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Netanyahu’s years in power have not only strengthened the far right’s influence. They have also entrenched harder-line positions towards the Palestinians and broadened opposition to a Palestinian state. As Israeli elections approach, the question is not simply whether he might lose power, but whether the parties challenging him differ from him on fundamental issues or disagree mainly over how to manage the conflict.
With settlement expansion and war continuing, and Netanyahu’s rivals competing to prove they are no less hard-line than he is, questions remain about what could change under a different government. Would his departure bring a real shift in Israeli policy towards the Palestinians, or would his successors pursue the same policies by different means?
Netanyahu’s legacy: a more extreme and divided society
In an interview with NoonPost, Mohammad Helseh, a Palestinian academic and researcher specialising in Israeli affairs, examines the changes Netanyahu brought about during his years in power. These extended beyond the political system to Israeli society, which, in Helseh’s view, has become dominated by growing racist and fascist tendencies.
Netanyahu brought figures who had been classified as terrorists under Israeli definitions and had criminal convictions back into the heart of decision-making. He also restored Kahanist ideology, which had been pushed out of the Knesset and the political system in the 1980s, to the forefront of government through Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich.
This went beyond reviving a political movement: it gave that movement power and opened the way for its ideas of population transfer, killing, settlement expansion and extermination to spread.
Helseh believes this accelerated Israeli society’s shift towards greater right-wing extremism, racism and exclusion. In his reading, opinion polls and the positions of broad sections of Israeli society reflect this shift, amid growing fears of an agenda to turn Israel into a “halakha state,” meaning a state governed by religious law.
He points to Israelis leaving the country since 2023, citing Tel Aviv University data that put the number at about 270,000. He links these departures not only to security and economic concerns, but also to fears that Israel has become a place where freedom of expression is not permitted and people cannot be assured of living safely.
He adds that sections of Israeli society now fear the unchecked violence the ruling Zionist right directs at Palestinians may eventually turn on Israelis themselves. Helseh points to the erosion of boundaries that once separated social groups and protected relations between them, including secular and religious communities, ethnic and racial groups, LGBTQ people, women and civil society institutions.
Internationally, Helseh believes Israel is losing ground, becoming more isolated and suffering reputational damage, with Israelis now facing economic and cultural boycotts and difficulties travelling. He links this decline to domestic changes, noting that some voices within Israel now identify the greatest threat to its future not as Iran, Hezbollah, the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, but as a crisis in its narrative and the way it tells its story, and the isolation and loss of standing that follow. He concludes that these developments have deepened divisions and polarisation within Israeli society while increasing Israel’s international isolation.
Netanyahu’s rivals: disagreement over means, agreement on ends
Helseh argues that the most significant shift is the entrenchment of an Israeli consensus against Palestinian political existence and statehood. These positions are no longer confined to Netanyahu’s government. They have become accepted assumptions that determine what is permissible in dealings with Palestinians and Arabs.
He cites Netanyahu’s position on cooperation with Arab parties, saying he drew red lines that made such partnerships a political taboo, one that opposition parties now also observe.
According to Helseh, a broad section of Israeli society shares this view. Rejection of Palestinian national rights and denial of Palestinians’ right to free themselves from Israeli control are evident across wide sections of society. He sees this reflected in the media and on social media, where racism towards Palestinians and Arabs is spreading.
In this climate, Helseh believes Israeli parties no longer dare speak of Palestinian political existence or Palestinians’ right to live as a people with national rights. Even the most favourable proposals these parties offer reduce Palestinians to a population stripped of its national identity and permitted to remain under absolute Israeli sovereignty, without recognition of its right to self-determination. At best, the privileges they might be granted amount to limited economic measures concerning workers and the removal of checkpoints. Helseh sums up this view by saying that, under this model, Palestinians live “as slaves in Israel.”
Helseh sees no fundamental difference between Netanyahu and the opposition on this issue, despite their differing approaches. Avigdor Lieberman, leader of Yisrael Beiteinu, has proposed a confederation with Jordan that would include annexing the West Bank to Jordan and giving it some security responsibilities there. He treats Gaza as an effectively closed question, perhaps one that could be attached to Egypt, although he has not explicitly said so.
