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Türkiye’s rapprochement with Khalifa Haftar’s camp has opened a new phase in the competition for influence in Libya and the eastern Mediterranean. The House of Representatives allied with Haftar, who commands the forces known as the Libyan National Army and controls the country’s east, has ratified the maritime agreement signed with Ankara in 2019. The decision ends years of opposition to a deal that sparked regional disputes over maritime boundaries and energy resources.
The shift raises the prospect of diminished Egyptian and Emirati influence over their traditional ally as competition over military cooperation and reconstruction projects intensifies. Greece, meanwhile, faces a dispute over areas where it has granted oil and gas exploration concessions, amid Cypriot and Israeli concerns about expanding Turkish influence and its impact on energy projects and maritime connections.
The decision came on 20 October 2026, after Libya’s parliament elected a new leadership more open to Ankara and revoked two decisions it had taken in 2020 rejecting the agreements with Türkiye and severing political relations with it.
Türkiye and Libya’s former Government of National Accord signed the agreement on 27 November 2019. The eastern authorities rejected it at the time but have now endorsed it, strengthening Türkiye’s political position without settling the legal dispute over the contested maritime zones.
Egypt and the UAE: Which interests are at risk from the Turkish-Libyan rapprochement?
Haftar’s overtures to Türkiye have tested Egyptian influence in eastern Libya, particularly Cairo’s ability to shape its ally’s political and military choices. The parliament allied with him has approved a maritime agreement Egypt has opposed since its signing, despite the extensive security and economic ties Cairo built with the eastern leadership during years of conflict.
These ties are important because of the countries’ shared land border, which stretches about 1,115 kilometres, and Cairo’s concerns over arms smuggling and the movement of armed groups across the Western Desert. These concerns led Egypt to back Haftar’s forces against the Tripoli government, particularly in 2019 and 2020, when Türkiye intervened militarily on the opposing side and helped repel the assault on the Libyan capital.
As its relations with the eastern leadership have expanded, Türkiye has been able to discuss military cooperation and the reunification of Libyan institutions with both sides. This touches on a source of Egyptian influence: Cairo’s relations with the commanders of the forces controlling areas adjacent to its border.
In a study published in early December 2025 by Poland’s Centre for Eastern Studies, which specialises in political and security affairs, Turkish foreign policy researcher Adam Michalski said Ankara’s rapprochement with Haftar offered an opportunity to expand its military and political presence in the east and participate in efforts to reunify Libya. This could affect the positions of the external powers that have historically backed Haftar’s camp.
Michalski based his assessment on a series of military and intelligence contacts in 2025. These included an April visit to Ankara by Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the forces affiliated with his father, followed by an August visit to Benghazi by Ibrahim Kalin, head of Türkiye’s intelligence service. Kalin discussed security, intelligence and military cooperation with Haftar.
Those contacts continued when Kalin met Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in Tripoli on 20 October 2026. According to Turkish security sources, they discussed efforts to unify the political and military institutions. This gives Ankara a role in discussions about the future of Libya’s forces, which several external powers are competing to influence.
Ratification followed an important change in the eastern legislature. On 6 October 2026, the House of Representatives elected al-Salehin Abdel Nabi al-Obeidi as speaker, succeeding Aguila Saleh, who had close ties to Cairo. Al-Obeidi had chaired the Libyan-Turkish Parliamentary Friendship Committee, helping to create a different political climate towards the agreement.
Anas El Gomati, director of Libya’s Sadeq Institute for Research and Public Policy, said parliamentary ratification weakened an argument previously used by Greece and Egypt: that the agreement lacked the approval of Libya’s legislature. It also gave Ankara additional political backing to defend the deal.
On the military front, a Reuters investigation published on 2 April 2026, based on satellite imagery and expert analysis, revealed at least three combat drones at Al Khadim Air Base, about 100 kilometres east of Benghazi. They included two believed to be Turkish Bayraktar TB2s and a third identified as a Chinese Wing Loong 1.
The investigation did not identify who supplied the aircraft to Haftar’s forces or who was operating them. But the diversity of arms suppliers broadens the eastern leadership’s military options after years of reliance on Egypt, the UAE and Russia, potentially reducing any single external party’s ability to steer its decisions.
The competition also affects Egyptian economic interests, particularly reconstruction and infrastructure projects in eastern Libya. These expanded after the floods in Derna and Bayda in September 2023, with Cairo’s ties to the eastern authorities helping Egyptian companies secure extensive contracts.
