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In a notable development, the United States accusations directly at the Sudanese army of using chemical weapons in 2024 and 2025, arguing that the Sudanese government had failed to meet its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, potentially exposing it to international legal and political accountability.

Washington said in a statement before the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that its assessment was based on an independent technical analysis that concluded Sudan had breached its obligations under the convention over the past two years.

It called on the Sudanese authorities to submit a comprehensive declaration containing accurate information on relevant facilities, materials and activities, in addition to allowing the organization’s teams to conduct full, unrestricted field inspections.

This development reflects a notable shift in the nature of the US position on the war in Sudan and its two main parties. Since the conflict erupted, US policy had been marked by a degree of caution and hesitation, avoiding direct involvement in the complexities of the situation and, for a long time, limiting itself to diplomatic pressure, general statements and calls for a ceasefire. The most recent period, however, has seen a clear escalation in the tone of US rhetoric, going beyond political statements to more direct steps.

This shift points to a growing US desire to reassess the Sudan file and examine the possibility of intervening in the crisis, but through a different approach. That raises questions about the significance of this latest escalation against the Sudanese army, and the extent to which it is tied to the course of the war and to Washington’s efforts to reshape the balance of pressure on both sides of the conflict in the coming phase.

What’s new?

This is not the first time Washington has accused the Sudanese government of using chemical weapons. It previously issued a similar accusation in April 2025, followed by restrictions on aid, arms sales, exports and US government financing. Despite the gravity of the accusation, the director-general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons said at the time that the organization’s Technical Secretariat had not received a sufficiently supported request to begin additional procedures or activities.

Washington also later acknowledged that it had not sent investigators to Sudan and did not publicly disclose the nature of the substance used or the locations and timing of the attacks, while the Sudanese authorities denied the accusations in full.

But the US position is now entering a new level of escalation. Washington is demanding that Khartoum submit a comprehensive declaration on any chemical weapons, facilities or programs, and allow immediate, unrestricted international inspections, while also signaling a second round of sanctions.

This means the issue is no longer confined to the framework of a US assessment or unilateral decision, but has moved into a track of organized pressure within the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, opening the door to broader internationalization of the file.

The accusation of using chemical weapons marks an unprecedented escalation in pressure on the Sudanese army. The matter goes beyond discussion of battlefield violations or the humanitarian disasters linked to the war and enters the realm of weapons of mass destruction, one of the most tightly regulated areas under strict international controls and agreements.

This shift could give Washington broader room to rally international support, impose additional punitive measures and widen the circle of political and diplomatic isolation imposed on the Sudanese authorities, making the accusation a legal and political pressure tool that goes beyond unilateral US sanctions.

How serious is this escalation?

The seriousness of this escalation lies in the nature of the targeted party and the sovereign symbolism it represents. The United States is not directing its accusation at a separate armed faction or political organization, but at the Sudanese army as the official military institution, and at the government as the legal representative of the Sudanese state before the international community. In that sense, the accusation goes beyond the bounds of individual or battlefield responsibility to implicate the state itself, with all its institutions and political and military symbolism.

Under this approach, according to the US view, the army and the Rapid Support Forces militia are placed in the same category in terms of holding both responsible for grave violations, even if the nature of the accusations against each side differs. While the militia faces accusations of committing genocide and widespread abuses against civilians, Washington holds the official authorities and the army responsible for using chemical weapons, undermining their attempts to present themselves as the only legitimate party in the conflict.

According to this accusation, the Sudanese state, from the US perspective, becomes responsible for military actions suspected of conflicting with its international obligations. That opens the door to demands that it submit to comprehensive international inspections — demands that constitute an infringement on Sudan’s national sovereignty and a diminution of its political standing, especially if the inspections are carried out under the pressure of sanctions and prior accusations.

The escalation does not stop at calls for investigation and inspection. It extends to Washington’s call to restrict Sudan’s participation in discussions of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its influence over the body’s decisions, despite Sudan’s membership in the organization.

Washington bases this on the argument that a state accused of using chemical weapons should not participate in shaping the decisions of the body tasked with monitoring their prohibition.