This differs from the approach of the ruling right, which embraces what Helseh describes as a policy of decisively resolving the conflict by annexing the West Bank, displacing its residents and placing its land under Israeli civil administration. Gadi Eisenkot, by contrast, rejects annexation but calls for security arrangements. Naftali Bennett shares this position, believing annexation harms Israel and its international image.
Yet none of these figures proposes a Palestinian state or speaks of a settlement that would end the conflict. According to Helseh, this option has disappeared from the political agenda and domestic Israeli debate. Even raising it has become politically costly, because a politician who takes such a position could lose standing in Israeli society or, as he puts it, “burn his political capital.”
Helseh describes the differences between Netanyahu and his rivals as a matter of tactics and conflict management, rather than their fundamental position towards the Palestinians. There is broad agreement on rejecting Palestinian “political existence” and statehood, and on supporting settlement expansion, military control and the use of force. The differences are more apparent in their rhetoric and the way they present these policies. Some opposition parties criticise Netanyahu for his populist rhetoric and the damage it does to Israel’s international image, rather than for the substance of his actions.
Helseh cites the statements and behaviour of Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, alongside the positions of some figures in power who openly boast of calling for killing, displacement and extermination. On Palestinian prisoners, he says Eisenkot and Bennett did not object to Ben-Gvir’s treatment of them. Helseh notes that, in a podcast, Eisenkot described what Ben-Gvir had done as “an excellent thing,” while criticising his public display of these practices for damaging Israel’s image and providing material that could be used against it internationally. Helseh sees this as evidence that the disagreement concerns how policies are implemented and presented to the world, rather than violations against Palestinians themselves.
Acceptance of these policies extends beyond the ruling right. According to Helseh, the opposition supported the war and took even harder-line positions than the government on Lebanon, the West Bank, Iran and Gaza. Its criticism of the war on Gaza centred mainly on the Israeli captives, with calls for their return followed by a resumption of the war. Once the captives had been brought back, there was no longer any serious opposition to Netanyahu’s policy towards Gaza. Nor did his rivals offer a political approach to the future of Gaza or to Palestinians in the West Bank that would lead to a resolution of the conflict.
This consensus also extends to settlement expansion. Smotrich speaks of a “revolution” he has led in this area and threatens to replicate it in the Galilee and the Negev. Helseh believes the current government sees this moment as an opportunity to expand the settlement project and make major advances, regardless of international criticism or Arab and Palestinian positions.
Can Netanyahu’s successors roll back his policies?
If other parties come to power, Helseh expects the current momentum to slow or some forms of lawlessness to end, but the underlying approach to remain. Given the political cost, he doubts any new government would dare reverse the settlement project’s gains, relinquish areas seized by settlers or remove settlement outposts, whether or not Israel recognises them as legal.
Helseh argues that, even if he leaves power, Netanyahu will continue to put political pressure on his rivals from the opposition and “wave the stick” in their faces. He will accuse them of making concessions and portray them as willing to allow a Palestinian state or withdraw from land seized by the right. Under such pressure, his potential successors will feel compelled to prove they are no less patriotic and Zionist than he is. They may seek to preserve the right’s gains or go further, fearing accusations of being left-wing and weak.
Helseh does not rule out the possibility that this competition could push some parties towards even harder-line positions on security, settlement expansion, military control and assassinations. He cites Lieberman, Bennett and Eisenkot, who, in his reading, are trying to prove they are no less right-wing than Netanyahu as they face accusations of leftism and making concessions. He believes this competition may harden their positions rather than prompt a review of existing policies. Netanyahu’s departure, therefore, does not in itself guarantee a fundamental change in Israeli policy towards the Palestinians.
The same applies to the treatment of Palestinians. Some of the lawlessness surrounding settler attacks may diminish, restrictions at some military checkpoints may be eased, or more Palestinian workers may be allowed in as part of an economic approach. But such measures do not mean abandoning settlement expansion or changing the underlying policy towards Palestinians. Helseh believes they may be intended more to improve Israel’s international image than to change Palestinians’ circumstances.
He links the persistence of this approach to factors beyond Netanyahu himself. These include social, political and intellectual changes within Israel and society’s shift to the right, as well as international and regional conditions, the weakness of the Arab political order and Arab states’ preoccupation with their own conflicts.
