هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية

Since the US-Israeli war against Iran broke out in late February, the Strait of Hormuz has taken centre stage as a major arena of confrontation and one of the most significant points of strategic leverage. It has attracted widespread political and media attention around the world because of its critical importance to energy security and international trade. One of the world’s most vital economic arteries, it carries roughly one-fifth of global energy supplies.

But since early September, attention has been shifting gradually south towards Bab el-Mandeb. Within a few weeks, the strait has become central to regional and international calculations, rivalling Hormuz for attention. Energy markets and global trade now face a dual challenge at two strategic chokepoints that control two of the world’s most important shipping and energy routes.

The striking feature of the crisis at Bab el-Mandeb, however, is the simultaneous turmoil on both shores. To the east, the escalation in Yemen opened a new phase of conflict over the strait, as the Houthis expanded towards strategic sites and islands around the shipping corridor. At almost the same time, the opposite African shore was becoming more unstable. Ethiopian-Eritrean tensions were rising and Egyptian-Ethiopian disputes intensifying, culminating in crises and diplomatic moves that again brought the Horn of Africa to the centre of regional attention.

🔲 أبلغ مسؤولون إقليميون وغربيون رويترز بأن السعودية تخطط لشن هجوم على الحوثيين، حيث يجري النظر في خيارات تشمل عملية على الساحل لتأمين ممر الملاحة في البحر الأحمر أو شن هجوم على جبهات متعددة.

🔲 وأفاد ستة أشخاص على دراية بالتحضيرات للعملية المتوقع أن تنطلق في الأسابيع المقبلة،… pic.twitter.com/ECFlmaCbJL

— قناة الحرة (@alhurranews) October 2, 2026

It is difficult to dismiss the simultaneous escalation on both shores as mere coincidence. It raises sensitive questions about what may connect the two escalations and which interests and powers intersect on either side of the strait. Treating them as separate crises — one in Yemen, the other in the Horn of Africa — may therefore be insufficient to understand the wider picture and the shifting balance of power across the Red Sea.

The central question, then, is whether these are two simultaneous fronts, each with its own motives and calculations, or the beginnings of a single strategic theatre in which the crises of Yemen, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Red Sea overlap and the interests of competing regional and international powers become entangled.

That question raises others that are equally important. Who wields influence on both shores of Bab el-Mandeb? Who can reshape the balance of power along this vital artery, which stretches between Ras Menheli on Yemen’s eastern coast and Ras Siyyan in Djibouti to the west? Above all, are we witnessing a broader redrawing of the map of ports, islands, bases and alliance networks across the Red Sea that reveals a deeper connection between the crises on both shores?

The Arab shore: The Houthis escalate the conflict

On 3 September, the Houthis launched a large-scale military operation on Yemen’s western coast in response to what they described as “Saudi harassment of Yemeni sovereignty.” But the most significant shift came on 10 September, when the group took control of the city and port of Mokha. This brought it to the northern approaches to Bab el-Mandeb and gave it a direct foothold on one of the world’s most sensitive maritime passages.

Alongside this advance, Houthi forces rapidly gained ground along the coast and on offshore islands, extending their control over the Hanish Islands in the southern Red Sea. Their presence expanded from the coastal strip to a network of strategically located islands on the route leading to Bab el-Mandeb. They then advanced southwards to Mayyun Island, at the heart of the strait, whose location makes it exceptionally important for controlling maritime traffic through the passage.

These developments gave the Houthis more than the ability to threaten navigation through Bab el-Mandeb. The group established a direct military presence at several of its most important locations and approaches, gaining additional leverage over shipping, energy security and trade through the Red Sea.

This shift figured in the calculations of Saudi Arabia and its allies, prompting Riyadh and those aligned with it to step up efforts to recapture the positions seized by the Houthis, reverse the group’s logistical gains and reduce its ability to use Bab el-Mandeb as leverage in the regional conflict.

A new round of conflict may now unfold in Yemen, particularly on the western coast and around Bab el-Mandeb, and could extend beyond the country’s internal confrontation. This comes amid growing talk of regional and international involvement and support for efforts to reshape the balance of power around the strait. The battle for Bab el-Mandeb therefore appears likely to move from being one episode in the Yemeni war to becoming one of the main arenas of competition over Red Sea security and its strategic waterways.

