NoonPost NoonPost

NoonPost

  • Home
  • Politics
  • Economy
  • Society
  • Culture
  • Files
  • Long Reads
  • Podcast
AR
Notification Show More
نون بوست
“There Are Nights I Can’t Close My Eyes”: How Gazans Are Living in Homes on the Brink of Collapse
نون بوست
From al-Jolani to Ahmad al-Shara: The Evolution of Syria’s New Leader
نون بوست
When Political Islam Receded in Egypt: Who Filled the Void?
نون بوست
An Extension of Genocide: Gaza’s Detainees Speak Out
نون بوست
A Tightrope Between Survival and Sovereignty: The Syrian Government Faces Normalization Pressures
نون بوست
American Aircraft Carriers: Has the Era of “100,000 Tons of Diplomacy” Ended?
نون بوست
U.S. Regime‑Change Policies: Why They Are Destined to Fail
نون بوست
Transformations of Israeli Judaism: Between the Victim Complex and the Colonizer’s Doctrine
نون بوست
The Gulf’s Balancing Act: Iran, Israel, and Hidden Links
نون بوست
Iraq–Turkey Oil Export Treaty: Why Did Ankara Cancel It After 52 Years?
نون بوست
Syria’s Northeast on Edge: QSD Between Ankara and Damascus
نون بوست
Has Europe Changed Its Stance on Israel… or Just Its Language?
NoonPost NoonPost
AR
Notification Show More
نون بوست
“There Are Nights I Can’t Close My Eyes”: How Gazans Are Living in Homes on the Brink of Collapse
نون بوست
From al-Jolani to Ahmad al-Shara: The Evolution of Syria’s New Leader
نون بوست
When Political Islam Receded in Egypt: Who Filled the Void?
نون بوست
An Extension of Genocide: Gaza’s Detainees Speak Out
نون بوست
A Tightrope Between Survival and Sovereignty: The Syrian Government Faces Normalization Pressures
نون بوست
American Aircraft Carriers: Has the Era of “100,000 Tons of Diplomacy” Ended?
نون بوست
U.S. Regime‑Change Policies: Why They Are Destined to Fail
نون بوست
Transformations of Israeli Judaism: Between the Victim Complex and the Colonizer’s Doctrine
نون بوست
The Gulf’s Balancing Act: Iran, Israel, and Hidden Links
نون بوست
Iraq–Turkey Oil Export Treaty: Why Did Ankara Cancel It After 52 Years?
نون بوست
Syria’s Northeast on Edge: QSD Between Ankara and Damascus
نون بوست
Has Europe Changed Its Stance on Israel… or Just Its Language?
Follow US

How Netanyahu Is Turning His Crisis into an Electoral Opportunity

أحمد الطناني
Ahmad Tanani Published 26 March ,2026
Share
نون بوست
نون بوست

In a highly charged political moment and at the height of his trial over corruption charges some of the most serious ever faced by an Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has submitted a formal request for a presidential pardon to Isaac Herzog. Herzog described the move as “extraordinary” and said it demands careful consideration “with responsibility and a serious heart.”

Netanyahu submitted the request not merely as a defendant seeking legal relief, but from his position as head of government, presenting himself as a unifying figure “a bridge to mend the rift within the people” and ease internal tensions, as his letter stated.

But behind this conciliatory language lies a profound political crisis, intertwining Netanyahu’s survival strategy with the seismic aftershocks of the October 7 attack, ongoing military and economic hemorrhaging, mounting pressure from the White House, and deep societal fractures within Israel.

Because Netanyahu made the request before any verdict has been reached, and without acknowledging guilt or pledging to retire from politics, the pardon request places Israel at one of the most sensitive junctures in its relationship between judicial authority and executive power.

This move reveals more than just Netanyahu’s personal legal dilemma it raises broader questions: Is the prime minister trying to defuse a legal time bomb before it detonates in the middle of a fateful election season? Has he sensed the court’s direction and abandoned hope for acquittal? Are we witnessing a constitutional precedent that could redraw the boundaries of power in Israel?

Electoral Stakes and Political Earthquake

It is difficult to separate the pardon request from the electoral context pressing in on Netanyahu. He is gearing up for one of the most consequential campaigns of his career and knows that waging it while knee-deep in interrogations and corruption files would weaken him and strip his campaign of the “historic leader” image he so often projects.

Thus, he frames the pardon as a move to “strengthen the resilience of the national state,” while opponents see it as a blatant attempt to neutralize the judicial bomb before the moment of reckoning.

