NoonPost NoonPost

NoonPost

  • Home
  • Politics
  • Economy
  • Society
  • Culture
  • Files
  • Long Reads
  • Podcast
AR
Notification Show More
نون بوست
“There Are Nights I Can’t Close My Eyes”: How Gazans Are Living in Homes on the Brink of Collapse
نون بوست
From al-Jolani to Ahmad al-Shara: The Evolution of Syria’s New Leader
نون بوست
When Political Islam Receded in Egypt: Who Filled the Void?
نون بوست
An Extension of Genocide: Gaza’s Detainees Speak Out
نون بوست
A Tightrope Between Survival and Sovereignty: The Syrian Government Faces Normalization Pressures
نون بوست
American Aircraft Carriers: Has the Era of “100,000 Tons of Diplomacy” Ended?
نون بوست
U.S. Regime‑Change Policies: Why They Are Destined to Fail
نون بوست
Transformations of Israeli Judaism: Between the Victim Complex and the Colonizer’s Doctrine
نون بوست
The Gulf’s Balancing Act: Iran, Israel, and Hidden Links
نون بوست
Iraq–Turkey Oil Export Treaty: Why Did Ankara Cancel It After 52 Years?
نون بوست
Syria’s Northeast on Edge: QSD Between Ankara and Damascus
نون بوست
Has Europe Changed Its Stance on Israel… or Just Its Language?
NoonPost NoonPost
AR
Notification Show More
نون بوست
“There Are Nights I Can’t Close My Eyes”: How Gazans Are Living in Homes on the Brink of Collapse
نون بوست
From al-Jolani to Ahmad al-Shara: The Evolution of Syria’s New Leader
نون بوست
When Political Islam Receded in Egypt: Who Filled the Void?
نون بوست
An Extension of Genocide: Gaza’s Detainees Speak Out
نون بوست
A Tightrope Between Survival and Sovereignty: The Syrian Government Faces Normalization Pressures
نون بوست
American Aircraft Carriers: Has the Era of “100,000 Tons of Diplomacy” Ended?
نون بوست
U.S. Regime‑Change Policies: Why They Are Destined to Fail
نون بوست
Transformations of Israeli Judaism: Between the Victim Complex and the Colonizer’s Doctrine
نون بوست
The Gulf’s Balancing Act: Iran, Israel, and Hidden Links
نون بوست
Iraq–Turkey Oil Export Treaty: Why Did Ankara Cancel It After 52 Years?
نون بوست
Syria’s Northeast on Edge: QSD Between Ankara and Damascus
نون بوست
Has Europe Changed Its Stance on Israel… or Just Its Language?
Follow US

Nepotism in Post-Assad Syria: A New Era, Same Old Patterns?

حسن إبراهيم
Hasan Ebrahim Published 26 March ,2026
Share
نون بوست
نون بوست

In the transitional period following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Syria’s new administration has undertaken a series of government appointments many of which involve individuals linked by kinship, marriage, or complex social networks.

This pattern has emerged across various levels of governance, from the pinnacle of power embodied by President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, down to numerous state institutions.

These appointments come amid a new political and administrative reality, shaped in the wake of ending 53 years of Assad family rule, following the “Deterrence of Aggression” campaign led by military factions, most notably Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.

The country is now navigating a delicate transition, steered by political figures who previously governed Idlib under the “Salvation Government” and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham.

President Ahmed Al-Sharaa has been at the helm of this transition. Initially, a three-month caretaker government was formed, followed by the appointment of a 23-member cabinet a critical phase given the legacy of institutional dysfunction, economic collapse, and entrenched corruption from previous decades.

Despite calls for reform, this pattern of appointments persists without clear public criteria or transparent selection mechanisms. Information about these roles has surfaced through leaked images from official visits, congratulatory social media posts, or unofficial media sources.

This report examines several cases where relatives of top officials have been appointed to public office. While familial ties alone do not necessarily indicate corruption, their prevalence raises questions about favoritism, legality, and the risks of prioritizing bloodlines over qualifications.

From the Presidency to Municipal Councils

After serving as acting Minister of Health in the caretaker cabinet, Maher Al-Sharaa, 53, the president’s brother, quietly assumed the post of Secretary-General of the Presidency in April 2025 without any formal announcement.

