هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية
In a dramatic move with no prior media buildup or political hint, the Government Media Office in the Gaza Strip announced that the head of the Government Emergency Committee, and acting head of the government committee responsible for managing the machinery of government in the Gaza Strip in both its civil and security branches, had submitted his resignation.
The resignation was submitted as part of a step aimed at clearing the way for the National Committee for the Administration of the Gaza Strip — formed in accordance with US President Donald Trump’s plan — to assume responsibility for government work and the management of public affairs in the enclave, as part of an internationally agreed transitional arrangement pending the reorganization of the Palestinian political system and the unification of government institutions under the Palestinian Authority.
Although the statements accompanying this announcement were not as welcoming as Hamas wanted or hoped, they nevertheless succeeded, in principle, in achieving the main objective of the move: reopening, publicly and seriously, the discussion over transferring responsibility for government work and moving beyond the current situation, which serves only as a gain for the Israeli occupation and fuel for its coming escalatory intentions.
The technocrats committee and the winding path
Talk of a technocrats committee as an option for managing the transitional phase did not emerge as some novelty with the launch of US President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan. Discussion of the idea, its composition and its formation dates back to October 2024, during rounds of factional dialogue in the Egyptian capital, Cairo, in which Egyptian intelligence was directly involved in seeking a formula for governing the Gaza Strip and ending Hamas rule there.
The idea came as an alternative to the outcome of the Beijing meeting of the Palestinian factions, which had called for moving toward a Palestinian national unity government. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas had preempted that by forming the “Mohammad Mustafa” government, creating a political wall that prevented the re-formation of a Palestinian government within a limited time frame.
As part of efforts to find approaches to break through that wall, a proposal was introduced to form a “Community Support Committee” for the Gaza Strip, conceived as a body of professional technocratic figures tasked with overseeing the transitional phase in Gaza, while also forming part of the official Palestinian political system and the institutions of the Palestinian Authority.
But that option failed to secure internal Palestinian consensus because of Palestinian disagreements over the committee’s reference authority, the method of its formation and the scope of the powers to be granted to it. That pushed the file, like other Palestinian files tied to national unity and internal arrangements, into a state of suspension.
After a full year of interaction that yielded no results, and with the resumption of the genocidal war with greater and harsher momentum than before following the occupation’s reversal of the January 2025 ceasefire agreement, which officially collapsed on March 18, 2025, the discussion returned, in the context of preparing the American plan bearing Trump’s name, to the clauses it contains regarding the shape of the transitional phase and the administration of the Gaza Strip. The same formula resurfaced, but within different frameworks and under different references.
Although the “technocrats committee” included in Trump’s plan reflects the danger of “internationalizing” governance in the Gaza Strip given that its formal reference authority is the executive council of the Peace Council and its “high” envoy, Nikolay Mladenov the arrangements for establishing and forming the committee were designed to ensure Palestinian approval, both official approval from the Palestinian president and factional approval from the various forces, through a meeting between the mediators and the six factions involved in the Cairo negotiations, thereby providing a partial neutralization of that danger.
Despite this context, the committee, whose formation was officially announced in mid-January 2026, remained trapped by the restrictions and parameters imposed by the Peace Council and its formal reference authority, Mladenov. That kept it outside any real engagement in matters related to the Gaza Strip, except for a series of meetings with international delegations and participation in fundraising alongside the Peace Council, without any role or statement regarding the catastrophic humanitarian conditions and ongoing Israeli attacks in the enclave.
With continued delays in allowing it into Gaza, it lost much of its momentum and credibility as a genuine actor capable of managing the transitional phase during one of the most sensitive periods in the Gaza Strip’s history.
Hamas’ decision: Administrative on the surface, political at its core
Officially, what happened was reflected in the announcement by the Government Media Office in the Gaza Strip, which said in a statement that the head of the Government Emergency Committee had resigned and that the committee had been formally dissolved, in preparation for transferring administrative duties and governance in the enclave to the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza.
The same statement said that Mohammad Jawad al-Farra, head of the Government Emergency Committee and acting head of government follow-up, had submitted his formal resignation from his post in a move aimed at demonstrating seriousness, facilitating the administrative transition and implementing national agreements.
The government media office confirmed that all administrative and legal arrangements for the handover had been completed, noting that these steps were presented transparently before the Palestinian factions and forces, the Higher Committee of Clans and civil society institutions, in the presence of an observer representing the United Nations.
But this step came as the culmination of a series of moves Hamas has made with national and Islamic forces in the Gaza Strip over recent months to complete the administrative and governmental arrangements for transferring governance files to the National Committee for the Administration of the Gaza Strip, the “technocrats committee.” These steps included the formation of a national committee in the enclave made up of Palestinian factions and civil society institutions, tasked with addressing any problems that might arise during the transition.
All administrative files related to government affairs were also completed and placed before the mediators and the Peace Council representative during the Cairo negotiations.
This came amid the deadlock and paralysis that had gripped the file in the following months, and the technocrats committee’s failure to exert any real pressure, at a time when the contours and parameters of Mladenov’s moves were increasingly signaling that he was acting as an obstacle to the committee’s entry, in line with Israeli conditions.
Added to that is the current situation in the enclave, where Hamas remains, in the public sense, the ruler of Gaza, while the government body remains exposed to targeting and daily bombardment, preventing it from exercising an effective governmental role. This title has in turn become material for escalating the aggression and incitement against the enclave by the occupation government, making movement on this file a top priority for the Palestinian factions through stark steps.
