“His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the State, received Benjamin Netanyahu, prime minister of the State of Israel, who visited the UAE yesterday, Sunday. During the meeting, the two sides discussed bilateral relations between the UAE and Israel and ways to strengthen and develop them”
With that brief statement, the official Emirates News Agency, WAM, announced a visit by Netanyahu to Abu Dhabi for the first time. Both the timing of the visit and the decision to announce it publicly were notable.
Netanyahu was accompanied by Israeli National Security Council chief Shmuel Ben Ezra, Mossad chief Roman Gofman, military secretary Guy Markizano and his political adviser, Ophir Falk. The UAE did not announce the visit while it was under way. Official confirmation came more than a day later, after Israeli and international media had reported it.
The visit came at a charged moment. Three days earlier, delegations from dozens of countries had walked out of Netanyahu’s speech to the UN General Assembly. Israeli elections were also about a month away, with the prime minister facing criticism that could threaten his political future.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was due in the UAE only hours later. The proximity of the visits raises questions about Abu Dhabi’s regional role and whether it is acting on Israel’s behalf or pursuing its own aims. What does the decision to make Netanyahu’s visit public reveal?
– التقى نتنياهو بمحمد بن زايد في أبو ظبي برفقة وفد أمني وسياسي رفيع.
– كشفت هآرتس أن نتنياهو طلب من بن زايد نفي تقارير تحذيره المبكر من الهجوم لتفادي الإحراج الداخلي.
– نفى مكتب نتنياهو تلقيه تحذيرات إماراتية، بينما أكدت أبو ظبي استمرار التنسيق الاستخباري المباشر ورفضت التعليق… pic.twitter.com/NylPcn0PP2
— نون بوست (@NoonPost) September 29, 2026
Why Abu Dhabi announced the visit
Netanyahu visited on Sunday, 27 September. An Israeli official disclosed the trip to Reuters while he was still in the UAE, but neither government announced it at the time. Israel’s internal security service, Shin Bet, was angered by the disclosure, which it viewed as a possible threat to Netanyahu’s security because his presence had become public before he left Emirati territory.
Nearly a day later, after Israeli and international media had reported and confirmed the visit, Abu Dhabi issued its statement through WAM. By then, continued silence risked leaving the purpose of the meeting open to competing accounts. The announcement gave the UAE a means of presenting its own account.
Its significance also lies in the decision to acknowledge a meeting at this level. Since the signing of the Abraham Accords, UAE-Israeli relations have been public, but Netanyahu’s visit had not previously been acknowledged in this way. The announcement suggests that high-level political meetings are becoming less sensitive to disclose.
The contrast with last May is striking. Israeli reports, including accounts attributed to sources in Netanyahu’s office, spoke then of a similar visit to the UAE. Abu Dhabi denied that it had taken place. This time, it confirmed the meeting despite the pressure on Netanyahu and the sensitivity of the regional moment. The change suggests that the UAE is now more willing to make its direct contacts with Israel’s leadership public.
A counterpoint to Netanyahu’s isolation
The visit followed Netanyahu’s speech at the UN General Assembly, when numerous delegations walked out as he addressed the chamber. Their departure offered a visible sign of the political pressure and isolation facing his government over its policies and regional actions.
Netanyahu also did not meet US President Donald Trump during his time in the United States. That absence added to the impression that his New York trip had yielded little politically.
His reception in Abu Dhabi offered a contrasting image: an Arab capital was willing to host him at the highest level. It showed that, despite criticism in international forums, some regional governments still regard relations with Israel — and with Netanyahu’s government — as a strategic interest. The visit gave him an answer to claims that he was wholly isolated.
The UAE has played a similar role during the Gaza war. As Houthi attacks disrupted Red Sea shipping and increased economic pressure on Israel, Emirati supply routes and goods helped supply Israeli markets. That support gave Israel economic breathing room and, the article argues, eased pressure that might otherwise have had domestic consequences.
Viewed in that context, the Abu Dhabi meeting extended an existing approach into the diplomatic sphere. Days after the walkout in New York, Netanyahu could point to a reception by an Arab leader. His international isolation may be growing, but the visit demonstrated that it is far from complete in the region.
