which mines gold and processes mining waste.
According to the Chatham House study, during the transitional period between 2019 and 2021, Hemedti reached an agreement with the civilian government to relinquish the group’s concession rights in Jebel Amer in exchange for government payments totalling $250 million and exemptions from fees and taxes linked to other operations. This allowed the group to expand its activities in the gold sector.
On 16 July 2026, Britain expanded sanctions targeting the war economy, targeting 11 people and entities involved in financing, procurement and trade networks linked to the Sudanese army and the RSF.
The sanctions included Abu Dhar and Prodigious Property Management Supervision Services, as well as Mazen Fadlallah and Ahmed Hashem, whom London suspects of links to RSF procurement. They also included Natwest Logistics Services and Aoun for Commercial Brokerage, companies accused of helping organise supplies and financial transactions.
The British sanctions also extended to Ahmed Abdallah, whom the government linked to Sudanese army procurement and the Defense Industries System, and Hong Kong-registered Portex Trade Ltd. Three Sudanese state-owned mining companies were also targeted: Omdurman Mining, Ariab Mining and Sudamin.
London suspected that revenues from these companies’ activities were being used to support the warring sides. It linked Sudamin to gold-revenue networks associated with both parties, including previous ties to the al-Junaid Group.
Changes in Sudan-UAE relations during the war led to a shift in official gold export destinations. Direct shipments to the UAE declined, and Egypt emerged as a main destination in 2025, according to Central Bank of Sudan data published in early April 2026. This shift coincided with disruptions to direct transport routes and a growing role for middlemen and neighbouring markets in the Sudanese gold trade.
Differences in prices and fees help explain some of the Egyptian market’s appeal. Soliman and Baldo estimated that about 60 per cent of production from the Northern, River Nile and Red Sea states was going to Egypt through informal trade and smuggling during the period covered by their study.
The researchers noted that 21-carat gold fetched about $85 per gram in Egypt in October 2024, compared with $55 to $60 in Sudan. Gold proceeds were also used to buy fuel, food supplies and mining inputs for transport back into Sudan.
Recorded Sudanese gold exports in the first nine months of 2026 were worth about $2.292 billion, according to an announcement by the Sudanese Mineral Resources Company on 6 October. Government revenues collected reached 1.886 trillion Sudanese pounds, exceeding the target by 31 per cent.
These revenues underline the sector’s financial importance as smuggling and informal trade continue across multiple production areas.
On 13 July 2026, the European Union approved a ban on the direct or indirect purchase, import or transfer of gold of Sudanese origin. This included gold that left Sudan after 15 July and passed through a third country before reaching the bloc.
The measures also banned the supply to Sudan of mercury and sodium cyanide used in gold extraction, in an attempt to restrict sources of income and inputs linked to the war economy.
Despite the extensive financing and trade networks exposed by international sanctions, establishing the link between end buyers and the triangle’s mines still requires specific shipping records and commercial transactions. This is particularly relevant as the gold-waste processing company linked to the RSF continues to operate without its name or the revenue the force receives from production being disclosed.
The struggle for influence in the triangle: How did Sudan’s war change the balance of control?
The war that broke out on 15 April 2023 between the Sudanese army, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces militia changed the military significance of the desert corridors between Darfur and southeastern Libya. Alongside the trade in gold and goods, these corridors became routes for transporting fighters, weapons, fuel and vehicles.
The border triangle became a focus of competition to secure these supplies and control their movement, amid growing Egyptian concern over the RSF militia’s advance towards its border.
The clashes that ended with the fall of the triangle began with reports that a force loyal to Haftar had entered about three kilometres into Sudanese territory near Jabal Arkenu on 6 June 2025. According to the Sudanese account, the ensuing clashes left two Libyan soldiers dead and others captured.
Four days later, the Sudanese army accused Haftar’s forces of joining the RSF in attacks on its positions. The Libyan military command rejected the accusations and accused groups allied with the Sudanese army of attacking its patrols.
On 24 March 2026, the final report of the UN Panel of Experts on Libya revealed details of the Subul al-Salam Battalion’s role in facilitating RSF operations through southern Libya.
The experts concluded that the battalion, led by Abdul Rahman Hashem al-Kilani, strengthened its control over RSF supply lines from January 2025 to early 2026 with the tacit approval of Haftar’s military command. It benefited from its local relationships in Kufra and its ties to Tebu groups.
The report documented the battalion’s provision of fighters, military escorts, fuel and vehicle spare parts during the attacks on the triangle. This helped the RSF militia advance towards Uweinat, before it expanded into the corridor linking the area to Karb al-Toum inside Sudan and captured a military camp there in the second half of June 2025.
The experts linked the shift to the Uweinat route to Sudanese army attempts, beginning in July 2024, to intercept supplies arriving from Libya through the Sudanese-Libyan-Chadian border triangle. These attempts prompted the RSF to use alternative routes.