In July 2025, Ahmed El Wakil, head of the Federation of Egyptian Chambers of Commerce, said Egyptian companies had carried out reconstruction projects in Libya worth more than $5 billion. Egyptian investments there had exceeded $2.5 billion, he said, while exports to the Libyan market had surpassed $2 billion.
These interests include road, bridge and infrastructure projects, some linked to the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, which is run by Belqasem Haftar, the son of the commander controlling the country’s east.
The eastern leadership’s overtures to Ankara could intensify competition for new reconstruction contracts. Turkish construction companies have extensive experience in Libya, although their work during the conflict was more closely tied to areas under the Tripoli government. They can now compete in eastern cities for projects that Egyptian companies secured with the help of political ties.
Egypt’s maritime interests are also directly in dispute. On 6 August 2020, Cairo and Athens signed an agreement partially delimiting their exclusive economic zone. Türkiye opposed it because its agreement with Libya is based on a different interpretation of maritime boundaries.
In December 2022, Egypt also issued a decision defining its western maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean and deposited the coordinates with the United Nations. Any exploration that overlaps with areas claimed by Cairo could therefore become a source of dispute over sovereign rights and the exploitation of energy resources.
Following Libya’s latest ratification, Egypt’s Foreign Ministry rejected the decision, saying the Turkish-Libyan agreement infringes on Egypt’s sovereign rights in its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. It also affirmed that Egypt reserves the right to protect its interests and confront measures that conflict with its declared maritime boundaries.
Cairo’s calculations are further complicated by the improvement in its relations with Ankara in recent years. This has included the resumption of presidential contacts, the activation of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Egypt in February 2026. These developments give the two countries channels to manage their differences without sacrificing their security and economic interests in Libya.
The UAE’s influence in eastern Libya, meanwhile, has rested on political and military support for Haftar’s camp, including the provision of military equipment and capabilities during the conflict. Reports by the UN panel of experts on Libya documented aspects of external support for the warring parties.
Abu Dhabi and Ankara supported opposing sides during the battles for Tripoli before their relations gradually improved. This culminated in the first meeting of their strategic council in July 2025 and an agreement to strengthen cooperation in defence, security, energy and investment, and to consider joint projects in third countries.
The improvement allows the UAE to respond to Türkiye’s new influence from a different position from Egypt’s. Abu Dhabi can preserve its military ties with the eastern leadership while exploring coordination with Ankara, particularly on unifying Libya’s military institutions, which could redistribute roles among external backers.
On 25 September 2026, Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE vice president, met Saddam Haftar in Abu Dhabi. Haftar also met Mohammed bin Mubarak Al Mazrouei, the UAE minister of state for defence affairs, in the presence of Issa Saif bin Ablan Al Mazrouei, chief of staff of the UAE Armed Forces.
The military talks covered continued coordination and stronger defence cooperation. Meanwhile, the Greek newspaper Kathimerini reported on 21 October 2026, citing informed sources, that Türkiye and the UAE were participating in efforts to unify Libya’s armed forces. No joint official announcement was issued confirming the nature of that coordination.
Preserving Emirati influence therefore depends on Abu Dhabi’s ability to adapt to Türkiye’s presence within Haftar’s camp. Egypt, meanwhile, faces a direct maritime dispute with Ankara as well as potential competition over its security and economic position in eastern Libya.
Greece, Cyprus and Israel: Who loses in the eastern Mediterranean?
Greece faces the challenge most directly linked to the maritime agreement. The Libyan parliament’s ratification strengthened Ankara’s political position in the dispute over maritime jurisdiction, which centres on the rights of Crete and the Aegean islands to exclusive economic zones and a continental shelf.
Athens maintains that the maritime rights of Crete, Rhodes, Karpathos and Kasos must be taken into account when delimiting boundaries. Türkiye, by contrast, takes an approach that gives islands limited effect compared with mainland coastlines, leaving a wide gap between the two countries’ maritime claims.
The dispute has also extended to economic competition over exploration areas south of Crete. On 16 February 2026, the Greek government signed four exploration contracts with a consortium led by US oil and gas company Chevron, which holds a 70 per cent stake, alongside Greek energy company Hellenic Energy, which holds 30 per cent.
The contracts covered the “South Crete 1” and “South Crete 2” blocks and two areas south of the Peloponnese peninsula, spanning nearly 47,000 square kilometres in total. The Greek parliament ratified them in March 2026, according to statements from the two companies and the Greek authorities.
Libya had objected to some of the exploration areas. Documents it deposited with the United Nations on 20 June 2025 included a report from Libya’s National Oil Corporation stating that the South Crete blocks cover about 23,300 square kilometres, more than 85 per cent of which lies south of the boundary line Libya uses in its maritime claims.
