As the second anniversary of Bashar Assad’s fall and flight from Syria approaches, the country’s central political question has changed. After decades of tyranny and injustice, the challenge is now to determine what kind of state should emerge and whether it can reunite a society deeply wounded by years of division and suffering.

Calls are growing to rebuild state institutions that Syrians can trust and create space for political participation that reflects the country’s diversity. Alongside transitional justice, economic recovery and the task of redefining Syria’s regional and international role, the country needs a national project that brings Syrians together around a shared vision of its future.

Abdulbaset Sieda brings decades of political and intellectual experience to these questions. He became prominent in Syrian opposition institutions during the revolution and served as president of the Syrian National Council in 2012.

Alongside his political work, Sieda has written extensively on the Kurdish issue, national identity and statehood, relations between Syria’s communities, and how to build a national project that preserves both diversity and unity. His experience combines political activism and intellectual work, informed by his Kurdish identity and his involvement in the national opposition.

In this exclusive interview with Noon Post, Sieda discusses rebuilding the state and its institutions, the Kurdish issue after the dissolution of the SDF, transitional justice and reconciliation, the future of Hasakah and its resources, and negotiations with Israel. Central to his vision for Syria’s future are repairing relations between its communities and restoring trust among Syrians.

How do you assess Syria’s situation today, as its state institutions, politics and economy undergo change? Where is the country heading during this transition?

Syria’s current situation cannot be separated from the complexities of the regional landscape and its interactions and shifts. The latter, in turn, reflects the reality of the international struggle over a region that still holds special importance in the calculations of the major and principal world powers.

These powers now deal with our region as an energy reservoir and a hub for the land, sea, and air routes needed by the competing powers vying for influence, leadership, and future roles.

On the other hand, Syria today, as a state, is suffering under the weight of the heavy accumulations left by military regimes that dealt with the country with a clique-based, adventurist mentality that did not contribute to building a real state with solid institutions — institutions that would have drawn clear lines between the state and the regime.

Instead, the latter dominated the former, adopted a policy of suppressing and banning parties, and fragmented the social fabric, despite the grand nationalist slogans it raised to lend a veneer of populist legitimacy to authorities that never acquired legitimacy in the first place.

The new administration inherited the country and the state in a near-collapse at the level of institutions, budget, and expertise. The national social fabric was also suffering from fragmentation, anxieties, a lack of mutual trust, and fear of an unknown future. Then the events on the coast and in Sweida, followed by the fighting in Sheikh Maqsoud, further intensified those fears.

At present, there is a limited easing on the social level, reflected in the relative calm prevailing on the coast, the recent understandings between the administration and the SDF, and the ongoing talk about the possibility of reaching solutions to address the situation in Sweida.

There are also efforts by the authorities to reconstitute institutions, all of which are positive indicators despite the many observations and gaps. In any case, having institutions is better than not having them.

For these institutions to be effective, the administration must adopt clarity and transparency, and there must be an active political life through which people can express their views, observations, and proposals, and even put forward their reform projects through parties and political and civic organizations that represent the views of the various segments and groups of Syrian society.

On the other hand, Syrians are suffering from extremely difficult economic and living conditions. The cost of living and services is very high, while the majority of people live below the poverty line.

The promises being made are not finding their way to implementation on the ground, which increases discontent, weakens trust, and drives further tensions and demands-based protests across all social components in different Syrian regions.

How do you assess the dissolution of the SDF and the integration of its military, security and administrative institutions into the state? What possibilities does this open up for Syrian politics?

In any case, we see the issue of dissolving the SDF and integrating it — along with the formations and structures of the “Autonomous Administration” that the Democratic Union Party, the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, had unilaterally declared in 2014 — into Syrian state institutions as a positive shift that serves the process of stability the country needs amid the stormy atmosphere hanging over the region.

This issue, as is clear to everyone, has regional and international dimensions, and it would not have been possible to bring it about in this form without the regional and international consensus reached in agreement with the Syrian administration.

What must be taken into account here is the need to distinguish between the issue of the SDF and the Syrian Kurdish issue, which remains bigger than the SDF and requires a fair national solution as a Syrian national issue, whereas the issue of the SDF is tied to developments in the ongoing negotiations between the Turkish state and Abdullah Ocalan.

In this context, it is worth noting the importance of Decree No. 13 of 2026, which addresses important aspects of the issue in question, while acknowledging the need to complete the remaining aspects through further dialogue and steps.