He cites Yair Golan’s vote to bar Sami Abu Shehadeh from standing in the election as evidence of a widening consensus on excluding Palestinians, even among parties presented as part of the anti-Netanyahu camp. Helseh links this position to the Israeli Supreme Court’s ruling in the case, arguing that the court did not want to stand alone against public opinion, political parties and elites.
In his reading of the ruling, the court gave Abu Shehadeh the option of withdrawing rather than issuing a disqualification ruling that would bring it into direct confrontation with this trend. Helseh sees this as more than a legal judgement, linking it to the court’s calculations within the wider political landscape. He also recalls Golan’s call for greater force against Palestinians after a settler attack in a village near Nablus. In Helseh’s view, this position made Golan appear closer to Ben-Gvir than the common perception of some opposition parties would suggest.
Helseh believes these positions show that Israel’s political divide is not clearly between right and left, but between the right and a more hard-line right. Parties considered left-wing represent only a small part of the political landscape. Some may adopt apparently more moderate rhetoric to attract Arab voters, but he believes their real positions will become clear when they move from campaigning to governing.
Helseh warns that expecting Netanyahu’s departure to bring fundamental change could lead the Palestinian leadership to place its hopes in a new Israeli government once again. Limited changes, such as easing restrictions or introducing economic measures, may suggest to Palestinians and the international community that the Israeli political system has changed, and that a new government might open the way to a settlement or grant Palestinians some of their rights. But they do not necessarily signal a change in the substance of Israeli policy.
Israel, meanwhile, may benefit from these changes through reduced international criticism and weaker international support for Palestinian rights. Helseh warns that Palestinians may lose out if they pin their hopes on changes of government rather than examine actual policies. He sums up the outcome of this approach: “Israel wins and the Palestinian loses.”
Israel’s elections: what is on voters’ minds?
Ibrahim Dalalsha, director of the Horizon Center for Political and Media Studies and Research, told NoonPost that the competing parties, whether on the right or in the centre, agree on ruling out a Palestinian state and a peaceful political process leading to its creation.
Dalalsha says the elections could produce four outcomes: a temporary national unity government, a narrow right-wing government, a narrow centrist government or another election. Forming a government depends on whether one of the competing camps can secure a majority of more than 60 Knesset seats.
He cautions against treating opinion polls as a definitive guide to the result, noting that their estimates fluctuate. He believes some serve more to steer Israeli voters towards right-wing positions, while others indicate that the contest remains intense. Predicting the outcome from polls could therefore lead to a mistaken assessment.
Several domestic issues will shape voters’ choices, he explains. Chief among them are the conscription of ultra-Orthodox Jews into the army, economic conditions and what the current government describes as shifting the balance of power in the Middle East in Israel’s favour. Security and strategic questions also feature, as do disputes over liberalism and far-right attempts to control state institutions, including the judiciary. These attempts involve appointments, interference in the judiciary’s work and, at times, refusal to implement its decisions on the grounds that the courts are politicised.
In Dalalsha’s assessment, the issues dominating Israeli elections are primarily domestic. The contest is not about whether to make peace with the Palestinians, but about how to manage the conflict with them. He links this to the repercussions of the 7 October attacks and the war on Gaza, and the extremism they have reinforced among voters and in Israeli political and social attitudes. He therefore rules out any serious political process with the Palestinians in the foreseeable future.
Security weighs heavily on Israeli voters’ choices, but the debate is not about reaching a peace agreement with the Palestinians. Dalalsha warns that a return to power by the far-right coalition could deepen the existing crisis and increase the risks posed by settlement expansion and settlers’ impunity for attacks, with government figures and ministers supporting these practices.
He points out that, even before the war on Gaza, Israel was not seeking a peace agreement that would end the conflict with the Palestinians. This raises fears that these policies will continue if the right-wing coalition returns with a renewed electoral mandate.
According to Dalalsha, the far right’s return could create more scope to implement Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s approach to decisively resolving the conflict: first ending Palestinian political existence, then occupying the Gaza Strip and resettling it, and finally expanding settlements in the West Bank and annexing the entire territory.
Dalalsha regards this scenario as a real danger to Palestinians and a genuine possibility if right-wing parties win the next elections.