This percentage reflects the Libyan side’s estimate of the extent of the overlap, while Greece maintains its rights to the same areas based on a different vision of maritime delimitation — a dispute that could heighten legal and operational risks for companies if conflicting exploration activities begin or rival licenses are issued for the same sites.
The significance of the recent ratification lies in the weakening of one of the political objections Athens had relied on against the Turkish agreement — namely, the rejection of it by the legislative institution in eastern Libya — after it came to enjoy the backing of the parliament that had opposed it for years, without that meaning the dispute over the rights of other states has been resolved.
Alongside this dispute, Turkish interests are expanding within Libya’s energy sector, as signedOn June 15, 2026, the National Oil Corporation signed a production-sharing agreement in Offshore Area 7 off Benghazi with a consortium comprising Spain’s Repsol energy company with a 40 percent stake, the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation with an equal share, and Hungary’s MOL oil and gas company with a 20 percent stake.
The area lies about 140 kilometers northwest of Benghazi and spans more than 10,300 square kilometers. Exploration commitments include seismic surveys and the drilling of an exploratory well, giving Turkish Petroleum a direct economic presence off eastern Libya as part of a partnership that includes companies from two European Union member states.
The overlap between commercial interests and political disputes complicates options for economic pressure on Ankara, as European companies are tied to joint investments with it in Libya, even as the European Union rejects the maritime delimitation agreement.
The dispute also extends to offshore infrastructure projects, most notably the Great Sea Interconnector, an electricity link connecting Greece and Cyprus, and eventually Israel, at an estimated cost of about 1.9 billion euros. France’s Nexans, which specializes in cable manufacturing, is responsible for a major part of its implementation.
The project has faced delays linked to maritime disputes with Turkey. On Oct. 15, 2026 announcedPavlos Marinakis, the Greek government spokesperson, said the implementing company has applied to resume the seabed surveys needed to lay the cables, with work set to begin once approval procedures are completed.
Turkey is demanding coordination over the surveys, which it says pass through areas within its maritime jurisdiction, while Greece insists on its right to regulate those activities. The dispute predates Libya’s recent ratification and concerns routes different from the contested exploration areas south of Crete.
Cyprus is also facing repercussions tied to its maritime rights and energy and electricity interconnection projects, particularly as Turkey’s vision for maritime delimitation gives islands limited effect — a position rejected by Nicosia, which insists on its rights in its exclusive economic zone.
Cyprus has major offshore gas investments, most notably the Cronos field in Block 6, where Italy’s Eni announced on July 28, 2026, a final investment decision to develop it in partnership with France’s TotalEnergies.
The field’s resources are estimated at more than 3 trillion cubic feet of gas, with production targeted to begin reaching markets in 2028. The gas is to be transported to the Zohr field facilities in Egypt and then to the Damietta liquefaction and export plant, linking the interests of Cyprus, Egypt, Italy, and France in a project aimed at European markets.
For Cyprus, the repercussions center on the dispute over islands’ maritime rights and the future of regional interconnection and energy projects, while the country’s main gas fields lie outside the scope of the Turkish-Libyan delimitation line, limiting the agreement’s direct geographic impact on them.
As for Israel, its objection is tied to the strengthening of Turkish influence in the eastern Mediterranean, where it has developed security and economic ties with Greece and Cyprus that include military cooperation as well as energy and electricity interconnection projects. Israel’s Foreign Ministry condemned Libya’s ratification, claiming it infringes on the sovereign rights of its regional allies.
Israeli interests also include the participation of gas company NewMed Energy, alongside Chevron and global energy company Shell, in developing Cyprus’ Aphrodite field, in addition to Israel’s connection to the future phases of the subsea electricity interconnection project.
In July 2026, Shell announced an agreement to sell its 35 percent stake in the Aphrodite project to Hungary’s MOL, with the deal to be completed once regulatory conditions are met, reflecting the continued transfer of investments among European, Israeli, and American companies in Cyprus’ gas sector.
The potential impact on Israel is concentrated in the balance of influence and regional partnerships. Its exclusive economic zone and main gas fields off its coast lie outside the Turkish-Libyan delimitation line, while an expanded Turkish presence could give Ankara additional leverage over energy and infrastructure arrangements in the eastern Mediterranean.
French and Italian interests also stand out. French companies are tied to Cypriot gas projects and subsea cables, while Italy’s Eni has major investments in Libyan oil and gas and in its export through the Greenstream pipeline linking Libya and Italy.
In June 2026, Eni announced that its production in Libya reached about 162,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day in 2025, and that it is carrying out three development projects with total investments of about $10 billion, making the continued production and transport of energy a direct economic interest for the company.