Here, US pressure moves from the realm of sanctions and economic measures to a more dangerous level: reducing the international legitimacy of the Sudanese authorities, both government and army, and trying to limit their ability to maneuver and exert influence within international institutions. If this path gains broader international backing, it could lead to greater political and diplomatic isolation for Khartoum and turn the chemical weapons file into a central pressure card in managing the war and the coming settlement tracks.

A dual pressure message

This escalation can be read in the context of the mounting pressure Washington is exerting on both sides of the war in Sudan, especially on the army, which still has reservations about a number of provisions in the US initiative aimed at establishing a 90-day humanitarian truce as a prelude to reaching a permanent ceasefire, unifying the military institution, disarming armed formations and launching a political process leading to civilian rule.

Although the army has agreed to some elements of the initiative, it has objected to others, chief among them limiting the withdrawal of the Rapid Support Forces to specific areas, insisting instead on their complete withdrawal from all cities and sites under their control. This dispute represents one of the main obstacles hindering the passage of the US initiative and the achievement of an agreed formula to stop the war.

From this standpoint, Washington appears to be seeking to raise the level of pressure on the army and the Sudanese authorities by brandishing sanctions, expanding the circle of international isolation and narrowing the margin of political and diplomatic legitimacy. At their core, these tools are intended to push Khartoum toward making concessions or showing greater flexibility in dealing with the US initiative and the requirements of a settlement.

At the same time, the escalation carries a parallel pressure message to regional states and allies of the Sudanese authorities, urging them to use their influence over Khartoum and press it to show greater transparency and cooperation. In this way, Washington is seeking to internationalize the chemical weapons file and move it from the scope of a bilateral confrontation between the United States and Sudan to a broader regional and international arena.

This path could reduce the political cover some regional powers provide to the Sudanese authorities and turn Khartoum’s relations with its allies into an additional pressure tool against it. In that sense, the chemical weapons file becomes part of a broader US strategy aimed at politically and diplomatically containing the army and reshaping the balance of negotiations in a way that serves the truce and settlement track Washington is pushing.

What about the US approach?

This escalation reveals that the US approach to the war in Sudan does not view either side in the conflict as a reliable partner or as qualified to lead the next phase on its own. US accusations have not been limited to the Sudanese army; Washington had previously accused the Rapid Support Forces of committing genocide in Darfur and imposed sanctions on its commander, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, as well as on financing and arms networks linked to it.

According to this view, both sides are now surrounded by grave accusations related to wartime abuses and crimes against civilians, undermining their political legitimacy. From the US perspective, the army does not possess a mandate allowing it to monopolize the legitimacy of rule, while the Rapid Support Forces militia is not considered an acceptable political or military alternative, nor a party qualified to participate in power in its current form.

But this position does not mean a complete US break with either side. Washington recognizes that no settlement can bypass them at the current stage, and it does not appear willing to enable either of them to achieve a decisive military victory over the other. That is why the US approach tends toward containing the conflict, preventing its resolution by force and pushing both sides toward a truce that would stop the bloodshed and reorder the scene.

This was reflected in the recent US initiative, which is based on a ceasefire, unifying the military institution, disarming militias and returning authority to a civilian track. At its core, this approach aims to dismantle the military duality governing the scene and prevent either side from turning its battlefield advantage into lasting political legitimacy.

Managing the crisis, not resolving it

In sum, it appears the United States has begun gradually moving away from the caution and relative distance that had defined its handling of the Sudanese crisis, shifting toward a clearer and more consequential role in its political, military and diplomatic tracks — but through a new approach that does not grant the Sudanese army absolute advantage at the expense of the Rapid Support Forces, and does not treat either side as a reliable partner or as qualified to lead the next phase on its own.

This approach is based on placing both sides within a circle of accusation and suspicion, holding each responsible for part of the violations witnessed during the war, thereby undermining their political legitimacy and imposing parallel pressure on them. Yet in practice, this approach may lead to keeping the balance of power unresolved and preventing either side from achieving decisive military or political superiority, without in return providing a clear and effective path to ending the conflict.

As a result, the new US approach may contribute more to managing and containing the crisis than to dismantling its roots or ending it. The situation may therefore remain as it is, with the Sudanese citizen continuing to be the most harmed party, paying the price of the ongoing war through more displacement, poverty and humanitarian collapse, while the Sudanese arena remains open to new rounds of escalation for an unknown period.