The timing is also critical. Israel is entering an election year marked by the fallout from October 7, unprecedented social divisions, and deep mistrust in political and military leadership. Even within the right-wing bloc, Netanyahu no longer enjoys the dominance he once held.

The rise of figures further to the right, the exhaustion from a protracted war, and a deteriorating economy have weakened his standing within his own camp. Any internal fractures in the coming months could derail his ability to form a cohesive right-wing coalition.

Though Netanyahu portrays the pardon as serving the public interest, the political scene views it differently as a shrewd maneuver to rewrite the rules of the game. His trial is no longer a purely legal matter but a political battlefield shaping Israel’s internal future. His move appears like a leap from a sinking ship taking on water fast.

The request has triggered a political earthquake. The opposition decried it as a “moral collapse,” interpreting it as a tacit admission by the prime minister that he no longer believes in his own acquittal.

Meanwhile, within the ruling coalition, the tone is optimistic, with right-wing figures welcoming the move as a way to safeguard the continuity of right-wing rule and preserve the gains the nationalist camp has made within Israel’s deep state.

In this sense, the pardon is not a mere legal procedure it is a pivotal political moment. It could either rescue Netanyahu from political extinction or end one of the longest leadership eras in Israeli history with a legal blow at the heart of a contentious election.

Ongoing Corruption Cases

To understand Netanyahu’s move, one must consider the complex legal proceedings that have haunted him for years, forming the backdrop of all his political battles. He faces three major cases Cases 1000, 2000, and 4000 centered on bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. These charges strike at the heart of public confidence and governance integrity, setting a precedent in Israeli political history.

In Case 4000, the most serious, Netanyahu is suspected of granting regulatory favors worth approximately $370 million to telecom giant Bezeq in exchange for favorable coverage on the Walla news site, owned by Shaul Elovitch.

According to former Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit, the case is backed by hundreds of pieces of evidence and key testimonies, forming the core of the bribery indictment.

Case 2000 revolves around Netanyahu’s dealings with Yedioth Ahronoth publisher Arnon Mozes. He allegedly sought a deal to curb the circulation of rival daily Israel Hayom in return for favorable coverage. Prosecutors argue this shows Netanyahu leveraging legislative power to influence the media.

In Case 1000, Netanyahu is accused of accepting lavish gifts worth hundreds of thousands of dollars including from businessman Arnon Milchan in return for personal and political favors. While this case is less severe than Case 4000, it reinforces the image of a prime minister entangled in a web of financial and political interests.

These are not relics of the past but live elements of Israel’s political reality. For years, Netanyahu has endured courtroom sessions, cross-examinations, leaked testimonies, and unrelenting media and political scrutiny.

Even after the eruption of war and political chaos, court proceedings continued unabated—contrary to Netanyahu’s expectations that national security crises might absorb or delay the legal process.

As elections loom, Netanyahu realizes the ongoing trial undermines his ability to campaign and erodes his public image. Voters may not be willing to trust a leader who walks into court each morning and runs the government by evening. The pardon request thus appears as an escape hatch from a courtroom increasingly exposing the fragility of the “politically persecuted leader” narrative.

Trump’s Pressure

Netanyahu’s pardon request was not an isolated domestic move. It coincided with increasing pressure from former US President Donald Trump, who openly backs Netanyahu and has repeatedly dismissed the charges as a “baseless political witch hunt.”

Over recent months, Trump has publicly and persistently urged President Herzog to close the case via a pardon, culminating in an unprecedented official letter urging him to terminate the legal process.

In that letter, Trump declared: “It’s time to let Bibi unify Israel,” linking the end of Netanyahu’s trial with his ability to advance major regional initiatives chiefly expanding the Abraham Accords and courting more Arab nations. This wasn’t just political endorsement it was a strategic vision portraying Netanyahu’s trial as an obstacle to a regional realignment spearheaded by Washington.

This direct intervention has placed Israeli institutions in a bind. Traditionally, pardons are considered strictly sovereign affairs. But Trump’s involvement has turned the matter into an international political file, placing Herzog in a difficult spot: granting the pardon might be seen as caving to foreign pressure, while denying it could be interpreted as a slap to Netanyahu and a snub to an unpredictable, impulsive former US president.

For Netanyahu, Trump’s support provides external political cover and reinforces his claim of political persecution. It also helps frame the pardon as a national necessity, echoing Trump’s own legal woes following his White House exit.

But beyond the public theatrics lies a deeper question: Is this convergence Trump’s repeated appeals, the timing of the pardon request, Netanyahu’s stance on Trump’s ceasefire plan for Gaza mere coincidence, or part of undisclosed understandings between the two?

