هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية

With the fall of Bashar Assad’s regime and Syria’s entry into a new phase under President Ahmed al-Sharaa, figures with political and economic backgrounds, along with businesspeople and company owners, have taken on positions and responsibilities across the new government. In some cases, these appointments also intersect with social and family ties, as well as networks formed through years of military, civil and administrative work.

Such overlaps do not, in themselves, establish corruption or illicit dealings. But they can create what may be described as a “potential conflict of interest” — a legal and administrative condition that can arise before any act of corruption takes place, when an official’s authority over contracts, licenses or public resources intersects with private interests or personal relationships in ways that may undermine the neutrality of public office and the principle of equal opportunity.

This issue takes on particular significance during Syria’s fragile transitional period, following six decades of a system shaped by corruption and patronage. A temporary constitutional declaration currently governs the country and continues to rely on laws enacted under the previous system until it establishes a new legal framework. Against this backdrop, one of the most difficult grey areas lies at the intersection of public appointments, economic interests and family networks, raising questions about whether the existing legal framework provides sufficient safeguards to regulate the relationship between public office and private commercial activity.

When government office intersects with private interest

We present the following cases without presuming legal violations or accusing anyone of corruption, and in the absence of tangible safeguards separating private ownership from government decision-making, as well as mechanisms requiring financial disclosure.

According to a previous report we prepared, the case of the “Badawi family” from the city of Binnish illustrates overlap between government appointment and commercial activity. Qutaiba Badawi heads the General Authority for Border Crossings and Customs with ministerial rank, and also serves on the Supreme Council for Economic Development and chairs the National Import and Export Committee. At the same time, his brother Hudhayfa leads the Supply and Provisioning Authority at the Ministry of Defense as a brigadier general, and their brother Musab serves as deputy governor of Damascus.

Alongside these positions, their fourth brother, Maad Badawi, heads the Syrian Poultry Association and serves as executive director of Rayan Food, which media reports say supplies products to the army and has faced accusations that chicken import and export decisions issued by the Border Crossings Authority and the import committee were steered to serve its interests. However, their accuracy cannot be verified. Although there is no evidence of violations or abuse of power, the combination of control over border crossings, military provisioning, and family commercial activity creates an environment of suspicion and a “conflict of interest.”

In another case, Abdul Rahman Salama (Abu Ibrahim) has come to the fore. He has served as governor of Raqqa since early 2026, after rising through several administrative and leadership positions following the regime’s fall, beginning as an aide to al-Sharaa, then as deputy governor of Aleppo, and honorary president of Al-Ittihad Ahli Aleppo Club.

Salama also serves as executive director of Al-Raqi Construction, although his name is not listed among its publicly declared staff. The company is accused of monopolizing contracting and infrastructure projects in Idlib because of its proximity to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the awarding of contracts to it without published tenders. 

After Assad’s fall, Al-Raqi expanded its operations, signing more than 24 construction and outfitting contracts during 2025 in the health, housing, and education sectors, extending to Aleppo, Damascus, and Latakia, in addition to maintenance and restoration work in the western countryside of Sweida following clashes and security tensions in the city.

Details on transparency measures, such as public tender processes or disclosure requirements for projects like the $5 million Al-Hamadaniya Hall rehabilitation, are crucial to build confidence and reassure policymakers and stakeholders about governance integrity.

In a previous report we prepared on the appointment of relatives in the new Syria, key positions were assigned to figures with economic and commercial backgrounds who run private companies, heightening the risks associated with conflicts of interest, as in the case of the president’s brother, Hazem al-Sharaa, who holds a doctorate in economic and legal sciences.

Hazem was appointed deputy head of the Supreme Council for Economic Development and, according to press reports, directly oversees the restructuring of the economic sector, control over major companies, and the tracking of financial assets exceeding $1.6 billion.

The same pattern appears in the banking sector, with the appointment of Abdullah al-Albi as chairman of the board of the Syrian Industrial Bank and as an adviser to the minister of communications. Al-Albi is the brother of Syria’s representative to the United Nations and a businessman and founder of private companies, including Tulip. His appointment puts him at the helm of a state financial institution responsible for financing industrial activity, while keeping ties to the private business sector.

A similar case concerns Tayba Fuel, which expanded across Syria’s provinces after the fall of the Assad government and secured the largest share of fuel tenders in Idlib. The company had previously operated as one of the projects affiliated with the General Monetary Administration, an institution linked to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, when Basel Sweidan, the current minister of agriculture, served as its director general.