بينما خلت المقاعد بعد انسحاب العديد من الوفود.. الإمارات "العربية" تختار البقاء لتستمع لخطاب نتنياهو.@mohammedhaniya pic.twitter.com/R79xL4VxeZ
— نون بوست (@NoonPost) September 25, 2026
What the visit means for the election
In recent years, no Arab government has offered Netanyahu’s government political support comparable to the UAE’s. Hebrew-language media have described Abu Dhabi as a strategic partner and ally of Israel, pointing to the continuity of relations and coordination even at sensitive moments. Netanyahu may be able to present the visit as a political gain before the elections scheduled for 27 October.
He also faces a dispute at home over his responsibility for the failures preceding the 7 October 2023 attacks. Leaked accounts have suggested that he received warnings from more than one external party, including the UAE, about the possibility of a major security operation. His opponents have cited those accounts as evidence that Israel’s political leadership failed to act on warnings.
The opposition has used them to sharpen its criticism of Netanyahu as the leading political figure in a government that failed to prevent the attacks. Israel continues to face their political, security and military consequences, alongside the immense losses and violations inflicted on Palestinians during the war that followed.
The accounts stem from a Haaretz investigation published weeks ago. It said Mohamed bin Zayed had called Netanyahu before the attacks and warned him of information suggesting that Yahya Sinwar, then Hamas’s leader in Gaza, was planning a large-scale operation against Israel. Netanyahu and his office denied that the call took place. Even so, the widespread circulation of the account gave his opponents another line of attack.
Against that background, the Abu Dhabi visit also carried potential domestic significance. Media reports suggested that one possible aim was to obtain a clear Emirati denial of the alleged contacts, weakening the opposition’s claim that Netanyahu had ignored warnings before Al-Aqsa Flood.
The UAE has issued no public statement that conclusively settles the matter. It has neither clearly confirmed the alleged contacts nor provided a detailed denial. That leaves room for political argument over the account and may help Netanyahu challenge his opponents’ presentation of the failure as a settled question.
Responsibility for 7 October remains among the most sensitive issues ahead of the election. Netanyahu is seeking to contain its political impact or change how it is understood, while the opposition wants to keep it central to the campaign in the hope of weakening his alliance and changing the balance of power in the next Knesset.
Abu Dhabi’s regional role
Within less than 24 hours, Abu Dhabi received Netanyahu and then Fidan. The timing may have been coincidental: the Turkish foreign minister’s visit had been arranged in advance, while Netanyahu’s was sudden. Even so, the two meetings drew attention to the UAE’s place in a region where Israel and Turkey have grown further apart.
As the gap between Tel Aviv and Ankara widens, Abu Dhabi may see value in remaining a point of contact between them, able to maintain dialogue with parties whose interests diverge. It may seek a similar role in its relations with Saudi Arabia and other regional states, strengthening its position as a mediator with access to several sides.
القناة 14 العبرية:
زيارة نتنياهو إلى الإمارات لم يقتصر على إجتماع ممثلين إسرائيليين وإماراتيين فقط، بل شاركت فيه أيضًا دول عربية أخرى، من بينها ممثلون سعوديون. pic.twitter.com/rpOWtSz60f
— Ali A.bk (@AB3_Ali3) September 28, 2026
There is also an unconfirmed account that Saudi officials and others attended part of Netanyahu’s meeting with bin Zayed. If accurate, it would invite closer scrutiny of whether the UAE is working towards arrangements that bring Israel into closer contact with Arab and regional states, particularly over Iran and regional security. Such arrangements could serve Netanyahu’s political and security interests as he tries to show voters that he can expand Israel’s regional relationships despite international pressure.
In this reading, Abu Dhabi’s role extends beyond conventional mediation. It has become an important diplomatic partner in strengthening and managing Israel’s regional presence, from Gaza and Yemen to Sudan and the Horn of Africa, and perhaps eventually the Gulf. The UAE is also seeking to regain some of the influence it has lost in recent years, even as it sets aside broader Arab and Islamic positions.
Netanyahu’s visit may therefore signal a further change in UAE-Israeli relations, with consequences beyond the two countries. If he survives the election and remains in power, high-level contacts may increasingly take place in public, with less regard for the Arab and regional considerations that once constrained them.