Many analysts believe Trump and Netanyahu are acting in concert based on mutual interests. American pressure may be linked to post-war arrangements, regional normalization, handling Iran, and Netanyahu’s future role in Israel.

There’s also a growing view that Trump is trying to “save Israel from itself,” aiming to avert internal collapse that could paralyze governance, while also helping Israel escape the international isolation it faces amid the war in Gaza.

In this light, the pardon request becomes more than a legal plea it’s part of a broader effort to reshape Israeli politics along lines aligned with shared Israeli-American objectives.

A Judicial Precedent?

What makes Netanyahu’s pardon request exceptional is not just its content, but its timing. This is the first time in Israeli history that a sitting prime minister or any senior official of this stature has sought a presidential pardon before a verdict has been issued or the trial concluded.

Legally, Netanyahu remains “innocent” until convicted under Israeli law. Requesting a pardon is not, in itself, an admission of guilt. Normally, pardons are granted post-conviction, but Israeli law grants the president broad discretion to issue a pardon at any stage of the legal process if it serves the state’s higher interests.

Yet politically and morally, the move carries heavy implications. Netanyahu’s request is written in a language of “reconciliation,” “bridging divides,” and “national unity” a stark departure from the combative “innocent fighter” rhetoric he’s espoused for years. The shift suggests he no longer trusts the judicial process or his chances of acquittal.

Israeli media has described the move as a “historic precedent,” though there have been similar exceptions, especially in Jewish terrorism cases. A prime example is the “Bus 300” affair, where a pardon was granted before trial proceedings concluded.

But the crucial difference here is that the subject is a sitting prime minister, and his trial touches the very structure of governance. A pardon in this context doesn’t just end a legal process it alters the balance between the judiciary and executive power, potentially undermining the judiciary’s authority at a time of internal division and waning public trust.

This episode also revives the Israeli concept of a “shame deal” plea bargains that typically involve an admission of guilt and withdrawal from public life. Such a deal was once offered to Netanyahu by former Attorney General Mandelblit, requiring him to admit to breach of trust and step back from politics for seven years. Netanyahu rejected it, unwilling to bear the “stain” of guilt or relinquish his role.

Now, the irony is that his current pardon request bypasses even the shame deal Netanyahu seeks total absolution without admission, penalty, or withdrawal, under the banner of “national resilience.” What he once refused through formal legal channels, he now seeks through a political and presidential route free of consequences. Legal experts warn this precedent could turn pardons into tools for voiding entire trials no guilt, no responsibility, no cost.

Ultimately, this dramatic development reinforces Netanyahu’s enduring image: the leader who never runs out of cards, the political tactician who finds new paths when all roads seem blocked.

For Netanyahu, moral arguments and public discourse are instruments to be leveraged in service of one goal: clinging to the pinnacle of political power. This is not a new trait—it reflects his deeply held belief that he is no mere prime minister but the “King of Kings of Israel,” more influential than Ben-Gurion, as his supporters often claim.

Regardless of Herzog’s decision, the mere act of submitting the request marks a key step in Netanyahu’s political reinvention, bolstering his narrative as the untouchable leader capable of weathering Israel’s gravest crises without losing his grip on power.

Should the request be granted, it will be far more than a legal maneuver it may well serve as the jolt that propels Netanyahu back into electoral safety at a time when Israel’s political map is wide open and primed for his return as the uncontested leader.

Download this article as PDF
Share this Article
Facebook Twitter Whatsapp Whatsapp Telegram Email Copy Link
أحمد الطناني
By أحمد الطناني كاتب وباحث في الشأن السياسي
Follow:
Previous Article نون بوست The Arab Trade Corridor: An Ambitious Project with Slim Chances of Success
Next Article نون بوست “Iraq’s ‘Development Road’: A Gateway Out of Oil Dependency and Foreign Interference”

Read More

  • U.S. Regime‑Change Policies: Why They Are Destined to Fail U.S. Regime‑Change Policies: Why They Are Destined to Fail
  • The Gulf’s Balancing Act: Iran, Israel, and Hidden Links
  • Iraq–Turkey Oil Export Treaty: Why Did Ankara Cancel It After 52 Years?
  • Syria’s Northeast on Edge: QSD Between Ankara and Damascus
  • Has Europe Changed Its Stance on Israel… or Just Its Language?
part of the design
NoonPost Weekly Newsletter

You May Also Like

U.S. Regime‑Change Policies: Why They Are Destined to Fail

U.S. Regime‑Change Policies: Why They Are Destined to Fail

إسراء سيد Esraa sayed 8 April ,2026
The Gulf’s Balancing Act: Iran, Israel, and Hidden Links

The Gulf’s Balancing Act: Iran, Israel, and Hidden Links

فريق التحرير Noon Post 8 April ,2026
Iraq–Turkey Oil Export Treaty: Why Did Ankara Cancel It After 52 Years?

