هذا التقرير متاح أيضًا بـ العربية

In recent days, Cairo has become a hub of intense political and security activity, underscoring Egypt’s strategic position in regional security and reinforcing its influence and relevance for policymakers and security analysts.

Against this backdrop, Cairo received CIA Director John Ratcliffe on 20 September, when he held talks with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi in the presence of the head of Egypt’s General Intelligence Service. The discussions addressed several regional issues, foremost among them developments in Yemen, the Houthi escalation and maritime security in the Red Sea.

The visit takes on particular significance given its timing, as regional tensions involving Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the US, and Iran threaten stability, which should alert policymakers and analysts to the gravity of the situation.

The Saudi crown prince’s visit to Cairo was also preceded by only a few hours of talks in Riyadh with US Central Command chief Adm. Brad Cooper, in a sequence of events reflecting intensive Saudi efforts to broaden regional and international coordination and explore more effective arrangements for dealing with the escalating Houthi threat and its security and strategic repercussions.

The overlap between Saudi and American moves involving Cairo — which cannot be viewed in isolation from one another — has raised broader questions about the nature of Egypt’s expected role in the coming phase. This is particularly the case as debate intensifies over the possibility of greater Egyptian involvement in confronting the Houthis, with some proposals going so far as to raise the prospect of direct Egyptian military intervention in Yemen.

Given the repercussions of the Houthi escalation for shipping, the Suez Canal and the economic interests tied to it, however, is betting on direct Egyptian military involvement in Yemen a realistic proposition in light of historical experience and the fundamentals of Egypt’s approach to the issue?

Riyadh and Washington’s calculations

Since the outbreak of the US-Iran war last February, Saudi Arabia has faced an exceptionally complex regional situation in which direct security threats intersect with economic and strategic risks. On the one hand, Riyadh faces challenges to its national security as a result of Houthi attacks. On the other hand, its economic and energy interests are under mounting pressure, particularly with the targeting of vital oil facilities and infrastructure linked to Aramco.

The picture becomes even more difficult for Riyadh with threats to, and disruptions of, the two most important maritime corridors linked to energy exports. The Strait of Hormuz is a key pressure point for Iranian influence, while Bab el-Mandeb constitutes an area of Houthi influence affecting shipping in the Red Sea. The security of energy exports therefore forms part of a broader security equation extending beyond Saudi Arabia’s borders.

For the United States, meanwhile, the priorities include protecting freedom of international navigation, securing energy flows and preserving the stability of supply chains in the Middle East. At the same time, Washington appears keen to avoid direct military involvement in Yemen. The New York Times reported that President Donald Trump rejected a Saudi request for US military involvement in Yemen even as he opened diplomatic channels with Riyadh through Muscat.

– كشف تقرير لصحيفة "نيويورك تايمز" أن الرئيس الأمريكي دونالد ترامب بقي مترددًا لإسبوعين إزاء طلب سعودي بضرب الحوثيين في اليمن بينما كانت الجماعة تحقق تقدمًا ميدانيًا سريعًا.

– غيّر ترامب موقفه عقب اتصال أجراه ولي العهد السعودي محمد بن سلمان بعدما أبلغ مستشاريه رفضه التدخل ووجّه… pic.twitter.com/Z1ONzNGghl

— نون بوست (@NoonPost) September 21, 2026

In light of these two approaches, Saudi Arabia needs a regional and international support network to prevent its confrontation with the Houthis from becoming a burden it bears alone. At the same time, Washington seeks an approach that can achieve its security objectives at the lowest possible cost through political pressure, intelligence support, and security arrangements, without sliding into an open-ended war.

Between Saudi and American calculations, Cairo emerges as a key venue for political and security consultations. On the one hand, it is a longstanding strategic ally of Washington; on the other, it is a close partner of Riyadh and occupies a geopolitical position that makes it central to the security of both the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Egypt’s oversight of the Suez Canal, a critical maritime route, underscores its vested interest in Red Sea stability and regional security, prompting questions about its potential roles in security coordination, diplomatic support, or navigation protection — without necessarily implying a shift toward military intervention.

The military option in Egypt’s approach

For many years, Egypt’s approach to Yemen has focused on preserving the Yemeni state’s unity and sovereignty, reflecting a responsible and strategic stance that should reassure regional security analysts and policymakers of Egypt’s measured role.

Accordingly, Cairo’s support for Yemeni state institutions and the internationally recognised government reflects its commitment to regional stability, raising questions about how Egypt might leverage this support to influence Yemen’s political process and regional security dynamics in the future.

From this standpoint, the Egyptian position tends to regard the political track as the most realistic option for ending the crisis, rather than relying on military solutions alone. Cairo is also keen to separate the political settlement inside Yemen from Red Sea security, because freedom of navigation along this vital corridor is a shared strategic interest that transcends the parties to the local conflict and should not become a pressure card or bargaining tool tied to the war’s balance.

However, this approach faces a more complex test in light of recent shifts in the regional environment. The repercussions of the Yemeni crisis are no longer confined to Yemen’s borders, but have extended directly to the security of the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, as well as to the interests of the countries most closely tied to this vital sphere, foremost among them Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

This raises questions about the nature of Egypt’s possible role in the coming phase, particularly in light of the intensifying political and security activity of Cairo’s allies in Riyadh and Washington. While Egypt’s role has historically relied on diplomatic and political tools, backed by security and intelligence coordination, rising threats raise the question of whether current developments could prompt a reassessment of those limits or lead to deeper involvement in the Yemeni scene, including the possibility of direct military intervention.