Maher had previously worked as a senior advisor to the Minister of Health in the Salvation Government in Idlib, a position he took in 2022. His appointment was controversial at the time, as he had worked in regime-held areas until 2020, which conflicted with Salvation Government directives.

A gynecologic surgeon by training, Maher holds a PhD in medical sciences and a diploma in health systems management.

Another of the president’s brothers, Hazem Al-Sharaa, 51, accompanied him on his first official visits abroad to Saudi Arabia and Turkey in February 2025, despite holding no formally announced government post. His role became gradually clearer:

  • On July 24, 2025, a Reuters investigation revealed that Hazem was covertly overseeing the restructuring of Syria’s economy. His responsibilities included managing acquisitions of major firms, dismantling the Assad-era economic network, and seizing over $1.6 billion in assets from businesses previously linked to the regime.

  • On December 5, 2025, Hazem appeared in a photograph onboard a flight to Saudi Arabia alongside Safwat Raslan, Director General of the Syrian Development Fund, and Talal Al-Hilali, Director General of the Syrian Investment Authority.

  • On December 15, 2025, the Qatari Businessmen Association publicly named Hazem as Vice President of the Supreme Council for Economic Development the first formal acknowledgment of his role by a non-Syrian entity.

The council, established by Decree No. 115 of 2025 and chaired by President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, includes 16 members—eight of whom are ministers. Its mandate is to stabilize and stimulate the economy, develop an investment strategy, and chart a national economic map.

Hazem holds a doctorate in economic and legal sciences from the Egyptian-American International University, a master’s degree in law from the same institution, and a law degree from the University of Damascus.

Following the regime’s collapse, Maher Muhammad Marwan Idlabi a native of Damascus and the brother-in-law of the president’s wife was appointed governor of the capital. Idlabi had held several positions in the Salvation Government, including Vice Minister of Religious Endowments, member of the Supreme Judicial Council, and Chairman of the General Zakat Authority.

In September 2025, Ayman Abu Qasra, brother of Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra, was named director of the Jarablus border crossing with Turkey. No official statement was issued by the border authority or the General Authority for Land and Sea Ports, nor was a biography made available. Activists noted that his prior experience in a rural hospital laboratory bore little relation to his new administrative role.

In January 2026, engineer Abdullah Al-Alabi brother of Syria’s ambassador to the UN, Ibrahim Al-Alabi was appointed chairman of the Syrian Industrial Bank. Abdullah also serves as an advisor to the Minister of Communications for robotics and smart systems. He holds an executive MBA and a software engineering degree from the American University of Sharjah and has founded several companies, including Tulip in Riyadh.

Meanwhile, Raafat Hassan, brother of Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan Al-Sheibani, heads the Arab Advertising Organization. Official documents list his name without the family surname “Al-Sheibani.” He appeared publicly only once, in a photo published by the Qatar Media Corporation during a July 7, 2025, visit.

“Nun Post” was unable to verify the familial link through additional sources, though the Syrian Heritage Protection Society noted in November 2025 that Raafat Al-Sheibani, described as the foreign minister’s brother, joined an official delegation to heritage conferences in Lausanne and Naples despite lacking relevant credentials or official employment at the Directorate of Antiquities.

After Assad’s fall, Muhammad Bara Shukri, son of Minister of Religious Endowments Muhammad Abu Al-Khair Shukri, quickly rose through the ranks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was appointed Director of Consular and Expatriate Affairs in January 2025, then Director of European Affairs in May, and Acting Ambassador to Germany in January 2026. Shukri holds a BA and an MA in political science and international relations from Istanbul Sabahattin Zaim University.

Abdul Basit Abdul Latif, cousin of Justice Minister Mazhar Al-Wais, was named chair of the newly created National Transitional Justice Commission under Decree No. 20 of 2025. A former Secretary-General of the Syrian National Coalition, Abdul Latif holds a law degree from the University of Aleppo.

Local Networks and Family Ties

A journalist from Deir Ezzor told “Nun Post” that several officials in the province are related but added that their appointments haven’t sparked backlash partly because many of them are viewed as competent or revolutionary veterans. He cited Khalil Abdul Munim Al-Ayyoub, director of the Al-Mayadin district, and his cousin, Yaqub Al-Ahmad Al-Ayyoub, head of the city council. General Intelligence Director Hussein Al-Salama is reportedly a cousin of Foreign Ministry official Yusuf Al-Hajjar, though this couldn’t be independently verified.