Iraq–Turkey Oil Export Treaty: Why Did Ankara Cancel It After 52 Years?

فريق التحرير Noon Post 8 April ,2026

تاريخ العلاقات الروسية السورية

سرمد الحمد
سرمد الحمد Published 27 September ,2015
Share
a481d502-34b3-4d61-bc8b-ea113b418245-2

تعود المصالح الروسية في سوريا إلى حقب سابقة أي ما قبل أحداث عام 2011، حيث كان الاتحاد السوفيتي من أولى الدول التي اعترفت باستقلال سوريا وأقامت علاقات دبلوماسية معها عام 1944، وتعززت العلاقات السورية الروسية بشكل كبير لترتقي إلى مستوى التحالف الإستراتيجي في زمن الرئيس حافظ الأسد عام 1970، وامتدت وتطورت إلى زمن الرئيس بشار الأسد.

تنوعت هذه العلاقات والمصالح سياسيًا وعسكريًا، حيث قدمت روسيا ومنذ أيام الاتحاد السوفيتي الدعم العسكري لسوريا من أسلحة وخبراء، إضافة إلى العلاقات الثقافية والتعليمية والتي تعود إلى عام 1925.

ولم يتوقف هذا الدعم إلا في التسعينات من القرن الماضي، في عهدي الرئيسين غورباتشوف ويلتسين، ثم عاد في عهد الرئيس فلاديمير بوتين ليشهد تطورًا ملحوظًا خاصة في عام 2005، لدرجة أن روسيا وافقت على أن تبيع سوريا أنظمة صواريخ جو دفاعية متقدمة على الرغم من المعارضة الأمريكية الإسرائيلية، شكّل هذا التقارب السوري الروسي تهديدًا للعلاقات الإسرائيلية الروسية، لكن موسكو استطاعت احتوائه.

كل ذلك يعطينا صورة عن البعد الإستراتيجي للعلاقات والمصالح المشتركة بين روسيا وسوريا، وهذا بدوره يجعل من سوريا محط اهتمام موسكو سياسيًا وعسكريًا واقتصاديًا.

الصراع السوري والتدخل الروسي؟

بدأ الصراع السوري عام 2011 باحتجاجات مناهضة لحكم الأسد، رافقته حرب أهلية أدت إلى مقتل ما يقارب من ربع مليون شخص، وأجبرت ما يقارب من 11 مليون سوري على مغادرة منازلهم وفر مئات الآلاف كلاجئين.

روسيا لم تقف متفرجة من الحرب، بل دخلت على خط المواجهة منذ بدايتها بصورة غير مباشرة مع حلفائها الآخرين، وبدا ذلك بوضوح مؤخرًا وباعتراف روسي من خلال إقامة قاعدة عسكرية في اللاذقية يجري توسيعها وتجهيزها بالمعدات العسكرية لتأمين الحماية لها.

الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية أبدت انزعاجها من التدخل الروسي المباشر وعدته نوع من أنواع إطالة أمد الحرب التي راح ضحيتها الآلاف من المدنيين.

هذا التدخل أقلق إسرائيل أيضًا؛ مما دفع نتنياهو إلى زيارة موسكو قبل أيام وكان الهدف تبديد المخاوف الإسرائيلية، وبالفعل تم طمأنة إسرائيل بأن التدخل الروسي لن يضرها مطلقًا.

لماذا التشبث الروسي بسوريا؟

التشبث الروسي بسوريا ومن خلالها بالبحر الأبيض المتوسط، فلا شيء في هذه اللحظة يفوق أهمية المتوسط في حسابات روسيا الجيوسياسية، هذا البحر هو بوابة أوروبا والبحر الأسود، واستتباعًا روسيا ذاتها، إنه الخاصرة الرخوة للأمنين الأوروبي والروسي على حد سواء، فالصراع الدولي على البحر الأبيض المتوسط يُمثل أحد عوامل التمسك الروسي بسوريا منذ العهد السوفيتي وحتى يومنا هذا، لأهميته الإستراتيجية للقوى العظمى.

وكانت مجموعة من القطع البحرية الروسية تتواجد بصفة مستمرة في البحر المتوسط إبان الحقبة السوفياتية، وتحديدًا منذ عام 1967، بينما كانت مجموعة أخرى تتواجد في المحيط الهندي، وقد عادت هذه القطع إلى قواعد الأسطول الروسي بعد سقوط الدولة السوفياتية، وفي حسابات التاريخ والحاضر معًا، لا يُمكن فصل حالة الأمن في البحر الأسود عن الوضع السائد في البحر المتوسط.

