هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
The economic partnership agreement signed by the UAE and Canada in Ottawa on 27 October 2026 continues to reverberate politically, amid growing questions about changes in Canada’s approach to the Gulf state’s human rights record and the extent to which economic and strategic interests are reshaping Canadian foreign policy priorities.
The agreement is the fastest bilateral deal negotiated between the two countries. Talks lasted just 47 days after both sides announced in July their intention to enter negotiations. It is expected to enter into force in 2027, once the necessary legal procedures and ratifications are complete.
Its significance goes beyond closer economic cooperation. It reflects a deeper shift towards a more pragmatic Canadian foreign policy, in which economic and geopolitical calculations take precedence over human rights considerations. This forms part of a broader trend increasingly shaping the policies of a number of Western powers that have begun reshaping their foreign policy priorities around their interests and strategic gains.
As the UAE uses its financial and investment clout to strengthen its influence and expand its international partnerships, Western countries are seeking to maximise economic returns and attract Gulf capital. Human rights appear to be gradually slipping down the list of priorities, having served for decades as a tool of political pressure in the West’s relations with Arab states.
This raises a fundamental question: why did Ottawa choose to prioritise its economic and strategic interests in its relationship with Abu Dhabi despite continued domestic and international criticism of the UAE’s human rights record? And to what extent does this shift reflect a Canadian reassessment of the balance between interests and values?
A comprehensive strategic partnership
The agreements signed by the two countries went beyond conventional arrangements to strengthen bilateral cooperation. Their unprecedented economic and strategic scope allows them to be described as historic. They included an Emirati commitment to invest up to about $50 billion in Canada, alongside an announcement by one Emirati company that it had entered negotiations over trade and investment deals worth an estimated $15 billion. These covered mining, logistics, energy and sovereign wealth fund investments.
DP World also signed a memorandum of understanding with two Canadian companies to develop an integrated transport corridor, while Masdar and Canada’s Ministry of Natural Resources concluded an arrangement to cooperate in the energy sector.
The rapprochement extended beyond economic and investment interests to defence and security, signalling a move towards a more comprehensive strategic partnership. The arrangements included a memorandum on defence cooperation covering military education and training, joint exercises, and closer cooperation in cybersecurity and defence industries. They also included the establishment of a joint military committee to coordinate cooperation between the two countries.
In light of these arrangements, the agreement is expected to help double bilateral trade over the next decade, from about $2.45 billion to $5.04 billion. It is also expected to give Canadian companies greater access to the UAE market, whose economy is estimated at about $700 billion, according to statements by Canada’s trade minister.
Why did Ottawa set values aside?
The agreement comes as Canada seeks to reduce its economic and trade dependence on the US market, particularly following escalating tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump’s administration on broad sectors of the Canadian economy and faltering efforts to reach trade understandings with Washington.
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney had accordingly pledged to double his country’s trade with non-US markets over the next decade, seeking to expand its economic partnerships and conclude trade agreements with countries in the Asia-Pacific region, Europe and the Middle East.
Mounting economic challenges forced Ottawa to reconsider its trade policy priorities and seek new partners that would allow it to diversify its markets and sources of investment and reduce its economy’s dependence on the US.
The rapprochement with Abu Dhabi can be read as a practical expression of this shift in Canada’s approach, reflecting a more pragmatic direction in which economic and strategic interests take precedence over other political considerations.
Ottawa thus appears to have chosen to turn a blind eye to mounting criticism of the UAE’s human rights record. Reports by international organisations have documented a continued deterioration in rights and freedoms in recent years.
Perhaps the most prominent is Human Rights Watch’s 2025 report, which documented evidence of the UAE’s abuses against dissidents, migrant residents and women at home, as well as violations arising from aspects of its foreign policy, such as its support for the Rapid Support Forces militia in Sudan.
There is also environmental criticism of Emirati energy policies, the expansion of fossil fuel production and the resulting climate consequences. These issues were absent from the Canadian government’s considerations when it signed the agreements.
The Saudi precedent: The rising cost of confrontation over human rights
Canada’s 2018 experience with Saudi Arabia still appears to weigh on Ottawa’s political calculations. The bruising episode exposed the potential economic and diplomatic costs of prioritising human rights and values over strategic interests. Canadian decision-makers now seem more intent on learning that lesson and avoiding a repeat of those consequences in relations with their Gulf partners.
The crisis began in August 2018, when then Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland expressed concern over the arrest of several women’s rights activists in Saudi Arabia, including Samar Badawi, and called for their immediate release. Riyadh viewed this as unacceptable interference in its internal affairs, plunging relations into acute diplomatic tension.
The Saudi campaign against Canada coincided with tensions in Canada’s relations with the US … Is there a connection?