There is an urgent need to enshrine what is contained in the decree, and whatever is agreed upon in the dialogues, in the anticipated constitution, which we hope will dispel the concerns of all Syrian components through written compacts that respect particularities and rights within the framework of the unity of the people and the homeland.

How can Syrians move beyond politics based on sect, ethnicity and region while ensuring that an inclusive national identity respects the rights and distinct identities of the country’s communities?

Syria’s history in all its stages, from the earliest times to the present, and its social reality, confirm that ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity has been an inherent feature of Syrian identity — one that some, from time to time, try to reduce to this component or that, or seek to replace with an imagined identity by erasing the existence of the different other, at least in people’s minds, if they are unable to achieve that in reality.

Nationalist ideology, and later Islamist ideology, helped entrench this exclusionary tendency. Their proponents tried to transcend the material realities imposed by the Sykes-Picot Agreement and its aftermath in our region after World War I through dreamy projects that never materialized and failed to impose a single, wishful, one-directional image on a reality that is diverse and plural by nature.

Based on the failures of the nationalist and religious projects, we believe the best solution for Syria and the region’s diverse societies lies in a national project that includes everyone and serves everyone.

The Syrian national project, grounded in the unity of the people, the homeland, and the state, should take as its broad framework an inclusive Syrian national identity shared by all Syrians and a source of pride for them.

Within this framework, the particularity of sub-identities must be respected, the regions that have been subjected to marginalization, depletion, and plunder must be taken into account, the rights arising from that must be acknowledged, concerns must be dispelled through written compacts, trust between the various components of Syrian society and the state must be strengthened through practical measures on the ground, and a mechanism must be agreed upon for resolving disputes through constitutional, legislative, and judicial institutions whose decisions the executive authorities are bound to implement, away from violence and the chaos of the street.

An inclusive national identity is the solid foundation for building bridges and the best means of tearing down walls between Syria’s social components. In that sense, it safeguards the sub-identities of those components and serves as the common denominator that unites everyone.

What progress has Syria made towards transitional justice and reconciliation, and what are the main obstacles?

We must not deceive ourselves — or those influenced by our views, positions, and practices — with slogans, empty courtesies, and stubborn denial, regardless of whether we are ordinary people, officials, or those close to them. Syrian society is suffering from deep wounds as a result of the enormous accumulation of the negative consequences of the policies and practices of the Assad family’s rule, as well as the mistakes that occurred and the crimes committed in the coastal region and Sweida after the fall of that authority and the arrival of the current administration.

These wounds cannot be treated through piecemeal emergency measures, nor through the glitter of trends and acrobatic methods. Transitional justice is a major and complex issue, and the scale of the crimes committed over decades exceeds the Syrian people’s capacity to endure and adapt. Sectarian and regional sensitivities have also interacted and contributed to further complicating an already complex situation.

What has added even more darkness to the Syrian picture, already dripping with sorrow, are the vile sectarian and racist discourses that some have resorted to with no national, moral, or human restraint, for the purpose of mobilizing Syrians against one another in the hope of securing a position or status within this component or that.

Accordingly, we believe this issue cannot be addressed as it should be without a genuine national dialogue among Syrians from different components, orientations, and regions.

What happened is enormous, and it cannot be dealt with by a group of amateurs seeking fame and position, or even by some professionals who have not yet freed themselves from the afflictions of entrenchment within sub-identities and have not grasped the importance and necessity of taking shelter in the Syrian national space that includes everyone and reassures them.

With Hasakah’s resources and institutions back under state control, how should the province’s wealth and revenues be managed to address decades of marginalisation and prevent renewed disputes between the central government and local residents?

Hasakah province has consistently suffered from neglect, marginalization, and plunder in all periods, especially during Baath rule and the very long rule of the Assad family, despite its substantial oil, agricultural, and livestock wealth and its vast tracts of land that the state confiscated from residents under the pretext of agrarian reform, only to fail to distribute them fairly to needy farmers. Instead, they became a playground for theft by officials, especially security officials.

Although the province’s residents have been keen to educate their children and steer them toward various professions they master with distinction, successive authorities treated Hasakah merely as a source of wealth.

They did not work to develop the province by building factories and institutions suited to its capabilities and needs, nor did they establish the necessary scientific and educational institutions there.