وبمنظور القوى الكبرى، فإن من يخسر في أي من البحرين يكون قد خسر بالضرورة في البحر الآخر، ومن يتقدم في أحدهما يتقدم في الآخر، بالضرورة أيضًا، وهذه معادلة تدركها روسيا والقوى الغربية على حد سواء.

وهنا، يبدو من المفيد التذكير بأن البيئة الجيوسياسية للبحر الأسود قد تغيّرت على نحو جوهري، قياسًا بما كانت عليه حتى الأمس القريب، ذلك أن بلغاريا ورومانيا أصبحتا عضوتين في حلف شمال الأطلسي (الناتو)، كما أصبحت أوكرانيا وجورجيا دولتين مستقلتين.

باختصار، فقد بات البحر الأسود منطقة نفوذ أطلسية، تضررت فيها مكانة روسيا ودورها التاريخي، وكان هذا أحد العوامل الدافعة باتجاه تعزيز موقع البحر المتوسط واستتباعًا موقع سوريا في السياسة الروسية الراهنة، كما أن سوريا تعتبر من حلفاء موسكو الإستراتيجيين، ولا يمكن لموسكو أن تخسر حليفًا مهمًا كسوريا.

موسكو تجر نفسها إلى المستنقع السوري؟

موسكو تنجر إلى المستنقع السوري بعلمها أو بدونه، فالصراع القائم في سوريا صراع دولي قبل أن يكون سوري، فالأسد مدعوم من إيران وروسيا والصين، والمعارضة مدعومة من الولايات المتحدة وحلفائها، وهذا ما يؤكد أن التدخل الروسي المباشر قد يجر روسيا إلى ما يشبه إلى حد كبير المستنقع الأفغاني والذي لاتزال الذاكرة الروسية تحتفظ به.

هذا التدخل وبصورته الحالية قد يجبر أطراف أخرى كالولايات المتحدة على تزويد المعارضة السورية بأسلحة أكثر فتكًا كما حدث في الفترة السوفيتية في أفغانستان، حيث تم تزويد الأفغان بصواريخ (ستينغر) التي قلبت موازين القتال، ولم يعد مستبعدًا للغرب إدارة الأزمة في سوريا بدل حسمها من أجل استنزاف موسكو اقتصاديًا وزيادة الأعباء على خزينتها المنهكة أصلاً، وفي حال أصرت موسكو على دخول هذا المستنقع فمن المتوقع أن تتكبد خسائر عسكرية كبيرة ويتم القضاء على آخر موطئ قدم لها في شرق المتوسط.

والخطوة الأكثر أهمية أن موسكو ستدخل في مواجهة مفتوحة مع الغالبية الإسلامية في العالم والتي باتت تحمل موسكو مسؤولية النكبة السورية، وهذا ما سيجعل روسيا أمام خطر انتقام الجماعات الإسلامية المتشددة.

وهذا ما يبدو أن بوتين مصر عليه وهو ما سيعرض روسيا إلى سيناريو مشابه للسيناريو الأفغاني. 

TAGGED: إيران و روسيا ، التدخل الروسي في سورية ، العلاقات السورية الروسية
TAGGED: الأزمة السورية
Download this article as PDF
Share this Article
Facebook Twitter Whatsapp Whatsapp Telegram Email Copy Link
سرمد الحمد
By سرمد الحمد كاتب
Follow:
Next Article نون بوست The Stigma of “ISIS”: A Heavy Legacy Haunting Women and Children of Former Members
part of the design
NoonPost Weekly Newsletter
dark

An independent media platform founded in 2013, rooted in slow journalism, producing in-depth reports, analysis, and multimedia content to offer deeper perspectives on the news, led by a diverse young team from several Arab countries.

  • Politics
  • Society
  • Rights & Liberties
  • Opinions
  • History
  • Sports
  • Education
  • Technology
  • Economy
  • Media
  • Arts & Literature
  • Entrepreneurship
  • Travel
  • Cinema & Drama
  • Food
  • Health
  • Culture
  • Latest Reports
  • Files
  • Long Reads
  • Interviews
  • Podcast
  • Interactive
  • Encyclopedia
  • In Pictures
  • About Us
  • Our Writers
  • Write for Us
  • Editorial Policy
  • Advanced Search
Some rights reserved under a Creative Commons license

Removed from favorites

Undo
Go to mobile version