#SaudiArabia_expels_the_Canadian_ambassador
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— نون بوست (@NoonPost) August 7, 2018
On 5 August, the kingdom responded with a series of escalatory measures that strained economic relations between the two countries. These included freezing new trade and investment dealings and suspending Saudi scholarship programmes to Canada, which had been an important source of revenue for a number of Canadian universities and educational institutions. There were also reports of directives to sell Canadian financial assets owned by Saudi entities.
What does Canada want?
As Ottawa seeks economic and trade alternatives to reduce its dependence on Washington, it sees Abu Dhabi as an investment and strategic opportunity that is difficult to pass up. The UAE’s economic and financial resources could help Canada address the growing challenges facing its economy, whether from US tariffs or disruptions to energy markets, shipping lanes and global supply chains amid regional tensions and military escalation between the US and Iran.
Among the foremost potential gains for Canada is access to the UAE’s substantial investment resources. Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth funds and financial institutions have an extensive international presence, making it an important partner in financing infrastructure, energy and technology projects.
The UAE’s strategic location as an economic and logistics hub linking Asia, Africa and Europe also offers Ottawa greater opportunities to diversify its markets, maximise trade and investment returns, and strengthen its economic and diplomatic presence in the Middle East.
The rapprochement goes beyond expanding bilateral relations. It can also be read as part of a broader reshaping of Canadian foreign policy priorities. Intensifying economic competition and mounting geopolitical pressures are pushing states to reassess their alliances and partnerships and adopt more pragmatic positions, giving interests and strategic gains precedence over other political considerations and values.
– Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney sparked widespread controversy after his government refused to specify whether he would raise with the UAE the issue of arms shipments to the Rapid Support Forces militia during his visit to Abu Dhabi.
– The government avoided giving a direct response on whether it accepted the UAE’s denial, while confirming that Carney would discuss regional peace issues, including the war in Sudan.
– Rights groups and activists urged Carney to pressure the UAE to stop supporting the militia accused of committing massacres in Darfur.
– Sudanese activists escalated their demands after numerous reports documented evidence of Emirati military support, including drones and armored vehicles.
– International pressure increased after the US secretary of state hinted at the UAE’s involvement in financing and arming the militia, stressing that the Rapid Support Forces cannot manufacture their own weapons.
– International organizations called on Canada to condemn the UAE’s support for the Rapid Support Forces and suspend security cooperation with it, while the US secretary of state warned that the peace process would not be a “shield” behind which states involved in arming could hide.
— نون بوست (@NoonPost) November 18, 2025
Buying influence: What does Abu Dhabi want?
For its part, the UAE’s willingness to invest more than $50 billion in Canada cannot be viewed as a purely economic decision, free of political and strategic calculations. Abu Dhabi takes a pragmatic approach to the partnership, using its financial and investment resources to maximise its gains and strengthen its international influence. Cooperation with Ottawa goes beyond direct economic returns to include political and strategic benefits that the Gulf state seeks over the medium and long term.
Foremost among these is strengthening the UAE’s international standing and securing wider recognition of its political and economic weight. A partnership with a country of Canada’s size, and a member of the G7, would help consolidate Abu Dhabi’s place in international economic and political networks, even if this does not necessarily mean Ottawa adopting its positions and policies.
Intertwined economic interests may also help ease human rights pressure and criticism of the UAE by reinforcing an approach that prioritises shared interests and manages disagreements rather than escalating them. The deeper the economic and investment ties, the greater the chances of continued cooperation despite existing political and human rights differences.
Expanding its partnerships with Western powers, particularly Canada and the US, also gives Abu Dhabi more room for manoeuvre in its foreign relations. It strengthens its ability to diversify its international options and consolidate its strategic autonomy amid growing global polarisation and competition among major powers, particularly in light of recent criticism of its foreign policies on a number of issues.
The future of international relations: Shifting positions
The tendency to prioritise economic pragmatism does not appear to be confined to Canada. It reflects a broader shift among a number of Western powers, which increasingly prioritise economic and strategic interests, even at the expense of their declared human rights commitments. One of the clearest examples was the US decision to release military aid allocated to Egypt, bypassing the human rights conditions attached to part of it on the grounds of national security and shared strategic interests.
Similar features can be seen in the policies of other Western powers, particularly Britain and France, where human rights considerations often give way to geopolitical interests. This raises serious questions about the consistency between Western rhetoric in support of human rights and actual practice, and the extent to which human rights principles are subject to calculations about interests and alliances.
The UAE-Canada partnership, despite ongoing criticism of Abu Dhabi’s human rights record, can thus be read as a revealing example of the shifts reshaping contemporary international relations. Economic and security interests are intertwined with political considerations and values, while human rights issues are losing their influence over cooperation and strategic partnerships.
This trend may spread in the coming period, reshaping international relations and alliances as economic interests take precedence over human rights commitments, strategic gains over declared principles, and political pragmatism over humanitarian rhetoric — placing the credibility of the international human rights system under growing strain.