The province also lacks modern roads that serve production processes and commercial exchange within the province and between it and other Syrian provinces. Its railway network is primitive, if not effectively defunct.

The airport is likewise rudimentary and falls short of the level required by needs and potential, especially given the dispersion of the province’s people across the world.

Today, there is an urgent need to support the province and enable it to rise, especially since it possesses all the ingredients for advancement, whether in terms of natural and human resources or its geographic location.

It borders both Turkey and Iraq and is capable of becoming a thriving commercial and industrial zone that would serve as a lever for the revival of the broader Syrian national economy. All of this requires allocating it a sufficient share of its own resources to provide the necessary infrastructure.

How do you assess Syria’s negotiations with Israel? What options does Damascus have amid continuing Israeli attacks and the imbalance of power between the two sides?

The issue of the course of Syrian negotiations with Israel is complex and thorny, tied to and intertwined with the history of the modern Syrian state that emerged after World War I — that is, before Syria’s independence in 1946, before the UN partition resolution of 1947, and before the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948.

Wars have taken place between Syria and Israel in which Egypt, Jordan, and other Arab states participated. This is an issue that stirs many national, pan-Arab, and religious sentiments in Syria and across the Arab and Islamic worlds, and it is linked to Syrian national interests and the rights of the Palestinian people.

Therefore, we must be extremely cautious in dealing with this issue with a deal-making mentality, and we must not resort to the method of secret meetings that provoke doubt, questions, and criticism.

The dispute centers on occupied Syrian land, the rights of Syrians who were forced to flee their land, and others who remain on their land under occupation.

This vital and important issue, surrounded by a heavy charge of accumulated national, pan-Arab, and religious emotions, is not one that a transitional authority can decide on its own to enter into difficult negotiations with a hardline right-wing Israeli government that shows no willingness to respect international legitimacy regarding the Golan.

This issue therefore requires, in light of the fragility of the Syrian state and society and the major imbalance in Arab, regional, and international power equations, a Syrian national position reached through consensus after an in-depth national dialogue, so that negotiations with Israel do not themselves become another factor of division and estrangement among Syrians, or a loophole exploited by internal or external forces that do not wish Syria and Syrians well.

What we need on this issue is national consensus, coordination with Arab and Islamic countries, and a return to the United Nations as the sponsor.

Naturally, it would be useful to convene an international regional conference involving the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union, alongside Arab and regional states and other willing countries, to examine the proposed solutions and agree on a settlement acceptable to both sides after the required concessions are made by each side — concessions that will be necessary in any case.

Such a conference could also examine the Lebanon-Israel negotiations file, given the overlap between the two files, especially after that file appears to have reached something close to a dead end.

But in all cases, Syrians must be reassured through credibility, and that comes through clarity, transparency, and drawing strength from the Syrian national position before drawing strength from any other party.

How do you envisage Syria’s future over the coming years, and what concerns you most?

It is difficult to answer this question, or even to predict what Syria’s condition may look like in the coming years. What is happening in the country now is the outcome of the interaction between Syrians’ revolution against the tyranny and corruption of Assad family rule and regional and international calculations.

In Syria, by virtue of our pivotal geographic location, we live amid the atmosphere of major regional and international struggles over leadership of the region and leadership of the world.

In this stormy climate, the best option for Syrians is to repair the national social fabric, which suffers from deep wounds. This process of repair requires in-depth dialogue among Syrians, respect for the different other, and recognition of their rights, on the basis of the unity of the homeland, the people, and the state.

No single Syrian party can alone bear the burden of preparing for the challenges imposed by the complex situation in which the region, including Syria, is living.

For that reason, we must break with the mentality of simplistic magical solutions, whose advocates believe that courtesies, intentions, wishes, and desires can persuade people to accept rhetorical solutions to the problems they suffer from. We must also break with adventurist tendencies whose advocates believe violence is the best means of imposing what they think are the solutions.

If we are keen to pursue peaceful diplomacy with the whole world to address disputes, reach understandings, and build partnerships, then it is even more appropriate that we do so with Syrians of all components.

They are partners in homeland and destiny, and they are the true support in times of hardship — provided that we are committed to building bridges by dispelling concerns through written compacts and strengthening trust through practical steps on the ground. That would close off avenues for some, at home and abroad, to exploit pre-national tendencies in service of projects that do not align with the national interests of Syria and Syrians.