In Daraa, two sons of Governor Anwar Al-Zoubi—Jaafar and Suhaib—frequently accompany him to official meetings, including some held inside the governorate’s headquarters, despite having no declared roles. In April 2025, a viral video showed Jaafar blocking a citizen from filming a public meeting, identifying himself as the “Governorate’s media representative” a claim that stirred anger and condemnation.

Elsewhere in Daraa, lawyer Abdul Munim Faleh Al-Khalil was appointed to lead media affairs for the governorate’s media directorate, while his son worked in a separate office within the same department.

Al-Khalil was later appointed head of the legal affairs directorate, with his son remaining in the media directorate. No formal policy was released regarding these appointments or how to separate professional roles from familial affiliations.

Fragile Governance and Transition Constraints

The new Syrian administration has made some early efforts to combat corruption. The finance minister revealed during the caretaker period that of the 1.3 million public employees, only 900,000 were actively working, while the remaining 400,000 were so-called “ghost employees.” Tens of thousands were dismissed pending investigation.

In February 2025, President Al-Sharaa declared that appointments would not be based on political favoritism, and that merit would be the key criterion. This was followed in May by Decree No. 45, which established a formal system for executive-level appointments outlining nomination criteria and performance evaluation mechanisms aimed at institutional stability and transparency.

The president also urged officials to disclose financial interests and prohibited them from engaging in private business with entrepreneurs, signaling a desire to break with the Assad-era norms.

Some ministries and agencies such as the General Authority for Radio and Television and the Ministries of Information and Foreign Affairs now publish open job postings with clearly defined qualifications. The Ministry of Administrative Development also periodically posts vacancies with transparent competition guidelines.

In one case at the Bab al-Hawa border crossing with Turkey, a customs agent was required to choose between keeping his job or allowing his son to continue working at the same site, due to internal rules prohibiting relatives from being employed at the same location.

“Nun Post” contacted Mazen Alloush, Director of Public Relations at the General Authority for Land and Sea Ports, to inquire about hiring policies and whether family relations are considered. No response was received as of publication. The same applies to inquiries sent to the Ministry of Administrative Development regarding appointment mechanisms.

Despite these reformist signals, recent appointments continue to draw criticism, either for perceived incompetence or for their familial nature. Leaked lists of new diplomats include Mohammad Bara Shukri (Germany), Mohammad Qanatri (United States), Mohsen Mehbash (Saudi Arabia), Mohammad Al-Ahmad (Egypt), Iyad Hazaa (Lebanon), Zakaria Lababidi (China), and Ashhad Salibi (Afro-Asia Affairs).

Legal Ambiguity and Awaiting Parliamentary Oversight

More than eight journalists and government officials confirmed to “Nun Post” that several appointments were made through personal endorsements based on familiarity with an individual’s past performance or revolutionary record.

Such practices—especially when disclosed through unofficial leaks—raise legal and ethical questions, particularly in a period aimed at establishing rule of law and institutional integrity.

Legal scholar Dr. Ahmad Qarbi argues that the transitional government’s appointment mechanisms deviate from the old legal frameworks, which he believes were implicitly annulled by the revolution.

“The old laws are void if they conflict with revolutionary goals,” Qarbi said, adding that trust remains a valid criterion during political transitions, though it must gradually be paired with competence.

He emphasized that Syrians have the right to question and criticize appointments, a right enshrined in the interim constitutional declaration. The government, in turn, has the right to make decisions as long as they balance public interest with executive authority.

Qarbi maintained that leaked appointments are not problematic if the appointee meets minimum qualifications, but emphasized that accountability will only become meaningful after the formation of a national parliament empowered to conduct hearings and investigations.

Download this article as PDF
Share this Article
Facebook Twitter Whatsapp Whatsapp Telegram Email Copy Link
حسن إبراهيم
By حسن إبراهيم صحفي سوري
Follow:
Previous Article نون بوست Washington and Tehran: Approaching the Moment of Reckoning
Next Article نون بوست Secret Drone Base: Is Egypt Militarily Involved in Sudan’s War?