What could change in Gaza and the West Bank after the elections?
Although Dalalsha rules out a Palestinian state, he identifies differences between the far right and other right-wing and centrist parties in how they would manage the conflict. He attributes opposition to a Palestinian state to several factors, including the 7 October attacks and the belief they reinforced among Israelis that agreements with Palestinians or the transfer of land to them endanger Israel.
He cites Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza, which Israelis view as a concession of land followed by attacks from the Strip. Dalalsha describes this reasoning as follows: “In the Israeli mindset, I gave up land, and the result was war or attacks on the Israeli people.”
He stresses, however, that this prevailing perception does not objectively explain what happened. Israel withdrew from the land, but the occupation did not end, nor was the withdrawal accompanied by a peace process. Subsequent events cannot be attributed to the withdrawal alone; they occurred in the context of several factors.
This position has become so entrenched that no influential Israeli party advocates resolving the conflict through the establishment of a Palestinian state. Those that support this proposal have limited backing and little influence in the current elections. Dalalsha therefore does not expect a change of government alone to bring a fundamental shift in Israel’s position on Palestinian statehood, although differences may emerge in its handling of political issues and conditions on the ground.
If the elections produce a centrist government, Dalalsha believes its management of the conflict may differ without any change in its position on Palestinian statehood, judging by these parties’ platforms and their officials’ statements.
He stresses that “the continuation of war and violence indefinitely is not a solution,” which may prompt such a government to reconsider some existing policies. This could include easing financial pressure on the Palestinian Authority and engaging with plans put forward by the “Peace Council” to end the war on Gaza.
The Peace Council plan negotiated by Jared Kushner, an adviser to the US president, is particularly relevant here. The current Israeli government rejected it even though, according to Dalalsha, it contains provisions that serve real Israeli interests, alongside regional arrangements and international intervention.
He links this rejection to the agenda of the far right, which wants the war to continue. A centrist government may be more willing to take a pragmatic approach to the plan. This does not mean the plan is favourable to Palestinians. Rather, the potential difference lies in treating it as a route to ending the war instead of continuing to fight with no end in sight.
The potential differences extend beyond Gaza. A centrist government could also take a different approach to the financial and operational pressures on the Palestinian Authority. Dalalsha believes it may allow some scope for negotiations or contacts to ease these pressures, given the risks that continued pressure poses to the Authority’s financial survival and ability to function.
Even so, this would not mean the next government would pursue a comprehensive political settlement with the Palestinians. Change may be confined to addressing parts of the existing crisis.
The damage to Israel’s international image and the risks posed by settler violence may also push a centrist government to take more serious action against such attacks. But this would not mean an end to the violence or a fundamental change in settlement policy. It may amount only to a change in how actively the government responds and the measures it takes.
Dalalsha rules out a strategic breakthrough by a centrist government on Palestinian statehood or regional peace. This includes the Saudi initiative concerning the two-state solution and normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia and other Arab and Islamic countries. Such a government would be weak: it could be a minority administration dependent on Arab lawmakers’ votes, or one described as having a fragile majority of no more than 60 or 61 seats. This would leave it vulnerable to opposition pressure and no-confidence motions, limiting its ability to take major steps on political and regional issues.
Dalalsha therefore believes the clearest changes under a centrist government may be tactical. They could concern its handling of Gaza and the Peace Council plan, pressure on the Palestinian Authority and conditions in the West Bank, alongside measures to curb settler violence and attacks and efforts to reduce Israel’s isolation and the effects of far-right government policies.
Differences between a centrist government and the far right could produce tangible changes in some policies and practices, easing certain political crises and crises on the ground. But they would fall short of fundamentally transforming Israeli policy towards the Palestinians or opening the way to a comprehensive political settlement.
Helseh and Dalalsha agree that a change of Israeli government does not necessarily mean a change in its position towards the Palestinians. Helseh emphasises the social and intellectual shifts that have extended rejection of Palestinian statehood beyond Netanyahu’s government. Dalalsha points out that the elections themselves revolve mainly around domestic issues and how to manage the conflict, rather than how to end it. The methods, rhetoric and some measures may change. But that alone does not amount to a new political direction while Palestinian statehood remains outside the calculations of the competing Israeli parties.