History has its say

The history of Egyptian military involvement in Yemen carries deeply difficult experiences. At different stages, intervention efforts encountered the complexities of Yemen’s geography, the entanglements of its tribal structure and the difficulty of translating military superiority into stable political outcomes. As a result, the Yemeni experience has remained embedded in Egypt’s collective memory, resurfacing whenever the prospect of renewed Egyptian military involvement in the country is debated.

These experiences did not begin with the Nasser era, as is often suggested, but extend much further back. During the reign of the Roman emperor Octavius (27 BC- AD 14), one of the earliest major attempts occurred when Aelius Gallus, the prefect of Egypt, led a Roman campaign toward the southern Arabian Peninsula. The campaign failed because of Yemen’s difficult terrain and harsh operational environment, which exhausted the participating forces.

But the experience of the 1960s remains the most prominent and influential in modern Egyptian calculations. Cairo intervened militarily after Yemen’s 1962 revolution to support the republican regime. As the operation dragged on, it developed into a prolonged war of attrition in which Egyptian forces confronted a complex environment and suffered heavy human and material losses. The repercussions of that attrition were subsequently reflected in the Egyptian army’s ability to confront its major strategic challenges, culminating in the June 1967 war.

Since then, the Yemeni experience has become one of the most prominent factors shaping the evolution of Egyptian military thinking, reinforcing the conviction that Egypt should avoid involvement in open-ended wars beyond its borders except where it serves clearly defined and limited objectives. As a result, Egyptian military doctrine has shifted toward prioritising direct national security, with greater emphasis on deterrence, security coordination, and limited special operations over prolonged conflicts with high costs and uncertain outcomes.

Is today’s Yemen different from the 1960s?

Some analyses argue that Yemen today differs significantly from Yemen in the 1960s, and that any potential Egyptian involvement at this stage would be informed by lessons from the past, reducing the likelihood of repeating the mistakes associated with the earlier experience. The different nature of the conflict, the evolution of the tools of warfare and the changing regional environment could all produce calculations different from those that governed the Egyptian intervention of the 1960s.

Yet this view runs up against the highly complex reality of Yemen, which appears no less difficult than it was in the past and may, in some respects, have become even more entangled. Yemen’s geography remains one of the greatest challenges for any external power, with its vast spaces, rugged mountainous terrain and multiple local centres of power — factors that make any ground intervention or attempt to impose military control extremely difficult and costly.

The nature of the Houthi movement adds another dimension to the equation. The Houthis are not a conventional regular army that can be defeated through superiority in armaments or control of military positions. Rather, they are an armed movement with extensive experience in irregular warfare and the ability to operate in a complex mountainous environment. They also possess missile and drone capabilities suited to the nature of the conflict, giving them means of exerting pressure that extend beyond what their conventional military size might suggest.

Nor can any potential military involvement in Yemen be separated from the broader regional dimension. Such a confrontation would not be viewed simply as a military operation against the Houthis. Still, it could become intertwined with a wider network of balances and conflicts involving Iran, Red Sea security and the protection of vital maritime corridors. Any Egyptian decision to engage directly would therefore depend not only on calculations on the Yemeni battlefield, but also on a broader assessment of its regional and strategic repercussions.

Have the threats changed Cairo’s calculations?

In light of these factors, direct Egyptian military involvement in Yemen appears, under current calculations, to be an extremely difficult course of action. That does not, however, mean it can be ruled out entirely. Some argue that an escalation in Houthi attacks on shipping and vital facilities in the region, and the implications for Egyptian and regional security, could prompt Cairo to reassess the level of its involvement if the threats exceed their current limits.

Egyptian calculations, however, are not based solely on the scale of the existing danger. They also turn on a more complex question: the likely consequences of any potential military intervention. The key consideration is not simply whether Egypt has the capacity to enter the conflict, but whether such intervention could reduce the level of threat — or whether it could instead develop into long-term involvement in an open-ended confrontation carrying high political, military and economic costs.

Amid current economic pressures, national security considerations, and the costs of protracted wars, Cairo appears more inclined to use alternative tools that can advance its objectives without entering confrontation. These include strengthening intelligence cooperation and information-sharing with regional and international partners, supporting Red Sea security, and deploying diplomatic and political tools made possible by Egypt’s relatively broad relations with the various actors involved in the crisis.

Accordingly, the case for direct Egyptian military involvement in Yemen at this stage does not fully align with established Egyptian calculations and the historical lessons drawn from previous experiences. Even so, ruling it out definitively would also be inaccurate. Cairo could reassess its position if the equation changes and the perceived cost of non-intervention exceeds the cost of involvement.

Ultimately, the central question facing the Egyptian decision-maker is not simply whether forces could be sent to Yemen, but what the political and military objective of such an intervention would be, what the timeframe for ending it would be, and how to ensure that the mission did not develop into a prolonged war of attrition that revives the bitter experience of the 1960s.