Read More

  • U.S. Regime‑Change Policies: Why They Are Destined to Fail U.S. Regime‑Change Policies: Why They Are Destined to Fail
  • The Gulf’s Balancing Act: Iran, Israel, and Hidden Links
  • Iraq–Turkey Oil Export Treaty: Why Did Ankara Cancel It After 52 Years?
  • Syria’s Northeast on Edge: QSD Between Ankara and Damascus
  • Has Europe Changed Its Stance on Israel… or Just Its Language?
part of the design
NoonPost Weekly Newsletter

You May Also Like

U.S. Regime‑Change Policies: Why They Are Destined to Fail

U.S. Regime‑Change Policies: Why They Are Destined to Fail

إسراء سيد Esraa sayed 8 April ,2026
The Gulf’s Balancing Act: Iran, Israel, and Hidden Links

The Gulf’s Balancing Act: Iran, Israel, and Hidden Links

فريق التحرير Noon Post 8 April ,2026
Iraq–Turkey Oil Export Treaty: Why Did Ankara Cancel It After 52 Years?

Iraq–Turkey Oil Export Treaty: Why Did Ankara Cancel It After 52 Years?

فريق التحرير Noon Post 8 April ,2026

الحاجة لاستنساخ التجربة القطرية في دعم القضية الفلسطينية

محمد عوده
محمد عوده Published 13 June ,2015
Share
000_Nic6363353-e1408635135118-635x3511

تتعامل قطر مع القضية الفلسطينية باعتبارها القضية الأهم التي تشغل وجدان الشعوب العربية والإسلامية؛ نظرًا لأبعادها الدينية والتاريخية والقومية، وطبيعة المشروع الصهيوني الموجهه بصورة أساسية للمنطقة العربية لإخضاعها ونهب ثرواتها.

باستقراء خطابات القادة القطريين من مختلف المستويات القيادية نجد الانسجام الواضح والعمل الجاد لدعم الشعب الفلسطيني في نضاله للحصول على حقوقه المشروعة، ويظهر لنا بصورة واضحة استناد السلوك القطري في دعمه للقضية الفلسطينية على الحلول السياسية السلمية.

تكمن أهمية دعم القضية الفلسطينية لقطر في جانبين أساسيين؛ الأول: يتعلق بتطلع النخبة الحاكمة القطرية لمكانة فريدة مؤثرة على الساحة الإقليمية من خلال رسم صورةٍ في أذهان الشعوب العربية حول قطر، وتَبنيها لقضايا الشعوب العادلة، أما الجانب الثاني: فهو البعد الديني والقومي باعتبار فلسطين أرضًا إسلامية عربية، تحتل المكانة الأبرز في وجدان كل عربي ومسلم.

ولهذا التوجه الساعي للمكانة الإقليمية، الأثر في بلورة الرؤية القطرية باتجاه التسوية السياسية للقضية الفلسطينية، من خلال المحافل الدولية وقرارات الأمم المتحدة، مستندة في ذلك على أدوات قوتها الناعمة التي تتمثل في دبلوماسيتها المرموقة، وإعلامها المؤثر عبر شبكة الجزيرة الإعلامية، دون إغفال أداتها الصلبة الأبرز والتي تتمثل في اقتصادٍ قويٍ؛ مما مكنها من تقديم مساعدات سخية للفلسطينيين.

وبرغم ذلك التوجه وتقييده بالطرق السلمية لحل الصراع، إلا أن قطر لم تغفل في سياستها عن دعم المقاومة بصورة غير مباشرة، من خلال تبني عدة إستراتيجيات سياسية واضحة ومعلنة، مكنتها من التحرك بحرية دون الوقوع ضمن دائرة دعم ما تسميه بعض الأنظمة بـ “الإرهاب”.

فقد برزت قطر كأهم حاضنة لسكان قطاع غزة، من خلال تبني إعادة إعمار ما خلفه العدوان الإسرائيلي المتكرر على قطاع غزة في حروبه الثلاث (2008 – 2009، 2012، 2014).

