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In October 2026, Türkiye’s National Intelligence Academy published a report titled “Anatomy of Israeli Expansionism”, examining the ideological, political and institutional foundations of Israeli expansionist policies, as well as the mechanisms that allow political visions and demands to become lasting facts on the ground.

The report examines three interrelated dimensions of Israeli expansion: control over land; the entrenchment of that control through institutions, laws and administrative measures; and the reshaping of the population’s demographic distribution. It also addresses the roles of religious and historical discourse, the growing influence of the far right, military capabilities and US support in driving and sustaining this expansion.

The report also analyses Israeli moves in the Palestinian territories, Lebanon, Syria, the eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and the Balkans, placing them in the broader context of competition for regional influence and strategic freedom of movement.

It devotes a section to the implications of these policies for Türkiye, examining the divergence between two visions of regional security: one based on strengthening surrounding states’ capabilities and sovereignty, and another aimed at limiting their military and strategic capacities while giving Israel greater scope to intervene in its neighbourhood.

The report warns that Israeli expansionism can no longer be reduced to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s inclinations. According to its analysis, the issue runs deeper: it is tied to a political, social and institutional system that sustains expansionist demands even if the political leadership changes. Relying on a change of Israeli government alone, or waiting for a more moderate political current to return, is therefore not enough to guarantee a change in course.

This conclusion is significant because it shifts the discussion from Israel’s immediate policies to the nature of the state and the direction of its decision-making institutions. The report explains how far-right currents, once on the margins of the political system, have moved to its centre, and how networks linked to the settlement movement have become part of the mechanisms through which ministries and the government bureaucracy make and implement decisions. As a result, settlement is no longer simply something ideological groups pressure the state to pursue. It has become one of the state’s own tools for imposing and entrenching facts on the ground.

Three interacting elements drive this trajectory: the use of religious and historical narratives to legitimise territorial claims; the presentation of expansion as a security necessity that cannot be abandoned; and the subsequent translation of these ideas into policies, laws and arrangements on the ground that are difficult to reverse.

The process becomes even more dangerous when these new realities themselves generate further security fears, which are then used to justify more intervention and expansion.

This does not mean that all Israeli institutions or political currents share a single position, or that expansion is inevitable and cannot be redirected. It does mean, however, that treating it as a passing political whim is a strategic error. Any real shift requires changing the political and security incentives that allow this trajectory to continue, raising the cost of the violations it entails, and removing the regional and international conditions that facilitate it.

The potential aims of Israeli expansion go beyond control over more land. By weakening surrounding states’ military capabilities and imposing security arrangements that extend beyond its internationally recognised borders, Israel seeks greater freedom to conduct military and intelligence operations and to prevent the emergence of regional powers capable of constraining its actions or counterbalancing its influence.

The Syrian case reveals this logic: the effort to limit the Syrian state’s ability to rebuild its military institutions intersects with the desire to curb Türkiye’s growing influence in the country.

More broadly, Israeli moves in the eastern Mediterranean, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea can be read as part of an attempt to strengthen access to maritime corridors, centres of influence, and energy and communications networks, and to develop security ties with regional actors in ways that alter the balance of power.

The risks extend to maritime security, trade and energy, particularly in the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and the eastern Mediterranean, where regional interests intersect with international shipping routes and supply networks. States in the region may find themselves forced to devote more resources to defence and armaments at a time when opportunities for economic cooperation and regional integration are declining.

In these circumstances, it is not enough for countries in the region merely to condemn Israeli policies or treat each crisis in isolation. They need to build a shared approach that combines respect for state sovereignty, stronger defensive capabilities, coordinated diplomatic positions, and the development of tools for applying economic and legal pressure.

In this context, the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan presents an opportunity worth examining. The “Mecca Alliance” can be seen as a vision for strategic coordination between three powers with relatively complementary economic, diplomatic and military resources. They share interests in regional stability and in preventing imbalances of power that threaten their sovereignty. Saudi Arabia brings the Gulf’s financial and political weight, Türkiye possesses military and industrial capabilities and a pivotal geopolitical position, while Pakistan offers military experience, considerable defence capabilities and strategic reach in South Asia.

Yet the significance of this rapprochement lies not in announcing a new alliance in itself, but in the ability to turn shared interests into practical arrangements. This requires setting clear objectives, developing mechanisms for consultation during crises, strengthening cooperation in defence industries, information-sharing and training, and coordinating positions on violations of sovereignty and occupation, alongside expanding economic and technological cooperation.

It also requires agreement that any defence coordination should serve as a tool for deterrence and the protection of sovereignty, rather than a means of imposing a new hegemony or targeting other regional actors.

It is also important that this process extend beyond the three countries. The success of any lasting regional security structure depends on its ability to include other states, especially Egypt, the Gulf states and Jordan, on the basis of shared interests and issues.

Building a counterbalance requires conditions in which imposing one’s will by force becomes more costly and less effective. If Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan, alongside the rest of the region’s states, can gradually turn their rapprochement into institutional cooperation, a firmer foundation may emerge for a regional security order based on mutual deterrence and respect for sovereignty. But if unilateral responses continue, Israel will have greater scope to expand its influence, leaving countries in the region facing successive crises without sufficient collective tools to shape their course.