Tayba later received approvals to invest in fuel stations belonging to the General Petroleum Administration, as well as a concession to operate dozens of military fuel stations previously controlled by the Assad government. These arrangements were reportedly made without open tenders or public auctions.

Highlight specific legal reforms or policy measures needed to establish clear conflict-of-interest rules and safeguard transparent procurement, empowering policymakers to strengthen governance and public trust.

Steps to combat corruption

The transitional period has also seen a series of government measures to curb networks of influence and illicit enrichment, including at senior levels. In August 2025, Damascus closed the commercial office of Jamal al-Sharaa, the Syrian president’s brother, by presidential order, and instructed government bodies not to do business with him. The move came amid reports that he had used his family connection to arrange meetings with officials and traders to pursue private interests in the import, export, and tourism sectors.

In October 2025, President [Ahmed al-Sharaa] instructed government officials not to enter into new investments or compete with private investors. He also called on them to disclose their investments and assets, restricted officials’ investments to publicly traded joint-stock companies subject to oversight, and ordered that meetings with investors be held only in official government offices rather than private venues.

The authorities have also activated existing mechanisms for combating illicit enrichment. The National Committee to Combat Illicit Enrichment has pursued the recovery of funds and assets linked to economic figures from the former regime. At the same time, the Central Authority for Supervision and Inspection and various ministerial bodies have announced the uncovering of corruption cases and the dismissal or suspension of employees over integrity-related violations.

As important as these measures are, they largely address suspected misconduct after it emerges rather than preventing conflicts of interest before they develop into abuses of public office. Syria’s administrative system still lacks a comprehensive set of preventive safeguards that can separate private interests from public decision-making early on. The need for such mechanisms is underscored by Syria’s continued poor performance on corruption indicators: the country ranked 172nd out of 182 countries in Transparency International’s 2025

Seven safeguards

Al-Muatasem al-Kilani, a specialist in international criminal law and human rights, says Syria already has legal provisions that could provide a basis for addressing conflicts of interest. But he draws a fundamental distinction between combating illicit enrichment and establishing a comprehensive system to prevent conflicts of interest. Syria currently has tools for the former, he says, while the framework for the latter still needs to be defined and developed more clearly.

Speaking to Noon Post, Kilani says the constitutional declaration established important general principles. Article 42 requires the executive authority to manage public resources “efficiently and transparently” and promote good governance, while Article 51 keeps existing laws in force unless they are amended or repealed.

A key piece of legislation is the 1958 Illicit Enrichment Law No. 64. It covers public officials and members of legislative councils and requires them to submit financial declarations covering themselves, their spouses, and minor children. The law defines illicit enrichment as wealth obtained through the exploitation of public office, influence, or position, and also applies to those who collude with officials to facilitate such gains.

Kilani points to a more recent institutional development: the National Commission for Combating Illicit Enrichment, established by Presidential Decree No. 13 of 2025. According to statements by the commission, its mandate covers public office holders, state employees and workers, and includes financial investigations and audits to compare assets with legitimate sources of income. It also reviews state property contracts and investments in the provinces as part of efforts to protect public funds.

But the central gap, according to Kilani, is that illicit enrichment and conflicts of interest are not the same thing. An official may be a business owner with interests in companies without having acquired any “illicit enrichment”, yet still find themselves in a position to make a government decision that directly affects the value of their company or the sector in which their family operates.

That is where a conflict of interest arises before corruption takes place. The law should therefore intervene before corruption occurs, rather than only after it has happened. This is particularly important in Syria’s current context, Kilani says, as the transitional period involves a broad restructuring of state assets, contracts and investments. At the same time, some officials come from commercial and economic backgrounds.

Kilani says Syria now needs a clearer and more specific set of rules: senior office holders should be required to disclose their commercial and financial interests, with clear limits on which interests they may retain while in office. They should also be barred from taking part in decisions affecting their private interests and required to recuse themselves whenever a conflict arises. The law should regulate contracts between the state and companies linked to officials or their families, while allowing for the publication of senior officials’ declarations of interests to promote transparency without unjustifiably infringing on their privacy. Kilani also calls for an independent mechanism to monitor compliance with these rules.

Kilani argues that conflict-of-interest rules first protect officials who act with integrity, while also safeguarding fair competition and Syrians’ trust in the institutions of their new state. The question, he says, should no longer be limited to “Where did you get this from?” It should also be asked before a decision is made: “Do you have a personal interest in this?”