ولم تكتف بمشاريع إعادة الإعمار، بل تجاوزتها لدعم متطلبات الحياة اليومية والإنسانية للفلسطينيين بصورة عامة، وسكان قطاع غزة بصورة خاصة، ثم تبنت عدة مشاريع تطويرية للبنية التحتية سعيًا منها للارتقاء بالحياة المعيشية ودعمًا لصمود الفلسطينيين في نضالهم من أجل استعادة حقوقهم المسلوبة.

لقد شكل الدعم القطر الظهير القوي للمقاومة الفلسطينية للاستمرار في إعدادها وتجهيزها المستمر لمواجهة الاعتداءات الإسرائيلية، فبدلًا من أن تنفق فصائل المقاومة من ميزانياتها على الحياة العامة وتفاصيلها، استطاعت ضمان استمرار الحياة الكريمة للفلسطينيين بأيدي قطرية، مما عزز ثبات الجبهة الداخلية، ومكن المقاومة من التفرغ لمجابهة العدو.

ولم تقف قطر عند هذا الحد من دعم المقاومة بصورة غير مباشرة، بل تخطتها لطرق الدعم المباشرة؛ من خلال توفير الملجأ الآمن لقادة المقاومة السياسيين بهدف تمكين حركتهم وإيصال آرائهم للأطراف الإقليمية والدولية، وعلى سبيل المثال يعد الدعم القطري لحماس بمثابة سياسة رسمية، فقد سُمح لها بالحفاظ على مكاتب رسمية في الدوحة، كما سُمِحَ لها بجمع الأموال من خلال الجمعيات الخيرية، ثم تزايد الدعم الرسمي لحركة حماس بشكل ملحوظ، عندما تعهدت قطر بالتبرع بمبلغ 50 مليون دولار للحكومة العاشرة التي شكلتها حماس.

وبالنظر لدول الإقليم وخاصة المركزية منها، نجد أنها تشترك مع قطر في أساس التعامل مع القضية الفلسطينية، من حيث السعي للمكانة الإقليمية المؤثرة، لكنها بحاجة لاتخاذ القرار المبني على رغبة صادقة للخروج عن رتابة الأداء السياسي تجاه القضية، وتوطيد العلاقة بها على أساس تحقيق مطالب الشعب الفلسطيني العادلة،  نظرًا لما تمثله القضية من أبعاد مختلفة، وخصوصًا ما يتعلق بالأمن القومي العربي.

إن ما قامت به قطر من دعمٍ سياسي واقتصادي وإنساني سخي للفلسطينيين ليس تهورًا ولا تصنعًا، وإنما هو توظيفٌ سليمٌ للموارد تجاه تحقيق المصلحة القومية، ويشكل ذلك مثالًا واضحًا على القدرات العربية الكامنة، والتي إن وُظِّفت في مكانها فإنها ستكون الضامن الحقيقي للأمن القومي العربي من خلال ردع الاحتلال عن ممارساته وصولًا لكنسه عن أرضنا ومقدساتنا.

يرونه بعيدًا، ونراه قريبًا.

TAGGED: الدعم القطري ، السياسة القطرية ، القضية الفلسطينية ، فلسطين وقطر
Download this article as PDF
Share this Article
Facebook Twitter Whatsapp Whatsapp Telegram Email Copy Link
محمد عوده
By محمد عوده باحث في الشأن الإقليمي
Follow:
Next Article نون بوست The Stigma of “ISIS”: A Heavy Legacy Haunting Women and Children of Former Members
part of the design
NoonPost Weekly Newsletter
dark

An independent media platform founded in 2013, rooted in slow journalism, producing in-depth reports, analysis, and multimedia content to offer deeper perspectives on the news, led by a diverse young team from several Arab countries.

  • Politics
  • Society
  • Rights & Liberties
  • Opinions
  • History
  • Sports
  • Education
  • Technology
  • Economy
  • Media
  • Arts & Literature
  • Entrepreneurship
  • Travel
  • Cinema & Drama
  • Food
  • Health
  • Culture
  • Latest Reports
  • Files
  • Long Reads
  • Interviews
  • Podcast
  • Interactive
  • Encyclopedia
  • In Pictures
  • About Us
  • Our Writers
  • Write for Us
  • Editorial Policy
  • Advanced Search
Some rights reserved under a Creative Commons license

Removed from favorites

Undo
Go to mobile version