Accordingly, the administrative announcement issued by the Government Media Office carries a clear and explicit political meaning: Gaza has not entered a phase of administrative vacuum, but its governmental scene has entered a phase of political vacuum, through a clear and explicit decision by Hamas that it no longer represents a political or administrative reference authority. On that basis, the committee that had managed the channel linking the movement’s leadership with the existing government body in the Gaza Strip was dissolved.
Multiple dimensions and a preemption of deeper dangers
The step taken by Hamas regarding government affairs came ahead of a new round of negotiations in the Egyptian capital, Cairo. Its timing therefore cannot be separated from the negotiating agenda, whose framework was set by the road map presented by Nikolay Mladenov as the executive track for moving to the second phase of US President Donald Trump’s plan.
That road map contains many dangerous headings and formulations that fundamentally undermine the Palestinian national need to move to advanced stages of the US plan, backed by a UN Security Council resolution, with the aim of fully and effectively stopping the genocide. Mladenov is centering and structuring the discussion around the issue of “disarmament” as the gateway to all solutions.
Accordingly, Hamas sought to recast the agenda of the negotiating meeting so as to restore priority to discussion of the administration of the Gaza Strip, begin executive steps to transfer responsibilities to the National Committee for the Administration of the enclave and halt the months-long stalling on this issue. It was keen to make its move public, unmistakable and entirely unambiguous, in order to force everyone back to this issue as a top priority.
This ordering of priorities was clearly understood by the relevant parties. The Israeli Broadcasting Authority reported an Israeli official as saying that dissolving the Hamas government was “media deception,” arguing that all movement officials were still in their positions and that the announcement carried no meaning or significance.
This was followed by a statement from Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar, who said that “Hamas’ maneuver aims to prevent its disarmament by making room for a technocratic government,” stressing that Tel Aviv insists on implementing Trump’s plan “to the letter, by disarming Hamas and the Gaza Strip.”
Saar said that “Hamas wants the technocrats committee to handle municipal services while it remains the military force,” adding that “the continued presence of Hamas’ weapons would cause the civilian government to act according to its dictates in order to continue the war against Israel.”
As for the Peace Council for Gaza, it said it had taken note of the announcement dissolving the emergency committee in the enclave, stressing that its assessment of developments is based on actions, not promises, as it put it.
The council stressed that the core principle in the coming phase is the existence of one authority and one weapon under the control of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, noting that the transfer of power must allow the committee to carry out its duties independently.
The council’s representative, Mladenov, said that today’s announcement in Gaza underscores the importance of successfully completing the road map negotiations, adding that the sooner an agreement is reached on the remaining implementation clauses, the sooner the Gaza administration committee will be able to assume its responsibilities.
Mladenov explained that accelerating an agreement would speed up the dismantling of weapons, the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the launch of the reconstruction process in the enclave.
These statements indicate that the main objective of Hamas’ move has been achieved, and that it was no longer possible to bypass the step, even if through an aggressive formulation like the Israeli position or an attempt to sidestep it like that of the Peace Council. The return of the discussion, however, represents a Palestinian achievement that the factions will try to carry to the negotiating table.
But behind all of this lies a larger and deeper danger that Hamas and the Palestinian factions sought to preempt: chiefly, the US effort to press ahead with Trump’s plan regardless of an understanding with the Palestinian forces, by moving to implement Clause 17 of Trump’s plan, which was drafted to deal with cases of disagreement with Hamas or its failure to fulfill its obligations under the agreement obligations now being reduced to the issue of weapons.
The clause stipulates that the Peace Council will begin reconstruction and relief operations in areas “free” of Palestinian resistance, “which the Israeli army hands over to the international stabilization force.” In practical terms, this would mean dividing the Gaza Strip into three zones. The first would be east of the yellow line and under the control of the Israeli army areas from which Benjamin Netanyahu and his war minister, Israel Katz, have publicly said there is no intention or direction to withdraw.
The second zone would be under the control of the Peace Council. In light of the Israeli Shin Bet’s rejection of any reconstruction process in the eastern areas near the border, the space available to the Peace Council for such a proposal would be concentrated in Rafah, meaning a return to the scenario of the “humanitarian city” that would turn into a vast prison paving the way for the displacement of the enclave’s residents.
The third zone, meanwhile, would be what remains — roughly 25 percent of the enclave’s area — crowded with hundreds of thousands of displaced people in catastrophic conditions, and it would be presented as areas under Hamas control. Hamas clearly estimated that this title was one of the issues raised during the discussions of the Peace Council held recently in Cyprus.
That makes preempting such a scenario an urgent necessity for the Palestinian forces, foremost among them Hamas, which understands that the Peace Council’s recent moves and Israel’s aggressive intentions are now converging on one point tied to declaring that the movement is not committed to the Trump agreement. That has made it necessary for Hamas to offer mobilizing approaches to prevent that, embodied for now in the move to issue the government announcement and affirm that it does not control any part of the enclave.
This step will most likely be followed by broader moves with the mediators to avoid the collapse of the agreement and reach logical and realistic approaches for getting through the four remaining months of the current Israeli governing coalition, during which Benjamin Netanyahu will devote all his energy to resuming the genocidal war.
