هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
Several US media outlets reported that President Donald Trump has formally approved a historic nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia, set to last about 30 years, that would enable Riyadh to develop a civilian nuclear program, with the possibility of opening the door to uranium enrichment inside the kingdom in a move that has stirred widespread controversy and significant reaction.
Although the agreement has not yet been officially announced, it is expected to be unveiled soon and submitted to Congress within days. Current expectations suggest it could pass despite objections from some lawmakers who fear it could enable Saudi Arabia to acquire a nuclear weapon, one of the issues Washington considers highly sensitive and among its red lines.
The surprise lies not in the agreement itself, which followed negotiations stretching over the past several years, but in reaching it on a standalone basis, without tying it to a broader deal that included normalizing relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv, as had previously been proposed.
That raises several questions: Why did Washington agree to conclude the deal without requiring Saudi-Israeli normalization? Why did the agreement come at this particular moment? What might the United States receive in return? And what does it indicate about the extent of Israeli influence within US decision-making circles?
Details of the agreement
Last November, during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to the White House, an understanding was reached with President Trump on civilian nuclear cooperation between the two countries. Since then, negotiations have been underway between US and Saudi officials to define the contours and details of the agreement ahead of submitting it to Congress this month.
The agreement falls under what is known as a “123 Agreement,” a binding legal framework governing nuclear cooperation between the United States and other countries aimed at ensuring nuclear nonproliferation. Washington is currently party to 26 such agreements with 51 governments, in addition to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The deal includes providing Saudi Arabia with the tools and technologies needed to develop a civilian nuclear program, with US companies expected to play a central role in implementing it, following extensive US-Saudi studies and discussions on its various technical and legal aspects.
According to reports carried by US news agencies and media outlets, the expected agreement does not include what is known as the “gold standard,” which prohibits the kingdom from enriching uranium and reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. That could, in the future, allow Riyadh to acquire the technical capabilities needed to develop a nuclear weapon. Nor does the agreement include the “Additional Protocol,” which grants the International Atomic Energy Agency broader and more comprehensive oversight powers over nuclear activities, including surprise inspections at undeclared sites.
Although some assessments link this agreement to the one the United States signed with the UAE in 2009, there are fundamental differences between the two cases related to the scale of concessions and guarantees required. The UAE agreement included strict inspection measures through the signing of the Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Abu Dhabi also gave up its right to produce nuclear fuel domestically, closing off the path to acquiring the infrastructure needed to produce a nuclear weapon. Such guarantees do not appear to be available at the same level in the expected agreement with Saudi Arabia.
The agreement is set to be referred to Congress, where it will undergo a review period of about 90 legislative days, during which lawmakers may object to it. Once that period ends, the agreement automatically enters into force unless Congress succeeds in blocking it.
Estimates suggest its passage may be all but assured despite the objections it faces, since Congress would have to pass a joint resolution and then secure a two-thirds majority to override any presidential veto, a task that appears difficult under the current balance of power.
The significance of the timing: Why now?
It is worth noting that talk of Saudi-US nuclear cooperation began in May 2025, when it was linked to the path of normalizing relations between Riyadh and “Tel Aviv”, with such cooperation presented as one of the incentives on offer to advance that track. The issue then receded somewhat from the spotlight before returning to the forefront in February and May of this year, but with a looser connection to the normalization condition as the sole path to concluding the agreement, culminating in its announcement today.
Naturally, the announcement of an agreement of this sensitivity cannot be read apart from its timing; the timing may carry implications no less important than the substance of the agreement itself. It comes amid unprecedented geopolitical turmoil in the region as a result of the war against Iran and the confusion it has created in the calculations of regional powers, which have found themselves compelled to reassess their positions and foreign policies.
In this context, Washington is trying to send a reassuring message to Riyadh after the doubts that have recently clouded relations between the two sides, especially following Iranian strikes on several Gulf states and what that revealed about the shortcomings of the US security umbrella in protecting its Gulf allies.
Here, America is telling Saudi Arabia, as the leading Gulf power, that it understands the region’s strategic and nuclear needs in confronting these challenges and that it will not abandon its allies.
Accordingly, granting Saudi Arabia a major strategic gain in the nuclear sphere can be seen as a way to re-anchor the alliance at a moment when Gulf states feel that the US-Iran conflict could expose them to direct and growing risks, potentially pushing them to reorder their priorities, calculations and alliance map.
In the same context, the American message of reassurance is not limited to the repercussions of the current war alone but extends to what comes after it. Once the war ends, Saudi Arabia could find itself facing a future confrontation with Iran for one reason or another, but with the possibility that Tehran may have moved closer to acquiring advanced nuclear capabilities. Here, Washington is trying to reassure Riyadh that it will work to achieve a kind of regional nuclear balance, even if that balance remains subject to US influence and oversight.
A nuclear deal without normalization: Why?
America’s abandonment of the normalization condition for concluding a nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia has raised several questions about the reasons behind this shift, which reflects a clear change in the rules governing Washington’s management of its relationships in the Middle East. For a long time, the United States treated the Saudi nuclear program as part of a broader regional bargain that would allow Israel greater integration into the region through Riyadh’s joining the “Abraham Accords.”
From this perspective, Washington’s decision to separate the track of nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia from the track of normalization with Israel — a linkage also adopted by the Joe Biden administration — stems from several factors, chief among them the US administration’s conclusion that Saudi-Israeli normalization at this stage has become more difficult and complex, especially after the latest Gaza war. As a result, continuing to tie the nuclear file to normalization could ultimately lead to losing Saudi Arabia, with its strategic and energy weight whose importance has grown amid the war with Iran and the energy crisis that has affected the global economy.