From objection to implementation: What options do the affected countries have?
Attention is turning to the ability of opposing countries to influence implementation of the Turkish-Libyan agreement, after parliament’s ratification strengthened Ankara’s political position, while any practical shift depends on the issuance of new exploration licenses and the start of surveying and drilling operations in areas where maritime claims overlap.
Greece is betting on leveraging its position within the Brussels bloc and its international ties to increase pressure on Ankara and the Libyan authorities. And said Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis that Athens has tools related to EU funding directed to Libya and to Turkey’s path toward EU membership, in addition to its ability to rally diplomatic support within international institutions.
But the use of these tools is tied to the European Union’s own interests in Libya, particularly cooperation with the eastern authorities on border management, search and rescue, and combating migrant smuggling.
Indeed, a letter revealed from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, dated Oct. 13, 2026, additional funding worth 25 million euros to expand cooperation with eastern Libya in these areas.
That cooperation gives the Haftar camp added importance in European calculations related to migration across the Mediterranean, which may limit Athens’ ability to push for broad financial measures, especially given that some European countries have economic interests in Libya and trade and security ties with Turkey.
The EU also has a legal sanctions regime tied to Turkish drilling activities it considers unauthorized in the eastern Mediterranean. The Council of the European Union extended it through Nov. 30, 2026, while the list of targeted individuals and entities remains empty, and imposing new measures would require additional decisions.
And said Arturo Varvelli, head of the Rome office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, that Libya’s ratification exposed the limits of European influence in reshaping the balance of power inside Libya. In comments to the Italian news agency Nova, he said the European response remained closer to political positions that did not alter the regional balance, while Ankara succeeded in expanding its influence with both sides of Libya’s divide.
This progress could give Turkey greater bargaining power over energy projects and links with Europe, despite the continuing legal dispute over maritime boundaries.
Athens also has other options, including extending its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles and considering an expansion of the partial delimitation agreement signed with Egypt in 2020. Gerapetritis confirmed that this issue will be discussed in the future according to circumstances.
Legally, resolving the dispute faces difficulties linked to differing interpretations of the rules governing maritime boundary delimitation. Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt adhere to the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, while Turkey relies on its own interpretation of the principle of equity in defining zones of jurisdiction and is not a party to the convention.
Recourse to international courts or arbitration requires a legal basis for the jurisdiction of the judicial body or the consent of the parties concerned, while registering agreements with the United Nations is subject to treaty documentation and publication procedures, without settling the conflicting maritime rights between states.
As for Turkish-Libyan implementation steps, they are based on existing cooperation in the energy sector, most notably a memorandum of understanding between Libya’s National Oil Corporation and the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation in Istanbul on June 25, 2025, which provides for geological and geophysical studies in four offshore areas.
Under the memorandum, the two sides discussed carrying out a 2D seismic survey spanning 10,000 kilometers and processing the resulting data over a period of up to nine months. The coordinates of the four areas, however, have not been clarified, making it necessary to identify their locations to determine the extent of any overlap with Greek exploration concessions south of Crete.
The Turkish seismic survey vessel Oruç Reis sails through the Bosporus Strait in Istanbul on Oct. 3, 2018 (Reuters)Claudia Gazzini, senior Libya analyst at the International Crisis Group, rules out the possibility of major global oil companies investing or exploring in waters disputed by several countries. She explained that such companies prefer to avoid legal and security risks while investment opportunities remain available elsewhere.
This assessment indicates that securing the Libyan parliament’s support does not guarantee that Ankara can translate the agreement into exploration projects in disputed areas, particularly if Greek objections continue and maritime licences overlap.
The dispute’s sensitivity is also evident in questions of authority over survey work and cable-laying. On 21 October 2026, the Greek foreign minister explained that Athens could provide information about maritime operations, while insisting that notifying authorities of such work was different from requesting Turkish authorisation.
The dispute could become more consequential when work resumes on the electricity interconnection project between Greece and Cyprus. The project has European funding and US backing and involves French companies’ interests, increasing the number of parties affected by any potential disruption.
Meanwhile, improving relations between Türkiye and Egypt and the UAE, together with continued Turkish-Greek dialogue, provide channels for negotiating exploration activities or reaching temporary arrangements to regulate work in disputed areas. The parties’ interlocking energy, trade and security interests are particularly relevant here.
The locations of new Turkish-Libyan exploration activities, their overlap with Greek concessions and the ability of Athens and its partners to resume maritime interconnection projects remain key to determining the practical impact of Libya’s ratification on the balance of influence and on economic and security interests in the eastern Mediterranean.