The African shore: Ethiopia fuels the escalation

Just days after fighting flared on the Yemeni shore of Bab el-Mandeb, tensions began rising rapidly on the opposite African shore to the west. Clashes erupted inside Ethiopia, with fighting intensifying between the federal government and Tigray forces. Other armed groups joined the Tigray forces in confronting Addis Ababa.

The crisis did not stay within Ethiopia’s borders for long. It quickly developed into wider regional tension in the Horn of Africa after Addis Ababa levelled accusations at neighbouring states and regional powers. The Ethiopian army chief of staff accused Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea of supporting armed opposition groups and backing them in their fight against the federal government.

The escalation soon went beyond accusations and political exchanges to reciprocal diplomatic action. Ethiopia expelled some members of the Eritrean mission and simultaneously closed its embassy in Asmara. Eritrea responded with corresponding measures, culminating in the severing of diplomatic relations with Addis Ababa.

In a less severe but still notable development, the crisis also affected Egyptian-Ethiopian relations. The Ethiopian Foreign Ministry informed a member of the Egyptian mission that he was persona non grata. Cairo responded in kind, asking an Ethiopian diplomat to leave the country. The exchanges signalled that tensions were spreading beyond the parties directly involved in the Ethiopian confrontation.

من مياه النيل إلى منافذ البحر الأحمر.. كيف تصاعدت الأزمة بين إثيوبيا وإريتريا ومصر، وأين تقع مصالح "إسرائيل" في المشهد؟ pic.twitter.com/xjHZugz3lL

— نون بوست (@NoonPost) October 2, 2026

The Ethiopian crisis thus gradually spread beyond the country to affect its neighbours and the wider Horn of Africa just as tensions were rising on the other side of Bab el-Mandeb. The African shore now faces a crisis that could spread further geographically, politically and militarily, threatening to add a new flashpoint to an already turbulent region.

With the crisis escalating hour by hour, the African Union warned of the consequences of escalation and urged all parties to exercise restraint, amid fears that it could spiral out of control and become a wider regional confrontation. The region is one of the world’s most sensitive, with the crises of the Horn of Africa intersecting with security calculations concerning the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb.

No coincidence: Simultaneous crises raise questions

It is difficult to treat developments on the Yemeni shore of Bab el-Mandeb and the opposite shore in the Horn of Africa as mere coincidence or a passing overlap. There is a clear strategic connection between the two arenas, linking the interests of the powers active on both sides, even if documented evidence has not yet emerged to prove a direct operational relationship or show that a single actor is managing the escalation on both shores simultaneously.

According to the strategic studies literature, neighbouring regional crises rarely remain isolated from one another, particularly when the same powers are involved in more than one theatre and their interests, alliances and security calculations overlap within a shared geographic space. Each theatre can then affect and be affected by the other, even when the direct causes of the crises differ and their development takes different paths.

Viewed this way, the crises on both shores appear deeply intertwined at the strategic level, despite their different motives and contexts to the east and west. The competing parties operate in the same maritime space, and their calculations centre on the same ports, islands, sea lanes and alliance networks. Any fundamental change in one theatre can therefore reshape the calculations of the powers in the other.

Any change in the balance of power or the course of confrontation on the eastern shore of the strait, in Yemen — particularly around Bab el-Mandeb and the islands and ports overlooking it — is therefore bound to directly affect the security and strategic calculations of the competing parties on the opposite African coast, and vice versa.

Geopolitically, Yemen and the Horn of Africa therefore appear less like two separate arenas than the two shores of a single security and strategic corridor spanning Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea. Along this corridor, calculations about security, navigation, energy and regional influence are so closely linked that a major shift on one shore is almost certain to have repercussions on the other.

Bab el-Mandeb at the heart of a wider battle

Read together, developments in Yemen and the Horn of Africa make clear that Bab el-Mandeb has become central to a wider regional battle extending beyond its two shores. Placing the strait at the centre of the map reveals a dense network of ports, islands and logistical and strategic sites. Around these sites, the interests of regional powers — and perhaps international ones — intersect. Each has its own calculations, means of influence, and security and economic priorities.