The report revealed that facilities around Kufra were used to transport Colombian fighters, equipment and military vehicles towards Sudan. It also revealed that operations targeting supplies had extended into Libyan territory, where Sudanese airstrikes hit shipments and foreign fighters linked to the RSF in late 2025.
The triangle remained important to military planning in 2026. On 15 May, Darfur 24 quoted a Sudanese army source as saying that ground and air preparations had been completed to retake the area and the al-Atrun base in the North Darfur desert, with support from the Joint Force.
An RSF source, meanwhile, described the deployment of more than 400 combat vehicles and the reinforcement of positions with jamming systems. Miners reported restrictions on movement and demands that they leave some sites.
As of October 2026, the latest documented situation on the ground remained RSF control of the Sudanese side of the triangle, with no confirmation that the army had retaken it.
The RSF’s expansion along the Egyptian border heightened Cairo’s concerns about its national security and Sudan’s unity, particularly after the fall of El Fasher, the Sudanese army’s last major stronghold in Darfur, in October 2025.
On 18 December that year, after Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi received al-Burhan, the Egyptian presidency announced that preserving Sudan’s unity, territorial integrity and institutions, and preventing the creation of parallel entities, were red lines affecting Egyptian national security. It stressed that Cairo reserved the right to protect these interests through measures permitted by international law and the two countries’ joint defence agreement.
This position was accompanied by a strengthening of Egypt’s military capabilities near the border. An investigation published on 2 February 2026 presented satellite images supplied by the US space technology company Fantor showing Turkish-made Bayraktar Akinci drones at Egypt’s East Oweinat airport. The airport, about 60 kilometres from the Sudanese border, underwent expansion and renovation in 2025.
Two Egyptian security officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Cairo had equipped two airports in southern Egypt with military equipment to protect the border and carry out strikes related to national security. The investigation also cited information about a strike attributed to Egyptian aircraft that targeted an RSF convoy near the triangle on 9 January 2026.
These moves came as supply routes from Libya grew in importance and the RSF advanced in areas near the Egyptian border. At the same time, Cairo maintained its close ties with Haftar, whose forces are linked to the Subul al-Salam Battalion.
On 30 June 2025, less than three weeks after the fall of the triangle, el-Sissi received Haftar in El Alamein, in the presence of Haftar’s sons Khaled and Saddam and Egyptian General Intelligence Director Hassan Rashad. They discussed security coordination and stability in Libya. Later that day, el-Sissi received al-Burhan to discuss developments in Sudan and bilateral cooperation.
The meetings continued the following year. El-Sissi received Haftar again on 19 August 2026, in the presence of his sons Khaled, chief of staff of his forces, and Belqasem, head of the Libyan Development and Reconstruction Fund.
On 4 October, el-Sissi hosted al-Burhan in New El Alamein City for a four-way summit that also included Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. The summit issued the “El Alamein Declaration” affirming respect for states’ sovereignty and unity and rejecting support for mercenaries and parallel entities.
These relationships raise questions about how Egyptian coordination with Haftar affects the movement of supplies through Kufra, after UN experts documented the role of armed groups affiliated with him in supporting RSF operations. Cairo, meanwhile, maintains a close partnership with the Sudanese army and is working to secure its southern and western borders.
Competition over resources extends to other parts of the Sudanese-Egyptian border. On 22 June 2026, the Egyptian army announced a security campaign in the Southern Military Zone targeting networks involved in unlicensed gold prospecting, smuggling and irregular migration.
According to the army’s statement, the campaign led to the arrest of 223 people, including 87 Egyptians and 136 foreigners, and the seizure of mining equipment, vehicles and weapons. Sudanese prospectors complained of arrests, deportations and raids on mining sites.
On 10 October 2026, airstrikes hit gold prospecting sites in the Jabal al-Aqaydat area near Souq al-Ansari on the Sudanese-Egyptian border. The Sudan Doctors Network, a professional medical group, said 13 prospectors were killed and 28 others wounded. The Emergency Lawyers group, a Sudanese rights organisation, put the death toll at about 72 and accused Egyptian aircraft of carrying out the attack.
In testimonies reported by Sudan Tribune on 11 October, three survivors estimated the death toll at more than 200, amid difficulties recovering bodies and transporting the wounded. The casualty figures and the identity of the aircraft involved remained under investigation.
According to accounts from the ground published by Sudan Tribune, the Aqaydat mines lie on a different stretch of the Sudanese-Egyptian border, far from the Uweinat triangle on the Libyan border. The area had previously been hit by airstrikes in June 2026 that prospectors accused Egyptian forces of carrying out.
These incidents reflect escalating tensions over gold mines and border control, alongside the continuing struggle over trade and supply routes extending from the triangle towards Kufra and Darfur, where armed forces control access to the mines, the movement of gold production and its transfer to foreign markets.