In the same context, China and Russia played a pivotal role in pushing Washington to conclude the agreement independently of normalization. From the American perspective, the United States is not the only party capable of supplying Saudi Arabia with the technology needed to develop a civilian nuclear program; both Beijing and Moscow possess nuclear capabilities and expertise that qualify them to play that role, especially since both countries have previously raised the issue of nuclear cooperation with Riyadh.
Accordingly, Washington moved to accelerate the agreement in order to keep the kingdom within the American system and under its umbrella of influence and management, rather than risk clinging to the normalization condition in a way that could push Riyadh to deepen its cooperation with Beijing or Moscow. The participation of US companies, experts and technology in the Saudi nuclear program also gives America greater room for oversight and influence, and relatively reduces fears that the civilian program could evolve into a path leading to the acquisition of a nuclear weapon.
What is the trade-off?
There is no doubt that the Trump administration’s determination to contain Saudi Arabia through this nuclear agreement, keep it within the orbit of US influence, and benefit from its capabilities in energy and investment, in addition to its strategic position in the Middle East, did not come without a price. Washington accepted paying a calculated political and strategic price according to a profit-and-loss equation.
The first thing America offered to achieve these goals was abandoning the use of Saudi nuclear ambitions as leverage to push Riyadh toward normalization with Israel. The nuclear agreement had previously been viewed as a possible reward for the kingdom in exchange for making concessions and joining the “Abraham Accords.” But after Saudi Arabia secured this gain separately, it has become difficult to push it toward normalization without offering additional incentives or using new pressure tools.
Washington’s decision to forgo including the so-called “gold standard” and the “Additional Protocol” also significantly eased the strict nuclear restrictions the United States has typically demanded when concluding such agreements. In theory, that could allow Saudi Arabia to develop capabilities that might bring it closer to acquiring a nuclear weapon, even if that possibility remains contingent on US approval and Washington’s management of that path something extremely difficult, if not impossible, under current circumstances.
Another price the Trump administration may pay is potential opposition to the agreement in Congress, whether from Democrats or some Republicans, which could later be used against it politically. This opposition stems from concern over the absence of stricter constraints and fears that the development of Saudi nuclear capabilities could upset the balance of power in the Middle East and reduce Israel’s qualitative military edge in the region.
Israeli influence: Between decline and recalibration?
Although a surface reading of this agreement being concluded on a standalone basis and away from the Israeli approach may suggest a decline in Israeli influence within US decision-making circles, and that Washington is now acting more independently without direct regard for Israeli interests, that reading may be hasty because it relies more on the form of the decision than on its substance and consequences.
Tel Aviv’s influence over Washington’s policies toward Riyadh does not necessarily always take the form of direct intervention in American decisions. It may appear more deeply through the implications of those decisions and the outcomes they produce. What matters is not the wording of the decision or its declared title, but how it is implemented and its practical substance.
The recent Gaza agreement may illustrate this approach in one way or another: on the surface, it appeared aimed at establishing peace, while in essence it served the Israeli agenda first and foremost.
Even so, there is no doubt that the Israeli approach has recently become a clear burden on the United States. The Trump administration has found itself in a growing moral and political predicament, both domestically and internationally, amid repeated accusations of yielding to Tel Aviv, particularly Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. It is therefore trying, to one degree or another, to widen its room for maneuver somewhat away from the Israeli narrative, guided by a pragmatic logic focused on direct American interests.
Still, the current agreement does not mean Israel has lost its weight within US policy, or that relations between the two sides have entered a period of tension. Most likely, this is merely a process of recalibrating and repositioning certain tracks, perhaps in coordination between the two sides, in a way that allows American interests to take greater priority without strict adherence to the Israeli approach and without affecting the depth of the strategic relationship between Washington and “Tel Aviv”.
What comes next?
The US-Saudi deal, in its announced form, reveals a repositioning in the contours of the new Middle East a Middle East in which “Israel” is no longer the sole pole, a result laid bare by the current war with Iran. The region is moving toward a multipolar structure with influence distributed across several centers, and Saudi Arabia is emerging as one of the rising poles whose status and regional weight are meant to be strengthened, transforming it into a central pillar in the US strategy to confront the Eastern bloc, especially Russia and China.
But a fundamental question imposes itself: Does this agreement officially mean Saudi Arabia has become a nuclear state? Naturally, it is still too early to answer that question. What has been announced so far appears closer to a declaration of principles and general understandings than to a final agreement with clearly defined details. This is reinforced by reports of joint studies between the two sides to chart the course of the agreement and determine the mechanisms for translating it on the ground.
In this context, Trump is betting on time to secure the greatest possible political and economic gains, and perhaps to use the agreement as a tool of pressure and bargaining until the technical and legal details are finalized. Some stages of the negotiations are expected to witness sharp disagreements amid potential pressure from opponents of the agreement, whether inside the United States or in Israel.
In any case, this agreement represents a pivotal moment in the course of the transformations taking place in the Middle East. It also reveals the depth of the rift created by the Gaza war, and then the war with Iran, in the wall of US-Israeli relations, even if that rift remains contained within a framework of mutual strategic protection. Even so, it is still too early to assess the agreement or foresee its final trajectory, pending the outcome of the upcoming studies and negotiations.