On the Arab shore, a chain of vital locations stretches from Yanbu and Jeddah on the Saudi coast to Hodeidah, Mokha, Mayyun Island, Aden and Socotra in Yemen. This network is linked to broader regional developments involving the Gulf and Iran, and its effects extend to other powers, including Turkey and Israel. The corridor is thus part of a web of interests that reaches far beyond its immediate geographic boundaries.

إدانة #الإمارات لهجمات #تيغراي تبدو خبرًا منفصلًا، لكن خلفها قصة أكبر عن نفوذ #أبوظبي الممتد من القرن الإفريقي إلى شرق المتوسط..

🔴 كيف بنت هذه الشبكة؟ وإلى أين تصل؟https://t.co/zV2RnzhREt
✍️ @Moh_Gamea

— نون بوست (@NoonPost) September 28, 2026

An equally important network runs along the opposite African shore, from Port Sudan in the north through Massawa and Assab in Eritrea and through Djibouti to Berbera and Bosaso on the Gulf of Aden. States without direct access to the Red Sea or Bab el-Mandeb are nevertheless closely tied to the strategic dynamics of this coast and affected by changes there. Foremost among them is Ethiopia, whose search for maritime access has become a prominent issue in its strategic calculations and regional relations.

On this reading of the map, Bab el-Mandeb can be seen as more than a shipping lane separating Asia and Africa. It is a strategic link connecting three overlapping security systems: the Gulf and Yemen to the east, the Horn of Africa to the west, and Egypt, Sudan and the Red Sea to the north. Any major disruption to one of these systems is therefore difficult to isolate from the other two, whether its effects are transmitted through shipping, trade and energy flows, or through changes in alliances, balances of influence and military presence around ports, islands and maritime corridors.

This is what makes Bab el-Mandeb so sensitive. The strait is becoming more than a maritime crossing: it is a focal point for several crises at once. Any serious imbalance of power on one shore can have repercussions beyond the strait, extending along the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and perhaps reshaping part of the wider map of regional influence.

A web of interests: Who controls the corridor?

The limited space in which the battle for Bab el-Mandeb unfolds is one of its most dangerous features. At its narrowest point, between Ras Menheli on Yemen’s eastern coast and Ras Siyyan in Djibouti to the west, the strait is no more than about 26 kilometres wide. Yemen’s Mayyun/Perim Island lies almost at its centre, dividing it into two shipping channels. The two shores are so close that the effects of tensions on one could plausibly reach the other, making the corridor particularly sensitive to any change in the balance of power on either side.

A look at the current conflicts on either side of Bab el-Mandeb reveals a complex and closely interconnected picture. Interests overlap, and several regional and international actors are involved on both shores. In Yemen, the calculations of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, Israel and the US intersect to varying degrees and in different ways, alongside those of other regional powers, including Turkey. Some of the same powers are involved in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, although their roles, alliances and relative influence differ.

This overlap does not necessarily mean that a single operations centre is managing the escalation on both shores, or that all the powers are acting as a unified front. But it does make a complete strategic separation between the two arenas extremely difficult. When the same actors recur and their interests intersect around ports, islands, maritime corridors, military bases, and trade and energy routes, what happens on one shore becomes part of the calculations of the powers active on the other.

The two arenas appear linked by a single strategic thread: developments east of the strait are reflected in security and political calculations to the west, and vice versa. The battle for Bab el-Mandeb therefore goes beyond the familiar framing of a Saudi-Houthi confrontation in Yemen or Ethiopian-Eritrean tensions on the African side.

Bab el-Mandeb is thus gradually becoming a wider arena of regional and international competition. The interests of Middle Eastern and Horn of Africa powers intersect with those of major international powers, including China, Russia, the US and European countries. This gives the conflict over the strait the character of a miniature international confrontation. The comparison concerns the concentration of actors, their intertwined interests and the many arenas of influence within a limited, highly sensitive geographic space; it does not suggest a direct world war.